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Crops in India and its Implications for Transnational Activism 
Richard Bownas Ph.D 
Cornell University 2012 
This  dissertation  explores  in  detail  the  case  of  one  transnational  advocacy  network  (TAN).  The 
purpose of the case study is twofold:  firstly to propose a new category of advocacy network, which I 
term  ‘romantic’  and  contrast  this  category  with  other  kinds  of  activist/advocacy  network,  and 
secondly to contribute to the broader literature on TANs and critically assess the hopes some have 
had for bottom up transnational mobilization. The dissertation argues that a type of activist network 
has  developed,  across  various  issues  areas  and  various  locations  that  is  neither  a  bottom  up 
movement of the dispossessed and marginalized nor a facilitator of  the smooth functioning of 
global governance. Rather, what is seen in these ‘romantic activist networks’ is the growth of a 
transnationally oriented elite of professional activists, bound together, firstly by the imperatives of 
organizational growth through linkages with global media and donor groups, and secondly, by a 
‘world view’ that can broadly be characterized as ‘romantic’, that is a world view that emphasizes 
threats  to  an  imagined  harmonious  community,  outside  of  modern  institutions,  markets  and 
technologies. The dissertation takes the anti GMO network in India as exemplary of transnational 
romanticism,  showing  how  domestic  activists  have  forged  linkages  with  global  media  and  elite 
organizations around a narrative that emphasizes romantic themes about rural India and excludes 
‘modernist’ or ‘developmentalist’ alternatives. The network could be said to ‘select’ for certain types 
of activism, therefore altering the field of contention in rural India in ways that may not benefit the 
agriculturalists the network claims to represent. iii 
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 1 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
“The  global  countermovement  nurtures  a  paradigm  shift.  Transcending  the  politics  of 
“underdevelopment” it draws attention to the choice facing the world’s peoples: between a path of 
exclusion, monoculture, and corporate control or a path of inclusion, diversity, and democracy.” 
McMichael (2005: 589) 
“We have to come to terms, once and for all, with a society without human happiness and, of 
course, without  taste, without solidarity, without similarity of living conditions. It makes no sense to 
insist on these aspirations, to revitalize or to supplement the list by renewing old names such as civil 
society  or  community.  This  can  only  mean  dreaming  up  new  utopias  and  generating  new 
disappointments in the narrow span of political possibilities.” 
Luhmann (1997: 69) 
“Predicting general professionalization and institutionalization of social movements, then, implies 
that opportunities for genuinely new issues, groups, tactics, and targets will diminish.....closing out 
claimants who are not part of the social movement establishment” 
Tilly (2004: 156) 
 
The Purpose of this Dissertation 
This  dissertation  explores  in  detail  the  case  of  one  transnational  activist  network  (TAN)
1. The 
purpose of the case study is twofold:  firstly to propose a new category of activist network , which I 
term  ‘romantic’  and  contrast  this  category  with  other  kinds  of  activist/advocacy  network,  and 
secondly to contribute to a broader literature on ‘global civil society’, and this literature’s arguably 
over optimistic hopes for bottom up transnational contention.  
                                                           
1 I use generally use ‘activist’ in the dissertation although some scholars prefer ‘advocacy’. Since organizations 
in the network have sometimes engaged in mass rallies and run projects in villages as well as doing lobbying 
work, the more encompassing term ‘activist’ is used. 2 
In summary, this dissertation argues that a type of activist network has developed, across various 
issue areas and in various locations that is neither accurately described as a bottom up movement of 
the dispossessed and marginalized, as in the quote from McMichael above, nor as contributing to 
the smooth functioning of global governance, as in certain liberal accounts of global civil society 
(Smith  2008).    Rather,  what  is  seen  in  these  ‘romantic  activist  networks’  is  the  growth  of  a 
transnationally oriented elite of professional activists, bound together, firstly by the imperatives of 
organizational growth through linkages with global media and donor groups,  and secondly, by a 
‘world view’ that can broadly be characterized as ‘romantic’, that is a world view that emphasizes 
threats  to  an  imagined  harmonious  community,  outside  of  modern  institutions,  markets  and 
technologies. This dissertation places these two aspects (the functional linkages and the ideational 
attitude)  of  the  chosen  transnational  network  in  ironic  contrast.    While  appealing  to  romantic 
perspectives on rural life, with a long history dating back to colonial administration and prior social 
movements this network also demonstrates an organizational ‘will to expansion’ that includes new 
and old media, domestic political parties, markets for niche products, European INGOs and states, 
and  depends  on  professional  brokerage  activities  that  threaten  to  exclude  the  very  people  the 
network claims to represent.   
Herein lies the principle puzzle that this dissertation seeks to uncover: chapter two points to the 
various  ways  the  network  fails  to  represent  the  interests  of  those  it  claims  to  speak  for,  but 
nonetheless the network organizations endure and attract participants from older social movements 
as well as donor funding and media attention. This endurance has become particularly obvious and 
politically important as the network’s resources have geared up in the last two years to oppose Bt 
egg plant (brinjal) using similar arguments as utilised against Bt Cotton.  
To properly address this puzzle the dissertation aims to innovate a new methodology for studying 
transnational networks.  Where most studies have concentrated on ‘snapshots’ of activist networks, 
sometimes focusing on the grassroots, sometimes on the transnational ‘head’ of networks, and 3 
often focusing on just one or two organizations within a given network, the method taken here is to 
try and map the ‘ecology’ of a network in its entirety. The aim is not to assess the ‘success’ or 
‘failure’  of  the  network  according  to  its  own  stated  policy  objectives,  but  rather  to  produce  a 
sociologically  rich  analysis  of  the  network’s  context.  This  involves  asking  under  what  social 
conditions ‘romantic’ framings of issues are likely to thrive, and asking how older forms of social 
movement organization such as farmers’ movements and unions responded to new transnational 
opportunities. In the methodology section I summarize this approach as an ‘ecological’ perspective 
on activist networks – analyzing their strategies and linkages in the same way a biologist might study 
the strategies of and selective pressures on organisms within a rapidly changing ecology.  
The next section addresses existing literatures on transnational activism and global civil society, 
clarifying the ways this dissertation critiques and complements that literature. 
 
Studying  Transnational  Politics:  What  is  missing  in  the  paradigms  and  how  this  dissertation 
addresses the gaps 
The rise of transnational collective action has been described as “the most dramatic change we see 
in the world of contentious politics” (Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005: 6).The anti GMO network has 
been hailed as one important example of the sometimes nebulous concept of ‘global civil society’ 
(GCS).  This  is  not  the  place  for  an  extended  review  of  that  voluminous  and  somewhat  dated 
literature, but some key claims can be crystallized from strands of that literature, which can be 
broken down into (sometimes overlapping) ‘liberal’ and ‘radical’ varieties.  
Liberals GCS theorists, draw theoretically on a classical tradition dating back to Adam Smith and 
Tocqueville,  sometimes  incorporating  Habermas’  (1962)  more  recent  account  of  the  bourgeois 4 
public sphere in enlightenment Europe
2.  In the 1990’s this body of theory either concentrated on 
Eastern  European  opposition  to  communism  or  engaged  in  speculative  hopes  for  a  future  civil 
society - “the image of ourselves” (Keane 2003:1), on a global scale. 
While the seeming ‘return to realism’ following 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq proved difficult for GCS 
theorists to assimilate, Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) seminal work on TANs
3 offered a new outlet for 
GCS type theorizing, picturing a more concretely described global ‘space’ which is relatively free 
from the ‘distortions’ of political interference from the state, from market forces and from various 
‘traditional’  forms  of  discrimination  and  prejudice.  This  space  can  then  be  utilised  for  the 
amplification  of  unheard  voices  (the  ‘boomerang  effect’  as  Keck  and  Sikkink  term  it)  and  the 
dissemination  of  information  and  repertoires  of  contention.  In  this  strand  of  more  cautious, 
institutionalist theorizing some criteria for the democratization of global economics and politics are 
set out
4. Smith (2008: 129-30), representing this more cautious tradition, lists five elements of a 
democratic global civil society, summarized below: 
1.  A better flow of information from local to global, allowing for transparent debate 
2.  The empowerment of marginalized groups through transnational resources 
3.  Expanded capacities for communication allowing for greater accountability 
4.  The generation of global ideas of fairness 
5.  Increased  effectiveness  of  global  institutions  due  to  the  attention  paid  in  the 
transnational sphere 
When applied to the study of transnational activist networks this ‘liberal’ version  of global civil 
society emphasizes the ‘governance oriented’ aspects of these networks – their ability, as in Smith’s 
list  above,  to  improve  the  applicability  and  transparency  of  existing  norms  and  institutions. 
                                                           
2 Though obviously Habermas’ point in that book was that the public sphere had been ‘refeudalized’ in the era 
of mass media and industrial state-capitalism – an insight more in line with the argument of this dissertation. 
3 Albeit ignoring their cautionary advice (1998: 213) that the new transnationalism is actually a set of non 
determinate “interactions” and that aggregating those interactions into a global civil society is likely to be 
misleading. 
4 See Wapner (2003) for this type of argument applied to global environmental politics. 5 
Governance  oriented  activist  networks  work  in  partnership  with  international  governmental 
organizations, focusing on detailed policy questions with hard data, such as Amnesty International’s 
gathering of multiply reviewed data on torture and wrongful imprisonment (Foley 2008).  
‘Radical’ GCS theorists
5 are more heterogeneous, and although most would probably agree with 
Smith’s points 2 and 4 above they would certainly distance themselves from point 5. For these 
theorists the emphasis is not on the smooth functioning of global institutions but on the innovation 
of new forms of organization outside of ‘global governance’. A seminal essay in this tradition is 
Graeber (2002), where he argues for a ‘prefigurative politics’ embodied in the new activist networks 
(70): 
It is not opposed to organization. It is about creating new forms of organization. It is not 
lacking in ideology. Those new forms of organization are its ideology. It is about creating and 
enacting  horizontal  networks  instead  of  top-down  structures  like  states,  parties  or 
corporations;  networks  based  on  principles  of  decentralized,  non-hierarchical  consensus 
democracy. Ultimately, it aspires to be much more than that, because ultimately it aspires to 
reinvent daily life as a whole. 
 
In this fashion, scholars of radical GCS often turn what seems to be the weakness of GCS – the sheer 
diversity of interests involved and the loose networked nature of participation, into strengths; as 
Hardt (2002) argues (in deliberate opposition liberal versions of GCS), the new transnational  public 
sphere  will  not  be  a  fixed  or  institutionalized  place  but  rather  a  ‘multitude’  of  ‘nodes’  in  an 
‘expansive network’, rhizomatically emergent and without a hierarchical force (political parties, the 
UN or the state) stabilizing and normalizing them
6. Less exuberant scholars stress culture, cultural 
difference and the formation of new hybrid transnational identities as the focus of a new GCS. 
                                                           
5 Here I am omitting, for brevity’s sake, more traditionally Marxist or Polanyian versions of radical GCS theories 
such as Cox (1999 ) or Munck (2004, 2006), where a counter mobilization against the power of capital is 
modeled on the nineteenth century mobilizations of labor. As Graeber puts it (2002) such theories depend on 
battle being fought primarily in the economic field, whereas the radical theories we are considering here, 
argue that in current circumstances opposition will begin in the political or cultural spheres. 
6 Echoed in more mainstream accounts such as Oleson (2005), where the diversity of networks under the slogan 
‘One no, many yeses’ is taken as a strength. For the philosophical origins of this enthusiasm for rhizomatic 
networks in Deleuze and Spinoza see Sellars (2007). 6 
Gupta’s (1998) analysis of the KRRS and the global peasant identity discussed in chapter five and 
Borras’ (2008) account of Via Campesina would fall into this category, as would Reitan’s assertion 
(2007: 238-39) that the new GCS will place “cultural recognition”  and “identity solidarity” at the 
centre of its program. Reitan’s work is arguably exemplary here (as argued in the next section), and 
culminates in the claim that “global interpretive transformative frames” (235) may be able to bind 
together multiple identity and survival struggles  into a coherent global movement with a vision for 
what might lie beyond capitalism and the nation state. 
This radical version of GCS leads to an emphasis on transnational activist networks that work from 
the bottom up; these are grassroots activist networks, of which Mexico’s Zapatistas are often taken 
to be exemplary (Oleson 2005). 
 
Drawing on Existing Critiques to Specify a Further Type of Activist Network 
The literature described above points to the existence of  two types of transnational activist network 
– the governance oriented and the grassroots. But this dissertation proposes a third type, often 
overlooked in the literature, but whose characteristics have been mentioned  by several scholars. 
This third type is referred to under the label ‘romantic’. This new typology can be justified with the 
help of existing critiques of transnationalism. 
 As  the  opening  quotations  from  sociologists  Niklas  Luhmann  and  Charles  Tilly  show,  there  are 
doubts both about the political content and the institutional form that transnational activism takes. 
On content, Luhmann provocatively raises the question of the Utopian tone of global civil society 
activism, with the implication that demands framed in moralistic or romantic ways are ill adapted to 
engaging with the technically minded, functionally differentiated institutions of a globalizing world. 
Scholars such as Bob (2005), DeMars (2005), Brooks (2005), Chandler (2009) and Mamdani (2009), 
although coming from very diverse theoretical positions, add their voices to this type of  critique, 7 
questioning the tendency of the new transnational activism to reduce complex political situations to 
rigidly modular, even Manichean renderings of good versus evil, science versus nature, innocent 
versus guilty. 
 In terms of institutional form, Charles Tilly (2004: 121) warns about the  potential negative side 
effects of the internationalization of protest: organization at this level depends on an increasingly 
professional elite of highly educated, well resourced activists, who are often educated in the global 
north  or  focused  exclusively  on  discourse  emerging  from  northern  activists.  According  to  some 
scholars, a new class of individuals rises up devoted to brokering and marketing complex campaigns 
which  often  coalesce  around  ‘choke  points’  (Herring  2009)  where  international  governance  has 
reached a conflict point, around international summits, WTO meetings and World Social Forum 
events  (Smith  2004),  or  to  take  strategic  advantage  of  funding  opportunities  from  donor 
organizations, with their constantly shifting agendas (Cooley and Ron 2002; Bob 2005). In each case, 
professional skills become paramount for those wanting to participate in social movement activity to 
the detriment of the radical and populist claims social movements have made on the state (in 
Charles Tilly’s historiography) over the last two hundred years.
7  
These  twin  critiques  form  the  basis  of  the  conceptualization  here  of  new  types  of  ‘romantic 
activism’.  In  romantic  activist  networks  moralistic,  Manichean  and  nostalgic  framings  of  issues 
combine  with  professionalization  ‘away’  from  a  grassroots  base  –  with  the  lack  of  grassroots 
interaction  in  turn  allowing  further  romantic  framings  of  the  issues  .  In  addition,  unlike  in  the 
‘governance’  oriented  networks  described  above,  which  are  tied  closely  to  the  demands  of 
technocratic organizations or global legal norms, romantic networks are more promiscuous in their 
choice  of  institutional  partners,  choosing  especially  to  link  with  the  media  and  with  donor 
                                                           
7 Of course, one could argue that the ‘content’ critique is wrong even though the ‘institutional’ critique is right, 
and this has generally been the strategy of scholars who have criticised TANs from within the mainstream of 
the literature, for example Munck (2004; 2006). One contribution this dissertation aims to make is to show 
how the two critiques are interconnected: it is precisely the institutional dominance of romantically inclined 
elites in TAN activism that leads to the content of these movements tilting toward a romantic ‘modularity’.  8 
organizations that favour their romantic narratives and which do not require rigorous data checking 
of claims.  These categorizations are returned to at the end of chapter six, where more detailed lines 
are drawn between the three ‘types’ of TAN introduced in the dissertation. 
 
 
Anti GMO Activism in India as an exemplary case of global civil society and activist networks? 
 
The  case of  biotechnology  in  India  has  been  a  center-piece  in  several monographs  and  articles 
produced  by  scholars  defending  the  radical  potential  of  global  civil  society:  for  example  Reitan 
(2007: Ch 5); Featherstone (2008: Ch 7), Scoones (2003; 2008) and Schurman and Munroe (2006). 
These scholars use aspects of the anti-GMO  campaign to illustrate their key theme of global justice 
through transnational politics.  
 
Schurman and Munro’s recent monograph about anti GMO activism (2010) illustrates some of these 
key arguments, distilling in their discussion of the anti GMO network elements of both ‘grassroots’ 
and ‘governance oriented’ activism. For these authors the “inherently transnational” (xxiv) anti-GMO 
campaign achieved several crucial pro democratic goals: “wresting agricultural biotechnology into 
the public sphere”; “broadening the conversation *about GMOs+”; helping create a “multilateral 
regulatory regime” and “challenging the twin hegemonies of science and profitability” (xiii-xiv).  The 
network  can  therefore  be  seen  (in  liberal  terms)  as  a  paradigm  of  Smith’s  (2008)  “democratic 
globalizers”: balancing out the unfair dominance of global business networks through open and 
transparent debate and reforming international norms and institutions in ways  that make them 
more responsive to popular pressures. From a radical/grassroots perspective the network stands up 
to profit oriented corporations, aligning and framing itself alongside other anti corporate actors.  For 
Schurman  and  Munro  the  network  represents  an  example  of  how  new,  anti-establishment 9 
transnational  identities  emerge  as  a  result  of  transnational  ideational  labor  and  the  linking  of 
previously isolated intellectual domains.  
But what are the specific mechanisms proposed by which an activist network can become truly 
global and achieve the normative goals proposed by global civil society theorists?  Ruth Reitan’s 
(2007) account of the mechanisms by which TANs operate is used as a launching point to show how 
the GMO debate in India might be seen as an exemplary case of new transnational advocacy. Reitan 
is an impassioned advocate of grassroots global justice movements, but her account also includes 
aspects (on implementing biosafety norms for example) more applicable to the governance oriented 
types of activism.  Her account tells the following story: 
 
  Neoliberal  policies  incite  local  actors  to  organize  to  defend  their  communities  from  an 
assault by global market forces 
  After efforts at scaling up protest to the state and national levels ,locals decide to ‘go global’ 
to oppose neoliberal globalization at its source in the form of transnational corporations and 
international institutions. 
  Through diffusion processes local activists learn organizational techniques and discourses 
from their global partners 
  Through frame alignment processes, the new allies construct a common ground for fighting 
neoliberal  globalization  with  common  targets  of  grievance,  such  as  transnational 
corporations or international institutions. 
  Transnational  solidarity  develops  through  three  mechanisms:  through  northern  NGOs 
deeming  southern  partners  worthy  of  support;  through  identifying  with  each  others’ 
struggles against common targets and, most important and most hard to achieve, through 
the construction of new global identities such as ‘peasant’, ‘debtor’ or ‘worker threatened by 
neoliberalism’ 10 
  The above processes are examples of scale shift as the level of activism moves from the local 
to the national to the transnational arena, culminating in fora such as the World Social 
Forum. 
 
The  Indian  GMO  case  would  appear  at  first  glance  to  accord  well  with  these  ideal-typical 
characteristics proposed by Reitan: 
 
  The target of the movement has been a model of corporate (Monsanto) oriented agriculture 
that allegedly raises input costs on a group of small cotton farmers already under stress in an 
age of freer trade, reduced protection and the withdrawal of the state from the countryside 
(Bhargava 2003; Shiva et al 2004). 
  The other main target has been a state bureaucracy (federal and local) accused of complicity 
in the aims of corporations and laxity on regulation. 
  The  movement  seeks  to  establish  strict  regulation  or  preferably  abolition  of  this  new 
technology  to  prevent  the  degradation  of  environmental  standards,  the  exposure  of 
vulnerable people to risks and the long term risk of ‘monoculture’ (Kuruganti 2006) 
  The movement seeks an ‘alternative path’ of organic agriculture with low input costs and an 
emphasis on rebuilding local communities against the threats of social fragmentation, ‘de-
skilling’ (Stone 2005) and the commodification of rural life. 
Secondly, the mechanisms by which the movement has operated resonate with the literature on 
how local movements ‘scale up’ to transnational spheres of contention: 
  From the mid 1990’s the anti-GMO networks in India appear to have adopted discursive 
frames from European activists (biosafety, biodiversity) as well as particular tactics (burning 
trial crops of GMOs). 11 
  Processes of diffusion are apparent, in which broker organizations like Greenpeace help 
previously diverse local groups to ‘align’ frames and targets. 
  The anti-GMO movement takes on a ‘network’ form of mobilization, adept at utilizing the 
mass media and the internet to link up diverse constituencies around a single target. 
  A neoliberal network of corporations and sympathisers (in the form of farmers’ groups and 
market-libertarian lobbyists) appears to have sprung up at the same time to promote GMOs 
and oppose these ‘democratic globalizers’, in accord with Reitan’s schema. 
  New forms of solidarity are exemplified as northern groups based in Europe frame Indian 
activists  as  worthy  recipients  of  aid;  as  both  European  and  Indian  activists  construct 
common targets and aims and, arguably, as new forms of identity, for example the ‘global 
peasant farmer’ (Borras et al 2008), get constructed through the campaigns and through 
appearances at global fora. 
This dissertation aims to interrogate this understanding of the anti-GMO movement in India by 
providing a political sociology of the actors involved, deepening the scholarly understanding of TAN’s 
and specifying a type of romantic TAN that does not conform to the optimistic models of either 
grassroots  or  governance  oriented  activism.    The  next  section  highlights  the  main  critical 
contributions that the dissertation makes. 
 
Theoretical Contributions of the Dissertation 
Inevitably, the theoretical contributions described below have evolved from the case studied, so 
included with each is an overview of how field research has contributed to its formulation. While this 
may clash with the strictly positivist demand that theory and empirics be kept in isolation, this is 
how most scholarly literature on TANs proceeds. With only a few rich cases to work from, and with 12 
TANs from different issue areas involving the same kinds of actors and relations, the hope is that 
conclusions reached in one case will illuminate other cases.  
These contributions are the overriding themes of the dissertation which are explored in chapters 
two through six, with each chapter containing discussion relevant to all of them. As chapter six and 
the preceding discussion made clear, the arguments are aimed at one type of TAN, albeit one which 
may  be  ubiquitous  across  many  issues  areas  –  the  ‘romantic  TAN’.  Governance  oriented  and 
grassroots networks (to the extent that they actually exist) will have different logics, purposes and 
will be much less susceptible to some of the arguments made below. 
Contribution One: Many TANs, and in particular ‘romantic TANs’, frame issues in a modular fashion, 
with  causal  theories  about  harm  and  harmers  that  belie  social  complexity.    Claims  that  they 
represent a direct and organic response to neoliberal globalization are exaggerated.  
Contribution  Two:  Romantic  TANs  tend  to  reinforce,  through  their  modular  framing  of  events, 
certain ‘world views’ and ‘silence’ others that fit poorly with those modular claims. They do so via 
the material and ideational resources they bring to the social fields they enter.  In other words we 
need to add the following questions to the insights of Snow and Benford (1988) and Tarrow (1992) 
who argue that activist frames must resonate with the social and cultural beliefs of their ‘clients’:  
Which clients? Which beliefs? Who benefits? 
 Contribution  Three:  The  scholarly  literature  on  frame  alignment  and  diffusion  of  frames 
underestimates the degree to which southern elite activists are strategic transnational thinkers able 
to take advantage of resources from the transnational sphere and shape that sphere intellectually 
before northern activists and donors ‘reach out’ to them. A corollary of this process is that southern  
activists may divert their efforts from building organizations or support at the national or regional 
grassroots level into transnational networking activities. 13 
Contribution  Four:  Though  activists  in  transnational  networks  may  well  be  driven  by  strong 
principled  commitments  they  are  also  part  of  functional  networks,  in  which  the  NGOs  and 
movements  they  build  serve  functions  for  other  organizations  to  which  they  are  coupled.  For 
example NGOs with claims to grassroots authenticity become crucial sources for both newspapers in 
India  and  for  international  donor  organizations.  Such  ‘structural  couplings’  and  the  professional 
brokerage  that  accompanies  them  can  explain  why  networks  survive  and  prosper  even  in  the 
absence of their ‘truth’ claims being validated. 
In what follows I try to explain my reasons for making these four key claims, drawing on the relevant 
literature and pointing out how my empirical chapters address each claim. 
 
1.   Modular Transnationalism 
By ‘modularity’ I mean a mode of addressing issues and framing grievance that can be replicated in 
diverse  contexts  according  to  an  implicit  or  explicit  grammar  of  causal  and  moral  claims.  The 
concept of modularity in social science has a rich history, which we can trace back to Anderson’s 
(1991) account of the spread of a modular template for nationalism through a burgeoning print 
media, and then to Tarrow’s (1998: 37-41) use of modularity to describe the capacity of modern 
social movements to replicate certain repertoires of contentious action. However, my use of the 
term here, in contrast to Tarrow’s,  refers more to the implicit grammar or ‘master narrative’ of a 
movement’s claims, its manner of parsing issues  into villains and victims for example, rather than  to 
the diffusion of tactics. In other words, modularity pertains as much to the content of TAN claims as 
to the diffusion of tactical repertories. 
Highlighting the role of these modular claims is intended as a challenge to the radical/Polanyian 
argument
8 that TANs associated with the anti-neoliberal globalization movement are spontaneous 
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popular responses to market forces.  The causal argument in this tradition (Reitan 2007; Evans 2008; 
Juris 2008; Smith 2008) runs from global market forces threatening communal life to a ‘survival’ 
response  launched  with  the  aid  of  TANs.  However,  this  case  study  argues  that  rather  than 
representing  a  spontaneous  survival  response,  TANs  are  social  actors  that  categorize  suffering 
according to a limited repertoire or ‘grammar’ of options – a grammar that arguably pre existed the 
current period of globalization. Such an argument can help answer Tarrow’s (2002: 242) pointed 
question: 
If the attribution of the threat of global inequity were sufficient to explain transnational 
action, we ought to find that equally threatened actors across the globe organize equally 
effectively against the institutions that govern the global economy. But they do not. Why 
not? 
Volker  Heins  (2005:  117)  provides  a  useful  table,  in  an  attempt  to  summarize  a  hypothesized 
modular repertoire for activists.  The table is intended to describe the modular logic of advocacy 
NGOs in general, but, as Heins himself has suggested
9, his arguments are especially pertinent to 
transnational advocacy groups, which rely on easily transposable modalities of issue framing: 
Table 1.1. Heins’ classification of TAN categories. 
Harmers  Victims  Acts  Conventions 
The state, war 
Business 
Humans, animals,  
Minorities 
Killing, torturing, neglecting 
Stigmatizing 
Prohibit 
Regulate 
 
Heins’ argument about modular framing of issues can be combined with contributions from Bob 
(2005)  and  De  Mars  (2005)
10. All three of these scholars, though coming from very different 
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10 These are book length studies: articles which support this strand of argument include Brooks (2005) on the 
Bangladesh garment industry controversy where an over emphasis on childhood innocence in the campaign 
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theoretical traditions, try to describe the limited repertoire of moves that transnational activists 
make.  All three come to conclusions similar to the above table, while examining cases as diverse as 
Shell Oil in Nigeria and the Zapatistas in Mexico (Bob) to the Victorian anti slavery movement and 
northern humanitarian interventions in Africa (De Mars).  
For  Bob,  (30-32)  transnational  alliances  have  to  have  single  culprits  to  target,  preferably  with 
international resonance; a Manichean moral argument; an emphasis on clear cut bodily harms and 
the promise of achieving ‘global public goods’. For DeMars, the modular nature of transnational 
activism centers on its theories of causality, in particular (9) a claim of “circumscribed causality” 
which makes an issue “autonomous from the contingencies of the local political and social context”. 
In response to these limited causal claims, “magic bullet solutions” are proposed by NGOs along with 
claims to be representing global norms in applying these magic bullet solutions.  
According to DeMars, these delimited causal claims seem more plausible to the extent that the 
victims of harm are portrayed as innocents, usually exposed to unwelcome global market intrusions.  
In other words, this process  involves an element of cultural construction, as the identities of the 
supposed victims are depicted in such a way as to make the causal claims cohere;  those threatened 
are depicted as innocent, pre-modern victims of processes outside their control, rather than, say, 
active manipulators of global connections. So the modularity to be addressed in this dissertation 
involves both causal claims and identity claims about the types of people who are harmed.  
Revealingly, both Reitan (2007) and Schurman and Munro (2010) display these tendencies toward 
modular content in their own favorable accounts of TANs. Reitan, for example (256) points out, 
rightly,  that  “the  identity  of  “peasant”  has  proved  tenaciously  resonant......in  forging  strong 
solidarity bonds in a way that “trade unionist” and much less “worker” as of late has not”.  But she 
does not subject this to any critical analysis, let alone question whether the ‘peasant’ category has 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Widener (2007), who argues that the transnationalization of community – oil company disputes in Ecuador 
made negotiated settlements between the two sides harder to achieve.  16 
much meaning for those it is meant to represent in say, rural India (as Gupta (2000; 2004; 2009) and 
others have forcefully argued is not the case)
11. Schurman and Munro also seem to be unaware of a 
contradiction between global civil society as a transparent forum for alternative ideas and the deep 
modularity of the claims that emerge from TAN activism. Within a few pages, for example, they try 
to claim that activism has opened up new possibilities and understandings, so that GMOs are to be 
seen just as “one strategy among several” (187) but they also praise the capacity of the network to 
frame GMOs according to a strict binary/Manichean opposition between GMOs and ‘not’ GMOs 
(185): 
The binary opposition between GMO and non-GMO had a classificatory effect that allowed 
activists  to  present  genetic  engineering  as  an  inherently  [their  emphasis]  unacceptable 
approach to the social and technical challenges of agricultural productivity 
And while they claim that in the global South anti corporate framings were more prominent than 
bio-safety  concerns,  they  nevertheless  claim  as  a  ‘success’  story  (186)  the  maintenance  of  the 
conceptual boundaries between rigid categories. This kind of contradiction in the argument belies 
their attempt to see the ‘lifeworld’ of activists in a purely cognitive way, as the product of open 
debate  and  shared  ideas  in  an  ideal  public  sphere.  Rather,  it  suggests  that  ‘success’  in  GCS 
campaigns may rely on conforming to content modularities that are prefabricated,  unspoken and 
pervasive. If this is true then it represents a more serious challenge to both the liberal and radical 
versions of global civil society described abobve than merely unevenness in access to transnational 
gatekeepers. In fact an analogy with the fate of ‘reality television’ and its reception might be to the 
point here: while early media commentators were keen to make the case for the democratizing 
aspects of reality television in the late 1990’s, arguing that this was the first time lower income 
participants had real, unmediated agency on television screens, it soon became clear that the action 
on “reality” television follows strictly modular forms – effectively ‘scripted’, even if unconsciously by 
the participants, who are keen to ‘couple’ with the expectations of the medium in order to gain fame 
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and fortune. Ironically of course, these self-produced stereotypes are far more rigid and patronising 
than portrayals in ‘elite’ dramas of twenty years previously. 
 Of course, modular political organizing is the very stuff of modern politics (Anderson 1991) and 
claims of ‘circumscribed causality’ are hardly new for social movements trying to summon popular 
support, so this claim needs some specification. Can we construct criteria or test through empirical 
research what counts as ‘good modularity’ as opposed to bad
12? 
The case study in this dissertation cannot hope to prove such broad evaluative claims, but there are 
ways to show that the modular logic of transnationally oriented groups opposing GM crops may fail 
to represent their supposed clients or reflect the complexity of the issues involved and that this 
narrowness has pernicious consequences. In making this case, the dissertation is not just engaging in 
external critique, but draws on the views of those interviewed for field research, including scientists, 
journalists and farmers’ leaders immersed in the issues on a daily basis. The aim is to show how  
‘famers’ distress’, ‘farmer suicide’, ‘rural crisis’ and ‘impacts of globalization’ may be real, but that 
attempts to link these phenomena with GM crops in a narrative influenced by modular conceptions  
fall short.  
This approach draws on, but also contrasts with the work of political scientists such as Herring (2005) 
and Paarlberg (2008), who tend to frame the politics of GM crops as ‘science versus vested interests’ 
or  even  ‘science  versus  irrationality’.    Rather  than  take  the  views  of  biotechnologists  and 
agronomists as a base line against which to judge the accuracy of the particular claims of anti GMO 
activists,  this  dissertation aims  to  illustrate  the  range  of  opinions  about  the  causes  of  farmers’ 
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distress in India
13 and contrast this spectrum of views with the circumscribed arguments of the anti-
GMO network.  There are many ‘paths not taken’ on the politics of biotechnology and one aim of 
this dissertation is to show how transnationalism may create new opportunities for protest but also 
biases the field against alternatives that do not fall into a ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ perspective, and perhaps 
even forces the spectrum of opinion into Manichean alternatives
14.  
 
2.  Specifying the modularity of TAN claims: Romantic TANs 
If the kind of TAN studied in this dissertation tends to frame issues via a modular discourse, this 
discourse may benefit some actors over others or be taken up by actors and groups whose views 
resonate  with  the  ‘circumscribed  causality’  championed  through  the  TAN.  This  is  the  point  of 
departure for this part of the argument of the dissertation and from the point of view of disciplinary 
boundaries is where a scholarly focus on the mechanisms internal to TANs typical of the existing 
literature can be brought into dialog with an historical survey of rural politics in India . 
Clifford Bob provides a methodological model for this section. Bob makes this type of argument both 
diachronically  (with  actors  changing  their  views  to  match  the  TAN  ‘grammar’  over  time)  and 
synchronically (with actors being ignored or championed depending on whether they match the TAN 
‘grammar’ at a particular time). In the former case, for example, activist Ken Saro Wiwa learned how 
to champion the Ogoni cause in Nigeria via “romantic notions” of ethnic primordiality (Bob 2005: 89)  
in order to attract international donor support for their cause. In the latter case, (Bob 2005: Ch 4 
passim) the non media savvy EPR guerrilla force in Mexico, making less ‘marketable’ class based 
demands,  fell  under  the  radar  of  transnational  attention  while  the  EZLN  (better  known  as  the 
Zapatistas)  flourished  in  the  transnational  limelight  as  defenders  (according  to  Bob)  of  a 
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14 For this insight I have to thank my attendance at a conference on the economics and politics of GM crops, at 
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romanticized indigenous identity, in particular after their political project for institutional inclusion in 
the Mexican state had failed. 
In applying this approach to the Indian anti-GMO case (primarily in chapters four and five) the 
dissertation first lays out the ideological and organizational terrain of activists, NGOs and farmers’ 
groups that have an opinion on the introduction of GM crops into India.   Following the methodology 
of Weberian ‘ideal types’ (see methodology section) two broad groups are constructed as below:  
  Romantic ruralists: committed to a quasi-Gandhian, or ‘Gandhian socialist’ vision of Indian 
agriculture
15, in which villages opt out of producing for global markets, or at least obtain 
crucial inputs (seeds, fertilizers, etc) from cooperative and preferably organic sources.  They 
have tended, in the words of one scholar interviewed
16, to concentrate fire on individual 
capitalists rather than the structural or administrative problems associated with particular 
types of capitalism, such as the current withdrawal of the state from providing services to 
farmers. Their prescriptions focus on new technologies as essentially disruptiv e to settled 
ways of life.
17  The Indian activists and scholars associated with this ideological strand have 
been writing about this vision for many decades as part of a project that was always 
transnational, both influencing and being influenced by Japan, Europe and the United States. 
Romantic ruralists rarely have a constituency at the local level whom they represent 
politically. They are mainly, and perhaps ironically, an urban based group, with strong 
transnational ties, who operate through intellectual influence, writing of reports, the control 
of NGOs and easy access to the media. The exemplary romantic ruralist in India would be 
Vandana Shiva, a key player in the anti-GMO movement. 
                                                           
15 For the deep historical routes of this vision of autonomous village life in both colonialist and anti-colonialist 
discourse see  Inden (1990), Metcalf (1994) and Jodhka (2007), all discussed further in chapter four 
16 Prof Assadi (Interview number 77) 
17 I use Jones’ (2006) history of Luddism and neo-Luddism in chapter four to put Indian rural romanticism in 
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  Modernists  (or  Materialists):  by  ‘modernist’  are  meant  those  activists  who  have 
campaigned on mainly economic grounds, for the interests of a particular group or coalition 
of rural people. The exemplary  movement of this kind would be the Shetkari Sanghatana 
(‘Cultivators’ Association’) of Maharashtra, which began its agitations in the early 1980s over 
the price of onions, and enlarged its focus to condemn more broadly what its leaders felt to 
be the parasitic role of urban India in relation to rural agriculturalists
18. The demand for ‘fair 
price’ or ‘scientific price’ for produce and for a reduction in heavy handed regulation of 
where and when  farmers could sell produce was echoed in other farmers’ movements such 
as the KRRS (Karnataka Peasants and Farmers’ Association) of Karnataka. In this dissertation 
I take these forms of bottom up populism demanding more inclusive institutions or markets 
to  be  a  different  category  of  politics  than  the  elite,  romantic  strain  described  above
19. 
Modernist mass movements tend to be organizationally distinct from romantic on es: they 
have a leadership which is engaged on a regular basis in ‘give and take’ interactions with 
that base, and they rely on a mixture of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ forms of mobilization (as 
opposed  to  post-modern  or  networked  forms),  whether  Gandhian  civil  disobedience, 
sabotage, mass rallies and in some cases violence. ‘Modernist’ politics today also takes a 
more technocratic form, as argued in chapter two, where various modernist suggestions for 
reforming agriculture from Indian academics and farmers’ leaders are contrasted with the 
romantic world view. 
 
For the purposes of the dissertation the tension between romantic and modernist ways of framing 
rural politics is essential and is dealt with at length explicitly or implicitly in chapters two, four, five 
and six. 
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Having formulated these ideal types of organization the dissertation addresses the question of what 
happens when they come into contact with the political opportunities and resources offered by 
TANs and their gatekeeper organizations. It asks the questions: which of these pre existing groups 
and organizations fit best with the circumscribed, modular discourse of the TAN against GM crops, 
and which find themselves to be an awkward fit?  Those that fit are able to make use of the material 
and cultural resources of TANs to reinforce their view of the world at the expense of others. They 
adopt  the  particular  discourse  about  GM  crops  as  exemplary  of  their  broader  ideological 
perspectives.  Metaphorically  one  could  say  that  romantic  TANs  represent  a  filter  for  domestic 
groups: they siphon out discourse which does not resonate with transnational requirements and act 
as an ‘invisible’ influence on the choices domestic activists make.
20 
One of the key empirical supports for this argument come from a pair wise comparison of farmers 
organizations in Maharashtra and Karnataka in chapter five. It is apparent that the leadership of the 
KRRS  in  Karnataka  was  predisposed  toward  largely  symbolic  campaigns  targeting  transnational 
capital,  even  as  far  back  as  the  mid  1980s  (Assadi  1997),  whereas  the  Shetkari  Sanghatana  of 
Maharashtra  followed  a  more  strictly  modernist/materialist  line  in  the  1980s,  making  it  less 
susceptible to joining forces with the TANs that emerged in the 1990s, although some individual 
activists in the Sanghatana broke ranks to join the anti GMO networks (as described in chapter five).  
While Clifford Bob finds evidence of pre existing groups changing their ideologies, or at least their 
points of emphasis, to attract TAN support (the diachronic story), this case study, as the pair wise 
comparison described above makes clear, concentrates mainly on the synchronic side of the story: in 
other words, out of the wide range of groups active on agricultural politics, why did only some of 
those groups get closely involved with the TAN against GM crops? However there is also evidence of 
                                                           
20 Though an alternative hypothesis to be debated in the dissertation is that materialist / populist groups were 
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activists shaping their world views over time (diachronically) in order to make themselves amenable 
to TANs, as argued in chapter six -  for example poorly resourced, leftist farmers’ unions in Andhra 
Pradesh appropriated the ‘romantic’ critique of GMOs and Monsanto from local NGOs, arguably at 
the expense of more ‘modernist’ alternative policy positions concerned with price and distribution 
of seeds. 
The theoretical aim of this aspect of the dissertation is to add flesh to the bones of the oft stated 
idea (initially Snow and Benford 1988) that social movement framing needs to resonate with pre 
existing cultural beliefs and discourses.  While this is clearly (perhaps too obviously) true, scholars 
should also be asking  about the distributional and class  consequences of activist framing: it might 
be that groups whose political themes are eclectic, too local in resonance, or out of keeping with the 
circumscribed causality of the new romantic TANs will fail to obtain resources  for mobilization. If so, 
that is an important qualification to enthusiasm about the promise of ‘global civil society’. 
 
3.   Southern actors in the global imaginary 
This theme of the dissertation expands on the ideas of Schurman and Munro (2006 and 2010), who 
address the role of thinking and thinkers in the pre mobilization phase of social movement activism. 
While  they  rightly  remind  us  of  the  importance  of  intellectual  resources,  they  emphasize  the 
northern part of the story in their own account of the anti-biotechnology movement. 
In contrast, this dissertation describes the complex history of transnational engagement in which key 
players in the anti-GMO movement in India have been involved. For activists like Vandana Shiva and 
the late Professor Nanjundaswamy of the KRRS, the anti-GMO struggle was a battle in a larger war 
for which they devised many of the tactics. From the late 1970s these figures, and others, played an 
important role in creating a tableau of southern farmers, hostile to transnational capitalists and 
fighting for a return to traditional forms of agriculture.  While much of the technical discourse about 23 
biotechnology and biosafety  emerges from the north, in particular from activists like Jeremy Rifkin 
in the USA in the 1980s, it was the ideological construction of a ‘global anti capitalist peasantry’ that 
proved resonant in the ‘global protest imaginary’. The ability to link to this transnational imagined 
identity is one reason why the anti GMO movement has lasted so long, despite the rapid uptake of 
GM crops in the global South.  This construction was the work of mainly southern actors and is 
described in more detail in chapters four and five. 
Figures  like  Prof.  Nanjundaswamy  and  Vandana  Shiva  could  be  termed  ‘strategic    transnational  
thinkers’ to show how they are anything but passive beneficiaries of transnational resources. In fact, 
the European part of the anti-GMO network needed the input of activists such as these, as much as 
they needed  northern resources. Information gleaned from networks in India has been a crucial 
resource for these European groups in their campaigns, in an organizational coupling described in 
chapter  three.    In  this  regard,  the  Indian  case  differs  somewhat  from  Clifford  Bob’s  picture  of 
northern activists ‘fishing’ for southern clients and might help illuminate similar cases of northern 
and southern actors coming together, where southern (elite) actors are just as much co-creators of  
transnational frames as their northern allies. 
 
4.  The ‘functional’ face of TANs and their work of brokerage 
This contribution addresses a large body of scholarship concerned with the organizational impact of 
NGOs and TANs on activists from the south.  In the words of Indian sociologist D.N.Dhanagare
21 
there seems to be a trend toward an “NGO-ization of social movements and a projectization of 
NGOs”.  This process of professionalization
22 changes the nature of activism. But is this a positive 
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22 The need for higher education qualifications to work for an NGO, the universal requirement for fluent 
English skills to network with donors and a background either in science or public relations, typical of NGOs 
working in this area.  24 
development for southern activists who now have access to new resources or does it bring with it 
unwelcome changes in the domestic political scene in the global south? 
To help answer this question Volker Heins suggests the illuminating metaphor of “benign parasitism” 
(Heins  2008: 38).   Heins argues that NGOs are “active intermediaries” (39), subtly or not so subtly 
altering  the  behaviour  of  their  ‘hosts’,  who  could  be  individual  activists,  pre-existing  social 
movements or government agencies. Heins intends to move the debate on NGOs and TANs away 
from  normative  arguments  that  either  portray  NGOs  as  right  wing  agents  of  neo-colonialism, 
depoliticizing potentially radical movements in the south (Petras 1999) or as bearers of a civilizing 
mission and catalysts of global civil society (Wapner 2002).   
The case study in this dissertation can add empirical detail to the ‘parasitism’ / ‘symbiosis’ concept 
by examining how new interests are created by the existence of TANs, and can also help explain the 
puzzle of why TANs persist, even when, as in the anti-GMO case, the battle over a particular issue 
seems to be lost on the ground (as farmers universally opt to buy Bt Cotton seeds).  
Symbiosis  takes  place  when  resource  rich  NGOs  that  are  part  of  the  activist  network  attach 
themselves, through professional brokerage activities, to other sources of power, or other social 
systems in mutually advantageous arrangements. Below are some of these symbiotic relationships: 
  With  government  ministries  that  use  NGO  information  and  arguments  in  international 
negotiations over patent regimes and biosafety policy. (Menski  2005) 
  With the EU and European NGOs, who see India as a vital battleground in the debate over 
biosafety regimes and the global future of GM crops. 
  With Indian state governments that see NGOs as a useful means to be ‘seen to be doing 
something’ about organic agriculture or rural crisis more generally, as well as sources of 
information about the activities of the central government and TNC’s, about which they are 
often unaware. 25 
  With European and North American retail and fashion companies, to supply organic cotton 
from farms not using GMOs.  
  With  the  Indian  and  transnational  media,  looking  for  dramatic  stories  of  corporate 
malfeasance and rural suicide and suffering, with easily identifiable causes. 
  With Communist party affiliated unions, looking for data to back them up in local disputes 
with seed dealers. 
 
Along with these symbiotic linkages TANs helps shape the domestic political scene spatially, in terms 
of the ‘elongation’ of the network of NGOs, farmers’ groups and rural activists that it mobilizes. The 
‘levels’
23 involved are roughly as set out below: 
  Metropolitan : the ‘elite’ professional NGOs mostly based in Delhi and communicating with 
the central government, international organizations and elite media 
  Nodal:  including  gatekeeper  NGOs  like  Greenpeace    and  transnationally  well  connected 
NGOs  in  large  cities  such  as  Bangalore  and  Hyderabad,  communicating  with  national  / 
international media and acting as broker agencies deciding which lower level groups with 
which to affiliate or fund 
  Regional: Project oriented NGOs based in cities or smaller towns, coordinating with nodal 
and metropolitan groups and doing both agricultural projects and advocacy work 
  Grassroots:  activists  working  part  time  for  NGOs  and  keen  to  become  professionally 
involved. 
Campaigns such as the anti-GMO coalition add differentiation to these levels, bringing resources in 
the form of international funding, which are in practice fungible and can be used for projects or for 
campaigns focused on biotechnology or advocating for organic crops. However, such differentiation 
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through  new  resources  also  threatens  to  exclude  groups  at  the  lowest  levels  –  for  example 
traditional (as opposed to elite) Gandhians have had little or no role in the anti-GMO campaign, even 
though they oppose the technology and speak with frustration of the professionalization of NGO 
activity and the way this excludes long term commitments at the village level. Resources also shape  
the career trajectories of people involved in rural politics, as they seek to ‘upgrade’ to those levels 
most integrated into transnational networks.  
These  processes  comprise  ‘elongation’,  in  which  the  relative  prestige  and  resources  of 
transnationally connected activists and groups increase relative to those not so well connected. This 
process is familiar from the copious literature on NGOs in domestic politics but less often addressed 
by scholars of TANs. 
This  section  of  the  dissertation,  including  chapters  three,  five  and  six  includes  case  studies  of 
individual activists to try and illustrate these processes. Interviewees include mid level leaders in 
farmers groups such as the KRRS and Shetkari Sanghatana; a school teacher with aspirations to work 
for  a  regional  NGO  in  Andhra  Pradesh;  a  journalist  working  for  a  regional  English  language 
newspaper; a leader of a relatively weak agricultural union in Andhra Pradesh; an academic asked to 
write a research report on behalf of an INGO  and a European academic asked to audit an NGO 
involved in the TAN. These case studies illustrate various important mechanisms by which TANs 
change the patterns of incentives and aspirations of individuals working on agricultural issues, for 
example: 
  Emulation  mechanisms:  by  which  successful  activists  such  as  Vandana  Shiva  and  Prof. 
Nanjundaswamy become role models for mid level activists who aspire to their level of 
transnational  linkage  and  media  renown.    This  influences  choices  of  career  path  and 
affiliation,  with  transnationally  affiliated  groups  being  seen  as  offering  access  to  better 
career opportunities 27 
  Epistemological mechanisms: by which certain types of information (those concerned with 
TAN issue areas) get transmitted to ‘higher’ levels and to national and international media 
because  they  are  deemed  more  newsworthy  whereas  reports  that  do  not  fit  the 
transnational frame, get ignored. For example, a report which sets out the multiple local 
causes of farmer suicide never gets published by Oxfam, whereas information that is framed 
in terms of ‘agriculture and globalization’ gets disseminated to the media through INGOs.  
 
The overall aim of this section is to add flesh to the bones of rationalist critiques of NGOs such as 
that of Cooley and Ron (2002), who make a strong case in the abstract for seeing NGOs and TANs as 
self-interested actors, but without explaining the social mechanisms by which they square normative 
commitment with organizational self-interest.   
 
This analysis of the work of brokerage also feeds back into the critique of TAN romanticism – as 
argued in chapter six. Romantic TANs, more so than governance oriented or grassroots TANs, tend to 
broker relationships with multiple elite organizations in a kind of ‘tree with upside down roots’ 
pattern. Unbound by either a strong grassroots base or a close functional relationship with a global 
governance  institution,  romantic  TANs  are  ‘mesomobilizers’  (Steinberg  1998),  focusing  their 
brokerage on the media, donors, and global niche markets.  Chapter six explores further  the class 
implications of this upside down model. 
 
Why the Politics of Biotechnology?  
The politics of biotechnology is important in its own right and can  be seen as a harbinger of a 
twenty-first  century  politics  about  nature,  the  environment  and  corporate  power.  The  study  of 
biotechnology politics lies at the intersection of important scholarly and activist debates. These 28 
debates will be examined throughout the dissertation, through the lens of this particular case study 
of activism. 
 
From the  perspective of political  economy,  development  sociologists  such  as  Lipton (2007)  and 
political scientists such as Paarlberg (2008) argue that biotechnology could be a transformative and 
beneficial force in the developing world, especially if states are able to harness technologies best 
suited to poor farmers. For Lipton, the key political battle is not ‘for or against’ biotechnology, but 
finding ways to promote technologies that would have pro-poor potential, such as drought resistant 
crops. For Paarlberg transnational activism represents one of the crucial barriers to accessing this 
pro poor potential.   
 
For  environmental  scholars  and  activists,  biotechnology  and  GMO’s  have  also  become  a  crucial 
arena  for  debate  about  the  future  of  ecological  thinking.  In  particular,  a  new  type  of  ‘eco-
pragmatism’ (Brand, 2009) has taken up the cause of biotechnology as a potentially ‘green’ weapon 
in  the  battle  against  global  warming  and  excessive  pesticide  and  fertilizer  use.  This  pragmatic 
outlook  is  in  sharp  contrast  to  more  ‘romantic’  forms  of  ecological  thought  hostile  to  most 
biotechnology  and  exemplified  in  the  writings  of  Vandana  Shiva  or  the  activists  described  by 
Schurman  and  Munro  (2003;  2010)  for  whom  biotechnology  represents  an  uncontrollable  and 
threatening incursion on nature. 
 
For  scholars  concerned  with  new  agrarian  and  ‘peasant’  movements  such  as  Edelman  (2005), 
McMichael (2007) and Borras (2008) opposition to corporate biotechnology is one of and  symbolic 
of threats to food sovereignty and small-scale, ‘sustainable’ farming. For these writers campaigns 
against  biotechnology  exemplify  an  important  backlash  against  agricultural  corporate  capitalism 
(Kloppenberg 2004). Biotechnology signifies larger processes and is distinguished from the positive 
alternatives of ‘real food’ (Bove and Dufour 2002) and organic agriculture. 29 
 
Finally, from the perspective of international relations theory (Drezner 2007; Pollack and Shaffer 
2009)  biotechnology  and  GMOs  represent  an  exemplary  case  of  failed  cooperation  within 
international  regimes.   As  these  authors  show, this  failure occurs  precisely where transnational 
activists find a niche in which to operate, often as proxies for groups of states such as the European 
Union.  Here, Herring’s (2009) conceptualization of ‘choke points’ and Tarrow’s metaphor of ‘coral 
reefs’  (2005:  27)  suggest  that  episodes  of  transnational  contention  are  likely  to  emerge  where 
international politics provides the fuel, in the form of disputed norms, conflictual summit meetings, 
covert lobbying via the non governmental sector and intense media interest.  Biotechnology, with its 
complex overlapping and competing regulatory regimes (USA versus Europe) is a paradigm for this 
kind of new politics. 
 
 
Methodological Considerations 
This  section  discusses  the  methodological  choices  made  in  this  dissertation.  It  begins  with  a 
discussion of the dissertation’s place between international relations and comparative politics then 
discusses the study as a ‘case study’ in the light of ‘mainstream’ (or ‘positivist’) political science 
literature,  and  finally  discusses  those  elements  that  do  not  fit  into  the  standard  categories  of 
political science methodology. 
 
Crossing Subfields 
This new literature on transnational politics crosses the border between international relations and 
comparative politics
24. If the stronger claims of exponents of transnationalism are true then we may 
                                                           
24 The literature began in earnest with Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) exposition of the ‘boomerang effect’, in which 
civil society in closed states reaches out to transnational forces to put pressure on states over human rights. 30 
be  witnessing  a  sea  change  in  the  very  structure  of  world  politics,  in  which  domestic  and 
international spheres are no longer clearly separable
25. If domestic and transnational actors are now 
joining forces ideationally and materially, then comparativists should be analyzing what difference 
these transnational resources make:  who are the potential winners and losers domestically and are 
transnational opportunities disproportionately captured by some groups to the disadvantage of 
others? International relations scholars, on the other hand, should be aware of the   complex 
domestic terrain into which transnational forces enter, one which belies any simple logic of 
normative diffusion or homogeneous increases in civility or respect for human rights.
26 
One of the purposes of this dissertation, then, is to bring to bear  the detailed field experience at 
which comparative politics excels to an area of study hitherto within the purview of international 
relations scholars. There is a substantive, as well as an academic motive for this. There is a tendency 
within the transnationalism literature, which draws on political process theories, to focus exclusively 
on the dynamics of how networks are formed and by which mechanisms they scale up contention, 
whether this is done in a value neutral manner (Tarrow 2005) or as engaged advocates of those 
networks (Reitan 2007)
27. What has less often been attempted (but see Bob 2005), is to assess how 
transnational activist resources might alter the parameters of domestic contention. As transnational 
resources become available, the dimensions  of what is seen as possible and impossible change, 
including the types of issues that are emphasized and the types of people who can get involved in 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
However,  more  recent  volumes  describe  the  growth  of  transnationalism  in  relatively  open  societies  over 
environmental issues (Guadeloupe and Rodrigues 2004; Khagram 2004), agriculture (Borras et al 2008) and 
economics (Della Porta et al 2006; Della Porta 2007; Featherstone 2008; Evans 2008) 
25 Even a popular, mainstream introductory text to international relations, commonly used in undergraduate 
classes, states without debate that organizations like Greenpeace represent a “genuine global civil society” 
(Mansbach and Rhodes 2003: 10) 
26 See Tsing (2000) for an anthropological critique of incautious teleology in the scholarship around 
globalization and global movements.  
27 I would argue that this applies both to the cautious claims of those , following Keck and Sikkink, who focus 
on particular issues and mechanisms, avoiding generalizations about ‘global civil society’ per se: the ‘splitters’ 
in Tarrow’s (2002) terms, as well as to Tarrow’s  ‘lumpers’, who have an overarching normative commitment 
to global transnationalism. Neither of these groups of scholars tend to dwell on the domestic consequences of 
transnational resources, being focused on whether transnational activists achieve their aims, as defined by 
those selfsame activists.  31 
social movements  and  get  heard  in  the  media.  These  subtle  and  not  so  subtle  impacts  on the 
dimensions of domestic politics are part of the subject of this dissertation.  
 
One case study or many? 
India is one country but many cases. This is a big advantage for any comparative research project, 
enabling researchers to multiply the observations without analyzing more than one country
28. The 
research contained in this dissertation covers three large states (Maharashtra, Karnataka and 
Andhra Pradesh) and each can be counted as an independent case due to the administrative priority 
given state governments on agricultu ral issues in India and the varied histories of state -farmer 
relations in those three states.  Apart from its inherent importance and its being often referenced in 
the literature (as described above), the particular issue area chosen is analytically fertil e for several 
reasons: 
  The structure of the anti-GMO coalition spans many different  levels of institution, from 
metropolitan elites to local farmers’ union leaders and ‘grassroots’ NGOs. This large span 
enables  interesting  comparisons  between  attitudes  and  motivations  across  class  and 
geographical divides. 
  The  NGOs  and  farmers’  groups  involved  in  the  coalition  are  not  one  bloc,  funded  and 
organized  centrally,  but  comprise  various  sub-networks  with  their  own  transnational 
linkages.  There are around 40 NGOs and farmers’ groups highly active in this area, and 
many others occasionally active. When we observe similar processes and dynamics across 
these financially and organizationally separate groups we have more reason to suppose 
those processes are relevant beyond one issue area.  
                                                           
28 See King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 213-217) on the virtues of multiplying observations within ‘one’ case. 32 
  The groups and activists interested in GMOs have usually been active on several other issues 
over the last thirty years (for example ‘big dams’ and indigenous rights), making it more 
plausible to generalize about the ‘bundles’ of attitudes and orientations that these groups 
advocate.  
For these reasons the anti-GMO case in India could be described, in positivist terms, as a strong 
‘hypothesis generating’ case (Gerring 2007 b: 39-43) as well as allowing for a certain amount of 
‘hypothesis testing’, since the case contains multiple observations of different social groups and 
networks in different locales and levels  and it is possible to ‘test’ whether similar processes are 
taking place in those different locales and levels.  
Evans et al (1995:4) offer a good appraisal of the kind of case study model advocated here: 
It (the case-study method) is work that draws on general theories whenever it can but also 
cares deeply about the particular historical outcomes. It sees particular cases as the building 
blocks  for  general  theories  and  theories  as  lenses  to  identify  what  is  interesting  and 
significant  about  particular  cases.  Neither  theories  nor  cases  are  sacrosanct.  Cases  are 
always  too  complicated  to  vindicate  a  single  theory…..At  the  same  time,  a  compelling 
interpretation of a particular case is only interesting if it points to ways of understanding 
other cases as well. 
 
Unorthodox methodological choices: an ‘ecological’ model of organizational behavior, ‘ideal types’ 
and critical-interpretive methods 
This  dissertation  differs  from  standard  conceptions  of  a  case  study  in  political  science  in  three 
respects: firstly, and most importantly, the claims made are not of the ‘covering law’ type, in which 
cases confirm or disconfirm a causal law, but rather the argument made employs the language of 
systems  and  environments,  in  other  words  an  ecological  rather  than  a  physics-centred  way  of 33 
viewing social causality; secondly, in another departure from positivism, the dissertation constructs 
‘ideal types’ in ways that are normatively broader and more contentious than most political science 
research;  thirdly,  the  research  aims  at  providing  (an  admittedly  crude)    ‘ethnography’  of  the 
organizations it describes, employing interpretive and critical methods more common in literary 
studies or anthropology than in empirical political science. 
As to the first point: the theoretical contributions that this dissertation tries to generate should not 
be seen as causal in the sense that dominates mainstream political science. In other words, the aim 
is  not  to  claim  that  activist  networks  (or  in  particular  the  ‘romantic’  variety  highlighted  here) 
invariably cause certain changes in domestic politics or that they themselves are caused by certain 
external  factors.  This  is  for  two  reasons:    Firstly,  activist  networks  and  NGOs  change  the 
organizations  they  ‘couple’  with  in  ways  that  are  impossible  to  reduce  to  linear  causality.  It  is 
preferable to think in terms of political environments, in which new actors form symbiotic linkages 
with old actors, in ways which might change both. As environments change, so certain adaptations 
prosper and certain symbiotic linkages aid the survival of organizations. The arguments described 
above (for example the favoring of romantic over modernist orientations by TANs) work in this way: 
TANs are simply not able to link with groups that do not share their internal ways of framing or 
coding issues, so ‘old’ groups have to choose whether to persist in ways of framing the world that 
cut them off from TANs or to adapt to the new opportunity. This kind of mutual adjustment is more 
subtle and contingent than linear causality; Secondly, many things change at once in a political 
environment,  making  the  positivist  goal of  isolating  particular  causal  influences  very  difficult  or 
impossible.  For  example,  in  India,  old  farmers’  movements  declined  just  as  new  transnational 
opportunities  arose  and  just  as  the  state  was  withdrawing  farmer-support  services  from  the 
countryside. Quantifying or formalizing the role of these various causal influences on the rise of new 
activist networks in Indian rural politics would be nearly as forlorn a task as isolating the precise 34 
weighting of factors that caused human beings to acquire complex language
29. It would also arguably 
be less ‘useful’ to participants and scholars than a good functional account of how different types of 
organizations work in their environments
30.  
Niklas Luhmann’s concept of ‘structural coupling’ (akin to Heins’ use of ‘parasitism’ discussed above) 
is  a  useful way  to  conceptualize  this  ecological  approach  to  social  causality.  For Luhmann,  two 
systems (which he conceives as autonomous and ‘closed’, that is to say, with their own particular 
modes of framing/coding environmental inputs) can become dependent on each other for those 
external inputs, one obvious example being the mass media and the economy. As Luhmann (2000: 
66) puts it in relation to advertising: 
For advertising has to make its product a reality via the auto-dynamics of the social system 
of  the  mass  media  and  not  merely,  as  is  typically  the  case  with  other  products,  via 
technological or physical-chemical-biological suitability for the satisfaction of a particular 
need. Within the strand of advertising, then, the economy is just as dependent upon the 
system of mass media as the latter is upon it, as is typical in cases of structural coupling, no 
logical symmetry, no hierarchy can be detected. 
If  for  advertising  and  mass  media  one  were  to  substitute  NGOs  and  the  Indian  media  and  for 
‘physical-chemical suitability’ one were to substitute ‘farmers’ actual needs’ this would be a good 
indication  of  the  kind  of  analysis  undertaken  in  chapter  three.  As  Luhmann  emphasizes  no 
‘hierarchy’ can be established in such cases, meaning that the role of the social scientist is to observe 
and describe the functional compatibilities of coupled systems, rather than to jump in and reduce (in 
hierarchical form) what he/she observes to some prior set of ‘causes’. 
                                                           
29 Ragin (2000) attempts just such a hopeless task with his idea of ‘fuzzy set social science’. But his rigidly 
deterministic approach is quite unlike the ecological approach to causality taken here.  
30 See Cartwright (1999) and Manicas (2006)  for philosophical defences of a science that does not necessarily 
seek causal generalizations that could be applied to all comparable cases. As Cartwright points out, there are 
very few ‘closed systems’, even in the natural sciences, in which contingency, chaos and feedback effects can 
be ignored when making theory. In the social world, of course we can add the complex feedback effects of 
theory feeding back into practice, ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’, etc. 35 
As to the second methodological point, the dissertation employs ‘ideal types’ as ways to categorize 
groups of organizations. According to Weber (1997: 88) 
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by 
the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent 
concrete  individual  phenomena,  which  are  arranged  according  to  those  one-sidedly 
emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. 
 
In chapter three ideal types of organizations are drawn up, such as ‘regional’, ‘nodal’ and ‘mass 
based’. These ideal types are fairly uncontroversial, being based on ‘objective’ factors such as the 
type of advocacy organizations engage in, their geographic locations and the professional expertise 
of the organizations concerned. More contentiously, in chapter four, organizations are categorized 
as ‘romantic’ based on an underlying world view or ‘deep structure’ of their claims and in chapter six 
TANs are divided into four ideal-hypothetical types on a grid. 
The justification for using these unusually broad and arguably contentious categories is that they are 
more likely to resonate beyond the particular case. As discussed earlier in this chapter and in more 
detail    in  chapter  six,  cases  as  varied  as  Islamic  Jihadism,  the  Zapatistas  in  Mexico,  diasporic 
nationalism and the spread of Christian evangelism resonate with the category of  ‘transnational 
romanticism’. While much scholarship on TANs cautiously generalizes around ‘mechanisms’ that 
sometimes verge on platitude or tautology, or which are too closely tied to the particular case at 
hand, this dissertation aims to set up a research agenda that will hopefully fertilize discussion about 
a  larger  range  of  transnational  phenomena,  drawing  attention  to  ‘family  resemblances’ 
(Wittgenstein 2009 [1953]) between phenomena that might otherwise be overlooked. 36 
It is important, however, to have concepts that are broad enough to have relevance to other issue 
areas and other countries, but which still have resonance ‘on the ground’ with activists themselves
31 
The categories used in the dissertation were determined both by reading extensively in secondary 
and  historical  literature  and  through  conducting  one  to  one  interviews  with  activists.  Where 
appropriate the categories used in this dissertation were mentioned with participants and responses 
were usually favorable
32.  
The use of a critically loaded term such as ‘romanticism’ leads into the third area of methodological 
importance – the eclectic use of ethnographic and literary forms of analysis in the dissertation. For 
example in chapter four the dissertation attempts to put current framings of GMOs into a ‘deep’ 
historical context going back to colonial historiography. Chapter four also engages in a brief literary-
critical analysis of some of the material produced by anti-GMO activists and references scholars of 
romanticism in diverse fields. The justification for these practices accords with the general outlines 
of ‘constructivism’ as a research project, in that interpretive framings and enduring discourses have 
material consequences and in fact are parts of material reality as much as guns and dollar bills. For 
colonial Britain for example, as discussed briefly in chapter four, a ‘romantic’ framing of the Indian 
countryside was a particular tool used to justify certain taxation practices as well as a fantastical 
consolation  (for  middle  class  consumers  of  the  discourse)  for  the  woes  and  guilt  induced  by  
industrial capitalist society. For NGOs and activists today framings and interpretations are equally 
tools used for organizational purposes, and it is no surprise that those tools are not designed from 
scratch,  but  are  rather  borrowed  and  refined  from  historical  models:  hence  the  historical 
comparative nature of chapter four. 
                                                           
31 See Gerring and Barresi (2003) for the mini-max idea that social science concepts should be a compromise 
between maximum applicability to other cases and ‘ideal-typical’ richness. Hopefully the categories of 
romantic and modernist in relation to rural politics achieve this balance.  
32 Interestingly Indian scholars based in India have been much more sympathetic to the categories used here 
than western scholars who have responded at conference presentations of some of the material. 37 
In practical terms, the basis for the dissertation comprised three field trips to India from 2007 
through 2009. Ideally the dissertation would be based on an ethnographic level of detail, from total 
immersion  in  the  day  to  day  activities  of  NGOs  and  farmers’  groups.  However,  given  limited 
resources, multiple languages spoken in the field, and most critically, the generally wary attitude of 
Indian  NGOs  to  external  observations  (when  not  guaranteed  of  ideological  sympathy  in  the 
observer) this level of immersion was not possible. Instead, the research strategy was to substitute 
breadth for depth and try to visit almost all organizations active in the network across four states 
and multiple ‘levels’ of activity – from elite intellectuals in New Delhi to volunteer activists in Andhra 
Pradesh.  In  addition,  NGO  reports,  pamphlets  and  video  materials,  newspaper  articles, 
biotechnology industry reports and parliamentary debates were studied for  information and for 
their discursive strategies.  
A list of interviews is provided in the appendix, which includes not only NGO members and activists 
but Indian based scholars and journalists. Farmers were interviewed in Andhra Pradesh, mainly in 
small groups with the aid of translators. 
 
Chapter Outlines 
Chapter  two  describes  the  discourses  on  GMOs  in  India.  Using  data  gathered  from  The  Hindu 
Newspaper over a period of 10 years it performs an analysis of GMO related events, establishing the 
provenance  of  stories  in  the  English  language  media  (whether  NGO,  grassroots,  scientific  or 
corporate), categorizing their evaluative content (positive, negative or neutral) and tracing certain 
‘memes’ or recurrent story lines associated with GMOs over time.  The chapter then shows how an 
anti-GMO discourse has permeated the public sphere using an analysis of parliamentary questions 
tabled on GMOs in the Lok Sabha, in the global ‘blogosphere’ and in the elite western media.   The 
second part of the chapter describes a much richer array of alternative perspectives on GMOs in 38 
India  gleaned  from  interviews  and  scholarly  literature.  These  alternative  perspectives  describe 
political roads not taken on GMOs, raising the core puzzle of how the debate on GMOs in the media 
and in much social science literature becomes stereotyped into ‘either or’ choices. The chapter 
therefore describes a possible ‘middle way’ on the GMO debate in India that emphasizes public 
sector science, pro poor potentials and the need for better government information to farmers. The 
discussion also illustrates the complex causality and regional differentiation behind ‘big narratives’ 
such as the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of Bt Cotton, ‘globalization, ‘rural crisis’, ’organic agriculture’ and 
‘farmer  suicides’    and  thus  illustrates  the  way  transnational  ‘filters’  narrow  and  stereotype  the 
debate.  
Chapter Three sets out the ‘functional’ face of transnational networks. It begins by describing the 
organizational terrain of groups involved in agricultural politics. The aim of this section is to show 
how transnational resources (especially funding) enabled a differentiation and professionalization of 
the  field  of  actors  involved,  with  nodal  and  regional  groups  mediating  in  the  middle,  all  partly 
supported by transnational resources. The chapter examines how the anti-GMO coalition formed 
various  symbiotic  linkages  or  ‘structural  couplings’  with  state  actors  in  India,  with  international 
markets  for  organic  cotton,  with  media  organizations,  with  donors,  with  political  parties,  with 
farmers’ unions and with international academics and activists. The chapter dissects these various 
structural couplings between NGOs and state and market actors, analyzing the financial, personal 
and discursive glue that links them together. 
Chapter four, which paired with chapter three explains the ‘two faces’ of the dissertation’s title, 
addresses the ‘romantic’ face of the network, in contrast to its ‘functional’ linkages. It posits a 
romantic  –  materialist  divide  in  agricultural  politics  and  describes  how  the  balance  of  power 
between romantic and materialist forces is affected by transnational opportunities.  To do this the 
chapter  begins  with  a  description  of  existing  approaches  to  ‘political  romanticism’  including 
arguments  from  Carl  Schmitt  and  Timothy  Morton,  and  then  traces  an  historical  path  through 39 
romantic conceptions of the countryside in India derived from British colonial historiography. It then 
shows how in two previous cases - the Chipko movement and the anti- Narmada dam movement, 
those domestic activists that have sought to transnationalize the framing of issues, have done so 
within a ‘romantic’ master frame, sometimes with deleterious consequences for the groups they 
claim to represent. This argument about the romantic narrative is then applied to key players in the 
anti-GMO network and different ‘varieties’ of romantic discourse are isolated and analyzed. The 
chapter thus aims to trace an historical line of descent for romantic politics, showing how the anti-
GMO network is embedded in previous struggles and discourses. 
Chapter  five  comprises  a  pair-wise  historical  comparison  of  two  key  farmers’  movements:    the 
Shetkari Sanghatana in Maharashtra  and the KRRS in Karnataka, and attempts to show how  already 
existing  ‘romantic’  tendencies  of  the  KRRS’  leadership  under  Prof.  Nanjundaswamy  were 
accentuated  by  that  organization’s  growing  transnational  linkages  in  the  1990s,  while  the 
Sanghatana mainly avoided transnational contacts.  The chapter attempts to find reasons why one 
organization went the transnational path and not the other. It does so by examining the structure 
and ideology of the two organizations and the affinity between the KRRS’ world view and the new 
transnational romantic narrative about the countryside. It explains how the KRRS also contributed to 
and  helped  shape  that  transnational  discourse.  The  chapter  ends  with  a  discussion  of  the 
Sanghatana’s later alliance with transnational libertarian organizations, and asks whether a type of 
‘market  romanticism’  (akin  to  Jackie  Smith’s  neoliberal  globalizers)  might  also  be  fostered  by 
transnational linkages, with surprisingly similar characteristics. 
Chapter  Six,  the  conclusion,  extends  the  discussion  of  chapters  three  through  five  by  trying  to 
account  for  the  conditions  that  make  ‘romantic  TANs’  possible,  in  particular  a  vacuum  of 
representation in rural India that has encouraged the turn to transnational linkages. The chapter 
then sets out various processes and mechanisms that may be especially relevant to the romantic 
variant of TANs, including the prevalence of brokerage activities in the network, the elongation of 40 
the  network  and  the  accompanying  ‘social  distance’  that  this  entails,  the  competition  over 
authenticity in the network and the reasons why its claims are so modular and ‘unrestrained’ by 
external realities. Finally the chapter applies these processes and mechanisms to other issue areas 
and ends with a tabular description of how romantic TANs differ from governance oriented and 
grassroots TANs.  
 
Why does it matter?  
The purpose of this dissertation is evaluative as well as theoretical. The aim is not merely to score 
points against certain bodies of academic literature, but to help answer larger questions of what 
TANs are and what and what they are good for.  William DeMars (2005: 22) aptly summarizes the 
need  to  ask  these  kinds  of  questions  when  he  refers  to  the  “roads  not  taken”  in  response  to 
globalization.  
The  history  of  the  marginalization  and  suppression  of  these  alternatives  [such  as  mass 
movements, religious movements, governments themselves] is long and complex. But it is a 
matter of immediate observation to acknowledge that installing NGOs in the lead against 
globalization rather than any of the alternatives constitutes an historic “switching point” 
with profound, if not entirely foreseeable, consequences for the future. 
It may be that DeMars exaggerates the potential for ‘alternatives’. Determining this is part of the  
work of this dissertation. For example, it could be that NGOs and associated TANs fill a vacuum 
formed  by  the  decline  of  older  forms  of  representation,  such  as  trade  unions  and  mass  rural 
movements.  But whether one accepts DeMars’ radical critique or not there are valid questions to 
ask about the legitimacy of TANs which should be of interest both to the academic and activist 
communities:  do  activist  networks  really  represent  their  clients  or  do  the  various  mechanisms 
outlined above distance them from those they claim to represent? Are traditional ways of doing 
politics being superseded by transnationally inclined network-politics, and if so what does that mean 41 
for the poor? These are the normative questions that the conclusion to chapter four and the whole 
of chapter six address in the light of the empirical evidence. 
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Chapter  Two:  Transnational  Activism  and  the  Missing  Alternatives  on 
Biotechnology in India 
 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part comprises an outline of the various narratives or 
‘memes’ about GMOs in India over the last ten years, using an analysis of media content from Indian 
newspapers and the internet. This is intended to give a sense both of where narratives originate  and 
which narratives have preoccupied public discussion during the course of the GMO controversy in 
India. 
The second part of the chapter addresses and, in effect, challenges those narratives about GMOs by 
analyzing the complex terrain out of which the simplified narratives emerge. The aim is to illuminate 
the way ‘transnationalized’ narratives reduce complex realities to the kind of ‘modular’ categories 
described in chapter one.  The ‘complex’ realities addressed in the second part of the chapter, and 
against  which  the  simplified  narratives  are  contrasted  are  the  following:  the  regionally  and 
temporally complex picture of the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of Bt Cotton as opposed to a media narrative 
about homogeneous failure or success; the complex debate about ‘farmer suicides’ and its relation 
to  an  NGO  narratives  about  those  suicides;    the  ambiguity  of  the  term  ‘organic’  and  its  being 
contrasted  to  Bt  Cotton; the  question  of  the  ‘price’  of  seeds  and  Monsanto’s  dispute  with  the 
government  of  Andhra  Pradesh  over  price  and  finally,  the  question  of  developmental  and 
environmental potentials of biotechnology and the squeezing out of ‘pro poor’ options for the future 
of biotechnology by the Manichean narratives that have captured the debate. 
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Introduction to Bt Cotton in India 
Before looking at common media narratives about Bt Cotton, it is useful to outline some of the main 
features of the technology
33. 
Bt Cotton was made by inserting a gene from the  baccilus thuringiensis soil bacterium into cotton 
hybrids. This gene enables the plant to produce the cry1Ac protein which is lethal to Lepidopterans. 
This  means  the  plant  has  an  ‘in  built’  weapon  against  the  ‘American  bollworm’,  Helicoverpa 
armigera, which is one of the most serious risk factors for Indian cotton farmers, especially since the 
cotton plant has a tendency (unusual among plants) to shed bolls when just a fraction of a plant is 
damaged by pests. (Deshmukh 2010: 179-80).  
Advocates of biotechnology have argued that Bt Cotton has multiple advantages over the preceding 
regimes of pest control (Manjunath 2007: 25-26): it protects against the bollworm for the entire life 
of the plant (unlike pesticides) and in every part of the plant; it targets only Lepidoptera, not other 
potentially beneficial insects; it (should) mean fewer pesticide sprays and thus lower spending on 
pesticides  (which  also  require  high  water  use  for  mixing),  and  reduced  side  effects  from  the 
dissemination of external pesticides in the environment and in contact with human sprayers
 34 , and 
finally, from a psychological perspective, Bt Cotton should reduce farmer tensions over bollworm, 
deriving from the constant need to monitor bollworms. Although it only targets the bollworm and 
not the 160+ other insects that threaten cotton, this insect has proven to be the greatest threat to 
Indian cotton farmers: the bollworm has caused enormous damage to cotton crops in India in recent 
times, for example (CICR 2003: 3) in Rajasthan, Haryana and Punjab in the 2001-02 season where 
50% of yield was destroyed just by the bollworm. 
In addition, from the agronomic perspective, Bt Cotton, is a scale-neutral technology (Lipton 2007), 
in that small and marginal farmers (assuming they have equal access to the seeds), should benefit 
                                                           
33 Drawing on Herring (2011) and a recent symposium on GMOs in India (Symposium 2011) 
34 In the words of the CICR (2003: 7) “even if the effect of the technology is merely to substitute one pesticide 
for another, the net effect might be to reduce negative environmental consequences”. 44 
the same as large farmers, unlike, for example, a revolution in automated harvesting technology, 
which would follow economies of scale.  
Bt Cotton was first introduced into India (legally) by Mayrco-Monsanto Biotech Ltd (MMB) in 2002 
and then licensed to different Indian seed companies for a license fee. Since 2002, the number of 
hybrids in which the gene construct has been inserted has gone from 3 hybrids (MECH 12, MECH 162 
and MECH 184) to nearly 800 (Herring 2011). These different hybrids, many now produced by Indian 
owned companies such as Nuziveedu Seeds, Rasi Seeds, Ankur Seeds and Ganga Kaveri Seeds, are 
each adapted for particular climatic and soil conditions in specific parts of India. Only one ‘variety’ 
(produced through the CICR, Nagpur: see below) has been produced in a Bt version. Varieties differ 
from hybrids in that the seeds are fertile, and can be re-sown in the following season, although they 
are generally less popular with farmers than the higher yielding hybrid versions.  New Bt gene 
constructs have since been added to the initial cry1Ac version, making for ‘stacked’ versions of Bt 
Cotton, that  have  been  designed  to overcome  potential  resistance  developing  in  the  bollworm, 
resistance which has been observed in studies by senior Indian cotton researcher Prof Kranthi of the 
CICR.
35 The other measure, to prevent resistance developing is the use of 30% ‘refugia’ of non Bt 
cotton, supposed to be planted alongside the Bt cotton plants. This practice, however, is rarely 
followed in reality, even though packets of Bt seed always contain non Bt seed intended for planting 
in refugia. 
The regulatory regime in India (described in an organizational diagram in chapter three) is multi 
layered. Applicants must pass through three layers of testing and committees in order for a hybrid to 
be approved. For MMB and the initial three Bt hybrids this process took approximately 7 years and 
cost around 1.5 million dollars (Murukgar et al 2007: 3787). For Indian firms seeking to utilise non 
Monsanto genes, this regulatory system may act as a disincentive, even though a handful have since 
purchased constructs from China or manufactured them domestically.  The regulatory process was 
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streamlined in 2008 by shifting to an ‘event’ based regulatory model (that is, the gene construct 
producing the cry1Ac protein is judged safe to be inserted in any hybrid or variety) rather than a 
‘hybrid’ based model (in which each hybrid with the gene in it has to be assessed separately). 
However, the unilateral refusal of permission for Bt brinjal (egg plant) by agriculture minister Jairam 
Ramesh in 2010 (Herring 2011) shows that the approval process is still highly contested and, in 
comparative international perspective, quite demanding. 
 
 
1.  Analysing Narratives about GMOs in India 
The media discourse about GMOs in India has attracted the attention of at least one scholarly 
article. Yamaguchi, Harris and Busch (2003) focus on the period before adoption of legal Bt Cotton in 
2002, so their findings concentrate on the media discussion of governance and regulatory issues that 
have been  less dominant post adoption. They conclude that civil society actors on the one side, and 
government, science and industry figures on the other “were not engaged in meaningful discussion” 
(2002: 68) because of their opposing views on the functionality of regulatory mechanisms.  
This  study  does  not  take  us  very  far  because  it  does  not  categorize  the  particular  framings  or 
narratives around GMOs or tabulate the sources of particular narratives. Below, is an attempt to 
probe deeper  into the specific stories produced about GMOs with data from the years 2001 to 2010, 
taken from The Hindu newspaper’s online archives. Unfortunately their archives do not go back 
further than 2001, so stories featuring the KRRS’ ‘Cremate Monsanto’ campaign from 1998 and 
other controversies involving Vandana Shiva and Suman Sahai are missing from this archive.  The 
Hindu is India’s third largest circulation English language daily (Wikipedia) and was chosen mainly 
because its online archives are designed efficiently for thorough content searches (its rivals the 46 
Times of India and Hindustan Times do not have this facility) and because of its relative popularity in 
Southern India, where most of the Bt Cotton related controversies have occurred.  
The first table, below, show the total number of stories, from the national edition, that featured ‘Bt 
Cotton’ as the primary subject matter of the story, from the years 2001 to 2010. 
 
Table 2.1. Number of stories about ‘Bt Cotton
36’ 
Year  Number of stories 
2001  24 
2002  23 
2003  17 
2004  2 
2005  5 
2006  22 
2007  17 
2008  17 
2009  35 
2010  41 
 
                                                           
36 All searches related to the Hindu conducted December 2010. 47 
It should be borne in mind that these are totals for the national edition of The Hindu, and that local 
editions probably included more stories
37, but this gives a good indication of the debate nationally 
and among elites in New Delhi.  The years 2001 to 2003 saw a peak of controversy with the decision 
by the GEAC to approve commercial cultivation of Bt Cotton in March 2002. Part of the later peaking 
of stories is explained by the controversy over Bt egg plant (or ‘brinjal’) in 2009 and 2010 , which was 
linked in most stories to the previous issues over Bt Cotton. Clearly, despite the almost universal 
uptake of Bt hybrids by 2010, the  debate about GMOs had  not died down, and despite a fallow 
period for stories in 2004 and 2005 was able to reemerge with new strength, and as discussed 
below, with very similar narratives.  Another reason for the reemergence, was the rise of new civil 
society entrepreneurs, in particular Kishor Tiwari of the VJAS in Vidarbha, who was able to ignite (or 
reignite) a  narrative about farmer suicides in 2006 and was especially successful at getting stories 
about suicide into the national press. 
The next table shows the breakdown of stories about Bt Cotton into ‘positive’, ‘negative’, ‘nuanced’ 
and  ‘factual’.  The  first  two  categories  are  self  explanatory,  referring  to  stories  where  only  one 
perspective  is  put  forward,  whether  they  are  editorial  pieces  or  reports  of  others’  opinions. 
‘Nuanced’ refers to stories that include both positive and negative points of view from different 
sources, or (much rarer in this search) stories that try to synthesize points of view to create a 
balanced perspective. ‘Factual’ refers mainly to brief reports on harvest numbers or the price of 
cotton, which offer no opinions about Bt Cotton per se. 
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Table 2.2. Opinions Expressed about Bt Cotton in The Hindu 2001-2010 
  Positive  Negative  Neutral 
(balanced) 
Factual 
2001  7  4  2  11 
2002  9  9  0  5 
2003  3  11  1  2 
2004  1  0  0  1 
2005  1  1  1  2 
2006  6  7  1  8 
2007  6  7  1  3 
2008  5  9  1  2 
2009  7  13  3  12 
2010  3  18  3  2 
Totals  48  79  13  48 
 
The table shows that negative stories outweighed positive ones, by nearly two to one over all 10 
years included, with little evidence of a shift in perspective over that period. Stories that tried to 
include conflicting perspectives or transcend ‘for or against’ dichotomies were clearly in the minority 
and showed no sign of increasing over the ten years. 49 
What were the sources of the positive and negative stories included in the sample? Tables 3 and 4 
address  this  question,  showing  the  sources  for  stories  in  The  Hindu.  Most  of  these  are  self 
explanatory and the organizations and individuals concerned will be addressed in later chapters. 
‘Editorial’ refers to commentary from The Hindu’s own editorial team or from a regular columnist. 
 
Table 2.3. Sources of Positive Stories in order of prominence 
Central Government  9 
Public Agricultural Universities and institutes  8 
State governments  7 
The Hindu reporters  6 
ISAAA  (International  Service  for  the  Acquisition  of 
Agribiotech Applications) 
4 
Editorial/Columnist  4 
Monsanto  4 
Farmers interviewed  3 
Indian agricultural business associations  3 
United States embassy  1 
Sharad Joshi  1 
Local government officials  1 
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Table 2.4. Sources of Negative Stories in order of prominence 
VJAS (Vidarbha Jan Andolan Samiti)  11 
Greenpeace  6 
State Governments’ spokespeople  6 
Gene Campaign/Suman Sahai  5 
P M Bhargava  5 
Environment Minister Ramesh  5 
Editorial opinion /regular columnist  5 
Vandana Shiva  4 
Left Farmers’ Unions  4 
DRMU  (Dakshini  Rajasthan  Majdoor 
Union) Rajasthan 
3 
NGO Coalitions  3 
Punjabi organic associations  3 
Other academic / ‘expert’  3 
Planning Commission  2 
Central MPs  2 
DDS (Deccan Development Society)  2 
Organic export associations  2 
KRRS  2 
Kalpavriksh  2 51 
CSE  (Centre  for  Science  and 
Environment) 
1 
Devinder Sharma  1 
Aruna Rodrigues  1 
The Hindu reporter  1 
Other central government  1 
 
In these tables ‘source’ means the ultimate source of the information for the article. This takes the 
form of press conferences, publications, press releases, interviews, and more rarely, demonstrations 
or other mass events. These tables reflect an informational struggle, fought on a battlefield of rival 
narratives, in which the winner is the group best able to get its narrative and its memes ensconced in 
the public sphere. 
The  tables  also  illustrate  important  themes  to  be  explored  in  the  dissertation.  Firstly,  non 
governmental organizations and urban, transnationally active campaigners have a predominant role 
in disseminating negative stories about GM crops, whereas positive stories arise mainly from the 
Indian state at central and local level and from state academic establishments
38. This casts doubt on 
interpretations of the dispute that (following Jackie Smith or Ruth Reitan) would interpret the 
conflict in terms of transnational capital versus civil society. Instead, arguments for  Bt Cotton in the 
Indian media come from primarily Indian sources. Secondly, and related to this, is that stories come 
almost exclusively from professional organizations, not from farmers themselves or from mass based 
farmers’  organizations.  In  fact,  none  of  the  negative  stories  are  sourced  from  interviews  with 
farmers. This illustrates the way that India’s public sphere is organized – with very little ‘input’ from 
grassroots  levels  and  an  increasingly  professionalized  mediating  layer  of  NGOs  that  serve  as 
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– and discussed further in chapter three when looking at alliances between NGOs and governmental actors. 52 
information sources for the media
39. The lack of full time agricultural journalists is also crucial in 
explaining this mediation by NGOs, as discussed further in the section on media -NGO linkages in 
chapter three. 
What exactly are the narratives being disseminated? The following table illustrates the negative 
‘memes’
40 disseminated in the stories. The table breaks down the appearance of these memes by 
the year in which they were found to try and illustrate possible shifts and trends in the stories. No 
table is included for the positive stories because these break down very simply: of the 48 positive 
stories,  35  were  associations  of  Bt  Cotton  with  higher  yields/better  harvests  and  the  other  13 
mentioned higher export earnings (5 instances), higher profits for Indian biotech firms (3 instances), 
lower  pesticide  use  (3  instances),  and  comparisons  with  China  urging  the  need  for  Bt  crops  (2 
instances). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
39 Is there reason to suppose this is different in the non English language media? This is a crucial question 
unfortunately not explored in depth here, but an interview with a Telegu language journalist, discussed further 
in chapter three, suggested that local media use the same NGO-predominant sources as the English language 
media. 
40 Following Dawkins (1976) in which the meme is a fundamental self-replicating unit akin to a gene, which 
reproduces itself in and is subject to selection pressures  in human media of communication just as genes 
reproduce themselves in and are subject to selective pressures  via the media of biological phenotypes. 53 
Table 2.5.  Negative memes
41 about Bt Cotton in order of preponderance 
Meme  200
1 
02  03  04  0
5 
06  07  08  0
9 
10  Total 
Bt Crop failure    2  5    1  1  2    4  1  16 
Transnational capital/Monsanto exploitation  1  5  1      1  1  1  2  2  14 
Inadequate regulation  3  1  1      1  3  2    1  13 
Allergies and animal deaths due to Bt cotton  1    2          2  3  2  10 
Bt increases vulnerability to market forces / risks          1  2  1  1    2  7 
Crop resistance failing  2    1        1  2    1  7 
General / unspecified ‘risks’  1  2  2            2    7 
Deaths of children in Bt cotton fields                  4  2  6 
Bt cotton causes farmer suicides              2    1  3  6 
Consumer safety (linked to Bt Brinjal)                    5  5 
Price too high (MRTPC dispute)      1      3          4 
Harm to soil      1        1    1    3 
Organic cotton better  1  1        1          3 
Refugia not used by farmers                    2  2 
Private technology not public sector                    1  1 
Farmers can’t keep seed                  1    1 
 
                                                           
41 Total adds to more than the 79 negative stories as obviously some stories contain more than one meme. 54 
This  table  illustrates  the  main  arguments  used  by  anti-GMO  campaigners  against  Bt  Cotton
42. 
Unfortunately the 1998-2000 period fell outside the searchable index on The Hindu’s web edition. 
Had  this  period  been  searchable  the  ‘Terminator  gene’
43  meme  would  probably  have  been 
prominent (thanks to the KRRS’ and global activism discussed in Chapter Five) and the score for 
Monsanto  would  probably  have  been  even  higher.  It  is  noticeable  that  the  main  memes  recur 
throughout  the  ten  year  period  analyzed  with  no  particular  pattern.  This  suggests  the  relative 
autonomy of the memes from actual events, (for comparison, those events are illustrated on the 
timeline of Bt Cotton related events in appendix one). For example references to ‘Bt cotton crop 
failure’  occur  just  as  frequently  in  the  last  three  years  analyzed  as  in  the  first  three,  despite 
overwhelming  evidence  of  higher  cotton  yields  by  this  later  period.  Similarly,  stories  linking  Bt 
Cotton to farmer suicides actually occurred several tears after the peak period of rural suicides and 
after  the  main  academic  discussion  of  causes  of  suicide  in  the  mid  part  of  the  decade.    This 
independence from ‘events’ or the outcome of scientific studies points to the power of media-
organizational linkages to create stories that have their own self-sustaining logic. Media dependence 
on activists and NGOs linked to those activists means that the repertoire of memes is limited to 
certain modalities or ‘framings’ that suit the mutual interests of media and activists (see chapter 
three).  
However there is also evidence of ‘meme innovation’ during the period studied. One is the ‘farmer 
suicide’  meme,  that  catches  on  in  the  middle  of  the  period  mainly  due  to advocacy  by  a  new 
organization – the VJAS of Maharasthra. The second is a meme implicitly linking Bt cotton to abusive 
                                                           
42 This  is not an exhaustive of all activist arguments about Bt Cotton. In Chapter Four we consider the more 
subtle socio-historical claims that these memes about Bt Cotton fit into, in a discussion of rural ‘romanticism’. 
However, this table certainly includes the key informational claims that activists have used to try and affect 
public policy through court cases, video materials, press releases and published studies. 
43 Being the claim that Monsanto would sell seeds with an in-built mechanism to ensure that seeds could not 
be replanted. This was not in fact the case and arguably irrelevant to the Indian situation where mostly hybrid 
seeds are bought and not replanted, whether Bt or non Bt. See Herring (2009) on the origins of the Terminator 
meme. 55 
labor practices in the ‘Bt cotton fields’ of Gujurat
44. This meme is propagated by the DRMU of 
Gujurat, an NGO advocating for child workers. Both these cases show evidence of imitation and 
innovation, whereby new organizational entrepreneurs take advantage of the saliency of Bt Cotton 
as a symbol to advance their own agendas. This theme of organizational rivalry and imitation is 
explored further in chapter three. 
As  regards  the  content  of  the  negative  stories,  a  crucial  finding  from  the  table,  is  the  relative 
absence of discussion of the core economic issues of the price of the seeds and of the private/public 
divide in Bt Cotton technology (just 5 mentions out of 79 negative stories). As discussed further 
below, these core economic issues have been largely ignored by the anti-GMO coalition, arguably to 
the detriment of the debate. Instead the focus of opposition has been on two core thematic areas: 
firstly, ‘risks’ of various kinds (to soil, animals, workers, ‘nature’) and secondly, Bt Cotton as a symbol 
and embodiment of the commodification of agriculture and the dangers of transnational capitalism.  
Neither  of  these  core  themes  are  susceptible  to  the  analysis  of  costs  and  benefits:  they  are 
propounded  as absolutes:  for example  in  these stories  the  risks of  Bt  Cotton  are  not  balanced 
against the risks of pesticide use or the risks associated with other forms of biotechnology as applied 
to  pharmaceuticals,  for  example.    Similarly,  debate  over  the  relative  roles  of  national  and 
transnational firms or public and private sectors in selling and developing Bt seeds is bypassed by an 
equation of Bt Cotton with transnational capital. In other words, the negative stories maintain a 
purity of attack on Bt Cotton, and avoid topics which might lead to the possibility of compromise or 
causal complexity.  
This  Manichean framing of Bt Cotton and the ‘success’ of memes that stress short causal chains has 
been discussed in chapter one, in the context of the work of Volker Heins and William DeMars. Here, 
we see these modalities in action: memes that originate in the discourse of NGO activists emphasize 
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deaths of child workers but it is clear that the NGO feeding these stories to the media is using a template in 
which ‘Bt Cotton’ summons up n 56 
clear harms (to innocent victims) and clear ‘harmers’ in the form of Monsanto and Bt technology. 
Chapter four addresses the ‘big picture’ behind these individual narratives/memes. There it is argued 
that the anti-GMO network is drawing on a background modality of expression, which the chapter 
generalizes as ‘rural romanticism’. To what extent do the media memes in the table represent that 
theme? At a ‘deeper’ level of similarity the claims about Bt Cotton touch on the following ‘romantic’ 
meta themes: 
  The big institutions of the state and the market (what Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) 
refer to as ‘The Center’) cannot be trusted. 
  ‘Nature’ (conceived as something separate from and innocent of human beings) 
should not be meddled with, and when it is, it will bite back (in the form here of 
resistance developing against Bt cotton, crop failure assigned to technological hubris 
and harmful side effects to innocent animals, conceived as outweighing any gains 
from productivity) 
  Science and scientific method is conceived as something inherently ‘risky’ (implicitly 
more risky than current practices), which feeds back into the second meta theme, 
that ‘nature’ will punish the hubris of science and technology.  
These meta themes are further explored in chapter four. The existence of a larger background world 
view, or modality, helps explain why some individual memes, such as the ‘crop failure’ and ‘allergies’ 
memes  persist,  despite  lack  of  empirical  foundations.  Of  course,  there  are  limits  to  this:  the 
‘terminator gene’ meme, popular in the late 1990’s, does not appear in the table and the ‘Bt causes 
suicides’  meme  is  only  cautiously  used  by  activists
45.  Both  these  memes,  unlike  the  vaguer 
allegations of crop failure, exploitation and hard to verify or disconfirm illnesses, are subject to 
                                                           
45 Even in the case of Kishor Tiwari and his VJAS, the ‘Bt causes suicides’ meme is not prominent in the 
organization’s study on problems about cotton production in Vidarbha (VJAS 2006), although in its conclusions 
it calls for a ban on Bt Seeds. The VJAS nevertheless puts most of the blame for rural suicides on factors related 
to globalization, and Bt cotton is a useful symbol of globalization. Technocratic organizations like Suman 
Sahai’s Gene Campaign altogether avoid this meme (interview number 87, with Suman Sahai) 57 
public  disconfirmation  or  (in  the  case  of  suicides)  scholarly  disapproval.  However,  as  argued  in 
chapters four and six, the organizations that follow the ‘romantic’ meta narrative will tend to keep 
producing  memes  that  accord  with  their  underlying  world  view;  some  will  stick,  others  will  be 
temporary, but the institutional power of the romantic meta theme ensures that like minded claims 
keep being produced
46. 
Do these memes extend beyond the world of English language Indian media?  As a brief test, the 
table below performs a similar analysis for internet web results on the google search engine.  
Table  2.6.  First  100  page  hits  on  ‘Bt  Cotton  and  India’  search  on  google
47,  sorted  by  positive, 
negative, neutral and factual 
Positive  Negative  Neutral / nuanced  Factual 
29  48  6  17 
 
Table 2.7. Sources of Positive stories on google in order of prominence 
Indian business media  9 
Business associations  6 
Indian public research institutions  4 
Academic articles  4 
Monsanto  3 
Economic think tanks  3 
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mainstream studies of TANs, which focus on memes / frames at the expense of meta narratives. 
47 Search conducted July 12
th-July 14th 2010. 58 
Even  more  than  in  the  Indian  media,  the  emphasis  of  these  positive  stories  on  the  internet  is 
overwhelmingly  about  yields  and  increased  profits,  from  a  cotton  industry,  rather  than  farmer-
centric perspective.  Only two positive web pages addressed reduced pesticide use and improved 
health. 
Table 2.8. Original Sources
48 of negative stories on google in order of prominence 
Suman Sahai/Gene Campaign  8 
Vandana Shiva  7 
DDS (Deccan Development Society)  7 
NGO Coalitions
49  6 
CSA (Centre for Sustainable Agriculture)  4 
VJAS  4 
Greenpeace  3 
Global anti GMO sites  3 
Devinder Sharma  2 
Blogs  2 
GRAIN  2 
P. Sainath  2 
Environment minister Ramesh  1 
Organic produce associations  1 
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original source, rather than ascribed to the blog. 
49 Such as ‘South Against Genetic Engineering’ (SAGE). Based on interviews, these coalitions appear to be 
artifacts either of DDS or CSA, based in Hyderabad, two ‘rival’ NGOs with overlapping networks of smaller 
NGOs working with them, as described in chapter three. 59 
These tables show similar results to those looking at the Indian media. One significant difference, as 
might be expected, is the even greater prominence of NGOs and NGO activists in the google list, and 
the relatively lesser role of Indian government officials. Some of the NGOs score higher on the 
google list than the Indian media list, and this accords with analysis from field interviews: the DDS of 
Hyderabad for example has adopted an international profile, with video materials (discussed in 
chapter  four)  aimed  at  a  mainly  global  audience.    Vandana  Shiva  and  Suman  Sahai  have  also 
cultivated mainly global  connections, via frequent speaking engagements. Organizations such as 
GRAIN and the CSA of Hyderabad, as discussed in chapter three, have tended more to cultivate 
domestic, governmental linkages. 
Table 2.9. Negative ‘memes’ about Bt Cotton from google search 
Crop failure  12 
Animal deaths due to eating Bt cotton  7 
Suicides related to Bt cotton  6 
Resistance developing in pests  4 
Regulatory laxness  4 
Monsanto exploiting farmers  3 
Harm to soil from using Bt  2 
Unfavorably compared to organic crops  2 
General risks  2 
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Compared with the stories in the The Hindu, the noticeable difference here is the prominence of 
stories about animal deaths due to ingestion of Bt Cotton. It could be that this meme (appealing to 
animal-welfare conscious northern publics) has greater purchase globally. Otherwise the story lines 
are similar to those appearing in The Hindu, this time with no reference at all to issues of price or 
issues  of  public/private  ownership  of  the  technology.  Given  that  the  google  stories  are  mostly 
collected through blogs and global activist meta-news sites this lack of reference to specifically 
Indian factors is not surprising. 
 
2.  Gauging the Impact of activism 
Has the predominance of certain memes had an impact on public policy in India? What are the ways 
in which activist originated ideas and campaigns have affected the introduction of GM crops in 
India?  One immediate way to measure the impact of NGO  / activist originated memes is to look at 
parliamentary questions about Bt Cotton in India’s Lok Sabha. The following table draws on the Lok 
Sabha’s  online  search  engine  to  highlight  questions  asked  about  Bt  Cotton  by  members  of 
parliament . Some of these questions seem to echo the negative memes seen in The Hindu and on 
the internet and which were sourced mainly from NGO-activists. 
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Table 2.10. Lok Sabha Questions tabled on topic of Bt Cotton seeming to draw on activist/NGO 
claims 
Member of Lok Sabha  Focus of question  Date
50 
Vijay Krishna  MNC’s ‘patenting’ indigenous seeds/exploiting farmers  25.08.04 
  Andhra Pradesh ban on 3 Bt hybrids
51  01.08.05 
Iqbal  Ahmed  Saradgi; 
S.R.Rao 
‘Failure’ of Bt in South India  06.03.06 
Iqbal Ahmed Saradgi  Karnataka ‘huge losses’ due to Bt according to NGOs  07.08.06 
Shivaji Patil; A.V.Adsul  Bt harming soil  07.08.06 
Shivaji Patil  Failure of Bt in Vidarbha  05.03.07 
Vinod Boianapalli  Failure of Bt in Vidarbha and Andhra Pradesh  20.08.07 
C.K Chandrappan, S.S.Reddy  Cattle deaths due to Bt Cotton  27.08.07 
Hitten Barman, K.S.S.Rao  Bt cotton harming traditional ‘seed exchanging’ / general 
risks 
26.11.07 
Ranen Barman  MNC’s selling ‘fake’ seeds  21.04.08 
 
It should be noted that the Government of India / ministerial replies to these questions were all 
highly detailed rebuttals of the empirical premises of the criticisms. It should also be pointed out 
that during the same period the Lok Sabha search engine turned up an equivalent number of Bt 
                                                           
50 The Lok Sabha’s online indexing system does not extend back beyond 2004 and the survey here was 
conducted in 2009 so this is an incomplete survey. 
51 This is not strictly an ‘activist’ or NGO originated question, although the ban on three Bt hybrids was 
regarded as the NGO coalition’s greatest success in Andhra Pradesh in 2005. 62 
Cotton related questions (nine), which were mainly factual in nature (asking about the number of Bt 
hybrids on the market) or positively encouraging the government to subsidise Bt cotton seeds or 
push  for  more  public  sector  involvement  in  the  production  of  Bt  hybrids  and  Bt  varieties. 
Nevertheless, this table provides some evidence that activist generated memes and claims have 
infiltrated the Indian legislature and that for some legislators, at least, NGOs are primary sources for 
information about Bt Cotton. 
The above discussion has established the prominence in the public sphere of certain memes and 
claims about Bt Cotton. But what real world effects have activist originated claims had on public 
policy? This counterfactual (what would have happened in the absence of activism?) is much harder 
to prove empirically, but from field interviews and secondary literature the following conclusions can 
be cautiously drawn. 
Interviews with two former members of India’s GEAC – the chief regulatory body for biotechnology 
approvals, confirm that activist claims have impacted decision making in this body. Professor Anand 
Kumar
52 claimed that NGOs had pushed India into what he described as an overly cautious approach 
to introducing new hybrids, as opposed to the ‘gene construct based’ (rather than hybrid based) 
regulatory structure that he argued would have made more sense, with no detriment to safety. 
Professor  A.R.Reddy
53  claimed that NGO campaigns caused anxiety in the GEAC and that he 
anticipated “mindboggling” opposition to food crops such as  Bt eggplant and Bt rice. He argued that 
due to activist pressure the GEAC had been forced to include “too many” non geneticists on its 
decision making panel, trying to incorporate socio-economic factors into decision making that he 
argued were quite separate from the Bt technology itself. 
Dr Khadi, director of the Central Institute for Cotton Research (CICR) in Nagpur, while concurring 
with these GEAC officials
54, singled out the role of the public in terest litigation against Bt Cotton, 
                                                           
52 Interview number 52 
53 Interview number 49 
54 Interview number 35 63 
orchestrated by activist Aruna Rodrigues. He argued that this litigation had prevented the timely 
introduction of at least 35 Bt hybrids in the 2002-2005 period, some of which would have been 
better adapted to Indian conditions than the three hybrids originally marketed by MMB. Here is one 
instance  of  the  paradoxical  nature  of  activism:  by  influencing  policy  toward  precaution  it 
disproportionately favored MMB’S products over those marketed by Indian owned firms, because 
the higher the regulatory hurdles, the more the larger firm is favored in the regulatory process
55 with  
more information about the variety of agronomic conditions, therefore arguably contributing to 
some of the early ‘failure’ stories that applied to the Monsanto hybrids (see discussion below on 
causes of ‘failure’). 
A representative of Nuzivvedu Seeds
56, a major rival to MMB, argued on similar lines to Dr Khadi, 
about the paradoxical ‘empowering’ of MMB involved in higher regulatory hurdles. He also made the 
related claim that delayed permission (in the case he mentioned, for Bt 2 hybrids) simply led to more 
illegal seeds on the market, and that illegal seeds were more likely to be spurious, resulting in more 
stories of ‘Bt crop failure’. 
No doubt activists would contest this kind of analysis, since their complaints about GM crops are 
posed at a more fundamental level and they could justifiably claim that ‘paradoxical’ side effects of 
activism  were  tolerable  in  a  larger  war  against  corporate  power  or  technocratic  hegemony. 
However, several interviewees raised larger concerns about the impact of NGO claims on discussion 
in the public sphere about biotechnology, concerns that relate to the questions raised from the 
discussion of media memes above.  
                                                           
55 For an economic analysis of this phenomenon, whereby high regulatory hurdles give a ‘first mover 
advantage’ to the biggest player see Murugkar et al 2007. Even Monsanto’s vice president in India, Mr Rak 
Ketkar (Interview number 26) brought up this point in relation to Vandana Shiva’s campaigning, arguing that it 
was the “small players” who were most hurt by the campaigns and that “up to three years” had been lost in 
“unnecessary trials” of every Bt hybrid. 
56 Interview number 33 64 
Professor N. Raghuram of the School of Biotechnology at Indrapastha University, for example
57, has 
undertaken speaking engagements all over India, arguing that the discussion about GM crops in 
India has been distorted by a “proxy war between the USA and EU in Indian civil society”, in which 
neither model  was appropriate  for  India’s  particular  developmental  needs.   He  argues  that  the 
modes  of  activism  that  NGOs  have  undertaken  are  deliberately  opaque  to  public  participation, 
whether it be court cases, or the (semi-covert) strategy of playing state governments against the 
central government over supposedly illegal field trials of GM crops. In all this, the ‘middle way’ of 
active public sector involvement in biotechnology research and priorities gets sidelined. Various 
other public sector biotechnologists interviewed argued along similar lines, expressing feelings of 
frustration about their inability to enter the public discussion about GM crops
58. As Lipton, (2007: 
11) strongly puts it, public sector biotechnologists get drawn into “a boring struggle against pseudo 
environmentalist PR” rather than making the case for public sector research
59. 
These kinds of criticisms can even be found in some parts of the non governmental sector, in NGOs 
that have taken a more technical orientation to agricultural issues rather than an advocacy position.  
At the Centre for Environmental Concerns (CEC), Hyderabad, for example, the director, Mr Gopal
60, 
argued that the debate over Bt Cotton had  generated “more heat than light” and that NGOs had 
entered into a position of “permanent critique” that was not useful to farmers
61. This criticism is 
shared even by those critical of Monsanto and of what they see as over enthusiasm about the new 
technologies  such  as  Dr  Kranthi  of  the  CICR,  whose  work  has  been  selectively  quoted  by  NGO 
activists  themselves.  He  argued
62  that  NGOs were “mainly  spreading  confusion”  about  what  he 
thought were the multi causal origins of Bt cotton’s ‘success’ or ‘failure’ (see below). In his capacity 
                                                           
57 Interview/Lecture number 55.c 
58 For example a brief roundtable discussion the author had with scientists at the University of Agricultural 
Science, Bangalore: Interview number 87. 
59 Pray and Naseem (2007: 22) make the similar point that NGOs working with public sector scientists could be 
making a strong case for pro poor research, instead they are working against each other. 
60 Interview number 34 
61 See also his specific criticisms of the DDS, which he once directed, in chapter three. 
62 Interview number 36 65 
as an active researcher trying to produce Bt cotton varieties (rather than hybrids) in the public sector 
he argued that the debate was being directed away from issues about the  management of the 
technology toward essentialist questions about the technology itself.  
Finally, one crucial impact of the Bt Cotton debate has been its legacy in the current debate about Bt 
brinjal (eggplant) in India. As Herring (2011) argues, the organizational infrastructure and memes of 
the anti- Bt Cotton coalition – what Herring refers to as “the residue of cotton politics” (3) have 
proven more effective when applied to Bt brinjal (in achieving a ban on the product), because of the 
even more marginal political influence that small brinjal farmers have on policy decisions. 
Table 11 summarizes some of the most salient points about the impact of activist memes on policy 
and on the context for debate about policy. Crucially these impacts should be considered in terms of 
the potential debates that are precluded when certain narratives dominate public discussion as well 
as in terms of the immediate consequences on policy. 
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Table 2.11. Summary of impacts
63 of activism on GMO related policy and debate 
Direct impacts  Indirect consequences 
Pressure  on  regulatory 
apparatus  to  take 
precautionary  approach, via 
court  cases  and  media 
campaigns 
Delays  in  legalization  of  larger  numbers  of  Bt  hybrids; 
advantage to Monsanto over smaller Indian competitors when 
regulatory  hurdles  higher;  increase  in  illegal  seed  meaning 
higher  percentage  of  ‘spurious’  seed  sold  leading  to  crop 
failures;  
Dominance of activist memes 
in  the  public  sphere  (as 
illustrated above) 
Precludes debate about a. price of seeds.  b. the public/private 
role  in  research  and  marketing.  c.  the  government’s  role  in 
managing  the  new  technologies.  Makes  it  harder  for  public 
sector  scientists  to  make  their  case  for  pro  poor  biotech 
research. Has impacted decisions down the road on Bt Brinjal. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter the activist memes/narratives about Bt Cotton are examined in the 
context of the complex realities of Bt Cotton, literally, ‘on the ground’. After summarizing field 
interviews with groups of cotton farmers themselves, four narratives about Bt Cotton are examined: 
firstly the fundamental claim that the crop ‘failed’,  increasing the poverty of small farmers and their 
vulnerability to market forces; secondly the related linkage of Bt Cotton and farmer suicides; thirdly 
the claim that Bt Cotton is the antithesis of ecological or organic farming and fourthly the ‘non 
meme’ of price and how debate and action over pricing of seeds took place outside the circuit of 
                                                           
63  Of  course,  this  summary  omits  some  of  the  ‘positive’  consequences  that  activist  debate  may  have 
promulgated, and which even critics of those activists in India acknowledge. For example, NGO critics such as 
Mr  Gopal  of  CEC  Hyderabad  admit  that  NGO  memes  played  a  role  in  moderating  Monsanto’s  initially 
exaggerated advertising claims about Bt Cotton. But others suggested that this mutual critique constituted a 
kind of closed circuit between NGO and corporation and did not actually further the debate. 
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activist memes . In the first three cases a homogenizing and monocausal narrative is ‘confronted’ 
with a complex reality. This could be seen as a rather facile exercise in ‘falsifying’ a set of Manichean 
claims that perhaps even their proponents would accept are meant to attract attention to a more 
fundamental cause. But the aim of the below discussion is not just falsification: rather, each section 
points to possibilities unrealized in the debate over GM crops and to the way complex realities of 
rural ‘crisis’ and poverty get subsumed into transnational meta narratives. As chapter six suggests, 
the  irony  is  that  the  causes  of  rural  crisis  are  often  also  the  enablers  of  this  ‘take  over’  by 
professional mediators.  
As a final pointer to the debates which the Bt Cotton controversy precludes the chapter ends with an 
alternative set of pragmatic cum utopian  ‘demands’ that incorporate GM crops into a pro poor 
agenda for agriculture. 
 
What do Farmers say? 
I conducted three field trips to speak with farmers in Andhra Pradesh, with translators (as I do not 
speak Telegu). As pointed out in chapter six there are reasons to be skeptical of information gleaned 
from brief visits to cotton farmers, as opposed to immersive ethnographic work
64. Farmers quite 
openly discussed how they gave different answers to different audiences, and found this a source of 
amusement.
65 On the first field trip, in the vicinity of Warangal, AP, in the company of an anti GMO 
activist, farmers were much more likely to speak negatively about Bt Cotton, but only after the 
activist had raised the issue, even prompting them to ascribe illnesses or allergies to Bt.  Although 
they did not know him personally, they were surely able to pick up hints about his own attitudes. 
Conversely, in Guntur, AP, in the presence of a wealthy landowner (who was also an input dealer) 
                                                           
64 Which unfortunately would have been unwise given visa restrictions (lack of research visa). 
65 Interview number 24 with farmers near Warangal. 68 
local  farmers  had  nothing  but  praise  for  the  impact  of  Bt  Cotton
66.  With  a  ‘neutral’  research 
assistant,  known  as  distant  kin  to  farmers  in  Sidupuram,  AP,  farmers  were  neither  particularly 
enthusiastic nor critical of Bt. 
Some farmers in the group interviewed near Warangal spontaneously raised issues of ‘sovereignty’ 
and ‘foreigners’ damaging their way of life, complaining about the “a/c” [air conditioned] way of life 
that elites led in Warangal
67 and its distance from real farmers. Farmers here (four interviewed 
individually off the side of the road, then a group of about 12 together in a hamlet), were farming on 
non irrigated land, and were clearly willing, with just a little prompting  from the activist translator, 
to blame Bt cotton for various different problems, including the ‘wilt’ of leaves, asthmatic attacks in 
farmers and ‘poisoning’ of the soil by something in the plant, none of which could be plausibly 
assigned to Bt from a biological standpoint. Often, when pushed by the activist, they claimed to have 
heard ‘stories’ about sheep or cattle deaths, although tellingly, one farmer claimed that it was rare 
for sheep to be allowed to graze on cotton fields, so he doubted the stories (see chapter three). It 
should also be stressed that in many of these areas support for the Naxalite rebels runs high – with 
monuments  to  Naxalite  martyrs  in  many  villages,  so  that  the  activist’s  linking  of  Bt  to 
external/foreign interventions or colonialism (given the Naxalites’ anti imperialist rhetoric) would 
have extra resonance here. 
In Sidupuram, a village 12 km from Warangal
68, where farmers were fortunate to be beneficiaries of 
an Australian irrigation scheme, Bt Cotton was seen more positively, with farmers cl aiming that Bt 
had meant fewer costs for pesticide use and higher yields. Interestingly some of the problems 
assigned to Bt cotton in the first group of farmers in Warangal, including respitory problems and 
‘poisoned’ soil, were here ascribed to previous high levels of pesticide use. Not all farmers here were 
                                                           
66 Interviews number 12 b 
67 That the medium sized town of Warangal is taken by farmers to represent elite, metropolitan values and 
decadent luxury reveals the sheer social distance between small cotton farmers and the transnational arena in 
which NGOs flourish. 
68 Interview number 27 69 
enthusiastic about Bt Cotton, although the minority (two out of ten farmers interviewed individually 
or collectively) who were less enthused saw it as making no difference rather than being harmful. 
Obviously the agronomic surveys described below give a more objective picture of the success or 
failure of Bt Cotton, but even from these brief field interviews with farmers relevant sociology of 
knowledge insights emerged: that farmers’ responses are highly attuned to their interlocutors; that 
rural India is rife with rumors and hearsay claims about the causes of bad outcomes, which could 
easily  be  assigned  by  an  interlocutor  to  an  external  influence;  and  that  whether  farmers  were 
basically in a good or bad socio-economic situation probably makes a big difference as to whether an 
external factor like Bt Cotton can be framed by interlocutors as the cause of problems (with the non 
irrigated farmers near Warangal easily, with the irrigated farmers in Sidupuram less so). This ease 
with which failures and problems can easily be assigned to available causes obviously applies even 
more at higher levels of civil society, removed from rural realities, and this is explored in the next 
section concerned with Bt Cotton ‘failure’. 
 
‘Failure’ of Bt Cotton? 
As described above in the media analyses, google searches and parliamentary questions the most 
popular meme about Bt Cotton in the last ten years  has been the claim of ‘failure’. For example the 
titles  of  several  Deccan  Development  Society  (DDS)  video  documentaries  talk  of  “Bt  Cotton  in 
Andhra Pradesh: A Three Year Fraud” and “Bt Cotton: A Disaster in Search of Success”. In addition 
activists  have produced several studies since the early years of Bt Cotton adoption showing ‘failure’ 
of the crop
69 . 
                                                           
69 Studies from four of the most prominent activist organizations are Shiva and Jaffri (2003); Qayam and 
Sakkhari (2006); VJAS (2006); Sahai and Rahman (2003) and GRAIN (2004), representing  the survey work of 
Shiva’s RSFTE, the DDS, the VJAS, Gene Campaign and GRAIN.  70 
Most NGO originated survey claims, however,  are based on opaque research methodologies and 
small sample sizes
70, however, there is one interesting exception in the form of a very detailed 
analysis of cotton production by the Centre for Science and Environment in Delhi (CSE 2006), which 
acknowledges gains in yield and profits for formers in various statistical tables, but strains in its 
editorializing of these statistics to link B Cotton with broader themes of crisis  in the cotton industry 
connected to low tariffs and high US cotton subsidies. The CSE, however, is noticeably not part of 
the main anti GMO networks in India, and like Oxfam UK in the late 1990’s, its more nuanced 
analysis has made it the object of criticism by other activist groups (see discussion in chapter three). 
The defenders of Bt Cotton point to all-India statistics showing very strong gains after Bt adoption. 
For example, India’s Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASSOCHAM, 2007) conducted 
a 6,000 farmer study of Bt and non Bt farmers in nine cotton growing states finding that 93% of Bt 
farmers were satisfied with the performance of the crop, that net revenue increases (compared to 
non Bt Cotton) were 7757 Rs per acre, taking into account higher yields (50% higher than non Bt) 
and reduction in pesticide use (37% lower than conventional cotton). Vasant Gandhi’s (2006) study 
of nearly 700 Bt and non Bt cotton farmers in four states backs up this study, finding that overall Bt 
Cotton produced 80-90% higher profits for farmers when taking into account yields, input costs, and 
reduced pesticide sprayings, with farmers satisfied with Bt Cotton and only unhappy with the high 
cost of the seed at the time of the survey. Crucially higher yields applied roughly equally to both 
irrigated and rain fed conditions (around two thirds of cotton farmers farm in rain fed conditions in 
India). Studies by Narayanamoorthy and Kalamikar (2006) for Vidarbha in Maharashtra (supposedly 
the most crisis hit part of the cotton belt) and Peshin et al (2007) for Punjab also find significant 
                                                           
70 No clear research methodologies are made available for the widely cited DDS study for example. Chapters 
three and six explore the problems of studies based on villages where organizations are working or might be 
working in the future, leading to a clear conflict of interest, with low paid NGO volunteers inclined to 
harmonize their findings with those of NGO leaders, for obvious career oriented reasons. But basic 
methodological problems exist with all these NGO studies, (IFPRI, 2008: 22), apart from perverse incentives. 
Most obviously, NGO studies select small samples in those (few) areas where Bt cotton was initially 
unsuccessful, for reasons described in this chapter. They then unjustifiably generalize these local findings to 
the whole of India. 71 
gains  in  yield  which  outweigh  marginal  increases  in  costs  of  seed.  Most  of  these  studies  were 
conducted before the 2005 court case in AP which led to a sharp price cut for MMB’s Bt seeds, so 
the cost part of these equations has probably been lower since the 2006 season. All these studies, in 
contrast to NGO studies were conducted using random sampling techniques and in most of the cited 
studies included both irrigated and rain fed farmers, farmers on different types of soil (black and red 
soils), and different hybrids of cotton (Bt and non Bt). 
On the macro level, Government of India statistics (Government of India, 2008) confirm that cotton 
has experienced relatively much higher gains in productivity over rival crops since the introduction 
of Bt technology
71. The below table reproduces some telling statistics from that survey (Government 
of India: 161) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
71 The report itself suggests that Bt Cotton is the key variable in explaining increased yields (Government of 
India 2008: 161). 72 
Table 2.12. Rates of growth in yield and production for major crops in India 
  rice  wheat  pulses  foodgrains  cotton  oilseeds  sugarcane 
Growth in production (%)               
1989-2007  1.17  1.90  -0.03  1.18  2.04  1.25  1.13 
1992-1997  1.73  3.60  0.66  1.88  4.88  3.57  3.74 
1997-2002  1.13  1.26  -2.52  0.67  -5.79  -4.68  1.23 
2002-2006  1.75  0.42  3.27  1.61  20.22  9.81  -1.23 
Growth in yield (%)               
1989-2007  1.02  1.16  0.32  1.43  1.17  1.24  -0.04 
1992-1997  1.27  2.06  1.01  2.05  0.77  2.96  1.14 
1997-2002  0.75  1.41  -0.76  1.23  4.56  -1.38  -0.53 
2002-2006  2.10  -0.66  1.25  1.09  18.48  4.11  0.36 
 
The figures in bold type show cotton outperforming other crops and outperforming its own figures 
from before the legalization of Bt Cotton in 2002.  Cotton appears to be an exception in a time of 
relative agricultural stagnation in India. The same report shows a reduction in pesti cide use (for 
which cotton farmers are the largest users) from 72,000 tonnes in 1991-92 to 38,000 tonnes in 2006-
07, seemingly concurring with Gandhi’s (2006: 11) finding that pesticide sprayings per season had 
been reduced by about 30% on Bt Cotton fields. Ramaswani and Pray (2007) additionally argue that 
the  financial  gains  from  these  increased  yields  have  accrued  more  to  farmers  than  to  seed 
companies (and initially that means MMB), in the ratio of two thirds to one third, so that the 
narrative of ‘exploitation’ cannot be maintained. 73 
So what are the grounds for claims about Bt Cotton ‘failure’? There are two issues here, which 
should not be confused. The first, and more straightforward concerns problems with initial versions 
of Bt, in MMB’s first three hybrids. The second  concerns regional differentiation in the general 
success of cotton farmers in India. This regional differentiation accounts for the particular problems 
facing cotton farmers in those areas where Bt Cotton is claimed, by organizations like the VJAS, to be 
a  failure, but there is little evidence, other than some more speculative arguments cited below, that 
these regional factors would disproportionately affect the outcome of using Bt seeds.  
To address the relatively simple question, of why Bt Cotton may sometimes have ‘failed’ in its early 
years there is a wide range of secondary literature, especially a series of articles published in India’s 
premier social science journal, Economic and Political Weekly (Naik et al, 2003; Shourie David et al 
2002;  Narayanamoorthy  and  Kalamikar  2006).  These  articles  point  to  problems  with  the  initial 
germplasm, confined to just three hybrids. In some areas and some soils, these hybrids may have 
been inappropriate: the studies point to ‘Bunny’ and ‘Brahma’ hybrids as showing better yields 
(although Naik et al suggest the difference were not great). Ironically, it was the very severity of the 
regulatory  regime  which caused  the  low  number of  hybrids  at  the outset,  despite  NGO  claims, 
especially from Suman Sahai, that poor regulation was leading to ‘failure’. This problem has since 
been resolved by the flood of new Bt hybrids available, to the extent that there may now be too 
many, rather than too few hybrids (see discussion below).  
On these issues Dr Kranthi of the CICR in Nagpur is an important voice, often cited by activists as an 
opponent of Bt Cotton. But in interview he was keen to stress that his criticisms concerned the 
‘management’ of the crop not the technology per se
72. He argued that the wrong ‘grand parent’ 
hybrid for the initial Bt hybrids (cocker 312) had been chosen, which was inappropriate for Indian 
conditions, with only one picking per harvest (better suited for American machine picking systems) 
                                                           
72 He has been personally involved in producing Bt varieties available through the public sector (as opposed to 
hybrids) although uptake and distribution of these varieties has been very limited so far. On NGOs he argued 
that they were “mainly spreading confusion” and singled out their “nonsensical” claims about animal deaths in 
relation to ingestion of Bt cotton. (Interview number 36). 74 
and with fibre lengths that were too short and too variable. Better agronomic results in recent years 
had been due to the more appropriate ‘Bunny’ hybrid being used for the Bt gene construct and to 
changes in seed treatment and insecticides that were separate from Bt technology.
73 Kranthi linked 
these poor initial choices with the general failure of public sector science in India to get its voice 
heard and to poor synergies between farmers and scientists in terms of information exchange. 
The more complex question concerns regional differences in cotton farm ing and whether the 
problems of regions specifically affected the performance of Bt Cotton. The relatively faster uptake 
and greater gains in yield in Gujurat, as opposed to Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka is 
one of the key regional differences borne out by the literature. Shah’s (2007) study of Bt cotton in 
Gujurat argues that high densities of social networks linking seed merchants, farmers, cotton agents 
and a wealthy transnational diaspora mark Gujurat out from other cotton growing areas
74. These 
networks assisted in the dissemination of the original ‘illegal’ varieties of Bt Cotton – Navbharat 
seeds – and continued to give farmers confidence in the quality of seeds provided them by seed 
merchants after legalization in 2002
75. In sharp contrast, as numerous interviewees in Maharashtra 
observed, these tight socio-economic networks based around caste solidarity between farmers and 
merchants are lacking in the poorest cotton producing area of Maharashtra  – Vidarbha. This is the 
region where Kishor Tiwari’s VJAS has been able to establish itself as a global witness to the farmer 
suicide crisis, caused, according to him, primarily by the WTO and Monsanto.
76  
                                                           
73 Other interviewees questioned Kranthi here, arguing that cotton has seen exceptional success compared to 
other crops such as chick peas that had also experienced similar new seed treatments. 
74 Shah also points to the ‘dark side’ of the success implied by Gujurat’s high social capital: its efficient 
exploitation of low paid (often adivasi) labor to engage in cross pollination of cotton seeds and produce stably 
performing hybrids. However, her essay’s implicit linking of the Bt technology with this political economy of 
exploited labor is strained, and resembles  the CSE’s ambivalent assessment of Bt Cotton described above. 
These authors, despite their nuanced analyses of the contextual political economy of cotton production, seem 
unwilling to ‘give up’ Bt technology as a talisman of exploitation, but in doing so they miss the value of a real 
critique, which should be to point to the potentially utopian (but hitherto suppressed) potentialities of a given 
technology. 
75 Legalization that was abetted and pushed for by protests in Gujurat. 
76 Interview number 42 75 
In interview
77 Vivek Deshpande, editor of the Indian Express in Nagpur, Maharashtra argued that 
activists (aiming in particular at Kishor Tiwari of the VJAS whom he has often criticized in print) had 
missed the “regionally specific complexes” that had determined the success or failure of cotton 
farming. For Deshpande the ‘theatrical’ and ‘symbolic’ claims made by activists involved in the anti-
GMO network distract from less dramaturgically salient factors such as land fragmentation (the 
generational diminution of average landholding size from around ten to a much less efficient  three 
acres over three decades), lack of irrigation ponds, poor water conservation strategies, locally salient 
informational  problems with  newer  cotton  farmers  trying  to  enter  the market  for  a  cash  crop, 
comparatively poor economic networks in Maharashtra as opposed to neighboring Gujurat, and 
local  government’s  tendency  to  build  agricultural  strategy  around  vote  banks  rather  than 
infrastructure. 
Other  interviewees  were  at  pains  to  point  regional  factors  that  long  preceded  either  WTO 
membership  or  the  introduction  of  Bt  Cotton.  Taking  the  very  long  view,  eminent  sociologist 
D.N.Dhanagare,  argued  in  interview  that  the  regional  problems  of  Vidarbha  and  the  Telengana 
region of Andhra Pradesh (the other chief ‘hot spot’ for activist claims of Bt induced failure) date 
back  to the feudal social relations and subsistence agriculture prevalent in those regions for most of 
the last 200 years, as opposed to the histories of migration, commercial agriculture and diasporic 
remittances that  created entrepreneurial cultures in Gujurat and Punjab
78. For Dhanagare, debt and 
‘crisis’ in these regions are not recent phenomena but long term legacies. Mohanty (2009) argues 
along similar lines, for long term cleavages inside Maharashtra between politically well connected 
and ethnically united sugar and commercial  farmers in the west, near urban Mumbai, and the 
neglected east (the cotton region) where caste and ethnic divisions prevented a unified movement 
of agriculturalists. 
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Some  former  Shetkari  Sanghatana  leaders  and  advisors,  Pradeep  Apta,  Vijay  Hardikar  and 
Chandrakant Wankhade
79 pointed to more recent political economic factors that have marred the 
Vidarbha region’s  attempts to benefit from new technologies. These commentators were mostly 
academics or journalists who had formerly been involved in farmers’ movements (see chapter five) 
in the 1980’s and early 90’s. They were not involved in the anti-GMO network. They were mostly 
positive about the role Bt Cotton had played in these regions, and while some were critical of MMB’s 
advertising campaigns they saw the Bt issue as a minor one in relation to these underlying systemic 
and political problems. Many of their comments bore a similarity to the comments of experts
80 on 
the area of Andhra Pradesh around Warangal, which has been the other geographical fo cus of 
negative claims about Bt Cotton (although crucially these claims do not talk about ‘failure’ as  local 
failure).  The following list attempts to summarize the comments  made in these interviews in the 
form of a socio-economic overview of what has happened to these cotton growing areas over the 
last twenty or thirty years: 
  Vidarbha and the Warangal area of Andhra Pradesh were never fully integrated into 
commercial networks, due to long term historical legacies (persistent feudal and 
semi feudal systems) in these areas. 
  With  the  gradual  collapse  of  the  reciprocal  ‘village  system’  (for  example  non 
monetary  exchanges  of  labor  and  product),  the  monetization  of  working 
relationships and then, crucially the ‘withdrawal of the state’ (agricultural extension, 
state seed companies and minimum support prices)in the 1990’s period of economic 
reform
81 these regions were comparatively hardest hit.  
  The reason for this comparative failure was that small cotton farmers did not have 
the  social  networks  necessary  to  thrive  under  the  new  conditions.  Interviewees 
                                                           
79 Interviews number 65, 67 and 82 
80 Venkateshwalu, Telengana independence activist and academic, interview number 79 and Narasinha Reddy, 
agricultural correspondent  of Telegu language newspaper Eenadu, interview number 5. 
81 See the discussion in Chapter six of the sociological ‘background’ for a fuller overview of this analysis. 77 
spoke  of  continual  conflict  between  farmers,  input  dealers
82, moneylenders and 
cotton mills, in which the economic and political power lay with the dealers, 
moneylenders and mills. This conflict means low information, and poor choices, for 
example, about when to spray crops with pesticide (farmers may have over sprayed 
Bt crops due to advice founded on zero sum relations with pesticide dealers) and 
about the quality of Bt seeds (especially when ‘illegal’). It also means inadequate 
feedback  from  farmers  to  seed  merchants  about  which  seed  varieties/hybrids 
worked best in which conditions – exactly the kind of feedback that helped ‘illlegal’ 
Bt Cotton thrive in Gujurat. 
  State institutions should have stepped in to substitute for the lack of networks in 
these regions, providing information, consolidating landholdings (a kind of reverse 
land reform), providing institutionalized credit and most crucially for cotton farmers, 
irrigation. 
These  arguments  are  supported  by  Deshmukh  (2010),  who  argues  that  in  Eastern  Maharashtra 
specifically, there is a systematic political preference for cotton mills over cotton farmers, which 
leads to inadequate procurement of cotton by the state procurement agency, ‘cheating’ of farmers 
in the form of bad ‘grading’ of the quality of their cotton, and most importantly at the national level 
(188-89)  no  attempt  to  prioritize  cotton  as  an  export  crop
83  by state or federal government 
promotion of integration between farmers and actors further up the production chain.  
The most detailed survey, specifically on the relation of Bt Cotton and rural crisis, comprising a meta 
analysis of published and unpublished data from 2003 to 2008, by the International Food Policy 
                                                           
82 For example Reddy described how cotton buyers and input dealers in Warangal would collude to keep prices 
paid for cotton down at harvest and prices of inputs high during sowing. Frequently moneylenders and input 
dealers were the same people, giving them opportunities to drive unfavorable deals with farmers, for example 
hiking interest rates on loans to buy pesticides during particularly bad outbreaks of pests. These practices 
appear to be far less common in Gujurat where caste solidarity between farmers and dealers insures fewer 
zero sum struggles.  
83 Cotton is not on the agriculture ministry’s list of 10 export crops called the ‘Preference List’, where growers 
and processors are encouraged, through incentives to merge or cooperate. The list includes floriculture, 
wheat, coarse grains, processed foods, spices, horticulture, cashew, oil seeds, rice and sugar. 78 
Research Institute (IFPRI, 2008) concurs on the importance of context for ‘success’ or ‘failure’. The 
four contextual factors this report highlights (IFPRI 2008: 15-20) can be summarized below: 
1.  ‘Spurious’ seeds have been responsible for crop failure, especially in Andhra Pradesh and 
Maharashtra, due to the regional issues of low social capital discussed above and due to 
poor government regulation of hybrids – from too few hybrids initially to too many by 
2007 (135 on the market). Too few meant farmers turned to illegal seeds claimed to suit 
local conditions better; too many meant farmers (in low social capital regions) were 
dependent  on  seed  dealers  for  information  regarding  which  to  use.  Similarly,  Stone 
(2007) in a widely cited piece, describes the confusion facing farmers about which seeds 
to  plant,  a  situation  he  universalizes  to  one  of  ‘de-skilling’  brought  about  by  new 
technologies; his research, based in one of the least successful cotton growing regions in 
Andhra  Pradesh  could  be  seen  as  supporting  the  ‘regional  complexes’  argument 
expounded in this chapter and is clearly not specific to Bt technology per se. 
2.  The decline of agricultural extension services in rural India has meant that “seed and 
fertilizer company agents have been the sole interface between the technology and the 
farmers” (IFPRI: 15). Where good networks exist this has not been a problem, where 
they do not it can mean farmers being exploited by dealers. 
3.  This same lack of information and the perverse incentives of dealers (who usually sell 
both seed and pesticides) have led to excessive spraying regimes, thus impacting the 
financial gains that Bt Cotton should have entailed. 
4.  No central agency has gathered information on Bt Cotton and its various hybrids and 
used that information to disseminate nuanced instructions to farmers.  
However, none of the above analysis backs up the claim that Bt Cotton systematically ‘failed’ or that 
its failures particularly hurt certain poorer regions most. The only evidence for that proposition 
would be that strong social networks assist with the introduction of any new technology, and that 79 
poorer regions lack those networks of trust between dealers and growers. New technology may then 
have provided further opportunities for information-exploitation, as in the example of dealers telling 
farmers to keep using more pesticides even with Bt seeds. On the other hand however, with the 
pesticide ‘internalized’ to the seed, the opportunity for dealers to charge exploitative prices for 
pesticides during a bollworm outbreak should be reduced. The agronomic studies cited above, also 
seem to confirm that gains from Bt Cotton were neutral in terms of size of farm and whether farms 
were irrigated or non irrigated.  
Activists  and  NGOs  campaigning  against  Bt  cotton (the  VJAS  in  Vidarbha  or the  DDS  in  Andhra 
Pradesh) do not often raise these kinds of regional/structural issues, instead preferring to emphasize 
the technology itself, Monsanto’s ‘lies’ and the ‘WTO regime’ which they were keen to associate 
with Bt cotton. In the words of an Indian academic otherwise sympathetic to the anti GMO case
84, Bt 
Cotton had become a ‘red flag to a bull’ for the activist community and parts of the Left.  This 
matters  because  the  structural  issues,  such  as  the  lack  of  integration  between  growers  and 
processors of cotton and the relative government neglect of cotton exports deserve more public 
discussion. It is doubtful that Bt cotton can be used as a suitable ‘wedge’ issue to get these deeper 
problems on the agenda; it is not a suitable symbol because cotton farmers’ problems, as described 
above, are problems of ‘relations’ of production, to use  Marx’s phrase, rather than technologies of 
production. Even when Bt Cotton/Monsanto focused campaigns attract attention to  the crisis in 
cotton farming, therefore, they do so in a romantic modality (chapter four) that obscures rather than 
reveals the real problems. 
 
Farmer suicides and Bt Cotton 
As seen above in the media analysis, ‘farmer suicides’ have been explicitly and implicitly linked to Bt 
Cotton  technology  and  to  Monsanto.  Most  directly  Vandana  Shiva,  who  had  promulgated  the 
                                                           
84 Interview number 72 with Prof A R Vasavi. 80 
‘suicide and globalization’ theme in the 1990’s (Shiva and Jafri, 1998) explicitly connected suicide 
among  farmers  to  Monsanto’s  Bt  Cotton  in  the  following  decade  (Shiva,  2004).  Delhi  activist 
Devinder Sharma has also made the connection, arguing revealingly in interview that “multi causal 
explanations” of farmer suicide “are bunk”.
85  
From around 2004 onwards the main actor linking Bt Cotton and suicides has been Kishor Tiwari of 
Vidarbha’s VJAS, an organization he founded after a long career with General Electric in India. Tiwari 
has acquired national fame in India and apparently the ear of Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh
86 
with his ‘suicide count’ in the Yavatmal district of Maharashtra, in which he informs the Indian media 
on a weekly basis of the number of suicides that have taken place. His campaigning on suicides has 
brought him a nomination for the CNN-IBN  –‘ Indian of the Year’ award for 2006 in the category of 
‘public service’ and an interview in PBS Frontline’s’ documentary about farmer suicides – ‘Seeds of 
Suicide’ (2005).  Other NGOs have been more cautious or ambivalent in making the connection 
between suicides and Bt – especially those with a more technocratic orientation
87 (see chapter 
three). However, the DDS of Hyderabad, in its video materials especially, has been willing to use 
individual biographies to explicitly connect adoption of Bt Cotton to suicide
88. In the case of 
Greenpeace India, while the campaign officer was reluctant to link suicides and Bt Cott on in 
interview with the author, they have nevertheless done so in press releases
89. A recent book on 
Monsanto (Robin, 2008) draws on several of these sources (Shiva, the DDS and Tiwari) in a chapter 
entitled “India: The seeds of Suicide”, presenting the connection as scientific fact. 
                                                           
85 Interview number 53. 
86 He has been credited, even by interviewees otherwise skeptical of his claims, with playing a role in pushing 
Singh to visit the Vidarbha region in July 2007 and confront the issue of compensation to farmers. 
87 Those most keen to distance themselves from this meme in conversation were the CSA in Hyderabad and 
Suman Sahai of Gene Campaign. As argued in chapter three, these technocratic organizations try to avoid 
‘radical’ or sensational claims in order to stay on good terms with state authorities and preserve their access to 
committees and in the case of the CSA to state funding for their organic agriculture projects. 
88 For example in its documentary, ‘A Disaster in Search of a Success: Bt Cotton in the Global South”, discussed 
in chapter four. 
89 For example a description of an anti GM corn meeting from March 23
rd, 2009, on the Greenpeace India 
website (http://www.greenpeace.org/india/en/news/stop-gm-trials-monsanto-qui/) where a “criminal’ 
Monsanto is explicitly blamed for suicides. 81 
As in the case of the ‘regional complexes’ described above, it might be straightforward to ‘debunk’ 
the ‘Bt Cotton causes farmer suicides’ meme by looking only at macro level statistics. For example, 
Table 13, drawn from an important study on this specific topic (IFPRI 2008: 6) shows that at the 
‘macro’ level the idea of an escalation in farmer suicides relative to the general population is a myth: 
Table 2.13. Farmer Suicides and suicides in the general population
90 
Year  Suicide rate/100,000 general pop.  Suicide rate/100,000 farmers 
1997  10.0  1.42 
1998  10.8  1.65 
1999  11.2  1.62 
2000  10.6  1.62 
2001  10.6  1.60 
2002  10.5  1.71 
2003  10.4  1.61 
2004  10.5  1.68 
2005  10.3  1.55 
 
But macro statistics can be misleading. Suicide ‘hot spots’ have coincided with the same troubled 
regions described above, that is, parts of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh that have seen marked 
spikes in farmer suicides, especially in 2002 and 2004 (IFPRI, 2008: 8).  Here, the conclusion of the 
                                                           
90 These figures are drawn from the only state by state official, comparable data source on suicides: the 
National Crime Records Bureau, which as the authors of the IFPRI report make clear is subject to dispute either 
for too low or too high figures for suicides.  82 
IFPRI report concurs with the analysis in the previous section and is worth quoting at length (IFPRI, 
2008: 43): 
One implication of this study is the critical need to distinguish the effect of Bt Cotton as a 
technology  with  the  context  in  which  it  was  introduced……in  addition  the  increasing 
adoption rate in two suicide prone states, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, indicates that 
farmers overall are seeing this technology as one of the solutions to their problem and not a 
cause of the problem….The second implication is that , as farmer suicides are not new or 
specific to recent cases or to the introduction of Bt Cotton, they point toward the failure of 
the socioeconomic environment and institutional settings in rural dry areas of India. 
Apart from this study, which specifically tackles Bt cotton’s relation to suicides, four other major 
reports  have  been  produced  in  recent  years  on  the  subject  of  farmer  suicides:  by  a  Pune, 
Maharashtra, based independent research institute (Yashada 2006); in an academic article by B B 
Mohanty, an academic also based in Pune, (Mohanty 2005), a Government of India,  Ministry of 
Finance  Report  (Government  of  India,  2007)  focusing  on  indebtedness  and  its  causes  and 
consequences and a volume of essays edited by Deshpande and Arora (2010). From these reports an 
explanation of spikes in suicide in particular regions at particular times can be drawn, that coincides 
quite closely with the account of regional ‘failure’ in the previous section.  
These four surveys encompass three broad ways of looking at the suicide crisis: the first based on 
short term failures of the government to offer protections and support to farmers in the wake of 
trade liberalization, the second looking at long term structural and sociological problems in regions 
prone to suicide and the third taking a more Durkheimian view of suicide in the wake of cultural 
shifts in power between urban and rural areas. There are also two more simplistic narratives about 
suicides: one the NGO/activist narrative putting most of the blame on Monsanto and Bt Cotton
91, 
and another dismissive narrative that sees the suicide epidemic as either driven by the perverse 
                                                           
91 In interview Kishor Tiwari (interview number 42) certainly mentioned other factors, mainly corresponding to 
the first ‘narrative’ about trade liberalization and failures to protect farmers from unfair competition. As with 
some other participants in the anti GMO network there is a tension between Tiwari’s obvious knowledge of 
the subtleties of trade politics and the radical simplicity of the message he delivers to the media and online. 
The transnationalizing incentives that create this tension are one of the main themes of this dissertation. 83 
incentive  to  make  compensation  claims  or  as  the  result  of  personal  failures  on  the  part  of 
individuals
92.  
The Government of India report, perhaps surprisingly, takes the first perspective on suicides and 
agrarian crisis, concluding that trade liberalization has had few benefits for rain fed cash crop 
farmers in neglected regions.  The report  emphasizes the failure of the state in the form of 
withdrawal  of  agricultural  extension  services  and  the  state’s  failure  to  act  as  an  effective 
informational mediator between market and farmer. Putting it succinctly the report argues (GOI 
2007:  13)  that  “the  gradual  withdrawal  of  the  state  from  active  participation  in  development 
activities  has  resulted  in  a  steep  decline  in  public  investment  in  agricultural  infrastructure  in 
general.” While an inevitable shift has been taking place from subsistence crops to diversified cash 
crops, the report argues that the state has failed to play its part in offering infrastructure, in the 
form of institutionalized credit or public-private partnerships in agricultural technology, to protect 
farmers  of  cash  crops  from  risks.  Thus  the  government  report  puts  much  of  the  blame  on 
government failures. 
The Mohanty survey emphasizes what he refers to as the “systemic element of causality” (Mohanty, 
2005:  258)  in  farmer  suicides.  By  this  he  means  the  social  systems  in  places  like  Yavatmal, 
Maharashtra  that  fail  small  cotton  farmers.  Information  about  seeds  and  other  inputs  is  only 
available through caste networks that exclude small farmers, who also tend to be from lower caste 
groups (260). According to the article there are now intense, caste based social antagonisms in the 
villages between small, low caste farmers, trying to achieve higher social status and new to cotton 
farming  and upper caste farmers, with strong commercial networks linking them to input merchants 
and  money  lenders.  Mohanty  therefore  sees  farmer  suicide  in  Dukheimian  terms  as  the 
                                                           
92 Journalist Vivek Deshpande in Nagpur referred to earlier, comes close to holding this narrative about suicide 
, although not about agrarian crisis, which, he believes to be real and regional. He had become, by his own 
account a kind of ‘nemesis’ to Tiwari, following up every account of suicide given by Tiwari over one week and 
interviewing families of victims, concluding that heterogeneous  personal factors were mainly to blame for 
suicides and not agricultural factors. But as the Mohanty and Yashoda reports make clear it is not so easy to 
separate personal and structural factors in the causes of suicide.  84 
consequence of a breakdown of reciprocal village systems into intensely competitive individualistic 
systems, without the state stepping in to ameliorate these antagonisms. His analysis echoes and 
contrasts  with  that  of  Shah,  for  Gujurat  (2003)  described  in  the  previous  section,  where  caste 
solidarity among farmers made commercial success in cotton farming possible. 
The Yashada study, uses different kinds of data, collecting over a hundred detailed biographies of 
suicide victims in Yavatmal, Maharashtra. The survey agrees with Mohanty and GOI that it has been 
mainly small farmers new to cotton growing who have committed suicide (Yashada, 2006: 131); it 
also concurs on the failure of government to mediate between markets and farmers in the age of 
liberalization and the informational problems caused by the ‘withdrawal of the state’. But the report 
also  puts  the  suicide  problem  into  a  larger  cultural  context,  describing  the  “social  humiliation” 
common to most of the suicide biographies (Yashada, 2006: 111). This humiliation derives from the 
increasing gap in productivity and earnings between urban and rural incomes combined with a 
continuing need to provide dowries and pay for expensive wedding ceremonies. Not surprisingly, the 
report finds that fathers of unmarried daughters were disproportionately likely to commit suicide 
and  more  likely  to  have  suffered  beforehand  from  the  common  precursor  to  rural  suicide  – 
alcoholism. Thus the report concludes that harvest ‘success’ or ‘failure’ and levels of indebtedness 
alone cannot explain suicides, since both indebtedness and crop ‘failure’ were just as, if not more 
common throughout the twentieth century but in previous times the social context did not translate 
these material problems into suicide.  
The Deshpande and Arora volume concurs with much of the above analysis, emphasizing especially 
the political consequences of the shrinkage of farm size
93 for farmers’ ability to bargain with input 
dealers. Although small size farms are not less efficient qua acreage, it is this lack of bargaining 
power and capital that makes it harder for small farmers to access new inputs or institutionalized 
credit. 
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and Arora 2010: 12). 85 
The aim of these summaries of farmer suicide studies has been to show how the ‘Bt causes suicides’ 
meme is orthogonal to the problems of small cotton farmers. In fact, to the degree that Bt Cotton 
increases yields (as shown above) and acts as an ‘insurance equivalent’ in the seed
94, Bt Cotton 
should be part of the solution set to farmer suicides. The danger, when activists use narratives of 
this kind, with their immediate transnational and elite resonance, is that they obscure the complex 
structural  problems  facing  farmers.  The  campaigning  narrative,  linking  Bt  Cotton,  the  WTO  and 
transnational corporations, may attract media attention, and was arguably partly responsible for 
bringing Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Vidarbha to address the suicide issue, but it fails to 
articulate the structural problems that lie behind suicide and agrarian crisis in particular regions. As 
chapter five seeks to show, grassroots farmers movement such as the Shetkari Sanghatana, in the 
1980’s,  were  able  to  articulate varied  and  specific  issues  because of their  relatively  democratic 
structure and a more favorable political climate for farmers’ issues. Today’s ‘farmer’ organizations 
such as the VJAS, on the other hand, articulate ‘strong’ narratives that resonate in the media, online 
and  among  transnational  activists,  but  which  bear  only  a  loose  connection  to  the  problems  of 
farmers in an era of ‘state withdrawal’ and loss of cultural status for agriculture. When they get to 
speak with those in political power (and it is debatable whether this is often their goal), these new 
organizations may have little in the way of policy to propose or negotiate on. 
 
Bt Cotton versus organics and ‘Ecopragmatism’ 
The meme of genetically modified crops versus organic agriculture receives less prominence in the 
media analysis above. But, as chapter three seeks to show, this meme is crucial to the insertion of 
NGOs into the niche markets for organic cotton in Europe and the USA. The same NGOs
95 that 
                                                           
94 It can be seen as a premium paid to avoid catastrophic losses rather than having to pay exaggerated prices 
at the time of a bollworm epidemic. (Interview number 36 with Prof Kranthi of CICR, Nagpur). 
95 Almost all the campaigning NGOs, including Suman Sahai’s Gene Campaign and Vandana Shiva’s Navdanya, 
also supervise organic cotton farming projects. These projects are frequently referred to in their campaigning 86 
participate in activism against Bt cotton also run organic agricultural projects as evidence of viable 
alternatives to GMOs. In this narrative, the two options – GMO or organic are framed as mutually 
exclusive.  
Before questioning this mutual exclusivity of organics and GMOs, it should be pointed out that the 
viability of organic farming as a solution to rural crisis is also in question in India. As one interviewee 
put  it
96, most small Indian cotton farmers already are de facto organic given lack of access to 
fertilizers and even pesticides. The process of conversion to organic farming takes 6 years according 
to NGO interviewees at several projects, and requires many ‘hidden’ inputs in terms of teaching 
techniques and access to bio fertilizers and natural pesticides, as well as requiring more labor input, 
from workers who are willing to forego opportunities for seasonal work in urban areas.  Based on a a 
recent field study of organic cotton farmers Puttaswamaiaih and Shah (2008) argue that although 
organic farming cut costs, the reduction in yields (compared to conventional farming) outweighed 
the financial gains from reduced input costs
97, and that this calculation does not even take into 
account the various start-up costs borne by the NGO – Agro-Cell -  that supervised the area studied.  
But could the two approaches be combined? There are both theoretical and ‘grassroots’ reasons to 
question this binary opposition between GM technology and organic agriculture. Again, the activist 
narrative may be making pro poor policy harder to articulate rather than ‘speaking for the poor’. 
At  the  theoretical  level,  some  ecologists  are  now  taking  a  much  friendlier  view  of  genetic 
engineering. Stewart Brand, president of the ‘Long Now Foundation’ in California,  has articulated a 
perspective that he christens ‘ecopragmatism’. In Brand’s latest book (Brand, 2009, Ch 6), he draws 
on the pragmatic approach of Indian agricultural scientist M.S.Swaminathan, known as the ‘father of 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
literature and in the case of smaller regional NGO’s, such as Warangal’s MARI, provide a large amount of their 
funding. (see chapter three for details). 
96 Interview number 21 with Prof. Deshpande of ISEC, Bangalore. 
97 Yields were 32 % less than on non organic farms in the vicinity of the project while input costs (not including 
NGO payments and training costs) were 19% less. 87 
the green revolution’, to extol the possibilities of biotechnology in the global south, quoting a speech 
by Swaminathan from 2006, (Brand, 2009: 191), in which he declared: 
The difference between organic farming and green agriculture is: You use integrated pest 
management, integrated nutrient supply, scientific water management  – all methods by 
which the potential of the soil is not reduced – and also you can use molecular breeding or 
Mendelian breeding, whichever is most appropriate. [italics in the original] 
This ‘and also’ is a crucial reason why activist narratives that must separate ‘green’ and ‘organic’ 
approaches, for organizational and marketing reasons, are flawed. As Brand, and numerous others 
have  pointed  out,  new  work  in  evolutionary  biology  shows  that  “life  at  its  most  creative  is 
transgenic” (Brand, 2009: 176). In other words, gene swapping via viruses – so called ‘horizontal 
gene swapping’ is ubiquitous in nature, perhaps even the “dominant engine of evolution” 
98(Brand, 
2009: 175). If this point might seem esoteric, Brand also points out that seeds, including organic 
seeds, have been produced for decades by selecting the best varieties after bombarding them with 
radiation – a process known as radiation mutagenesis. This process, very common between 1965 
and 1990 and not subject to regulation in the EU
99, is rarely critiqued in the literature supporting a 
pure version of organic farming, even though  the varieties that result from mutagenesis may be 
theoretically  more  prone  to  the  k inds  of  ‘unpredictable’  consequences  for  phenotype  that 
campaigners have attributed to single gene insertion
100 (Demain and Solomon 1981 cited in Miller 
and Conko 2004: 6). 
Brand joins Lipton (2007) and Paarlberg (2010) in arguing that problems about property rights and 
access to gene constructs by the public sector in the global south can be addressed, but that activism 
                                                           
98 Brand contrasts this fact with the sub-Heideggerian rhetoric common to some organic agriculture ‘purists’, 
such as the argument that “Genetic engineering does not respect the characteristic way of being (“nature”) of 
living organisms.” (Brand, 2009: 185). See chapter four for further analysis of the ‘romantic’ framing of nature 
entailed in this kind of rhetoric. 
99 Information from Federal Government of Germany website: http://www.gmo-
safety.eu/glossary/815.mutagenesis.html 
100 Other ‘internal contradictions’ of the organic discourse include the fact that biotechnology as applied to 
pharmaceuticals, such as insulin for diabetics, has not been the target of anti-GMO activists. (Herring, Personal 
communication) 88 
has  made  it  harder  not  easier  to engage  in  those kinds  of  discussions  and negotiations.  When 
Greenpeace  for  example  sets  itself  permanently  against  GE  technology  for  bananas,  cassava, 
sorghum and ‘golden’ rice (Brand, 2009: 195), it demonstrates an intransigence which filters down to 
activists at all levels, contributing to a climate of insecurity that Brand likens to the fears of the 
national security community on new technologies (Brand, 2009: 203).  
Bringing the discussion down to the local level: Cornell researcher Devparna Roy’s work (Roy, 2006), 
among Gujurati ‘organic’ cotton farmers shows that the binary opposition between organic and 
genetically modified also does not hold among grassroots farmers. Roy conducted interviews with 
organic cotton farmers in Gujurat from 2002 to 2004 and found (Roy 2006: 174-75) that from a 
sample of 30 self declared ‘organic’ farmers, 12 followed activist memes about the incompatibility of 
GM crops and organic crops (the ‘organismic’ view about an ‘essential’ nature), while 13 farmers 
believed Bt cotton was part of organic agriculture, mainly because the pesticidal component was ‘in’ 
the plant not in the form of ‘external’ pesticide sprays.  
These  examples  of  show  that  activist  narratives  may  not  be  in  tune  with  the  interests  or 
interpretations of small farmers themselves.  Chapters three and four pursue the themes of organic 
agriculture through the lenses, respectively, or organizational incentives facing NGOs in India and 
the  ‘romantic’  interpretation  of  nature  and  agriculture  that  informs  transnational  framings  of 
agricultural politics. 
 
Bt Cotton and the price of seeds 
The final specific issue to be addressed in this chapter is that of the controversy over the (initial) 
pricing of seeds by Monsanto and its licensees in India. Here, the question is somewhat different: it 
is the non appearance of the issue in activist discourse that is of interest. As seen in the media 
analysis section, price rarely gets a mention in media discourse, and those stories that did mention 89 
price originated from Left farmer unions in Andhra Pradesh and from Andhra Pradesh government 
officials, not from NGOs or activists. In fact, activists interviewed admitted that they did not want to 
get  involved  in  discussions  about  the  price  of  seeds.  The  Greenpeace  India  campaign  officer
101 
argued  that  price  was  “not  their  concern”  and  that    farmers’  unions  were  being  “tricked’  by 
Monsanto into engaging on this issue rather than the crucial issue (for Greenpeace) of the biosafety, 
health and larger ideological objections to Bt cotton. Although Kishor Tiwari of the VJAS talked about 
price in his interview, and Vandana Shiva sometimes writes about price issues in her attacks on 
Monsanto, neither campaigner was in a position to formulate a demand for lower prices of Bt seeds, 
whether through regulatory changes or public sector involvement, because their identity as activists 
had come to depend on a non negotiable opposition to GM crops.
102 
But in January 2006, the Andhra Pradesh government filed a case against Monsanto at the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (MRTPC) over the pricing of Bt cotton seeds, 
which the state won in a judgment of May 11
th,  2006  (CSE,  2006:  28).  The  court  found  that 
Monsanto was charging an excessive trait fee of Rs 1250 per 450 gram pack of seed, whereas for the 
same amount of seed in China the fee was just Rs 90 and in the USA the equivalent of Rs 150. After 
initially  fighting  this  decision  Monsanto  lowered  the  price  of  the  trait  value  on  its  seed  across 
India
103.  
While some economists argue that this decision smacked of populism and that the long term effect 
might  be  to deter innovation among private  seed companies (Pray and Naseem, 2007),  the 
consensus among interviewees in Andhra Pradesh was that the decision was a major success for 
cotton farmers, not just in price of legal s eeds but because the reduction virtually eliminated the 
                                                           
101 Interview number 22 
102 Although this is probably less true of Tiwari than Shiva, since he runs a much smaller operation and is less 
tied to transnational sources of funding. As of Summer, 2011 however, there is no evidence of a shift in the 
VJAS position on Bt Cotton. 
103 In interview Monsanto India vice president Raj Ketkar (interview number 26) offered various justifications 
for this ‘excessive’ pricing, arguing that Chinese farmers used more seed per acre, therefore justifying a higher 
price in India to compensate Monsanto for its research costs.  90 
market for ‘illegal’ seeds that were more likely to be spurious and cause failure
104. The key point for 
the  argument  of  this  dissertation  is  that  the  process  whereby  complaints  about  price  were 
addressed  was  through  ‘traditional’  political  mechanisms  plus  a  certain  amount  of  chance;  the 
activist network did not participate in this process. In fact, one of the activists’ most impressive 
policy achievements had occurred in Andhra Pradesh the previous year, 2005, when the three initial 
Bt cotton hybrids were banned by the state government
105. The comparison is telling, because this 
banning was largely symbolic  – at this point new and better hybrids were coming on the market, 
whereas the price decision in 2006 put money in farmers’ hands that would not have been there 
otherwise
106. 
Which actors were involved in the decision to take Monsanto to the MRTPC? According to Andhra 
Pradesh’ s agriculture minister
107 those pushing for the move included the Congress Party’s own 
officials on the ground, the Communist Party of India’s (CPI’s) associated farmers’ union, and an 
unusually committed agriculture commissioner of the state – Punam Malkondiah.  The minister was 
keen to stress that activists and NGOs played no role in the decision, and in none of the interviews 
conducted  with  activists  did  anyone  claim  credit  for  it.  According  to  other  interviewees  it  was 
Nuziveedu Seeds, a major Indian rival to Mayhco-Monsanto, that provided the main ‘push’ to the AP 
government, presumably though bribes, in the (justified) expectation that lowering the seed price 
would destroy the market for illegal Bt seeds and increase its own market share, or perhaps as 
‘punishment’ to Monsanto for what they felt was an unfair monopoly over the seed market based 
on the pro-Monsanto consequences of India’s strict regulatory regime
108.  
                                                           
104 This point was made by Guntur, Andhra Pradesh, director of agriculture for the local government. Interview 
number 12. 
105 Although one interviewee argued, off the record, that this decision was brought about by pressure from 
Nuziveedu Seeds in order for them to be able to sell their own Bt seeds illegally after the ban and increase 
their market share. If this is true, then even the NGO campaigners’ biggest ‘win’ may be questionable. 
106 The AP agriculture minister claimed that the decision had put 180 crore rupees (around $40 million) into 
the pockets of Andhra farmers. 
107 Interview number 7 
108 This is one implication of the analysis of the dispute in CSE, 2006: 28, where it is pointed out that at the 
MRTPC trial a previous dispute between Nuziveedu and Monsanto was brought up 91 
The upshot of this episode, is twofold. Firstly, activists have deliberately paid little attention to issues 
of price, for obvious reasons – their identity and organizational incentives, described in the following 
two chapters, make it impossible for them to advocate on behalf of farmers on issues of pricing, 
because they are committed to opposing GM crops in whatever form. Secondly, the price trial was 
the result of a contingent coming together of actors – a committed agriculture commissioner for 
Andhra Pradesh
109, a private sector dispute between Nuziveedu Seeds and Monsanto and a Congress 
Party in the state that had staked some of its political prestige on addressing farmers’ issues. The 
contingency of these factors actually highlights the vacuum of representation for farmers’ issues in 
India. With no powerful activist groups addressing fundamental material concerns like price, and 
with media space taken up with activists memes about the ‘failure’ of Bt Cotton and its dangers, few 
groups speak for farmers, as once was the case in the 1980’s.  
 
A ‘modernist’ agenda that includes GM Crops? 
Finally, it is a useful exercise to draw up an ‘imaginary’ or ‘ideal’ agenda that includes GM crops, but 
which has pro poor goals. This agenda could be labelled ‘modernist’ or ‘developmentalist’ in the 
sense that it proposes, not a withdrawal from state and market institutions but a strengthening of 
them (Gupta 2000; 2009, Jodhka 2007). The purpose of this exercise from the point of view of the 
dissertation  as  a  whole  is  to  point  to the  ‘missing’  agenda  in  the  public  sphere  in  India.  In  an 
alternative world, what might activists be arguing? Making this case highlights the narrow set of 
options  that  dominate  the  activist  network  and encourages  a  critique of  why  that  spectrum  of 
options is relatively narrow. As Reiss and Straughan (1996: Ch 6) argue, in their overview of the 
ethical  considerations  surrounding  GM  crops,  there  is  no  a  priori  reason  why  certain  ethical 
‘absolutes’ should block the consideration of costs and benefits of new technologies, especially, we 
                                                           
109 Several interviewees pointed out this fact, speaking volumes for the status of farmers’ concerns when they 
expressed surprise that an agriculture commissioner would a. have an agricultural background and b. care 
about farmers. 92 
might add,  when those ‘absolutes’ tend to be ideas about nature held by middle class northern 
publics or southern elites.  
Some items in this pro poor agenda are specific to Bt cotton: 
  An active role for agricultural extension services in surveying and processing data on which 
hybrids are appropriate for which agronomic region. Local ‘failures’ of Bt cotton in India can 
be partly ascribed to a lack of information flow between farmers and seed manufacturers. At 
the beginning of Bt’s introduction there were too few, and probably inappropriate hybrids, 
whereas later there have been too many, leading to confusion and ‘gambling’ (Stone, 2007) 
over  which  to  choose.  Arguably,  only  the  state  can  intervene  to  provide  this  relevant 
information. Bt farmers also need information about how often and when to spray Bt crops, 
and input dealers are unreliable mediators of this information. 
  The state could push for the use of Bt varieties as opposed to Bt hybrids. Some evidence 
suggests (CSE, 2006: 25, drawing on CICR research) that varieties, as used in China, might 
have  been  more  effective  against  bollworm  infestations,  as  well  as  being  cheaper  for 
farmers. While the CICR has produced Bt varieties they have had little impact on the market, 
and again, this is connected to the withdrawal of the state from the arena. Lipton (2007: 7) 
makes a similar case for multi-gene insect resistance rather than single gene, arguing that  
  The withdrawal of the state may date back even further, according to various sources
110, to 
the failure of the Indian government (more specifically, the Indian Council of Agricultural 
Research, ICAR) to accept an offer from Monsanto in 1993 to purchase the Bt gene construct 
and use it, through the public se ctor, to produce Bt seeds. This   kind of public-private 
partnerships, or “fee for service” deal (Lipton, 2007: 14) has been neglected and the role of 
activists in deterring such deals cannot be discounted. 
                                                           
110 Raj Ketkar, vice president of Monsanto, India. Interview number 26 and Dr Narayanan of ANGROU, Guntur, 
Andhra Pradesh. Interview number 13.  93 
  Bt seeds are a technology that is beneficial for small and large farmers, independent of size 
of farm,  and which should cut costs overall if pesticide spraying is reduced, but for small 
farmers to get access to seeds might require institutionalized credit. Small farmers, from low 
caste groups in ‘low social capital’ regions such as Vidarbha, Maharashtra, or certain parts of 
Andhra Pradesh, do require state help in terms of credit and possibly a return to some of the 
state run seed distribution mechanisms that have disappeared since the period of liberal 
reform.  
In more general terms, Lipton (2007) argues that the state does need to intervene to push the 
private  sector  in  the  direction  of  pro  poor  research  priorities
111, but that even private sector 
innovations alone will have likely positive effects on  marginal and  poorer farmers (55); more so 
arguably than in the Green Revolution, where positive impacts were size and resource  dependent. 
In summary, Lipton makes a  point that is significant for the argument of this dissertation that (35), 
“Policy makers have agency, and can turn almost any breeding strategy in favor of – or against – the 
rural poor “.  
‘Pushing’ this agency in the direction of the poor is part of any definition of pro poor activism or pro 
poor social movements. This chapter has highlighted some of the ways that the anti-GMO network 
in India may not have played a constructive role in this process, and in many ways has achieved the 
opposite: providing ammunition for the Indian state to raise regulatory barriers, favoring Monsanto 
(MMB) over smaller Indian companies or the public sector, distracting attention from the ‘tougher’ 
politics of relations between growers and the textile industry, and perhaps most crucially in the long 
term,  starving  the  public  sphere  of  alternative  voices  arguing  for  a  pro  poor  direction  in 
biotechnology research. 
                                                           
111 That is into traits that bring “higher yields and greater robustness for staples in water-insecure 
environments”, (Lipton, 2007: 54) rather than being chosen to suit consumers in the global north. 94 
As Anitha Ramanna, of Pune University argues on the basis of interviews with cotton farmers in 
Maharashtra: (Ramanna 2006: 18): 
The  farmers’  viewpoint  appears  to  be  starkly  different  from  both  the  pro  and  anti-GM 
networks. Farmer experiences with Bt cotton do not correlate with views of Bt cotton as an 
answer to poverty nor as a harbinger of hunger. The farmer is neither an autonomous entity, 
whose views can simply be taken out of context to make policy decisions on the ‘need’ for 
GM technology, nor is he a victim as portrayed by NGOs. The farmer’s view illustrates the 
importance of viewing any technology in a holistic perspective in relation to agricultural 
practices and not in terms of reductionist frames.  
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Chapter Three: How the anti GMO Network Couples with other Organizations  
 
Introduction 
This chapter argues that the transnational activist network that has arisen around opposition to 
GMOs  in  India  represents  constellations  of  interests  which  forge  functional    linkages  of mutual 
dependence, or what Niklas Luhmann (for example Luhmann 2000: Ch’s 9 and 15) calls ‘structural 
couplings’
112. It will be argued that these constellations or couplings cannot easily be accounted for 
as bottom up, normative responses to external threats of the kind described in the recent academic 
literature on TANs (for example Reitan 2007 as discussed in Chapter 1).  The aim of the chapter is to 
provide a model for how to conceptualize new activist networks in global politics, one less focused 
on the stated aims of these networks and more alert to the unanticipated dependencies they create 
with actors in civil society, the state, the media, the donor community and the private sector. 
This chapter brings the debate on TANs into touch with the large and critical literature that already 
exists on NGOs in the developing world, and asks what the advantages might be of applying the 
themes of this literature to the study of TANs. The thinking behind this is twofold: firstly that the 
NGO literature pays more attention to questions of linkages, co-dependence and institutional self-
interest; questions which have been under emphasized in the literature on TANs; secondly, that it 
many cases TANs are highly NGO-ized anyway, and the anti GMO TAN is exemplary in this regard, 
with most of the main actors running NGOs. 
The empirical part of the chapter begins with an  institutional map of the organizations in India 
devoted to opposing GMOs, showing how they operate geographically and how they are connected 
                                                           
112 For Luhmann these couplings are not mere marriages of material convenience but mutual agreements to 
schematize reality in ways that reduce chaos and entropy for both partners to the coupling: eventually both 
organizations in the coupling come to rely on the other’s ways of ‘coding’ reality as an input into their own 
system.  96 
to each other in clusters of mutually dependent and cooperative nodes in a larger network. The next 
section of the chapter examines the various interests that are at work at the various levels of the 
network, analyzing the co dependence between the network actors and various powerful and less 
powerful actors at international, national and local levels.  
 
TANs and NGOs: Redefining ‘brokerage’ by learning from the literature on NGOs 
One of the aims of chapter one was to describe the recent academic outpouring of work on TANs in 
the wake of Keck and Sikkink’s original (1998) work, and to show how this literature might be 
brought to bear on the anti-GMO case in India. Scholar-advocates such as Reitan (2007), Smith 
(2008), McMichael (2005), Featherstone (2008) and Routledge (2009) have argued that TANs herald 
a new form of political participation, based on transnational flows of information and networked 
forms of political cooperation across borders. These forms of politics are seen as the natural counter 
movement  to  the  flows  of  capital,  goods  and  neoliberal  ideology  brought  about  by  economic 
globalization.  As explained in chapter one, the anti-GMO coalition in India has been specifically 
highlighted  in  the  work  of  some  of  these  scholar  advocates  (Featherstone  2008;  Reitan  2007; 
Schurman and Munro 2010) and on first analysis the network would seem to be an exemplary case 
of TANs in action, whereby grassroots voices, and if not grassroots, at least non conforming voices, 
from  the  global  south  are  translated  into  protests  that  attract  a  world-wide  following,  gaining  
capacity from transnational linkages to affect politics at the domestic level in the global south, in the 
classic form of a ‘boomerang’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998) 
At the same time as a (mainly celebratory) literature on TANs has been gathering force, there have 
been numerous more circumspect analyses of the rise of NGOs as an institutional form in the global 
south,  as  providers  of  development  assistance,  as  mediators  between  International  Financial 97 
Institutions and local states and as advocates for the poor
113. Few scholars (with the clear exception 
of Bob 2005) have attempted to link the two literatures conceptually. Below, we discuss the critical 
literature  on  NGOs  in  ways  that  will  hopefully  prove  useful  for  the  analysis  of  TANs,  and 
transnational social movements more broadly. I divide the existing critiques of NGOs into radical, 
institutionalist and ethnographic schools of thought, and  then ask: to what extent can this  critical 
literature on NGOs teach us lessons that might then be applied to the study of activist networks and 
global civil society more broadly? 
Firstly, on the left, NGOs have been seen as a threat to more traditional forms of social mobilization 
based around class interests. Petras (1999) for example, condemns the way in which NGOs deflect 
mass anger at what he sees, following dependency and world systems theories, as imperialist 
economic exploitation in the global south. By fragmenting the poor into sub sectors, each dependent 
on particular NGOs, the potential for mass protest is pre-empted, and on the normative level “ersatz 
globalism”, as Petras terms it, replaces the possibility of radical class consciousness across borders.  
India and South Asia, as high NGO growth areas, have been at the centre of radical critiques of the 
rise of NGOs. Kamat (2002) writing about India and Feldman (1997) writing about the most heavily 
NGO-ized  state  in  South  Asia,  Bangladesh,  concur  on  the  dangers  of  NGO  led  politics:  that  it 
immobilizes grassroots action by creating new forms of institutional patrimony at the local level; that 
social goals blur into narrow program goals; that stakeholders to NGO action have little say over 
those programs compared with the real partners – the NGO donors and that a new business model 
supplants  populist  politics  at  the  local  level.  In  Feldman’s  words  (1997:  63)  the  NGO  model 
“refashions mobilization to represent particularist, not popular interests”.  
These are critiques based on a commitment to radical, mass politics. But institutionalists, more 
concerned with the supposed ‘efficiency’ of NGOs as service providers and catalysts for the growth 
                                                           
113 For an example of the liberal celebration of the rise of NGOs as a new political form, against which these 
critiques are aimed, see Matthews (1997) who sees NGOs initiating a “power shift” (52) away from old 
hierarchical politics. 98 
of domestic civil society have also contributed to doubts about the NGO model. In an influential 
piece Cooley and Ron (2002) argued that NGO politics is beset by two dilemmas: principal agent 
problems  that  make  accountability  difficult
114  because  there  are  multiple  principals  (donors)  
allowing agents (the NGOs) to play off among them, and the complementary problem that the 
demands of the NGO market for donor support and individual contributions make honest reporting 
of NGO results unlikely
115. Empirical work in this tradition on NGOs in the former USSR by Mendelson 
and Glenn (2002), finds similar agent-principal problems at work, when donor driven agendas cause 
NGOs to shift their priorities over very short time frames, and emphasize donor agendas (such as the 
nebulous ‘biodiversity’) rather than address clear cut local instances of economic exploitation.   
The third body of work critical of NGOs, takes an ethnographic approach to the impact of NGOs on 
domestic politics, trying to ‘get inside’ the black box of NGO activity, and asking whose interests are 
served by the discourses NGOs reproduce.  Ferguson (1990) had pointed to the ways the ‘discourse’ 
of NGOs can depoliticize contentious issues of resource distribution and actually strengthen the 
hand of state elites in the name of ‘development’.
116  Fisher (1997) points out that NGOs represent 
not so much individual agents as a new ‘arena’ of contestation, where potentials for resistance and 
tendencies toward professionalization meet and conflict with one another. For Fisher it is naive to 
create a dichotomy between ‘good’ grassroots social movements and ‘bad’ NGOs (1997: 451), given 
the ways that social movements are often in fact coalitions of NGOs.  
The best empirical work on NGOs in India, such as Batliwala (2004) adopts this ethnographic critique, 
by problematizing a naive conception of genuine ‘grassroots’ organizations. Both her work on NGO 
slum organizations  and that of Randeria (2006) on the anti dam movement emphasize that NGOs in 
                                                           
114 Though see Wapner (2002) for a counter argument on accountability: that a larger number of stakeholders 
(members, donors, network partners) actually makes NGOs more accountable than states who are only 
accountable at elections, if that. However Wapner passes over the problems of multiple agents and principals 
115 In the most notorious case described by Cooley and Ron, NGOs in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide 
in Goma refugee camps put self publicity ahead of justice for the perpetrators and ended up assisting those 
who had committed genocide. 
116 See Lewis and Mosse’s (2006: 4) important critique of ethnographic work in Ferguson’s tradition, relevant 
to chapter four of this dissertation, where they argue that an ethnographic methodology all too often spills 
over into a romantic populism, scornful of all things ‘modern’ or associated with ‘development’. 99 
India form ‘cunning alliances’ (Randeria 2006: 103) to be able to deal with ‘cunning states’. Alliances 
consisting of donor funded NGOs and the ‘grassroots’ groups they aim to catalyze might lead either 
to a new elitist politics or to new forms of resistance, quite different from the mass movements of 
the past. For this reason, ethnographic approaches are less definitively critical than the radical and 
institutionalist critiques of NGOs, but they emphasize the ambivalence of NGOs as ‘change agents’, 
and question whether today there really is a ‘grassroots’ politics that can be contrasted with the 
institutionalized and donor funded domain of the NGO. 
Even more pertinent in this tradition of ethnographic analysis is the recent work of Lewis and Mosse 
(2006) on ‘brokerage’ and NGO politics. Drawing on the Manchester School of sociology, they argue 
that a brokerage approach sees organizations as active shapers of their own environment:  “social 
actors operate as active agents building social, political, and economic roles rather than simply 
following normative scripts” (2006: 11). Existing  literature on TANs also refers to brokerage as a 
concept for understanding activist networks, in terms of “the linking of two or more previously 
unconnected social actors by a unit that mediates their relations with one another and/or with yet 
other  sites”  (Tarrow  2005:  190)
117.  However,  for  Lewis  and  Mosse  brokerage  is  not  just  about 
information transfer, or acting as a ‘transnational  hinge’, as Tarrow puts it, between actors in 
different locations; it is also about the strategic and discursive interests of the mediating actors 
themselves, as well as those of the parties they are linking. This sense of brokerage as concerning the 
interests  of  the  brokers  is  closer  to  institutionalist  critiques  of  NGOs,  but  it  goes  beyond  the 
institutionalists’ emphasis on money. For example Bending and Rosendo (2006: 226) in the Lewis 
and Mosse volume show how organizations representing the Penan nomadic groups in Malaysia 
“have first had to adopt and help reproduce the discourse of romantic environmentalism in order to 
secure an alliance with foreign NGOs, and those same NGOs in turn adopt and help reproduce the 
discursive mantle of “sustainability” and technocratic sustainable resource management”. Here we 
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linking of two or more previously unconnected social sites” ( Reitan 2007: 42) 100 
have the ‘two faces’ of NGOs referred to in this dissertation’s title, straddling the ambiguous zone 
between romantic ideology and technocratic managerialism and becoming adept at the professional 
‘brokerage’ skills required to face different audiences at different times. In fact this analysis of the 
mutual adjustment process brings Lewis and Mosse’s work close to Luhmann’s concept of ‘structural 
coupling’ described above. 
This chapter will try to provide an analytic description and critique of the network against GMOs, 
with this critical literature on NGOs brought to bear on transnational activism. The ‘celebratory’ 
literature on global civil society described in chapter one, should be modified with the help of these 
critiques, as will be argued further in chapter six.  There is still a tendency to uncritically associate 
transnational  activists’ voices  with  ‘grassroots’ voices.  There  is  also  a tendency  to overlook the 
institutional prerogatives of TANs themselves – the means by which they position themselves (as 
brokers)  in  a  political  environment  to  maximize  their  resources  and  gain  the  most  media  and 
international attention, while trying to present different ‘faces’ to different audiences and at the 
same time maintain a discursive and ideological consistency of vision.  
These complex pressures can be analyzed by looking at the different functional dependencies that 
the actors create (this chapter) and then by looking at the other ‘face’ of the network – its ‘world 
view’ which is the hybrid product of transnational and domestic currents (discussed in chapters four 
and five). These chapters seek to demonstrate a way of analyzing TANs that goes beyond either 
celebration  of  their  aims  or  the  mere  description  of  mechanisms  of  linkage  and  scale  shift. 
‘Brokerage’, in the sense we explore here is a transnational process whereby new types of actors are 
empowering  themselves,  driven  in  part  by  financial  motivations  and  strategically  alert  to 
organizational opportunities wherever they are to be found, but also actively producing new types of 
transnational ideology. 
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The Institutional Geography of the Anti GMO Network:  
The six ‘levels’ of the coalition sketched below represent a macro view of the organizations in the  
network (s) against GMOs in India. The tables provide information about how long the organizations 
have  been  working,  who  their  main  funding  partners  are,  if  any,  and  what  kind  of  work  the 
organization engages in. The ‘levels’ are ‘ideal types’, and in some cases organizations may fall under 
two different headings depending on what kind of work they are doing at a particular time.  For 
example the KRRS farmers’ movement, during the lifetime of its leader Nanjundaswamy,  was both a 
‘charismatic’ cosmopolitan organization and a mass based grassroots organization. A brief summary 
follows each table, although the institutional dynamics involved with particular organizations are 
explored more fully throughout the rest of the chapter. 
‘Technocratic’ Metropolitan Organizations 
Table 3.1.Technocratic metropolitan organizations. 
Name  Working 
since 
Type of work  Main Funding Partners
118 
GRAIN, 
India 
1995  Lobbying  and 
research 
GRAIN  central  office  in  Spain:  Action  Solidarite  Tiers  Monde 
(Luxemburg);  Oxfam  Novib  (Neths);  Basque  Gvt;  KZE  Germany; 
SwedBio;  Brot  Fur  Die  Welt  (German  church  group);  Grassroots 
International, USA; Christensen Fund, USA; Swissaid 
Gene 
Campaign 
1993  Lobbying  and 
research;  program 
management 
German church groups (KZE); donations via website 
 
                                                           
118 Here, and in the below tables, the funding partner information comes from a mixture of interviews, NGO 
brochures picked up during interviews and NGO websites, where made public. The information is subject to 
changes in partnerships (which usually run for 5 years), and more problematic – the fact that donors fund 
particular projects and funds are not supposed to be fungible between projects – so that some donors may be 
funding projects not directly related to GMOs / organics, even though administration costs may be fungible 
across tasks. 102 
These organizations are based in New Delhi and their interactions are of a mainly technocratic 
nature, lobbying the central government of India in various forums where NGOs are invited, and also 
various Treaty Organizations concerned with setting norms on biotechnology. By technocratic we 
refer  to  interventions  designed  to  affect  policy  at  the  central  level  or  to  assist  the  central 
government in its interactions with international agencies.  These organizations regard themselves 
as  repositories  of  expert  knowledge,  and  their  aim  is  to  insert  themselves  as  necessary 
intermediaries  in  contentious  transnational  debates,  to  access  working  groups  set  up  by  the 
government and be the first port of call for opinion in the elite English language media. However, in 
the section on governmental linkages below, it is argued that this part of the network should not be 
classified as strictly governance oriented, in the way that, say some human rights groups are – with 
organizationally specific technical/legal expertise and regularized input into governance decisions. 
This distinction becomes theoretically relevant in chapter six where ‘romantic’ TANs are contrasted 
with ‘governance oriented TANs’ 
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  Charismatic Cosmopolitan Organizations 
  Table 3.2. Charismatic cosmopolitan organizations. 
FBFS  /  Devinder 
Sharma 
Late 
80’s 
Lobbying  and 
research 
Unknown 
KRRS (till death of Prof 
Nanjundaswamy) 
Early 
80’s 
Farmers’ 
movement  and 
international 
campaigns 
Mainly  domestic  contributions  from 
sugar farmers; small grants from Via 
Campesina,  Peoples’  Global  Action; 
United  States  of  the  World  (SUM:  a 
Bahai faith group in Italy) for organics 
RFSTE  and  Navdanya 
Vandana Shiva 
1987  International 
campaigns; 
program 
management 
  HIVOS;  Focus  on  the  Global  South; 
ETC Group; Via Campesina; Slow Food 
International;  Tibetan  Gvt  in  exile; 
Terre des homes 
VJAS / Kishor Tiwari  2002  International  / 
national 
campaigns 
Privately funded 
 
Two of these organizations also work out of the capital, New Delhi, while the VJAS is based in rural 
Maharashtra  and  the  KRRS  in  Karnataka.  They  represent  the  obverse  of  the  metropolitan  / 
technocratic organizations above;  in Weberian terms drawing their  legitimacy through the force of 
personality of their leaders and the rhetorical power of making the issue of GMOs ‘meaningful’ in a 
wider  context,  rather  than  by  being  repositories  of  technical,  bureaucratic  knowledge.    This 
rhetorical power is explored further in chapter four, where Vandana Shiva’s and others’ ‘romantic 
rhetoric’ and capacity for metaphor-making is analyzed. The Forum on Biotechnology and Food 
Security (FBFS), fronted by Devinder Sharma and the VJAS fronted by Kishor Tiwari also depend on 
the  dramaturgical  rhetoric  of their  leaders and  their  successful  access to  the  media  and  senior 104 
political leaders.  Of these groups Shiva’s Research Foundation for Science Technology and Ecology, 
RFSTE gets substantial funding from abroad (see below), while the other two groups (whose funding 
is more obscure and are operated on small budgets) depend almost entirely on linkages to the 
media,  as  analyzed  below.  The  risk  these  organization  face  is  oblivion  without  their  central 
charismatic figure, as seen most dramatically in the decline of the KRRS after the death of Prof. 
Nanjundaswamy, as described in chapter five.   
It should be pointed out that interviewees from other types of organization were divided over the 
role of the charismatic campaigners. Some expressed embarrassment at the ‘egotistic’ tactics of 
Shiva and Tiwari, but others saw complementarities between the two approaches. The ‘two faces’ 
approach taken in this dissertation agrees more with the latter argument: the ‘two faces’ of the 
campaign are essential to its persistence and often the same actors take a charismatic role in one 
situation (perhaps Suman Sahai giving a political speech to a mass audience) and a technocratic role 
in another (Sahai on a government advisory body). The two types of legitimacy (charismatic and 
technocratic)  are  as  crucial  for  the  survival  of  activist  networks  as  for  other  modern  forms  of 
governance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 105 
 Nodal Organizations / Nodal Donor organizations 
Table 3.3. Nodal organizations. 
Centre  for 
sustainable 
agriculture, 
Hyderabad 
2004  Campaigns 
and  project 
management 
HIVOS; NABARD (Indian development bank); Swissaid; Aid India; 
Aide  a  l’enfance  de  l’Inde,  Sir  Dorabji  Tata  Trust;  Oxfam  GB; 
Andhra Pradesh Gvt 
Deccan 
development 
society, 
Hyderabad 
1985  Campaigns 
and  project 
management 
Misereor and KZE Germany; NABARD, Find Your Feet, UK; HIVOS; 
Christian Aid, UK; EED Germany (Church groups) 
Chetna 
Organics, 
Hyderabad 
2004  Organic 
cotton 
marketing 
and projects; 
campaigns 
Solidaridad (Neths); ICCO (Neths based church groups); Oxfam GB 
Greenpeace 
India, 
Bangalore 
1998  Campaigns  Greenpeace International (private fundraising); Indian fundraising 
HIVOS,  India, 
Bangalore 
1997  Project 
coordination 
and funding 
HIVOS  (Dutch Gvt; EU; private fundraising) 
 
These organizations are based outside of Delhi, in the regional capitals  - Hyderabad and Bangalore. 
This location enables them to be ‘nodal’ intermediaries, between transnational audiences and local 
NGOs  and  social  movements  concerned  with  agriculture.  These  nodal  groups  have  two  main 106 
functions: firstly, to channel funding to and monitor local agricultural projects connected to organic 
crops and research into ‘alternative’ farming; secondly, to gather information from local sources and 
put  that  information  into  forms  appropriate  for  transnational  campaigns.    Obviously  the  two 
international  organizations  listed  (HIVOS  and  Greenpeace)  play  a  somewhat  different  role,  of 
necessity, less openly polemical in orientation, but working very closely with the other nodal and 
charismatic  groups listed, sometimes including direct exchanges of personnel.  
These nodal groups are less concerned with inserting themselves into centres of power in Delhi, and 
more concerned with the media, and with the crucial work of ‘framing’ movement activity. It is in 
these nodal groups that most of the key ‘frames’ and ‘data’ of the anti- GMO coalition are forged, 
and it is no surprise that workers in these groups often come from a background in public relations 
as well as in environmental science. 
 
Nodal Service Organizations 
Table 3.4. Nodal service organizations. 
Kalpavriksh, Pune  1979  Provides library resources 
and conducts research on 
ecological issues 
Oxfam  Novib  (Neths);  Greenpeace 
India;  SwedBio;  WWF;  Misereor; 
UNDP;  Global  green  Funds;  Concern 
India Foundation 
National Centre for 
Advocacy  Studies, 
Pune 
1992  Lobbying;  training  NGOs 
in  advocacy;  producing 
video  and  research 
material 
Ford  Foundation;  Christian  Aid  UK; 
Oxfam GB 
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These  groups  have  played  a  relatively  small  role  in  the  GMO  debate,  although  their  staff  have 
participated in the anti GMO network’s meetings and NCAS has produced some video materials and 
documentation (NCAS 2007) arguing against GMOs in agriculture. But mainly these are ‘service’ 
organizations that provide resources to NGOs, in the form of well stocked libraries (Kalpavriksh) and, 
more  crucially  training  in  the  techniques  of  advocacy,  framing  and  lobbying  (NCAS).
119  These 
resources make NGOs valuable sources of information to elites and to the media, providing a source 
of informational power to the network. 
 Regional Organizations 
 Table 3.5. Regional Organizations. 
MARI Warangal  1988  Organic  farming 
projects and campaigns 
Oxfam GB; Center for World Solidarity; Spices Board (Gvt of 
India); CARE India;  
SYO Warangal  1993  ‘’    ‘’’  Oxfam  GB;  CARE  India;  NABARD;  World  Bank;  DDS;  EED 
(German church groups); Greenpeace; Andhra Pradesh Gvt  
CROPS, Jangaon  1991  ‘’   ‘’  Oxfam GB; DDS; MARI 
ICRA Bangalore  1990  ‘’    ‘’  HIVOS 
Green  Foundation, 
Bangalore 
1996  ‘’    ‘’  HIVOS; UNDP; USC  Canada, Agreetera; IDRC; Karnataka Gvt; 
Global Green Foundation 
Dhara  Mitra, 
Wardha 
1998  ‘’    ‘’  Swissaid 
VOFA,  Yavatmal, 
Vidarbha 
n/a  ‘’    ‘’  n/a 
YUVA, Maharshtra  2001  ‘’    ‘’  Oxfam GB; Oxfam Novib (Neths) 
                                                           
119 NCAS clearly takes an anti-GMO stance although it frames this in a highly ‘objective’, data oriented style, for 
example in its booklet aimed at members of parliament data on GMOs is presented neutrally as a set of 
statistics showing uptake of Bt Cotton, but in a section devoted to the ‘problems’ facing Indian farmers.  108 
These groups are the local workhorses of the coalition. They run projects on a fixed term basis with 
money  channelled  either  from  nodal  and  metropolitan  organizations  (as  seen  in  the  funding 
relations of some of the above) or directly from INGOs and foreign governments, though also with 
significant  amounts  from  state  government  or  national  bank  (NABARD)  sources.  They  are  less 
involved than the metropolitan and nodal groups in communicating with the media or in national 
level lobbying or protest activities. However, apart from their ‘development’ work, they serve the 
wider coalition in three main ways: firstly they provide field data about the ‘failure’ of Bt Cotton and 
the danger of GMOs to health and wildlife; secondly, they provide manpower for protests and 
marches from the villages in which they work; thirdly their projects provide an ‘alternative’ model of 
agrarian economics, which is frequently cited in the literature of the nodal and metropolitan groups.  
The  skill  sets  of  their  workers  reflect  their  less  media  centred  role,  with  senior  officers  being 
generally  older,  having  worked  in  rural  development  since  the  1980s  in  most  cases.  For  these 
groups, participation in anti GMO networks is just part of their identity, and success in organic 
farming  projects might make  them more viable  contenders  for  funding  in  many other  areas of 
development work, as discussed below. 
 
 Mass based and grassroots organizations 
Table 3.6. Mass based and grassroots organizations. 
KRRS  Early 80’s  Campaigns  As above 
Factions of Shetkari Sangatana  Mid 90’s  Campaigns  None 
CPI  affiliated  farmers’  and  shepherds    unions  and  Left 
groups 
Since 
1948 
Campaigns  Party funding 
Gandhian grassroots organizations  Since 
1948 
Projects  at  village 
level 
Domestic 
funding 109 
These are non professional organizations, either voluntary (the Gandhian groups), or openly political 
in  orientation  (the  farmers’  unions  affiliated  to  the  Indian  Communist  Party and  mass  farmers’ 
movements). Their relationship to the anti-GMO coalition is more problematic, as analyzed below, 
and in chapter five (where the case of the Shetkari Sangatana and the KRRS is explored in depth). 
They have many different motivations to involve themselves in the coalition, which are analyzed 
below, but apart from the KRRS up till 2002, they have played a mainly subordinate role in coalition 
activities and in the framing of movement goals.  This is largely because of the crucial difference 
between this ‘level’ and the others - the lack of professional resources and professional ‘framing’ 
capacity of this group of organizations. In most cases, they rely on information generated at the level 
of  the  nodal  and  metropolitan  groups,  and  have  made  few  contributions  to  the  copious 
documentation and research put together by the nodal and metropolitan groups.  
One of the ironies of the coalition, given its emphasis on Gandhian themes, is that the Gandhian 
groups at the bottom of the list, have few connections to the rest of the organizations. For example, 
a long term Gandhian village organizer interviewed in Nagpur
120, who had been pushing for organic 
cotton farming in the villages he worked with, told me that he had no transnational l inkages at all, 
and that the only connection he had to the network was a symbolic gift of organic seeds from 
Vandana Shiva’s organization, Navdanya, when she visited as part of her ‘bija satyagraha’ campaign. 
Local ashrams may provide support for these village level Gandhians, but they lack the capacities or 
ideological orientation to transnational imaginaries necessary to participate in the network.  This gap 
in ideational ‘pull’ is explored further in chapters four and six. 
 
Funding of organizations 
Looking in more detail at the patterns of funding for NGOs in the coalition, we see that European 
INGOs and donors dominate the scene. In particular, the following groups occur with the most 
                                                           
120 Interview number 39: Mr Nisal. 110 
frequency: HIVOS (Netherlands), Oxfam GB, and various German church groups (Misereor – the 
Catholic umbrella organization, and EED and EZE, two protestant/evangelical umbrella groups). In 
turn, these European donors like HIVOS of the Netherlands receive a majority of their funding from 
EU sources
121 so there is a strong but indirect link between the EU and network members in India, 
the significance of which is explored below.  
 
The amounts of money involved are quite large. Data is not available for all actors in the network but 
the data does exist from both donors and recipients and can be extrapolated to give a picture of the 
financial health of both elite and regional organizations in the coalition. From HIVOS, the most 
generous donor to coalition members, the following amounts (converted into August 2011 dollars 
for ease of  comparison) were contracted for projects
122 to organizations mentioned in the tables 
above, for two to four year periods beginning in 2006: (from HIVOS 2009): 
 
DDS, Hyderabad:    $ 176,445  
Navdanya / RFSTE (2 projects): $ 890, 443 
CSA, Hyderabad:    $ 72,138 
Green Foundation, Bangalore:    $ 126, 485  
ICRA, Bangalore (2 projects):    $ 583,429 
123 
 
Oxfam, India also reports  yearly  amounts distributed to organizations included in the coalition 
(Oxfam India 2010: 68): 
CSA, Hyderabad: $ 37,029 
MARI, Warangal: $ 76,615 
                                                           
121 Interview number 71 with HIVOS sustainable agriculture program director. 
122 For particular village projects, but presumably including salaries and other expenses at headquarters of 
these organizations. An assumption of some fungibility of funds seems realistic. 
123 Information in HIVOS (2008), the annual report for years 2006/2007 111 
SYO, Warangal: $ 84,902 
NCAS, Pune: $ 55,100 
YUVA, Maharashtra:  $ 280,009 
       
       
Greenpeace India does not report the specific amounts it disburses to particular groups (it spends 
most of its own money rather than working directly with others), but its total figure for both income 
and expenditure in 2009 (give or take a few dollars difference between them) was $ 2,778,274, of 
which 11% ($ 305, 610) was directed toward GMO related campaigns (Greenpeace India 2009:37). 
This amount is all the more substantial given that Greenpeace do not fund organic farming projects 
directly, so the money is given for meetings, one off protests, advocacy and lobbying, mostly for 
events run directly by Greenpeace India, although the DDS and SYO in Andhra Pradesh, for example 
reported  one  off  sums  being  made  available  for  research  (surveys  of  farmers)  and  advocacy  ( 
transporting farmers for rallies, etc. ) 
 Looking  at  the  other  side  of  the  balance  sheet  –  at  figures  for  particular  recipient  regional 
organizations (which were usually not made available to me), the Green Foundation in Bangalore 
reported  (for  2007)  foreign  donor  contributions
124  of $ 153,000, and domestic contributions of  
$21,500 toward its model organic farming and seed bank projects in 10 village s, with 20 fi eld 
workers. On a smaller scale, CROPS in Andhra Pradesh which runs one village level project (of about 
30 farmers) in Eeenabavi near Warangal, reported total contributions of $ 20,860 for the year 2008, 
not including incomes for its many other village level projects (see below). 
What does this data mean? A number of conclusions can be drawn from the figures above and in the 
tables showing the names of donors. Firstly, in the Indian context these incomes are very high: 
Vandana Shiva’s Navdanya is earning (from HIVOS alone) nearly $1,000,0000 for a four year organic 
                                                           
124 The bulk coming from HIVOS, UNDP and USC Canada. 112 
agriculture project, and when income from Navdanya’s stores in Delhi, online contributions and 
from other aid organizations is added, Shiva is clearly running a multi-million dollar operation. Even 
at the most modest level (CROPS), an input per farmer of around $1,000 per year is considerable in 
the Indian countryside, and creates strong incentives  to participate in such projects for farmers 
heavily in debt or earning just a dollar a day on average. Secondly, donors are overwhelmingly 
European, and as described below, the externalisation of Europe’s anti GMO preferences is part of 
the larger explanation for the persistence of the network. Thirdly, and most importantly for this 
dissertation,  these  large  sums  of  money  are  not  available  to  traditional  organizations,  such  as 
farmers’  unions,  non  professional  Gandhian  activists,  or  to  the  non  transnationalized  faction  of 
farmers’  movements  such  as  the  KRRS  and  Shetkari  Sangatana  (see  chapter  five).  Neither  can 
advocates of what chapter two described as ‘modernization’ approaches offer similar incentives for 
organizations to mobilize around their themes. Financial incentives therefore exist to adapt to the 
prevailing norms, for anyone or any organization working on agricultural issues.  
 
Remarks on the ‘levels’ of the coalition 
The diagram below tries to sketch the relationships between the levels of the network, in the form 
of  a  map  of  transactions,  highlighting  the  direction  and  type  of  flows  that  occur  between  the 
different  members.  Information,  money  and  ‘authenticity’  are  taken  as  the  three  key  elements 
moving between members.  
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           Figure 3.1. Diagrammatic overview of the network(s) 
 
This  sketch  highlights  several  points  about  the  network  (bearing  in  mind  that  it  ignores,  for 
simplicity’s  sake,  the  various  governmental  and  private  actors  also  involved  in  the  coalition, 
(described below). Firstly, it shows that the network is really various networks  rather than one 
‘spoke and wheel’ system. This is important when addressing the intra network rivalries described in 
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chapter six. Secodnly it shows that grassroots, or mass membership groups
125 have relatively little 
input into the network and get little money out of participation, reflecting the fact that they do not 
produce professional information or marketable discourse that can be utilized in the media or 
handed on to donors; i nstead  they  are  ‘receivers’  of  frames  and  information  from  nodal  and 
charismatic members of the network. Thirdly, it shows that the charismatic groups are relatively 
poorly linked to the nodal and regional groups, reflecting the fact that activists like Vandana Shiva 
and  Kishor  Tiwari  speak  mainly  to  English  speaking  media  and  an  international  audience,  in  a 
discourse  that  is  less  immediately  utilizable  for  project  oriented  or  technocratic  organizations. 
Fourthly,  it  shows  how  information  is  circulated  around  the  system;  although  some  high  level 
scientific  information  comes  from  foreign  INGOs  to  the  Indian  network,  via  for  example, 
Greenpeace’s science officer in the UK,  data about GMOs is ‘produced’ mainly at the intermediate / 
nodal level, in the form of reports, surveys and video material.  Finally, it highlights how, not just 
information, but ‘authenticity’ (here meaning the appearance of grassroots ‘voices’ if not the reality) 
are exchanged when donors give funds to regional or charismatic organizations: representations of 
these groups’ activities act as valuable marketing tools for northern organizations and stories from 
India about Bt Cotton percolate down to northern activists, rallying people against GM crops or 
corporations, where the less tangible harms of GMOs in Europe might be less persuasive
126. 
The network is therefore, not  dominated  by  northern  interests,  in  the  way  that  Bob  (2005) 
sometimes implies in his otherwise complementary account of TANs. As argued in chapter one, 
Indian actors (‘strategic transnational thinkers’) are the movers and disseminators, not international 
donors.  Instead, there are  a  series of exchanges, which,  overall,  encourage  the  production  and 
dissemination of certain frames and narratives. Below, the linkages and relationships involved in the 
                                                           
125 Meaning here, primarily Left farmers’ unions and the remnants of the KRRS and Sanghatana that oppose 
GMOs. 
126 This claim is based on interviews conducted in the UK with some anti GMO activists, for whom the 
narratives coming out of India have great emotional force. See also the online anarchist magazine Do or Die 
(1999), which draws heavily on Vandana Shiva’s account of Monsanto’s actions in India. 115 
network are broken down in more detail, bringing in other types of organizations, as well as just 
donors and NGOs. 
 
Institutional Linkages 
In this section of the chapter, we examine nine functional linkages, or ‘structural couplings’, which 
have sustained the anti-GMO network, asking what interests are served at some of the different 
levels set out in the sketch above. Questions of ideological commonality and cultural significance are 
postponed until chapters four and five, although in some sections (on the media and international 
donors), ideational resonance in a wider community of ‘users’ obviously makes functional linkages 
possible just as those linkages then accentuate those ideas in a positive feedback loop. The point of 
this section is to try and show for a particular activist network the richness of its connections to 
players not normally thought of as ‘civil society’ actors, and to provide a (sometimes ironic) contrast 
for chapter four’s analysis of the normative or ‘romantic’ face of the network. These structural 
couplings can also be described as instances of the ‘brokerage’ that Lewis and Mosse (above) saw in 
NGO behavior.  
 
 
1.  Negotiating international choke points: the network and the Indian state in functional co- 
dependency 
One reason for the influence and prestige of the metropolitan  NGO-activist networks in India is that 
they  work  in  an  area  riven  with  international  conflict,  where  expert  guidance,  information  and 
activist ‘framings’ of the issues can be useful both to foreign states and to the Indian state itself. 
Speaking metaphorically, TANs occupy rifts in global governance rather as bacteria occupy rifts in the 116 
sea floor, because these openings are rich in sustenance. For organizations, the sustenance comes in 
the  form  of  attention  from  powerful  players  in  world  politics,  who  often  use  information  and 
discourse provided by activist networks and their accompanying NGOs to achieve their political goals 
under conditions of normative and regulatory uncertainty. 
Herring  (2009;  2010)  has  coined  a  useful  term  –  ‘choke  points’  –  in  relation  to  the  anti  GMO 
coalition. A choke point occurs when there is a fundamental ambiguity or disagreement about norms 
or the competency of particular agencies;  at these points TANs and NGOs thrive because they are 
able to offer  technical knowledge and are able  to ‘sell’ their own version of events in the media. 
Drezner (2007) and Pollack and Shaffer (2009) highlight the regulation of GMOs as a key choke point 
in the international regulatory order. As Pollack and Shaffer put it (18) each of the EU and US “has 
sought to promote international standards and international cooperation on its own terms”, and 
despite over a decade of deliberation this rift has become deeper
127.  Briefly, the US has promoted a 
view of GMOs that reconciles them with existing agricultural products, that does not treat them as 
special  based  on  the  process  by  which  they  have  been  produced,  but  rather  as  ‘substantially 
equivalent’ to ordinary crops. The EU, on the other hand, with the Cartagena Protocol of 2000 as its 
embodiment,  sees  GMOs  as  fundamentally  ‘special’  because  of  the  recombinant  process  that 
formed them
128 and therefore worthy of a ‘precautionary principle’ in putting the products into the 
market. In practical terms this has meant strict labelling of products containing GMOs, a practice 
                                                           
127 The causes of the rift of beyond the scope of this dissertation, although the use made of India is not. Pollack 
and Shaffer highlight four causes: interest group configurations (fewer beneficiaries of GM technology in 
Europe than the USA) ; cultural differences (especially as regarding the status of farming in Europe as protector 
of the land); institutional differences (with more ‘veto players’ in the EU) and contingent events (the food 
crises in Europe of the late 1990’s) 
128 Herring (     ) points out the irony that only certain kinds of products produced through recombinant 
processes get targeted for special regulation, as medicinal products such as insulin, do not. Interest group 
politics is at work here -  117 
strongly resisted by the USA and its allies in Latin America
129, given consumer resistance to GMOs in 
European export markets.
130 
For developing countries such as India, as Pollack and  Shaffer (2009: 295) put it, the problem is as 
follows: 
In making their domestic regulatory choices, developing countries must take into account 
developments in the ongoing US / EU dispute, the economic and political pressure exerted 
on them by both sides,  the resulting conflicts among and stalemates within most relevant 
international regimes, and the uncertainty about the future direction of biotech regulation 
and its impact on agricultural change. 
Or as Bernauer (2005: 9) puts it more bluntly, for developi ng countries not to antagonise the US or 
the EU on GMO regulation “amounts to squaring a circle”. Without this precondition of international 
uncertainty and stalemate, it is hard to believe the anti-GMO network would have endured as long 
as it has. Practically, this transcontinental rift means two principle roles for TANs: firstly, and most 
crudely,  a  role  for  metropolitan  organizations  to  channel  the  ‘European’  /  Cartagena  line  on 
biosafety, in other words to act as ambassadors for Europe in India; secondly, and more subtly, to 
act as agents of the Indian state and its various departments as it struggles to negotiate a fine line 
between developmentalist objectives, wariness of American corporate motives and fears for the 
European market for Indian agricultural products.  
The first of these roles – that of ambassador was often cited in interviews with supporters of GMOs 
in India
131. These critics see TANs as straightforward tools of the European Union, in its battle with 
the USA over regime type. Drezner (2007), for example, makes this argument  for TANs in the GMO 
case. Along similar lines for Africa, Paarlberg (2008; 138 -47) has made a strong case for the 
dominance of European money in the NGO opposition to GMOs, in a case which may well be over 
                                                           
129 Bernauer (2003: 8) distinguishes the USA, Argentina and Canada as the GMO enthusiasts and Australia, 
Brazil, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia and South Africa as the cautious countries wary of EU norms. 
130 Obviously this public resistance is complexly related to the regulatory regimes, as  
131 These kind of claims were commonly made in interview with those involved in pro biotech think tanks, 
public sector scientists and those in the pro GMO farmers’ networks. 118 
determined, given the reliance of African farming on European markets and the high percentage of 
development aid in African budgets.  
Indian civil society is arguably more autonomous than Africa of direct financial dominance from 
Europe. Certainly, however, in terms of the discourse, metropolitan members of the network have 
pushed for the adoption of European norms. This is especially true of Suman Sahai’s metropolitan 
group, Gene Campaign. This organization’s literature, for example, is replete with references to EU 
formulations on biosafety (for example, Gene Campaign 2004). 
The data (described above) on money originating mainly from Europe, and much of that originally 
from  the  EU  (via  INGOs  like  HIVOS)  might  support  the  above  hypothesis.  However,  several 
interviewees argued that sheer market forces (fears about export markets) were more important in 
pushing India toward the EU model. 
132  
 
Perhaps, the more promising line is to see the network’s metropolitan organizations as agents of the 
Indian  state  in  its  attempts  to  negotiate  a  difficult  path  on  GMO  regulation,  rather  than  more 
directly as ambassadors of European norms.  The Indian government has had to thread the needle 
between European worries about GMO exports, and a developmentalist approach that would mean 
promoting India’s own biotechnology industry (Menski 2005; Scoones 2006). This has given NGOs a 
vital role in providing discursive frames and data to governmental agents in India’s negotiations with 
international organizations.   
There are four ways in which members of the network act as agents for the central state. The first 
sees civil society providing resources to the state with outcomes it may not quite intend. In his PhD 
dissertation  Menski  (2005)  argues  that  on  a  range  of  issues  (biosafety,  patents  and 
                                                           
132 For example Prof. Anand Kumar (interview number 52) argued that it was fears about the EU market for 
GM crops that influenced policy more than any direct donor influence. But market sentiment in Europe has 
obviously been strongly influenced by NGOs ( Toke 2004; Pollack and Shaffer 2009), many of whom work in 
partnership with Indian groups and utilise Indian narratives in their campaigns, so assigning causality to the 
market or to civil society is impossible. 119 
biosovereignty)
133 civil society organizations (especially Gene Campaign and Vandana Shiva’s RFSTE) 
have been invaluable agents of the Indian government. For example, it was the NGOs with their skills 
at ‘framing’ activities and public relations who coined the term ‘biopiracy’ to critique the way that 
western corporations were attempting to develop versions of Indian crops like neem and basmati. 
The  Indian  government  took  up  the  terminology,  and  incorporated  what  seemed  to  be  NGO 
concerns  into  the  2002  Patents  Amendment  Act  (Menski  2005:  191).  However,  according  to 
Menski’s analysis, the Indian government was not intending to hand over patent rights on crops to 
communities and / or their NGO ‘guardians’. The benefit is subject to state discretion (229). Similarly, 
while taking up NGO rhetoric about not commodifying nature in the form of patents, the Indian 
government was also trying to encourage Indian entrepreneurs to do exactly that, by filing patents 
of their own (187).  Menski refers to this as a “hybrid discourse” (173), in which nationalism, NGO 
talk and liberalism get melded together, and it is something that the Indian government would not 
have been able to produce by itself, argues Menski, without input from consummate NGO ‘framers’ 
such as Vandana Shiva and Suman Sahai. 
The second way NGO members of the network act as potential agents of the state is more direct 
than  in  Menski’s  argument.  Metropolitan  NGOs,  especially  Suman  Sahai’s  Gene  Campaign  have 
sought  to  incorporate  themselves  into  governmental  decision  making  bodies.  In  fact,  Gene 
Campaign’s literature appears designed to serve this end – with its emphasis on the particular points 
in the regulatory apparatus that need NGO or ‘civil society’ input. For example Sahai frequently lists 
points of entry for civil society ‘experts’ into the decision making machinery, both in publications 
(2004: 153) , and more recently on her internet blog. To summarize some relevant points from a 
blog of February 2
nd 2010
134: 
                                                           
133 Menski’s argument works best for the latter two issues, and less well for biosafety, where the NGOs’ 
demands chime less well with the developmentalist / productivist concerns of the Indian government. 
134 http://sumansahai-blog.blogspot.com/2010_02_01_archive.html 120 
  The GEAC (the primary advisory body on biosafety issues) should be divided into different 
committees with expertise on social science, agronomy, ecology, etc 
  New “structures *to+ enable public participation in decision making” should be established 
  “Risk  - benefit” analysis must include public participation 
Tellingly Sahai also refers to European norms as being more appropriate than American norms, 
including  the  ‘precautionary  principle’,  labelling  of  GM  products  and  the  inappropriateness  of 
putting GMO regulation under environmental protection legislation. Gene Campaign is trying to 
make the case for the indispensability of civil society organizations like Gene Campaign. Not only are 
they the ideal mediators to arrange for ‘the public’  to get their voice heard in government but they 
can (as suggested above) select the best norms for India from international options, unlike the 
Indian government that lacks, in Sahai’s eyes, the competency to do this.
135  Gene Campaign’s tactics 
include the launching of a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in 2004, the outcome of which was to get 
the  anti  GMO  scholar,  Pushpa  Bhargava  installed  on  the  GEAC,  and,  a  quieter  effort  with 
government actors to get Gene Campaign acknowledged as an official advisory body on GMO’s. The 
latter tactic has succeeded, with Gene Campaign and Greenpeace India taken on board as official 
advisers to the recently concluded M S Swaminathan panel on the future of GMO regulation in 
India
136. This tactic of ‘insertion’ into key committees and advisory bodies has led to tensions played 
out in the media and described by interviewees, for example between Prof Deepak Pental and 
                                                           
135 Heins (2008: 96) makes this case for Gene Campaign, based in research in the 1990’s. He argues that Sahai 
emphasized the incompetence of the Indian civil service, framing the Indian government as the ‘enemy’ rather 
as Vandana Shiva framed foreign corporations as the enemy. He may understate the way in which Sahai’s 
discourse differs from Shiva’s – the difference in my argument between technocratic and charismatic forms of 
NGO legitimation. 
136 See Financial Express, June 3
rd 2010, where ‘experts flay’ the panel’s findings – the experts being Suman 
Sahai and Greenpeace scientific adviser Dr Ashesh Tayal.  121 
Suman Sahai over a Planning Commission taskforce on GMOs in 2007
137, in which Pental felt Sahai 
had distorted the consensus of the panel toward the precautionary approach
138. 
This latter incident suggests a meaningful distinction between organizations that are technocratic in 
the way they frame themselves and those that are genuinely ‘governance oriented’ (chapter six – 
conclusion). While Gene Campaign has gained access to some committees as described above, they 
were described by several interviewees as having little or no influence on policy. Perusal of Gene 
Campaign’s documentation (as described in chapter four) shows that arguments come down to 
appeals to ‘uncertainty’ and to a general appeal for tighter regulation. This is a rather different 
relation to governance than, for example, human rights organizations that gather data which is then 
passed on to United Nations bodies for possible action. As argued in chapter six, the restraint that 
such governance relations put on TANs is not present in any actors in the coalition against GMOs. 
The third aspect of state-network linkages is the dextrous way in which members of the network 
‘target’  particular  parts  of  the  Indian  state,  trying  to  form  linkages  and  personal  alliances  with 
individuals or agencies with which they believe they can form lasting partnerships. These linkages 
can help to accentuate rifts in the extremely complex governmental apparatus surrounding GMO 
regulation in India. This complexity is explained in the table and figure below, the table adapted 
from USDA (2007))
139 sets out the main agencies involved and the figure from Manjunath (2007: 64) 
describes the process of application (at least up until 2008 when a gene event model simplified 
applications somewhat). 
 
 
                                                           
137 Times of India June 2
nd 2007 and Sahai’s own explanation: http://www.genecampaign.org/home/Dr-ss-
response-to-PC.htm  
138 This is an interesting, if minor case of the politics of information flows, since Pental was only alerted to a 
discrepancy between his views and the panel’s findings by a pro GMO private activist in Bangalore, Prof 
Kameshwara Rao. 
139 Essentially a guide written by the US embassy in India to potential biotechnology investors in the USA. 122 
Table 3.7. Main Actors in biotechnology Policy. 
Agency  Role in regulation 
Genetic  Engineering  Approval  Committee 
(GEAC), under Ministry of Environment and 
Forests (MOEF) 
Responsible for implementing Biotech Rules of 1989: 
to  approve  use  of  bio-engineered  products  and 
approve imports. 
Department  of  Biotechnology  (DBT),  under 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MST) 
Evaluates overall strategy on biotechnology and sets 
research agenda for public research 
Review Committee of Genetic Manipulation 
(RCGM), under DBT 
 
Monitor  ongoing  field  trials  of  all  bio  engineered 
crops and decide on regulatory apparatus used by 
GEAC 
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)  Assess agronomic performance of GM crops 
Ministry  of  Health  and  Family  Welfare 
(MHFW) 
Evaluates  human  safety  issues  associated  with 
biotech 
State Governments and State Biotechnology 
Coordination Committees (SBCC) 
Research  support  at  state  agricultural  universities; 
monitoring any adverse effects of biotech products 
on the environment 
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Figure 3.2. GMO Application Process 
As Montpettit et al (2007: 268) argue, based on European cases, fragmented polities, especially 
federal ones like India, provide more opportunities for interest groups like the anti GMO coalition to 
grow.  Network  actors  are  aware  of  this  and  have  used  tensions  between  different  levels  of 
regulation to form linkages, as argued below in the case of tensions between state and central 
government at the stage of field trials. 
In interview with Greenpeace India’s GMO officer for example, he stressed that the very complexity 
of the GEAC’s apparatus alone (with 7 ministries involved and 4 represented on the GEAC itself) was 
an  opportunity  for  Greenpeace  to  intervene.  Herring  (2010)  refers  to  the  2010  decision  of 
Environment  Minister  Jairam  Ramesh  to  ban  Bt  Brinjal  over  the  objections  of  the  minister  of 
Applicant 
IBSC: forwards 
application to RCGM 
RCGM: recommends appropriate 
tests for agronomics and biosafety 
ICAR: recommend 
crops for commercial 
release and generate 
data 
MEC: visits trial 
sites, inspect 
facilities 
Min. of 
Enviro
nment 
GEAC: approve for large scale 
use/open release 
Minister of Agriculture  Commercial 
release 124 
agriculture  and  the  various  coalitions  of  pro  and  anti  GMO  actors  who  tried  to  win  over  the 
environment minister. 
In the past, this targeting has involved the former Union Health Minister (2004-2009) Dr Ambumani 
Ramadoss. As President of the Pasumai Thayagam (Green Motherland) movement within the PMK 
(allies  of  Congress),  Ramadoss  was  seen  as  the  crucial  sympathetic  insider  by  NGOs  such  as 
Greenpeace India
140 and Greenpeace invited him to their public consultation sessions on GMOs .  
Finally, NGOs in the network have cultivated links with political parties at the centre. A search 
through  the  online  archives  of  the  Lok  Sabha  for  ‘Bt  Cotton’,  for  example,  shows  numerous 
questions from members referring explicitly to NGO knowledge claims or discursive formulations, as 
shown in chapter two.  These are members from all of India’s main parties (CPI, Congress, Shiva 
Sena, BJP), about half of  whom represent areas with cotton farming.  As several interviewees in the 
NGO sector suggested, Indian MP’s are ‘knowledge poor’ or ‘followers not leaders’ on GMO issues 
and NGO’s provide a ‘hot button’ discourse for MP’s to take advantage of politically
141.  
More importantly these party political linkages also include strong ties between the leading network 
members and metropolitan NGOs. Suman Sahai, for example had such ties to the  Rashtriya Janata 
Dal (RJD) in her native Bihar, in the capacity of official spokesperson and general secretary
142 and 
Vandana Shiva and Devinder Sharma have both tried  to forge ties with the BJP, especially at the 
regional level (see below). As discussed in the next section, NGOs with their international legitimacy 
and local projects offer valuable resources to political parties, especially before elections when funds 
are being disbursed to rural constituencies and it is helpful if the channels for disbursement look like 
development aid. At the same time, as the example of Sahai and Gene Campaign  shows, having 
experience in the ‘old politics’ of political parties run as one person fiefdoms (Laloo and the RJD) 
might act as a background condition for the success of NGOs in accessing governmental networks. In 
                                                           
140 Interview number 22 
141 See Herring (2010) on the use the opposition parties have made of NGO discourse on Bt Brinjal 
142 Prof Volker Heins reports in a personal communication that he raised concerns about these linkages in 1999 
as part of his role as auditor of Gene Campaign on behalf of a consortium of German donors 125 
either case, functional dependencies tie network members to the kinds of hierarchical politics their 
romantic discourse (see chapter four) condemns. 
 
2. Linkages to Local state governments and parties 
This section continues a similar theme. Members of the network have developed functional, co 
dependent relations with political actors at the state as well as the central level. Suman Sahai’s links 
with a political party in the notoriously corrupt state of Bihar were mentioned above. What kinds of 
advantage can state actors and network members get out of these kind of linkages? 
One advantage was very clear from interviews conducted in the run up to India’s 2009 general 
election. State governments were keen to find ways to appeal to the rural electorate, which explains 
a flurry of (probably superfluous and poorly targeted) measures in the field of debt relief before the 
election. Support for ‘organic’ agriculture is another way in which funds can be disbursed to key 
rural  groups  and  NGOs  are  channels  for  this  kind  of  funding.  For  example  more  than  one 
interviewee
143  mentioned    the  role  of  Devinder  Sharma  as  intermediary  between  NGOs, 
(formerly)the KRRS and the Karnataka BJP government, which he has cultivated as a partner over the 
last 10 years; the Karnataka government announced a generous package of s upport for organic 
agriculture before the election in 2009
144. In this enterprise, Sharma was joined by Vandana Shiva, 
who also cultivated links with the Karnataka BJP, via its farmers’ wing, the Kisan Morcha, (Madsen 
2001 b). In Andhra Pradesh it is the CSA in Hyderabad which has done most to cultivate linkages with 
the state government. Apparently
145, these linkages began with the personal interest of the AP 
agriculture  minister  in  organic  farming  on  his  (extensive)  personal  land.  According  to  some 
                                                           
143 For example Mr P Babu of ICRA, Bangalore (interview number 78) 
144 It is not clear how this money was to be distributed or which NGOs in particular would benefit, but all the 
project oriented NGOs I spoke to in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh talked about receiving an increasing 
portion of funding from state sources for organic agriculture. 
145 Interview number 5, with Eenadu (Telegu newspaper) agriculture journalist. 126 
interviewees, the CSA has close linkages with the hierarchy  of the AP Congress Party
146 and has used 
these linkages to channel funding to organic projects. It is noteworthy that in Maharashtra, where 
interviewees all agreed the state government has historically had little focus on the Western cotton 
growing areas, there are very few NGOs or formal activist groups within the network. The lack of 
viable linkages with state government as compared with AP and Karnataka may be one explanation 
for this. 
In an interview with CSA program coordinator Kavita Kuruganti
147, it was made clear than another 
mutual dependency between the network and state politics matters: this is the capacity of NGOs to 
remind state governments of incursions on their ‘sovereignty’ over agricultural issues, especially in 
the form of field tests of Bt Cotton that allegedly were unknown to state governments. The strategy 
mirrors  the  role  metropolitan  NGOs  played  with  the  central  government  in  Menski’s  account, 
whereby they used international sovereignty anxieties to make themselves indispensable to the 
state as ‘defenders’ of Indian autonomy vis a vis international corporations. 
 
At the state level NGOs remind jealous state governments that much of the activity on GMOs is 
being regulated at the central level. However, the degree to which NGOs are valuable knowledge 
sources for state government is challenged: in interview
148 the Andhra Pradesh agriculture minister 
strongly denied that NGOs had had any role to play in the state’s legal battles with Monsanto 
(chapter two) or over the question of Monsanto’s supposedly unacknowledged Bt trials on state 
territory. But other interviewees, otherwise hostile to the network
149, conceded that this was one 
area where NGOs had an advantage over knowledge -poor farmers’ unions and grassroots political 
activists 
                                                           
146 According to Prof Kameshwara Rao, a pro GMO activist and scientist, these linkages were seen as politically 
valuable by the AP Congress in its rivalry with the Telegu Desam Party , and in its efforts to be seen as pro rural 
– a crucial symbolic factor in the victory of the AP Congress in 2002. 
147 Interview number 3 
148 Interview number 7 
149 For example Anil Kuman of the Confederation of Kisan Organizations, interview number 8 127 
 
 3. Linkages with the media 
As the media analysis in Chapter two showed, network NGOs have managed to orchestrate much of 
the debate in the Indian  media about the cons of GMOs, setting the terms of the debate and 
potentially drowning out the alternative discourses described in that chapter.  The ‘memes’ which 
the media responds to, as shown in chapter two, are persistent and seemingly immune from reality 
checks.  But  the  nature  of  this  media-network  linkage  goes  beyond  the  capacity  of  these 
organizations to get stories into the media. There are two mechanisms by which a media-NGO 
complex emerges: the first through a subtle logic by which certain stories are regarded as news and 
others are ignored, the second through the rise of ‘celebrity activists’ who work specifically through 
access to the media. These influences are made easier by changes in the structure of news media in 
India. 
In interviews with journalists at major English language and Telegu language newspapers in Andhra 
Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra what emerged was the new structure of the news media in 
India. The number of specific agricultural correspondents has dramatically reduced over the last 20 
years. When I asked to speak to ‘agricultural journalists’ for interviews, I was usually told by editorial 
staff, that no one met that description. This has meant that agricultural stories or ‘rural’ stories need 
an especially strong narrative or ‘hook’ to get into newspapers.  For example, Mr. Venkateshwarlu at 
the Indian Express in Hyderabad
150 pointed out that when he covered Bt Cotton stories his own 
name would be attached to the story , whereas typical agricultural stories would be given an 
anonymous ‘special correspondent’ tag. In addition, he believed that Bt Cotton related stories were 
more  likely  to  be  ‘promoted’  to  the  national  editions  of  his  newspaper  than  other  agricultural 
stories, for example about  irrigation money corruption.  These stories  emerge from NGO’s, making 
them key partners for journalists strapped for resources and trying to ‘sell’ rural issues to a mainly 
                                                           
150 Interview number 79 128 
urban audience. A journalist at Telegu language newspaper Eenadu, Narasinha Reddy
151 agreed that 
NGO’s working on GMOs were now primarily working via the media, rather than other forms of mass 
protest and that even in the regional language press NGOs were crucial sources of information for 
journalists, almost all of whom are now based in urban areas without close family relations in the 
countryside, as might have been the case 20 years previously. 
At the ‘highest’ end of this system of media filtration, are the European newspapers that run stories 
on issues related to GMOs in India. For example a Guardian (UK) environment story from July 30
th , 
2008 “Indian farmers shun GM for organic” simply takes quotes from the DDS and CROPS in Andhra 
Pradesh and unquestioningly refers to these groups as if they were spontaneous social movements 
of farmers
152.  
Two ‘charismatic’ members of the network – Devinder Sharma and Kishor Tiwari have proved to be 
particular  masters  of  the  media.  In  an  interview,  Sharma  pointed  out  that  he  now  writes  11 
newspaper columns, 7 in regional languages and 4 in English. Kishor Tiwari of the VJAS ( see above)  
has waged a campaign to ‘count’ the suicide dead in Vidarbha District, for which he has attracted 
attention in the national and international media, not least for his insistence that suicides are related 
directly to globalization and in particular to Bt Cotton use
153. However the latter case also points to a 
rare rupture in t he functional dependency of media and activist networks;  in Nagpur, Vivek 
Deshpande, editor of the Indian Express in that city, has waged a less renowned campaign
154 against 
                                                           
151 Interview number 5 
152 This particular article may be unusually poorly researched, and out of date, given that by this point these 
NGOs, when I interviewed them had stopped claiming (within India) that they were social movement 
organizations, and would never have made the extravagant claims about Bt failure mentioned in the article 
within India, but it illustrates the ‘direct line’ that the activist network has to the most prestigious newspapers. 
153 For example in the English language version of Der Spiegel of August 9
th 2007, where it is pointed out that 
he is driven around in  a vehicle on the front of which is written “this man was sent to help the poor” or on the 
BBC website 1
st May 2006, where Tiwari is described as founding a ‘farmers’ movement’ to oppose 
globalization and biotechnology in India. Tiwari certainly fits the ‘charismatic’ ideal type. 
154 ‘How facts die in the Vidarbha Suicide count’, Sunday Express , Sep 2
nd 2007, where Indian Express 
journalists travelled to meet families of the ‘10 suicides in 24 hours’ reported by Tiwari on the occasion of the 
Prime Minister’s visit to Vidarbha District. The findings were that only two of the 10 suicides were related to 
agrarian crisis, the others being a combination of family problems, natural calamities such as floods and 
histories of alcoholism. This is not, of course to say that these problems might not have socio-economic origins 129 
Tiwari’s suicide watch, by visiting the families of suicides immediately after Tiwari and trying to find 
out the causes of the suicide. In most cases Deshpande claims, suicide was due to a variety of 
psychological and family problems and rarely corresponded directly to the ‘international’ narrative 
Tiwari was trying to promote
155.  Even where economic problems and debt were the primary cause 
Deshpande referred to the ‘regional complexes’ that affect Vidarbha District and cannot be directly 
tied to globalization, let alone Bt Cotton (see further discussion in chapter two).  Cases like this, 
where the transnational GMO / globalization narrative was challenged are rare; for example while 
the  two  journalists  interviewed  in  Andhra  Pradesh  were  skeptical  about  the  centrality  of  the 
GMO/globalization narrative they felt it was their job to present the news available to them, and the 
NGOs were the best creators of news stories
156. 
In all these cases, apart from the careerist motivations of journalists to rely on reliable NGO news 
sources, it is also the narrative power of the Bt Cotton / globalization story itself that makes reports 
based on this narrative ‘rise’ further through the hierarchies of the global media than stories about 
‘regional complexes’ and multiple causation would. As media theorists have suggested there are 
certain types of story which resonate with the demands of international media more than others. 
This should not be seen simply as ‘distortion’, which is how the media is portrayed in Boykoff’s 
(2006) analysis of the media’s framing of the Global Justice Movement, for example.
157 Neither, with 
this particular TAN has the media been a threat to the network’s ability to ‘set its own agenda’ 
(Tarrow 1994: 128). Rather, we find, in this case at least, a symbiosis of media and NGO framings.  
                                                                                                                                                                                      
or be made worse by socio-economic conditions, but in Deshpande’s view the causes are a regional lack of 
agricultural-social capital / skills and internal to regional politics and corruption and do not correlate with the 
narrative of the GMO / globalization thesis. For example debt problems in Vidarbha according to Deshpande 
were even worse before the arrival of Bt Cotton and were a constant even before the minimum support price 
of cotton was reduced in 2002 by the Maharashtra Government, allegedly at the bequest of global neoliberal 
discourse. 
155 See Chapter 2 on ‘regional complexes’ for further discussion 
156 Interview with 
157 He argues that ‘violence’, ‘disruption’ and ‘freak’ frames of the anti WTO protests damaged public opinion of 
the protestors at Seattle. Perhaps, the anti GMO TAN’s greater staying power and ‘success’ is partly due to its 
ability to work with rather than against the grain of the codings and formulae of mass media – as suggested 
above. 130 
 In Niklas Luhmann’s (1996: 26-41) catalog of nine formal features of news media representations, 
there  is  much  overlap  with  the  anti  GMO  narrative.  In  the  table  below,  the  relevant  features 
mentioned by Luhmann (one of them – ‘local relevance’ seems less applicable) are enumerated and 
their relation to the anti GMO narrative is pointed out. 
Table 3.8. Luhmann’s media analysis applied to the case 
Luhmann’s category  Application to anti GMO narratives 
Surprise: “break with existing expectations “ but 
preferably in a “series of novelties” 
The GMO stories of crop failure or allergies, etc recur 
with each harvest – both surprising and regular 
Prolonged/deferred  conflicts:  “put  off  the 
liberating information about winners and losers by 
way of reference to a future” 
Constant  appeals  to  regulation  ‘in  the  future’  –  court 
cases, etc, create drama of minor battles and larger war 
Norm  Violation:  a  particular  deviation  from 
normal  practices  is  picked  out  as  noteworthy, 
especially if ‘extraordinary’ – e.g ‘alligator in back 
garden’. 
‘External’ arrival of Bt Cotton marks a seeming violation 
of  ‘normal’  agriculture  (as  Luhmann  points  out  –  the 
media coding of violation is often factually wrong when 
contextualised – in this case debt and risky market based 
agriculture are decades long features in India, but this is 
passed over in the media) 
Moral  Judgment  of  norm  violation:  but 
“disembedded”  from  any  practical  possibility  of 
restitution  through  law.  Allows  for  free  play  of 
commentary as ‘observers
158’ 
Complex causality of rural crisis is moralized in attacks on 
Mayhco-Monsanto  or  on  lax  regulation,  or  alien 
technologies,  but  without  practical  suggestions  of 
alternative institutions. 
Attribution  to  Actors  not  structures:  particular 
organizations  “serve  society  as  tangible  symbols 
of an unknown future”, especially in times of rapid 
social  change,  and  despite  the  obvious 
The campaign attributes blame to Monsanto and to the 
GEAC, rather than to structural dysfunctions or long term 
change  in  the  relative  incomes  of  rural  and  urban 
citizens, etc 
                                                           
158 This links to the analysis of the ‘romantic’ world view of chapter four. 131 
simplifications involved 
Recursive  Topicality:  ‘series’  of  events  are 
favoured for reporting 
As above: yearly harvests, and the potential for yearly 
‘crises’  make  Bt  Cotton  ‘failure’  stories  useful  for  the 
media; they are also able to re-use and refer to previous 
stories of ‘failure’, e.g the recurrence of Bt failure stories 
when Bt Brinjal was proposed  
Quantities  are  favoured:  because  they  do  not 
require ‘context’; they appear to have significance 
in and of themselves, especially if they are ‘big’ 
Kishor Tiwari’s strategic use of  suicide ‘numbers’ on a 
large  chart  in  his  office  demonstrates  this  synergy  of 
NGOs and media; again, as shown in chapter two context 
is missing 
Expression of Opinions: the media are drawn to 
charismatic  opinion  makers,  because  ‘strong’ 
opinions  can  be  endlessly  reflected  on,  even 
within the media itself. 
The  evidence  from  chapter  two,  showing  the 
prominence  of  charismatic  figures  like  Vandana  Shiva 
and Kishor Tiwari. Critiques of  these strong views and 
counter critiques of the critiques then get fed back into 
the media system. 
 
 
As Luhmann puts it, the  mass news  media, as any system, whether social or biological, makes 
‘selections’ from its environment “based on a context of condensing, confirmation, generalization 
and schematization not found in the same way in the outside world” (37). It so happens that the kind 
of selections and schematizations made by the media (in the above table) are strikingly similar to 
those made by campaigning NGOs, especially as described in chapter one in the work of Heins (2008) 
and DeMars (2005). This pre-established harmony of function may of course be related to a mutual 
history of symbiosis dating back to the co evolution of modern mass media and modern campaigning 
organizations. 132 
In Luhmann’s monograph, this kind of schematization is not depicted as a ‘problem’ – more as a 
deep structural fact of modern experience along the lines of Anderson’s (1991) print media and the 
corresponding  experience  of  ‘simultaneity’  through  newspapers.  However,  there  is  a  difference 
between 1990’s Germany, which Luhmann had in mind, with its multiple and relatively effective 
modern institutions, and rural India today. In the absence of effective parties, agricultural extension, 
or universal education, that might represent agriculturalists or enable them to integrate into other 
modern institutions, the media and their NGO partners have a disproportionate power to represent 
agricultural  issues. With  the  decline of  locally  knowledgeable  journalists  (at  least  in the  English 
language media), this means a ‘pull’ toward frames and narratives that are exportable across media 
markets and which are upwardly mobile to more prestigious national editions. 
 
4. Linkages with international donor organizations 
As  discussed  above,  members  of  the  network  are  not  just  ‘ambassadors’  within  India  for  the 
precautionary principle as championed by the EU. More crucially, the network has forged ongoing 
linkages  with  donor  organizations,  more  focused  on  trying  to  find  partners  with  the  requisite 
grassroots legitimacy and involved in projects that will resonate with the concerns of contributors in 
Europe  or  North  America.  Donor-activist  relations  are  under  studied  in  the  literature,  with  the 
obvious exception of Bob (2005), but Bob’s instrumentalist approach may understate the power that 
southern organizations have in the relationship, at least in a country with a long history of civil 
society activity like India. 
Some very useful information related to the functional needs of donors comes from the Greenpeace 
International Archive of documentation (up to 1998), held at the International Institute of Social 
History in Amsterdam, which I visited in June 2011. Unfortunately, this archive does not contain 
information about the post 1998 GMO campaigns in India or elsewhere, but it includes high level 133 
managerial discussions of earlier biotechnology related campaigns, and arguments for setting up a 
permanent Greenpeace office in India. 
In an intriguing diagrammatic representation, from 1996, senior program coordinator Chris Rose laid 
out Greenpeace’s task, and dilemma for the future, as follows (this is a replication of the original 
drawing): 
 
                  Social Space                                                                  society 
        
 
                                                                                       Greenpeace 
                                                                 Time 
Figure 3.3. Greenpeace representation of challenges it faces 
 
Rose interprets this graph as meaning that the old ‘eco warrior’ image of Greenpeace as heroic 
interceptors of whaling ships, etc, is now endangered. Instead, with an increasingly complex ‘social 
space’, meaning expanded mass media and the burgeoning internet, Greenpeace needs to form 
linkages around the idea of ‘choice’ rather than just the old idea of ‘protest’, by connecting with 
both new media and with markets for ecologically oriented products, otherwise it will be left behind. 
Effectively, Greenpeace’s own senior management understand their role in a similar way to that 
expounded in this chapter: that the creation and nurturing of structural couplings is essential to 134 
organizational  growth  and  that  this  is  potentially  in  tension  with  the  ‘romantic’  aspect  of 
Greenpeace’s ideology
159. 
A similar set of concerns is seen in the documents considering the opening of an office in India
160, 
something that was finally done in 1998.  A set of institutions was listed as possible strategic allies. 
The list (same wording as original) was as follows: 
  Media: English media very influential 
  Judiciary: Very supportive on environmental issues 
  Bureaucracy: Very vulnerable to informal activism, more resistant to pure peoples’                         
                              movements 
  Industry:  Has received no opposition so far 
  Urban Middle Class: Increasingly aware, can be strategically made part of environmental 
                                           debates on middle class issues, for credibility 
 
In other words Greenpeace is thinking in terms of possible structural couplings, in ‘social spaces’ that 
have not yet been exploited, providing room for the kind of organizational growth required (as set 
out in the previous diagram). Newly middle class India represents an environment in which this 
expansion is possible. 
 
Particular individuals are highlighted as contact persons: these are Devinder Sharma (media), Anil 
and Ravi Agarwal
161 and Vandana Shiva (NGOs) and M C Mehta (law). Obviously this list includes two 
of the most prominent anti GMO campaigners, even though the do cuments do not yet mention 
GMOs (in 1997) as a potential Indian issue. 
 
                                                           
159 Although the argument made in this dissertation is somewhat different: that the two faces go together. It is 
not as if the ‘romantic’ appeal of Greenpeace is replaced with a consumer oriented, marketing operation, it is 
more that the two inevitably go together – as argued in chapter four – a romantic ideology is already 
amenable to consumerism. 
160 Archive number 2015. 
161 Of the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) ironically ridiculed elsewhere in the archive by another 
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Archival documents frequently use the word ‘radical’ (in its strictly marketing sense), to mean a 
message that can cut through crowded social space and give Greenpeace more prominence. For 
example,  in  the  archive  related  to  biotechnology  (1987-1992)  Roger  Wilson  writes  this  note  to 
Nandini Katre: 
 
It may be useful for us as an organization to strategically propose an interpretation [of 
biotechnology and biodiversity] that we know is radical 
 
Here, the conjunction of ‘strategic’ and ‘radical’ is noticeable, and appears to be linked to the need 
for a message on biotechnology that is strictly Manichean – as seen in a revealing internal email 
from Kay Treakle (17
th Oct. 1989) which argues that Greenpeace must avoid GMOs being framed as 
‘anti pesticide’, (clearly a logical possibility as argued in chapter two) and must instead adopt a “hard 
stance” against them from the beginning. 
 
By contrast to their own ‘radicalism’, when reviewing the existing Indian NGO environment (in a 
memo from May 1996), the committee call the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) in Delhi “a 
conservative, pro waste, pro trade NGO”. The CSE’s research on GMOs was discussed in chapter two: 
it was mainly critical of GMOS, but certainly acknowledged arguments on both sides, admitting the 
productivity increases following Bt Cotton’s introduction. For Greenpeace, however, ‘radical’ seems 
to be conceived as a pure media-oriented message, with no caveats
162. It also means innovating new 
tactics, more appropriate to a middle class, market oriented organization: another memo from the 
India related archive talks favorably about (media) “stunts” replacing “marches /morchas, yatras, 
                                                           
162 Ironically, perhaps, the CSE later adopted strategies closer to those of Greenpeace, in a successful campaign 
against Coke and Pepsi on pesticide residues in their drinks from 2003 (Frontline, Aug 22-25th  2006). Some 
interviewees saw this is a degeneration in an organization (under new leadership) that had previously 
concentrated on poverty related issues  - the Pepsi residue issue being marginal to the much bigger pesticide 
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strikes, lockouts, etc”. Clearly the implication here is that Greenpeace can help
163 develop a new 
mode of protest geared toward linkages with the media and middle class interests, and that mass 
based protest is now seen as out of date.  
 
The most generous donor to the network in India is HIVOS of the Netherlands, with headquarters in 
Bangalore (where Greenpeace India is also based). An interview with the officer responsible for their 
‘sustainable production’ program
164 revealed several of the factors that draw donors to organic 
agriculture projects and to the NGOs that combine this agricultural work with campaigns against 
GMOs. It should be noted that the officer himself appeared non committal about the science behind 
GMOs
165; for him it was the organizational benefits of forming partnerships that were crucial. HIVOS 
(like Greenpeace in its planning documents) regarded Vandana Shiva whom it has funded (see 
above) and previously the KRRS under Nanjundaswamy, as ‘strategic partners’. According to the 
HIVOS officer, these organizations, because they are seen as ‘indigenous’ or ‘authentic’ and because 
they started out without foreign funds, have a charisma and legitimacy that both donors and NGOs 
want to be associated with. While money might move from donors to Vandana Shiva, what she 
offers them was described as being more valuable, in terms of transnational prestige.  
 It is important to note the ways that these big donors are hardly ‘shapers’ of the ideational terrain 
in India: again, the concept of brokerage in Lewis and Mosse is more useful here than a more cynical 
(instrumentalist) perspective which might see Indian entrepreneurs manufacturing discourse to suit 
the needs of donors. More subtly one could see forms of indigenous ‘legitimacy’ (however romantic) 
                                                           
163 Although as the archives suggest, this is not a ‘western’ imposition, but in tune with the changing tactics of 
elite Indian activists like Vandana Shiva, Devinder Sharma, and the author of the assessment document on 
opening an Indian office, Smitu Kothari. 
164 Interview number 71. 
165 Specifically, when asked he said “time will tell” and admitted that India was being treated as a battleground 
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being  traded  for  financial  support,  with  project  NGOs  and  donors  both  trying  to  benefit  from 
association with the charismatic energy of Shiva, Sharma or Nanjundaswamy
166. 
Another crucial, and more instrumental benefit to donors from work with the network is the 
mutually beneficial access to parts of the populati on that donors need to fulfil their own criteria 
about  beneficiaries  (interview  with  HIVOS).  Because  agricultural  NGOs  work  in  areas  with  a 
preponderance of ‘dalits’ and ‘tribals / adivasis’, their projects ‘tick boxes’ for working with marginal 
groups, as well as for sustainability. As analyzed below, this coupling of interests is not necessarily 
beneficial  to  the  wider  rural  population  or  even  to  the  ostensible  goals  of  spreading  organic 
agriculture. 
The network has also been useful to donors like HIVOS, Greenpeace and Oxfam because the organic 
projects they supervise provide an ‘alternative’ to mainstream agriculture associated with GMOs
167 
and these projects are therefore sources of information to be disseminated around the world. HIVOS 
sees part of its function as proving, via these projects that ‘corporate agriculture’ and GMOs closely 
tied  to  it  in  the  European  discourse  are  not  the  only  way  forward.  Some  of  the  paradoxical 
consequences  of this approach are discussed in the section  below. In effect, donors are ‘paying’ for 
data and information from supposedly grassroots organizations, without which the data would have 
little legitimacy. The DDS and CSA in Hyderabad have been the organizations of choice for both 
Greenpeace and Oxfam, in conducting ‘scientific’ surveys of GMOs and comparing GMO and organic 
cotton  production.  This  information  ultimately  ends  up  among  NGOs  in  the  North.  Activists 
                                                           
166 It is worth comparing HIVOS here with Greenpeace: Greenpeace have given less regular money to project 
NGOs than HIVOS and have funded mainly one off conferences, events and pieces of research, rather than 
having permanent relationships with any organization, in line with their philosophy not to have ‘permanent 
alliances’ with anyone. However, they certainly need to acquire information and data from local NGO partners, 
and as with HIVOS the businesslike and skeptical tone of the young, very ‘urban’ officer at Greenpeace 
responsible for GMOs whom I interviewed belies the fact that they rely on the ideational groundwork of 
campaigners like Shiva, Sharma and Nanjundaswamy to give legitimacy to their ‘safety’ focused campaigns. 
Again, the ‘two faces’ of the network are at work: the HIVOS officer, while personally undogmatic, admitted 
that the populist and romantic aspects of the campaign were essential to its success – this is why they have 
channelled over a million dollars to Vandana Shiva.  
167 Though of course see Chapter 2 for the point that organics and GMOs are not logically incompatible. There 
is a cultural politics at work in the assumptions made by groups like HIVOS. 138 
interviewed in the UK for example
168, rely on information that has been filtered through this system, 
a system with systematic incentives to bias discussed in chapter six. 
 
5. NGO partners of donors: the functions and relations of nodal and regional NGOs 
Almost all the NGOs I interviewed in the network that are now working with international donors 
pre existed the explosion of funding for sustainable agriculture from HIVOS, Oxfam and German aid 
groups in the late 1990s. However, this new interest in ‘sustainable agriculture’ (the obverse of GMO 
or  corporate  agriculture  in  the  transnational  discourse),  meant  that  NGO’s  could  expand  their 
programs at the turn of the millennium. At the same time many respondents talked of a large 
increase in available funds for NGOs domestically at this time, with the booming IT sector producing 
a surplus that state governments could invest via reliable partners.  For example the Centre for 
World Solidarity (originally founded as a German group Actionsgemeinschaft Solidarische Welt  – 
ASW) in Hyderabad split into 6 different organizations in the late 1990’s to accommodate donor 
interests  in  diverse  fields  of  rural  development,  including  the  CSA  (Centre  for  Sustainable 
Agriculture), which is now responsible for GMO issues. The CSA has become an exemplary ‘nodal’ 
organization, rivalled only by the much smaller DDS
169 in Hyderabad. It is important to emphasize 
how technically extensive and far reaching the CWS / CSA are. Their annual report for 2008-09 (CWS 
2009) describes 322 separate annual grants given to NGOs (in mainly five states) out of total receipts 
for the CWS of around 3 million dollars  per year. Of these the sustainable agriculture / non GMO 
program is obviously only a small but significant fraction. The ‘activist’ part of their work is therefore 
embedded  within  a  huge  apparatus  with  deep  penetration  into  the  countryside,  explaining  the 
political influence (see above) that the CSA has with state government 
                                                           
168 For example the chief campaigning group in the UK, Genewatch and informally with an anarchist / green 
activist (and acquaintance) at Birmingham University who was preparing a paper on the impact of GMOs in 
India for a newsletter. 
169 The DDS, as argued in Chapter 4, is more concerned with transnational media relations, given its director’s 
background in television production. Its offices are much smaller and less plush than those of the CSA and it 
operates with just two officers working on sustainable agriculture. 139 
NGO  partners  to  nodal organizations  and  donors  have  brokered  their  way  into the  network  by 
offering  local  knowledge, grassroots  legitimacy  and  capacity.  A  contrast between two Warangal 
NGO’s demonstrates how different kinds of local actors end up performing similar functions in the 
network by responding to demands from further up the network hierarchy.  
MARI in Warangal is led by a ‘social worker’, Mr Murali, with a long history in Gandhian grassroots 
organizing  and,  in  interview,  a  very  clear  ‘world  view’  of  a  future  of  self  sufficient  village 
communities at which he was aiming
170; for him the resources of the network  offered the chance for 
greater professionalization and expansion, with the equivocal gains this brings (see below). Some of 
these local groups  on the other hand, had had little previous legitimacy as social movement 
organizations, but had a record as successful ‘brokers’. The SYO (Sarvodya Youth Organization) in 
Warangal, which has put its name to several DDS funded studies on Bt Cotton and sheep deaths as 
well as partaking in various network protest activities
171 is illustrative of the processes involved with 
some of these NGOs. The SYO was previously (from 1993) a legal service provider involved in 
conducting law suits for consumers against local  companies
172. In 2000 it started to receive funds 
from Oxfam and CARE International for organic agriculture projects on the basis of its linkages to the 
nodal group, the DDS in Hyderabad, and on the back of these linkages has since branched out into 
micro-finance and World Bank funded urban health projects.  
The success of a small (basically one man) organization like the SYO demonstrates how organizations 
can  succeed  by  framing  themselves  as  ‘grassroots’  and  by  skilfully  brokering  the  ever  changing 
development discourses favoured by donors. While MARI and the SYO may have started out with 
very  different  social  intentions,  they  have  become  similarly  placed  actors  in  the  network,  with 
incentives to produce the same discourse about GMOs that higher placed organizations (nodal, 
                                                           
170 Mr Murali, who was a Gandhi Peace Centre fellow in 1990 and in his interview liked to put MARIs activities 
in the context of a hoilistic ‘world view’ involving the overcoming of anomic conditions of labor (see chapter 
four), in sharp contrast to the businesslike attitude of the SYO leader I interviewed. 
171 For example sending villagers to rallies in Delhi and mobilizing local level protests in Warangal 
172 Filing 10,000 cases on consumer electronics and similar products according to the interview 140 
donor and metropolitan) were rewarding.  And, we could add, that the directors of both MARI and 
SYO are led by older individuals without the prestigious educational qualifications held by officers at 
the CSA, DDS or Greenpeace, so that the educational prestige of the ‘higher level’ groups forms part 
of their ‘pull’ over socially less prestigious individuals. In short, the ‘base’ of the network comprises a 
heterogeneous mixture of normatively committed activists and entrepreneurial NGO brokers, both 
subject to the same ‘pulls’ coming from higher up the network where the resources are. 
So what are the functions that these varied regional, project oriented NGOs serve in the network 
and what functions does the network serve for them?  
Firstly, NGOs devise programs that enable their donor partners to ‘tick boxes’ on distribution of aid 
to ‘marginal’ groups. The NGOs in rural areas which I interviewed therefore focus their programs on 
areas with a high proportion of adivasi / tribal / low caste and female beneficiaries. This can lead to 
paradoxical consequences: the programs are located far from urban centres, partly to access the 
most marginal populations and partly (according to one NGO activist)
173to make it less likely that the 
participants will leave the program early and migrate to urban jobs, because people in remote areas 
are more likely to be dependent on financial inputs from the NGO and less susceptible to the ‘pull’ of 
the city. But choosing distant areas for programs means firstly, that the imitation effect of programs 
is likely to be less (because marginal, geographically remote farmers are unlikely to be role models) 
and secondly that the farmers in the programs are already de facto ‘organic’ / low input farmers. In 
other words program locations are chosen to comply with two transnational donor discourses of 
‘sustainability’  and  ‘empowerment  of  marginal  people’,  but  these  aims  are  not  necessarily 
compatible with each other and the latter is not necessarily compatible with the network’s stated 
aim to provide viable ‘alternatives’ to corporate / GMO agriculture.  
                                                           
173 Presentation about the Timbuktoo Collective (an organic farming project)in Karnataka, at Hyderabad 
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Secondly NGOs act as showpieces, or to put it more provocatively, Potemkin Villages for an urban 
and transnational audience. For example CROPS, which runs an organic farming village at the village 
of Eenabavi near Warangal illustrates the way that NGOs broker a place for themselves, sometimes 
awkwardly, between transnational discourses and local ‘needs’. The director of the project explained 
that they were working with primarily ‘scheduled’ or ‘backward’ castes in the project, comprising 51 
families in one village. The village itself is a marketing tool for the network’s organic alternatives, 
with sign posts on the main road advertising the various foreign aid agencies that have donated to 
the project, including CSA, HIVOS and AEI from Luxembourg. In addition to donor funds the village 
makes money by inviting groups of farmers from around India on tours (recorded in the visitor 
book).  While it has succeeded in keeping farmers away from the ‘temptations’ of the city, Eenabavi 
clearly requires a large input of financial and human resources to keep going: roughly $20,000 in 
annual donor financial input (for just the 51 families, as shown in the section on funding) plus 
presumably much larger start up costs to purchase necessary livestock, build wells and provide very 
intense and long term training
174.  
Thirdly,  NGOs  take  advantage  of  the  professional  competencies  demonstrated  by  running 
agricultural projects to expand their portfolio and forg e linkages with multiple donors at the same 
time. As mentioned above, the SYO in Warangal proudly displays a list in its office of the numerous 
projects it is involved with, including AIDS awareness, women’s’ empowerment, microfinance, urban 
health, and pesticides. MARI, Warangal,  according to its documentation (MARI 2006) is involved in 
nutrition, HIV prevention, child development, micro finance, panchayat raj institution strengthening, 
water  tank  renovation,  drinking  water,  chilli  farming  innovation,  forest  management,  gender 
sensitization, water conservation and natural resource management training,  while CROPS also 
boasts its involvement in child labor eradication and micro finance. These programs may be funded 
                                                           
174 Several organic NGOs I spoke to agreed that even under ideal conditions it would take 6 years for farmers 
to become sustainably organic without external training or inputs, although it was never clear whether 
examples actually existed of villages where organic methods were still being pursued when funding ended. See 
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by the same nodal NGOs that fund the agricultural work or (in the case of the SYO) by bigger donors 
like the World Bank. This represents a way that NGOs make use of the network to expand their own 
professional portfolio and their capacity to broker new roles, should ‘sustainable agriculture’ fall out 
of fashion with donors. 
Fourthly NGOs are producers and conduits for data, which then finds its way up the hierarchy of the 
network, as described in chapter six. 
Finally,  NGOs  are  able  to  mobilize  farmers who work on  their  projects  for demonstrations  and 
protests that can then be framed as ‘grassroots’. This practice has declined in the last few years, as 
protests have become more focused on the media (although Bt Brinjal may resurrect ‘mass’ protest).  
Though often mentioned by critics of the network, at least two NGOs, in interview, admitted to this 
practice of ‘shipping’ farmers to protests in distant locations 
175. 
In summary the relation between project oriented NGOs and the nodal NGOs and donors who fund 
them could be described in terms of the following transactions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
175 Interview with MARI project villagers in Sadyatanda village, Warangal District (interview number 47), where 
the MARI worker told me that villagers from this project had joined protests in 2004 at the height of the ‘Bt 
Failure’ campaign in the Warangal area, and that they had also participated in DDS video documentaries about 
Bt Cotton (see chapter 4) and interview with Chetna Organic, Hyderabad (interview number 32). 143 
Table 3.9. Transactions between project NGOs and donors 
From donors / nodal NGOs to projects NGOs  From project  NGOs to nodal/donors 
  Finance  
  Discursive  meta  frames:  e.g  ‘sustainable 
production’; ‘marginality’ 
  Training  on  techniques  for  ‘replicable’ 
organic farming 
  Opportunities  for  branching  out  into  non 
related development work 
  Access  to  global  organic  product  markets 
(see below) 
  Data  about  success  of  organics 
and failure of GMOs 
  Supply of farmers for protests 
  Evidence  (video,  photo, 
anecdote) of project success 
  Access  to  marginal  groups:  low 
caste / adivasis 
         
 
6. Local Activists, farmers and the Network 
At the bottom of the hierarchy that runs from donors to nodal groups to regional organizations are 
the farmers and unpaid activists who work with regional NGOs like MARI or the SYO.  Why would 
farmers join an NGO project and why would unpaid activists work as volunteers or very low paid part 
time workers with NGO’s in the network? (see chapter two for the larger discussion of farmers’ 
points of view on GMOs). 
One answer is obviously the financial motivation. After a research interview with one of MARI’s 
village-projects in Warangal District I interviewed farmers in the next, non NGO village and asked 
them what they had heard about the MARI project. Their only response was that  ‘an NGO was 
giving money to farmers’ to do organic farming, while they had not heard stories of sheep and goat 
deaths that were told me by MARI project workers.  144 
Less instrumentally, it was clear from visits to the MARI and CROPS projects in the Warangal District 
and from talking to regional NGOs in Maharashtra and Karnataka that life conditions in the organic 
projects were probably better than outside in various non pecuniary ways. NGO financing makes 
possible a semblance of the ‘traditional village’ (see chapter four), with regular community meetings 
and strict regulations about child labor and the gender division of labor. It is notable that on these 
projects there are more young farmers than usual in contemporary rural villages, suggesting that the 
‘lure’ of the city condemned by almost all NGO directors has been overcome with varied work, a 
sense  of  ‘specialness’  and  financial  stability/insurance  provided  by  the  NGOs’  steady  source  of 
income.  
For the unpaid NGO activists and workers, the incentives are more to do with career trajectories. A 
case study may illustrate some of the incentives. In Warangal I interviewed a high school teacher 
who had set up his own ‘name only’ NGO on organic crops (SEED, Warangal – which is listed on 
websites as a partner in various coalition groups against GMOs) and was working simultaneously as a 
volunteer for MARI and for the SYO in Warangal. He was also (see chapter six) assigned as an 
‘experimenter’ by DDS to test the dangers of Bt Cotton on goats. He had previously been involved 
with the Naxalite movement (in an intellectual capacity) and he now saw the organic / anti GMO 
campaign as the best available way to accomplish both ideological and career goals. Ideologically he 
strongly associated the campaign with the leftism of the Naxalites
176, emphasizing the anti corporate 
/  imperialist  aspects  of  the  network’s  discourse.  In  terms  of  career,  he  described  how  unpaid 
volunteer work might eventually pay off with a paid NGO job: even for a stably employed school 
teacher such positions are seen as an excellent opportunity, involving varied work and the possibility 
of foreign travel and funding for further Masters level education.  
 
                                                           
176 Albeit his was the (relatively) middle class (romantic) framing of Naxalism as an anti corporate movement, 
rather than a movement for basic survival against police/landlords/thugs. 145 
7.  Left affiliated unions, Left organizations and the Network 
Why do organizations that might seem to hold a more ‘materialist’ attitude to new agricultural 
technologies attach themselves to the network and what function do they serve for the network? 
Below  we  consider  the  left  affiliated  farmers’  unions  in  Andhra  Pradesh,  the  Shepherds  and 
Goatherds Union in the same state, and the Left oriented National Alliance of Peoples’ Movements 
(NAPM) that works across several states.  Discussion of the KRRS (arguably a ‘left’ oriented mass 
member organization) is postponed until Chapter five.  
The CPI affiliated farmers’ union of Andhra Pradesh has been an active player in the network, able to 
mobilize farmers in Warangal District during the height of the anti Bt protests in a way that no NGO 
could. Other NGO actors, including Greenpeace India mentioned this union as a key player and the 
alliance with them as a way to maintain the popular legitimacy of the anti GMO movement. In 
return, one function the resources of the network serve for the union is the provision of modern, 
professionally presented ‘data’ about GMOs. For example when I visited Malla Reddy the head of 
the CPI farmers’ union
177, he had numerous NGO publications (primarily by the DDS though he also 
mentioned useful information he had received from the CSA) on his desk which he showed me when 
I asked him about the supposed dangers of Bt Cotton. The slick professionalism of the NGO workers I 
met  certainly  contrasted  with  the  somewhat  chaotic  and  much  more  distinctly  patriarchal  and 
deferential atmosphere of the union’s main office. It was clear that this organization would not 
thrive in the English speaking conferences and transnational media events that are the lifeblood of 
the network against GMOs. Therefore it is no surprise that the union was not actively contributing to 
shaping the information flow about GMOs, but was rather taking up a ‘list’ of NGO claims
178 which 
                                                           
177 Interview number 6. 
178 In interview this list  included 146 
often did not cohere with the union’s other claims about price of seeds and access to state help
179 in 
buying those same GM seeds. 
 He stressed that his organization was ‘not against technology’ at the start of the interview and one 
of his main points was about ongoing local conflicts (with a decades-long history) between union 
members and seed dealers, which included Monsanto but did not seem confined to transnational 
corporations. In fact Reddy’s repeated emphasis was on the issue of price and costs, so that he 
mentioned  the  cheaper  price  of  Bt  seeds  in  China  and  even  (quite  contrary  to  the  NGO  ‘line’) 
complained that planting non Bt refugia on 30% of land was economically impossible for farmers and 
that  they  should  not  have  to  do  this,  nor  should  they  have  to  pay  for  the  non  Bt  seeds  that 
accompany the packets of Bt for this purpose.   
A larger ideological agenda concerned his stated fear that Bt Cotton was somehow associated with 
future ‘plans’ by various international and domestic actors to transform the Indian countryside into 
contract farms and completely withdraw the state from agriculture.  As discussed in chapters two 
and four, this set of concerns only partially overlaps with the network’s more ‘romantic’ brand of 
anti corporate ideology, with the concerns about price and that the state itself should ‘do more’ in 
the area of biotechnology falling outside the network’s concerns, leaving only the anti corporate 
aspect of Reddy’s arguments to echo the network’s own discourse.  
According to another activist-scholar interviewee
180 the Left Unions in AP had lost their political 
raison  d’être,  which  was  in  opposition  to  big  landlords  and  have  been  struggling  to  reassert 
themselves by adopting local struggles with input dealers (for the background of such struggles see 
chapter three). They had not come to terms with fact that political power was now based “outside 
the village” as this critic put it.  Targeting Monsanto and working in synergy with the anti GMO 
network could be seen as one attempt to re-establish a political raison d’être for their fading force. 
                                                           
179 The other chief concern of the union was the decline of the Andhra Pradesh Seed Corporation, which Reddy 
believed should be distributing Bt seeds itself. 
180 Interview with Dr Kodandaran, Nizam College, Hyderabad, an activist for Telengana independence and 
supportive of the anti GMO network (Interview number 57). 147 
Indeed Malla Reddy boasted in interview of ‘locking up’ various seed dealers who he labelled as 
‘Monsanto’ workers, although no verification for this was available and the disputes probably had 
little to do with the ultimate ownership of the company – foreign or Indian. The NGOs could be seen 
as ‘followers’ of these kinds of local level actions, drawing on the general hostility toward seed 
dealers but retrospectively, at an elite level, redescribing them as actions against GMOs or ‘big 
corporations’.  
In the case of the allied Shepherds and Goatherds Union, led by Mr. Jamaliah in Andhra Pradesh, an 
even sharper contrast to the professional part of the network presents itself. This union has been 
cited by NGOs in protests about the deaths of sheep and goats in the state which are alleged to have 
consumed Bt Cotton leaves.  The union claims to have over 100,000 members in the state, and as 
with the CPI farmers’ union the organization is part of an older type of politics conducted by older 
men, who are not part of the English speaking circuit of professional NGOs, although the union, as 
with the CPI group, cites NGO (DDS) data to back up its claims.  
A  larger  sociological  focus  might  help  to  explain  this  linkage  over  the  Bt  issue
181. Traditionally, 
shepherds were invited by farmers to graze their animals on the fields after harvest in a reciprocal 
system, so that farmers got animal manure in exchange for the animals having a chance to feed. This 
practice was treated as customary in rural areas, with shepherds being invited into the farmers’ 
homes during the grazing period and offered food. However, this practice is now dying out, along 
with most of what could be referred to as the ‘village system’ (see chapter 4). With fertilizer use 
increasing  the  need  for  animal  manure  has  decreased  and  with  urban  migration  of  the  young, 
reciprocal systems like the above are waning along with the social knowledge that made them 
possible.  In  this  context  the  possibility  of  mistrust  between  shepherds  and  cotton  farmers  has 
increased.  Somewhat  speculatively,  low  levels  of  trust    between  shepherds  and  farmers  might 
explain the quick uptake of rumors about animal deaths., as well as the need for the union to make 
                                                           
181 For this context I am grateful to the interview with Mr P Chennaiha of the NAPM (see below) who has 
worked closely with the Shephered and Goatherds Union in AP. (Interview number 81) 148 
linkages wherever possible with allies that can publicise the plight of shepherds, who are mostly 
illiterate and at the bottom of the rural status pyramid. This sociological explanation squares with 
the possibility of numerous alternative ‘sheep death’ scenarios (Rao 2007, Herring 2008), most of 
which include as a background condition declining communication and trust between farmers and 
shepherds. 
Thirdly, there are the social movements of the (non Marxist) Left, such as the National Alliance of 
Peoples’ Movements (NAPM)
182. This group of activists, like the CPI Unions (although more middle 
class in background) are not global media oriented activists. They meet in informal settings and were 
suspicious of a foreigner (the author) observing their discussions. What was clear from discussions 
with participants after their meeting
183 was that issues like Bt Cotton were seen in the same frame as 
the anti dam campaign, as ways to unite what was described as a group of movements divided by 
caste, party, region and language. However, Bt Cotton was not emphasized by participants unless I 
brought it up  – they were more focused on a minimum support price and insurance schemes for 
small farmers. Although one of the participants mentioned Vandana Shiva and Devinder Sharma as 
partners on some issues, there did not appear to be a formal connection with these activists and the 
anti  GMO  network,  showing  that  not  all  left  leaning  activists  have  chosen  to  join  transnational 
networks, either for ideological reasons or for lack of opportunities. 
The  table  below,  attempts  to  summarize  who  gains  what  from  the  linkages  between  Left 
organizations and the network. 
 
 
                                                           
182 Their website: http://napm-india.org/aboutus shows that they were formed over mainly domestic issues – 
the rise of hindutva following the Ayodhya incident. GMOs are not mentioned on their main list of activities. In 
fact less transnationally fashionable campaigns against SEZs and against anti Muslim activities of Gujurati 
leader Narendra Modi have pride of place. 
183 Interview number 80. 149 
Table 3.10 Left organizations and the network. 
What the network brings to the Left organizations  What the left organizations bring to 
the movement 
  Access to professional data  
  The  potential  for  scaling  up  local  movements 
around an issue that attracts resources 
  Legitimacy  as  ‘grassroots’ 
social movements 
 
It should be noted of course that the grassroots legitimacy of these left groups is also in doubt, and 
that even the Left Unions in AP may be trying to ‘piggyback’ on spontaneous disputes between 
farmers and seed dealers, for example
184. 
 
8.  Business, markets and the network 
 A  crucial  and  burgeoning  form  of  ‘coupling’  or  functional  dependency  within  the  network  is 
between network actors and market actors.  This mainly takes the form of the actions of what could 
be termed ‘market environmentalists’ within the network and their attempts to form linkages for 
transnational textile and fashion companies. There is also another, more conspiratorial argument 
which links the network directly to the interests of Monsanto. The economic logic of this is clear (see 
chapter  two),  since  higher  regulatory  hurdles  will  make  it  easier  for  a  very  large  company  like 
Monsanto  to  get  a  product  onto  market  than  smaller  rivals.  Variants  of  this  (rather  unlikely) 
argument  were  suggested  in  interviews  several  times,  sometimes  going  further  to  suggest  that 
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Monsanto was directly funding NGOs for publicity, or to try and avoid the risk of competing with 
public sector science
185.  
While such linkages are either alleged conspiracies or purely speculative, other network actors have 
been trying to forge real linkages with the international market. Chetna Organic, an NGO based in 
Hyderabad, is the most active player, although most project NGOs are trying to make their projects 
‘sustainable’  by  finding  buyers  of  organic  cotton  in  Europe.  Chetna’s  project  officer
186openly 
contrasted his market oriented strategy with what he admitted was the lack of a grassroots social 
movement on GMOs. Chetna has forged links with higher end fashion retailers such as ‘Under the 
Canopy’ in the USA and ‘H and M’ in the UK. According to Chetna, in this “very competitive” market 
it is important to have an “edge”. For them this has been the concept of ‘traceability’, whereby 
through a website called stringtogether.com
187, customers can trace the village where the cotton for 
their clothing came from. The officer was keen to stress that this kind of marketing linkage was more 
sophisticated than that used by other NGOs in the field, especially those funded by Oxfam in AP, 
which he criticized for their lack of market savvy
188. 
At the same time, Chetna has been active in anti GMO protests, sending a party of ‘its’ farmers to 
the Ministry of Health in Delhi, for example. For Chetna, it seems, the anti-GMO protests are crucial, 
but subsidiary to its market ambitions, since the buyers of cotton want to be persuaded that their 
cotton  is  ‘pure’  and  GMOs  do  not  fit  that  definition  in  the  transnational  discourse.  Therefore, 
although the Chetna officer expressed skepticism about the “prima donna” antics of Vandana Shiva, 
one  could  argue  that  the  romantic  ideology  of  village  India  (chapter  four)  most  eloquently 
propounded  by  charismatic  campaigners  like  Shiva underpins  the market  success of  groups  like 
Chetna.  A parallel might be found in Luetchford’s (2007) work on fair trade coffee in Costa Rica, 
where  the  romanticization  of  the  conditions  of  its  production  went  hand  in  hand  with  fierce 
                                                           
185 For example in an interview with Prof K C Suri at Hyderabad University (interview number 4) 
186 Interview number 32. 
187 http://www.stringtogether.com/ 
188 See chapter six for a discussion of the competitive logic which this unleashes. 151 
competition for access to a valuable ‘market niche’
189. Again, the ‘two faces’ of the network  – its 
capacity to form functional relationships and its romantic rhetoric – combine in Chetna’s market 
oriented strategy. 
Finally, NGOs in the network often double as retail outlets for organic and other ‘village made’ 
products. For example Vandana Shiva’s Navdanya organization in Delhi is effectively a shop, selling 
various textiles, spices and books associated with her village projects, as is the office of the Green 
Foundation in Bangalore. This aspect is suggestively emphasized in Navdanya’s numerous booklets 
and brochures, which always features products for sale. 
 
9. ‘Western’ Academia and the network 
Finally, and more speculatively, there are couplings between academia and the network. Most of the 
research cited in chapters one and six, which praises  the anti GMO network as art of ‘global civil 
society’, draws primarily on material and interviews  provided by organizations that are part of the 
network. This is not universally true (see Pattenden 2005 and his critique of KRRS claims and of 
course many articles and chapters by Ron Herring), but generally NGOs provide a useful resource for 
researchers, as I also found. It is easier to access NGOs than farmers’ unions for example: they speak 
fluent  English  and  they  have  ready-made  sources  of  information  in  the  form  of  brochures, 
pamphlets, surveys and video materials, whether free or for sale. This ease of access obviously 
brings with it problems for objectivity in the representation of network claims. The ‘modernization’ 
thinkers I interviewed, for example, were accessed through very different circuits (starting at small 
public universities), and I would not have found them, if I had relied on a ‘snowballing’ method 
beginning only with NGOs. 
                                                           
189 See also Murdoch and Miele (1999) for the new differentiation of the food market according to the means 
of production – whether perceived as ‘natural’ or ‘industrial’. 152 
It is less clear what NGOs gain from the linkage with academics, given the slow turnaround time for 
academic publications. One small instrumental advantage is the supply of interns from the global 
North, used widely at Vandana Shiva’s Navdanya and at NCAS in Pune, for example. Interns have 
often  heard  about  campaigns  through  academic  literature.  A  longer  term,  more  important 
advantage may simply be the prestige and ‘certification’ that reference to network members and 
their  claims  brings.  So,  for  example  when  David  Graeber,  arguably  the  world’s  most  brilliant 
anthropological theorist refers to (the remnants of) the KRRS as a mass based “Gandhian socialist” 
organization (Graeber 2002), or when eminent scholar of India Dietmar Rothermund (2008: 126) 
endorses the link between Bt Cotton and the spike in farmer suicides in a major overview of Indian 
politics, this has the effect of certifying the claims made by network organizations, in ways that, 
indirectly, may benefit their opportunities for gaining resources in the future.  
 
Conclusion 
This  chapter  has  explored  the  functional  dependencies  /  structural  couplings  between  network 
organizations, both among themselves and with external actors in the state and the market. A 
discussion of the implications of these findings for the literature on global civil society and activist 
networks will be postponed until chapter six.  
Chapter  four  applies  different  methodologies,  to  the  analysis  of  the  ideational  ‘face’,  of  these 
organizations and in the conclusion of chapter four an attempt is made to square the ideational and 
functional aspects of the power of the network using the ideas of Mary Douglas and Michael Mann. 
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Chapter Four: Rural Romanticism, the Anti GMO Network and the Global 
Protest Imaginary 
 
Chapter Three developed one ‘face’ of the activist networks and NGOs fighting GMOs in Indian 
agriculture. Seen from this ‘functional’ face, TANs and their associated NGOs find functional niches 
for  themselves,  structurally  coupled  in  symbiotic  relations  to  the  state,  the  media,  donors  and 
others.  This  ‘face’  was  depicted  through  the  lens  of  the  systems  sociology  of  Niklas  Luhmann, 
although some of the insights can be squared with a rationalist, instrumental view of organizational 
motivations, as in Cooley and Ron (2002) and arguably Bob (2005).  
 
This chapter takes a look at the ‘other face’ of the coalition and delves into the political culture of 
the anti GMO movement in India and globally, using more critical, ethnographic and interpretive 
methods. Firstly, it tries, from a very broad perspective to outline the features of romantic politics 
and especially romantic environmental politics as a ‘syndrome’ or world view with several inter 
related characteristics.  Secondly, it examines how a strand of romantic politics, termed ‘romantic 
ruralism’ has been a long lasting feature of politics in India, with governmental as well as idealistic 
features. Thirdly, the chapter describes a ‘global protest imaginary’ in which anti-GMO politics is just 
part of a generally ‘romantic’ meta frame or orientation, informing responses to issues, especially as 
concerns  ecology.  These  historical  and  theoretical  insights  are  then  applied  to  two  movements 
which can be seen as precursors of the anti GMO network: the Chipko movement and the Narmada 
dam campaigns. The chapter then gives an account, drawing on interviews and primary documents, 
of how the anti GMO network in India displays many of the features of romantic politics accounted 
for earlier and ends with some speculations about how to square these interpretive insights with the 
instrumental approach taken in chapter three. Throughout the chapter a ‘modernist’ or ‘materialist’ 154 
alternative to romantic politics is taken, somewhat loosely, as a theoretical foil for the ideal type of 
romanticism.  
 
Such an excursion into political culture and discourse is justified because it helps interrogate the idea 
that new transnational activism is something unprecedented and that the content of its ideas is a 
direct or unique response to neoliberal globalization.  On the contrary, the chapter argues that 
political romanticism and its sibling, ecological romanticism are deep seated tendencies in modern 
(middle  class)  life  that  happen  to  thrive  in  the  conditions  offered  by  transnational  advocacy 
networks and new mass media. 
 
 
Political and Ecological Romanticism as a ‘syndrome’ 
 
Theories of ‘political romanticism’ emphasize widely differing aspects of this varied ‘syndrome’. As 
Kompridis (2009) puts it, romanticism should be taken as a broad structuring of response to events, 
rather than a set of particular doctrines: 
 
[a] distinct form of expressive response...which outlines a relation to the world and to ways 
of life, individual, and shared, that [this] form of expressive response makes visible... 
 
Carl Schmitt, German political theorist of the Weimar, and later, (notoriously) the Nazi period, draws 
on Hegel’s conceptualization of the ‘Beautiful Soul’ to describe political romanticism (which can be 
of left or right varieties). For Schmitt, the essence of  political romanticism is  the aestheticization of 
political events
190, combined with a refusal to  engage in actual institutions, whether as defenders, 
                                                           
190 But it should not be equated with early literary romanticism: It is arguably the later nineteenth century’s 
version of romanticism, in figures such as Ruskin and Morris (Guha( 2000) describes Ruskin’s opposition to the 
railways as exemplary) that has more in common with contemporary romantic protest movements; 
Wordsworth and the early romantics were less prone to turning rural life into mere symbolism. In fact it is 155 
reformists, or revolutionaries. The crucial irony of the political romantic position for Schmitt is that 
while  appearing  to  remain  ‘pure’,  and  above  the  fray  of  everyday  politics  the  romantic  denies 
his/her own embededness in the institutions of the modern world: critiquing or rhapsodizing while 
denying that their ability to do so depends on everyday institutions, markets and the state
191. For 
Schmitt (1986 [1919]: 160), romanticism is not the same as myth-making: 
   
[in romanticism] an impression suggested by historical or political reality is supposed to 
become the occasion for subjective creativity....an intellectual music for a political program. 
This is not the irrationality of myth. That is because the creation of a political or a historical 
myth arises from political activity....A myth arises only in the real war... 
 
This distinction between romantic ‘mood music’ and the creation of real, mobilizing myths
192 will be 
important in chapter five, where the Shetkari Sanghatana’s ‘Bharat-India’ opposition could be seen 
as a ‘myth’ that mobilized farmers for real change, while the KRRS’ transnational activities of the 
1990’s more closely resemble the romantic aestheticism criticized by Schmitt. 
 
Arguably, Schmitt’s analysis is even more trenchant today, when the mass media makes possible an 
aestheticization of  ‘suffering  at  a  distance’  (Chouliariki  2006),  barely  dreamed  of  by  nineteenth 
century political romantics.  
                                                                                                                                                                                      
telling that Guha (24) argues that Gandhi’s romanticism was more “practical” than Wordsworth’s, given 
Gandhi’s highly mediated and idealized perspective on the Indian village – unlike the radically ‘open’ project of 
Wordsworthian romanticism. For an interesting take on ‘Wordsworth meets GMOs’ see Francois (2003), who 
argues against what she sees, using Wordsworth as a foil, as the arrogant denial of contingency in both the pro 
and anti GMO discourse (arrogant techno-science for the former or arrogant protection of an essentialist 
version of nature for the latter). The Wordsworthian contingency she defends is difficult to map onto the 
political terrain, although in Chapter Two we tried to outline a ‘middle way’ view of biotechnology as serving 
human needs and local variations in climate, soil, skills and demands that come close to  a political analogue. It 
should be borne in mind that ‘materialist’ in this dissertation does not map onto a pro-biotech or pro-
Monsanto point of view – it maps onto a mixture of reformist and radical measures that farmers seem to want, 
including access to new technologies but also more government support on a host of issues, as set out in 
Chapter Two.  
191 Obviously the parallel between the instrumental and romantic faces of the anti GMO network is implied 
here. 
192 ‘Myth’ here resembles Mannheim’s ‘Utopia’ – which must be distinguished from mere ‘ideology’ because a 
Utopia puts forward hitherto unimagined possibilities that might actually change social relations, while 
‘ideology’ disguises reality from its participants. (Mannheim 1985 *1936+) 156 
 
Morton (2007) brings us up to date, with an analysis of contemporary ecological romanticism which 
is also inspired by Hegel’s ‘beautiful soul’ (117-18). For Morton, ecological romanticism is fixated on 
imagining “a coherent sense of place” (84): 
   
Such thinking aims to conserve a piece of the world or subjectivity from the ravages of 
industrial capitalism and its ideologies. Place, and in particular, the local, have become key 
terms  in  Romantic  ecocriticism’s  rage....Moreover  this  impotent  rage  is  itself  an  ironic 
barrier to the genuine...interrelationship between beings desired, posited and predicted [by 
romantic ecocriticism] 
 
So ecological romanticism’s rhetoric seems (intentionally or otherwise) designed to prevent real 
institutional change, and to preserve a purity of position from which to observe various threats to a 
purported innocence of ‘place’ or ‘the local’
193. For pragmatic environmental activists, like Brand 
(2009), the romantic attitude might have been useful in attracting attention to the issues (208), but 
is “poor at solving problems” (215). In particular the romantic obsession with decline, impending 
disaster  and  threatened  innocence  (217)  are  inadequate  ways  to  frame  climate  change  or 
biotechnology. For Brand, ‘ecopragmatism’, by contrast will mean environmentalists abandoning the 
‘beautiful  soul’s’  position  of  wounded  purity,  engaging  with  scientists  and  accepting  some 
technological solutions to environmental problems.  
 
Below, is an attempt to isolate five key aspects of the syndrome of political and especially ecological 
romanticism; this list will help orientate the discussion in the rest of the chapter:  
  Nostalgia for ‘place’: romantics mourn the loss of ‘closed systems’ such as the (imaginary) 
village.  Morton  cites the archetypal modern  instance  in  Tolkien’s  ‘Shire’  –  home  of  the 
                                                           
193 For an example of such thinking see Bate (2000), who argues that ‘ecopoetics’ must necessarily be non 
political, if political refers to things ‘of the polis’ – the city. For Bate eco poetry and criticism is about 
“imagining a state of nature prior to the fall into property, into inequality, and into the city” (266). 157 
hobbits, who live in a “world-bubble” (97), outside of politics, markets or institutions (and 
are chosen as heroes by Tolkien precisely because of their non political status
194) 
  Pessimism about institutions, politics and technology: romantics see the world in terms of 
‘slippery slope’ arguments – institutions cannot be trusted and any interventions to avert 
problems are likely to make the problem worse. Selection bias informs their analysis of risk 
along  these  lines  –  with  potential  costs  always  being  rated  more  highly  than  potential 
benefits of interventions. 
  Spectacle:  romantics  are  drawn  to,  and  more  importantly  invent  spectacles  –  often  of 
suffering, or victimhood (Greenpeace, for example, is a skilled producer of these kind of 
images). This spectatorship, designed for mass media, is allied with a consumerist tendency, 
in fact is a form of consumerism (Morton 2007:110).
195 
  Moralism: when ‘world bubbles’ such as the Indian village, so perceived, are punctured by 
external forces, the natural reaction is outraged moralism, exercised again in a ‘spectacular’ 
way, inspiring pity in observers, rather than through direct political action by those affected. 
  Paternalism: the ‘practical’ manifestation of romanticism is a paternalistic attitude towards 
those(victims) it claims to represent. Because the victims, or potential victims, are ‘outside 
history’ or modern institutions they need to be protected and helped by benefactors  (think 
of Gandalf’s relationship to Frodo as an archetype here). This last characteristic is crucial 
because it links romanticism as consumer commodity to romanticism as a form of power – 
as describe below in the section on colonial romanticism. 
 
                                                           
194 Only the Hobbits can be entrusted with the carrying of the ring, because they are too innocent and clueless 
to ever utilize political power themselves. This seems to be Tolkein’s ideal imagination of a democratic public 
and resonates with the way I found NGO project leaders talking about farmers as both quasi sacred carriers of 
tradition and as lazy and feckless. 
195 See discussion of market environmentalism in chapter three. 158 
The history of the Luddites, skilled English laborers who smashed machinery that was destroying 
their livelihoods, in the early nineteenth century, provides a useful example of how romanticism has 
been deployed politically. 
 
As recounted by Steven Jones (2006: 27 and passim) in a monograph on the Luddites and their neo-
Luddite imitators, the original Luddite actions in Nottinghamshire, England were associated with a 
“customary labor culture” and were overwhelmingly concerned with opposing the economic disaster 
they associated with new looms
196. This account parallels the famous analysis of Luddism by E P 
Thompson (1963). It was only somewhat later in urban Manchester, that Luddism “functioned more 
artificially as a device to unite the diverse interests of spinners, colliers, and other workers with 
those of Jacobins and radical reformers already active in the area” (Jones: 27). While this fusion, 
around the original ‘myth’ of General Ludd, was still strongly routed in the material conditions of the 
English working class, through the  nineteenth and twentieth centuries a process of romanticization 
took place, as  Luddism became an increasingly middle class, urban phenomenon leading up to the 
various ‘neo-Luddite’ congresses of the 1990’s (Jones: Ch 1). These congresses themselves flowed 
into  the  global  anti-GMO  and  anti  capitalist  networks  flourishing  around  international  summit 
meetings,  most  famously  at  Seattle.  An  example  of  this  contemporary  use  of  Luddism,  which 
connects it to the anti GMO campaigns, comes from British anarchist online magazine ‘Do or Die’ 
(1999): 
 
Two hundred years ago the English elite’s main enemy was the peasantry who lived for the 
most part outside the cash economy and were forever rising up.....The class was eradicated 
by physical force and the elite’s technology and forced to become either wage slaves....or 
[work] on the farms of the rich. Two hundred years later......the relative autonomy and link 
                                                           
196 Luddite groups “began to organize themselves.....in order to take direct actions against those they accused 
of violating the fair and customary practices of their trade, sometimes putting them out of work and generally 
profiting from changes in their social and economic conditions by deploying new kinds of machinery” (Jones: 
47) 159 
with the land which fuelled the Zapatistas in Mexico, the Viet Cong in Vietnam and the MST 
in Brazil has to be destroyed. This is where genetic engineering comes in.  
 
This quote is revealing in the way it re-describes the Luddite struggle as a struggle for ‘autonomy’ 
and withdrawal (from modern institutions), rather than the struggle for maintenance of (cash) wages 
described by E P Thompson. Thompson’s Luddites were strategic thinkers, willing to make deals, to 
target only the worst offending owners (who had most reduced wages) and when their economic 
goals were partly achieved, as in the Luddism of the Midlands (Thompson 1963: 556), end their 
protests.  These  contemporary  neo-  Luddites  however  dismiss  “lobbying  the  government”  as 
pointless and call for a ‘final’ conflict with the powers of evil: capitalism, international institutions, 
and technology. 
 
This brief overview of the historical trajectory of Luddism helps put the issue of romanticism in 
historical  context.  To  summarize:    The  romantic  perspective  uses  symbols  such  as  an  idealized 
Luddism,  to summon up images of a community that has already passed; these symbols are usually 
mobilized by middle class activists. We can suggest, in contrast to this romanticism a ‘materialist’ or 
‘modernist’ foil to romantic activism. A ‘materialist/modernist’ perspective, is centred on specific 
demands  directed  at  economic or  political  institutions.    It  usually  aims  at  inclusion  rather  than 
autonomy, even when the demand for inclusion may invoke populist and revolutionary demands, as 
in the original Luddism. 
 
It could be argued that in the modern era there has always been an oscillation between these two 
modalities  (the  romantic  and  the  modernist)  in  social  movements,  especially  today  in  those 
concerned with the environment and with agriculture.  This dissertation asks how transnational 
protest might bias that oscillation toward its romantic moments. 
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Romantic Rural Politics in India 
 
Romantic attitudes and values do not just float in the ether of ideas. They are connected to power 
and interests. Scholars have noted how ‘romantic’ ideologies accompanied and assisted the work of 
colonialism  in  the  nineteenth  century,  shaping  the treatment  of  Native  Americans,  for  example 
(Hutchings 2009; Fulford 2006), and justifying their exclusion from modern institutions in ways that 
were both sentimentally ennobling, and paternalistic. The romantic conceptualisation of innocence 
could become a less than innocent justification for the exclusion and exploitation of certain groups, 
marked out simultaneously for protection and control. 
 
In the case of colonial India, Ronald Inden (1990) provides a useful survey of ideas of ‘village India’, 
concentrating on British colonialist historiography of the nineteenth century. He points out that in 
the British model of village life, peasants were “the truly powerless opposites of themselves, abiding 
in  natural  communities  that  had  only  a  natural  history”  (148).    The  “self-contained  world  of 
solidarities and reciprocities” of the village (159) resembles the ‘cold’ part in Levi Strauss’ (1963) 
division of the world into ‘cold’ peoples (the fortunate pre moderns, trapped in timeless stasis) and 
‘hot’ moderns (rushing into history).  
 
For Metcalf (1994) these romantic binary oppositions and projections served more than one political 
and economic purpose for the British colonists in India. They allowed the British rulers to take 
advantage of ‘traditional’ forms of tax collection (70) by labelling them as natural, timeless facts of 
village life and to create lucrative trades in ‘authentic’ Indian arts and crafts. But they also helped to 
disguise domination and brutality under “medievalist fantasies” which (80): 
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can  best  be  seen  as  a  form  of  theatre  which  was  meant,  through  insistence  upon  the 
persistence of the past, to obscure, from the British themselves as much as from the Indians, 
the extent of change which occurred under British rule. 
 
This “simulation of the Middle Ages” (in which caste hierarchies were categorized in terms familiar 
from European feudalism) would enable the British to shape those categories in ways that suited 
their interests (Dirks 2001), but with the patina of an ethnographic authenticity that also acted as a 
psychological stimulant for those Victorian middle classes who were tired of dirty, commercial urban 
existence and fond of projecting lost values onto the idealized Indian village. 
 
This ‘Indological’ conception of the village, is arguably carried forward into post independence India 
in the thought of Gandhi and his social movement imitators
197.  The colonial tendency to describe 
the  countryside  as  a  ‘place  without  history’  gets  adopted  in  the  nationalist  movement,  albeit 
changed in tone from disparagement to praise
198. As Jodhka (2002: 3343) puts it, for the nationalists, 
“the village represented ‘the real’ India, the nation that needed to be recovered, liberated and 
transformed”. Gandhi saw the village in romantic terms as a source of community to be restored  
through outside activism. Although Gandhi did not believe in a simple ‘going back’ to old forms, and 
of course wanted to bring education and handicraft skills to the countryside, nevertheless the village 
stood in sharp contrast to the city, which had been corrupted by western influence, and most of all 
by contact with global markets. As with John Ruskin in England before him, the railways represented 
                                                           
197 There are of course many Gandhis, as Nandy (2000) points out: from the Gandhi appropriated by Indian 
nationalism, to the Gandhi as international symbol mobilized by Polish Solidarity or Martin Luther King. Many 
‘materialist’ movements of the poor have learned from Gandhi’s tactics, including the Shetkari Sanghatana 
discussed earlier. Nandy links Vandana Shiva to his preferred version of Gandhi, as ‘ragamuffin’ or ‘nag’ of 
transnational corporations and the state. I argue later that this kind of Gandhianism is anything but worrying 
to the Indian state or to global capitalism, unlike the specific and material demands made by the Shetkari 
Sanghatana prior to 1992 (chapter five) or the modernist demands for proper state biotechnology research 
described in chapter two. In any case it seems legitimate to select Nandy’s preferred Gandhi as the Gandhi 
most closely associated with the global protest imaginary and its intersection with metropolitan Indian 
activists.  
198 As Nanda (2003) points out, there are other routes from nineteenth century romanticism (especially the 
German variety of Vedic Indology not discussed above) to contemporary Indian politics – including the 
appropriation of Germanic Vedic romanticism in the Bengal renaissance and by the founders of Hindu 
revivalism. 162 
a potentially infectious means of linking people who would be better off outside of the tumult of 
history (Gandhi, cited in Basu 2007: 40): 
 
The railways, too have spread the bubonic plague. Without them, the masses could not 
move from place to place. They are the carriers of plague germs. Formerly we had natural 
segregation....They  accentuate  the  evil  nature  of  man....The  holy  places  of  India  have 
become unholy. 
 
As  Basu  (43)  argues,  such  rhetoric  against  modern  technology  can  come  dangerously  close  to 
chauvinism, when it leads to nostalgic and essentialist claims such as Gandhi’s statement that “India 
was one undivided land so made by nature”.
199 It also makes for a romantic political ideology that is, 
as Madsen (2001 a: 3735) puts it in his critique of Gandhianism in the KRRS (see chapter five), “thin 
on institutions”, or on stretegies mechanisms for negotiating with institutions.  
 
In contrast to Gandhi, the figures of Nehru and Ambedkar offer, for Jodhka (2002) alternative styles 
of thinking about the countryside which have had consequences for the real world politics of India 
over the last fifty years. Nehru is the godfather of contemporary state led developmentalism (Gupta 
1998), but as Jodhka points out (3348) Nehru too took as his starting point the British view of the 
village as static and unchanging, leading to a paternalistic form of intervention that began from the 
premise of rural idiocy.  Only Ambedkar, who unlike the other two founding fathers of India, actually 
had lived in a village, had a thoroughly hostile attitude to it, and a hope that rather than it being 
reconstructed or revived the village, as “the negation of the Republic”  would be absorbed into 
modern, secular institutions. As Jodhka (3351) puts it: 
 
                                                           
199 Of course few social movements in India, bar the Naxalite Maoist Peoples’ War groups and certain dalit 
groups, would abjure Gandhi as a role model. Even those groups I think of as ‘materialist’ in orientation such as 
the Shetkari Sanghatana hold Gandhi up as a model and emulate his non violent forms of protest. The 
argument is that the more essentialist and romantic strand in Gandhi’s thought gets (over) emphasized in 
contemporary transnational romanticism. 163 
While Gandhi and Nehru accepted the notion of ‘village community’ as a natural fact of 
Indian civilization, Ambedkar perhaps saw it in more historical terms, as having been derived 
from the colonial western imaginations of India. 
 
This digression into the competing world views of the founders of the Indian state matters, because 
such configurations represent long standing conflicts over the representation of rural India, which 
are still playing themselves out today
200. Whereas in Jodhka’s formulation British historiography was 
taken up by Gandhian romantic nationalism, today a transnational discourse and its accompanying 
resources, in the form of a ‘global protest imaginary’, combine with indigenous romanticism to help 
shape views about what is going on in the Indian countryside and arguably to stifle voices of ‘social 
modernization’ like Ambedkar’s
201. Today, this push toward the romantic view is coming from middle 
class, metropolitan voices in the south at least as much as from the north. Indian environmentalists 
(and  scholar-activists),  for  example,  have  taken  up  certain  romantic  themes,  with  more  or  less 
nuance, in their diagnoses of rural Indian problems. 
 
Ramachandra  Guha  (2000),  himself  a  collaborator  in  and  scholar  of  Indian  environmental 
movements since the 1970s, admits the tension between a (mainly Northern) “ecology of affluence” 
and Southern environmentalisms that focus on “claims of economic justice - that is, the rights [of 
poorer  communities+  to  natural  resources”  (122).    However  Guha  rather  too  easily  finds  an 
accommodation between the two, perhaps because his view of those ‘claims’ of justice relies on a 
Gandhian assumption that communities want primarily to maintain their autonomy from modern 
                                                           
200 See Shome (2011) for an overview of Indian environmental romanticism that takes a similar line of 
argument to that of this chapter. 
201 Ambedkar wrote almost nothing about rural economics, but this critical quote makes his modernist / 
Marxian critique of Gandhi’s Luddism clear: “The economics of Gandhism are hopelessly fallacious. The fact 
that machinery and modern civilization have produced many evils may be admitted. But these evils are no 
argument against them. For the evils are not due to machinery and modern civilization. They are due to wrong 
social organization which has made private property and the pursuit of personal gain matters of absolute 
sanctitiy” (Rodrigues, 158). Given Ambedkar’s relentless focus on actual exploitation and caste based privilege, 
it would be invalid to link his variety of Marxism with the externalizing and romantic kind favoured by the 
KRRS, Left farmer unions in Andhra Pradesh and Shiva herself.  164 
institutions or states’ development agendas (122-124)
202. Kothari and Parajuli (1993), the former the 
founder of Lokayan  – an important activist resource organization and part time participant in the 
anti GMO network, declares more emphatically, about ‘tribal’ rights movements that (234): 
 
They found the state to be a cause of their insubordination, exploitation, and deprivation. 
Whilst challenging the very nature of development itself, these movements are no longer 
pressing for a greater share in the pie of national development but for greater autonomy. 
 
The second sentence does not follow automatically from the first, and if it is true of certain tribal 
communities it may be more a despairing than a transformative attitude; it represents a shift to a 
new (romantic) key (‘challenging the very idea of development’) that speaks more to the world view 
of postmodern critics of development, such as Wolfgang Sachs (the editor of the volume in which 
the essay appears (Sachs 1993)) than it does to tribal communities’ self understanding.
203 
In a more rebarbative account, environmental activist, close ally of Vandana Shiva and future key 
participant in the anti GMO network
204, Claude Alvares (1988) declares himself a proud ‘Luddite’ and 
condemns the “dissemination of scientific knowledge” (109) as: 
   
an alien cosmology that is exogenous to peoples’ living environments and harvested through 
a method which must conflict with nature, with the daily technology of the non elites.. 
 
Despite his speaking up for these ‘non elites’ versus western scientific imperialism his account of the 
‘failures’ of western science and medicine draws heavily on ‘western’ relativistic critiques of the 
                                                           
202 See the later discussion in the chapter of the Chipko movement and Guha’s views of it, (which are close to 
those of Vandana Shiva). 
203 Such judgments are bound to be highly contentious. I have never done research among tribal communities: 
however, speaking to researchers based at Indian universities who had done such research tends to give a 
picture of the needs and views of these communities that clashes with that of Kothari. A fundamental 
sociology of knowledge problem seems to be at work here: graduate researchers I spoke with at the University 
of Hyderabad – a non elite Indian institution – seemed to take for granted a ‘modernist’ / materialist approach 
to rural politics (how can these communities get better roads and water from the state?) – an attitude which 
extended naturally to the issue of GM crops.  
204 As one of the named authors of the petition to the Supreme Court to ban Bt Cotton and director of the Goa 
based Organic Farmers’ Association of India (OFAI), in which capacity he has helped to convene meetings in 
Maharashtra of anti GMO NGOs. 165 
knowledge claims of science, such as that of Ivan Illich
205. This is the kind of irony that Nanda (2003) 
makes much of, in her denunciation of ‘postmodern’ romanticism in India: while ‘radical’ ecologists 
like Alvares condemn western science they do so through a romantic lens thoroughly implicated 
itself in western colonialism and power.  
 
When applied specifically to the agricultural  economy this ‘romantic’ attitude tends to emphasize 
‘individualization’ and the fragmentation of rural social relations – what many interviewees termed 
the ‘village system’. Vasavi (2010: 79), also drawing on Stone (2007) is exemplary of this attitude: 
 
Withdrawn into their individualized households and families agriculturalists are often unable 
to gauge the risk involved in engaging with an unpredictable market, varying and unreliable 
climatic conditions, unreliable quality of seeds, fertilisers and pesticides and unsure and 
untested forms of new agricultural practices
206. 
 
This plangent emphasis on unknowable risks and dubious technologies echoes the activist discourse 
described below, especially in the ‘risk’ discourse of Suman Sahai of Gene Campaign and kavita 
Kuruganthi of the CSA, Hyderabad. 
 
In the next section we consider how a global protest imaginary has developed over the last twenty 
years. This global imaginary links back to the discussion in chapter one of the ‘modular’ discourse of 
transnational activist networks, of which it is a key variety. The resources of this global imaginary 
combine with the Indian middle class romanticisms described above (with their own legacies in 
colonialism) to produce the conditions for transnational romantic activist networks. 
 
                                                           
205 For an example applied to biodiversity issues see Reese and Rosenthal (2008). 
206 To be fair to Vasavi there is also a ‘modernization’ aspect to her argument, when she points out that the 
dilemma facing farmers (80) is that the ‘cultural’ sphere has not been so individualized – leaving farmers in the 
worst of all worlds – needing to make dowry payments for example, but without the ‘village system’ to fall 
back on.  166 
 
A Global Protest Imaginary 
 
Steger (2008: 199) describes the rise of a “Justice Globalism” imaginary in this way: 
 
In addition to articulating their particular concerns and demands within a global framework, 
the members of this New-New left increasingly engaged in “multi-issue framing” – the ability 
to  grasp  how  certain  issues  like  environmental  protection  or  the  struggle  against  AIDS 
related to other issues such as patriarchy, race or the debt burden of the global South  
 
This description is consistent with the work of Reitan (2008) discussed further in chapters one and 
six.  Other scholars, such as McDonald (2006) refer to a new “grammar” in the global sphere, linking 
multiple  issue  areas  around  common  themes  such  as  resistance  to  infringements  on  common 
property resources and threats to biodiversity. The ‘romantic’ element in this global imaginary is 
visible in the way it fuses together multiple concerns, each of which has a separate causal history. In 
the above citation, for example, it is not clear what links ‘patriarchy’ with the ‘debt burden’ and 
‘environmental protection’. In fact, one might as well argue on the contrary that the spread of global 
institutions and markets is a threat both to patriarchy and rainforests. But as McDonald phrases it 
(2006: 4) these new transnational movements “confront us with forms of public experience that do 
not correspond to understandings of deliberative , rational, disembodied public spheres” ; instead 
McDonald urges us to see these new movements, exemplified by the Zapatistas, as representative of 
a new “romantic structure of feeling” (94) that defies the Weberian differentiation of the social 
sphere.  This global imaginary, then, is organized around the postulation of communities outside of 
modernity, whose resources might actually ‘renew’ our stale and decadent societies, if only we can 
forge connections with them. 
 167 
 It might fairly be argued that McDonald and Steger represent an unrepresentative form of academic  
romanticism that tells us little about social movements in the real world. But the ‘global protest 
imaginary’ is also a real place. It consists of those global stages, like Seattle where Vandana Shiva 
and Jose Bove made spectacular protests against GMOs in the name of ‘real food’ and authentic 
peasantries, or in the Inter Continental Caravan through Europe attended by the KRRS of Karnataka 
discussed in detail in chapter five. It also consists of those media spaces that give air time to anti-
globalization and anti-GMO protestors, or quality newspapers like Britain’s Guardian and Observer 
that have frequently taken stories from India about GMOs directly from activists.  
 
The  rhetoric of  these  scholars  resonates with  the modus operandi of  a  subset of  transnational 
movements
207 that refuses to engage in negotiation over lists of policy proposals and prefers instead 
to concentrate on projecting an identity for consumption in these global spaces
208. Such movements, 
of the ‘global protest imaginary’ nostalgically refer back to a rural past while looking forward to new 
forms of community founded on ‘feeling’ rather than on bureaucratic rationality.  
 
For example, some influential transnational networks working on rural and agricultural issues show 
strong romantic tendencies in their public documents and stated policy position. Best known of 
these transnational groups is the Via Campesina, which includes among its member groups the KRRS 
of Karnataka
209, and which has actively intervened in the GMO debate in India over the last 15 years, 
especially by disseminating a set of ideas about the dangers of GMOs  from India to the rest of the 
                                                           
207 Bearing in mind Tarrow’s (2002) injunction to be ‘splitters’ rather than ‘lumpers’, not all transnational 
movements should be termed ‘romantic’ or mainly romantic. Delineating this, is part of the task of chapter six. 
For example, climate change groups that centre on epistemic communities of scientists and concerned 
citizens, might have romantic tendencies at the margins, but speak a technical language that makes them 
more amenable to integration in governance systems. (see diagrammatic representation at end of chapter six) 
208  Bob (2005) makes this case most forcefully.  
209 The Via Campesina is also connected to the KRRS through marriage: with Prof. Nanjundaswamy’s daughter, 
Chuki Nanjundaswam marrying a Via Campesina leader from Brazil. This is something that the ‘non-family’ 
leaders of the KRRS (interview) regarded as partly explaining her lack of interest in maintaining the local 
grassroots viability of the organization. The KRRS also hosted the 1999, ‘Third Annual Congress’ of the Via 
Campesina in India.  168 
world.  The Via Campesina refers to itself on its website
210 as “the international peasant movement” 
and boasts (as of October 2009) 148 member organizations in 69 countries. The use of the term 
‘peasant’ has been a crucial ingredient in the Via Campesina’s global image, as explained in the 
words of a Canadian activist cited by Edelman (2003: 187): 
 
If you actually look at what “peasant” means, it means “people of the land.” ....We too are 
peasants  and  it’s  our  land  and  our  relationship  to  the  land  and  food  production  that 
distinguishes  us...  We’re  not  part  of  the  industrial  machine....The  language  around  this 
matters.  It begins to make us understand that “people of the land” – peasantry everywhere, 
the millions of small subsistence peasants with whom we think we have so little in common 
– identifies them and it identifies us. 
 
This quote is revealing. The term ‘peasant’, as Desmarais (2008: 195) points out in her book on the 
Via Campesina, is redolent of feudalism and of bygone rural social formations. As with the typical 
rhetoric of the global protest imaginary it points both forwards and backwards, but does so with 
claims about connection and identity that are hard to make tangible. Does  a relatively wealthy 
Canadian  organic  farmer  really  have  so  much  in  common  with  a  ‘subsistence’  farmer  from 
Karnataka? What would that activist have said if they had known that their partner organization the 
KRRS, for example, caters almost exclusively to relatively wealthy non subsistence sugar farmers, 
very much immersed in the trials of the global market? 
 
As Borras (2008) points out in his sympathetic article on the Via Campesina as a ‘transnational 
agrarian movement’ (TAM), these kind of contradictions are masked by the ‘global master framing’ 
the Via Campesina has constructed around the World Bank, “whose villainy was...relatively easy to 
explain to the different subjective forces...that the campaign hoped to sway” (267).  Contradictions 
in the movement were many: not least the tendency for wealthy farmers’ groups in a country (the 
KRRS is mentioned as a key example (275) to block membership of groups adopting more radical 
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(materialist) positions about land reform (see chapter five).  Despite Borras’ positive gloss on the Via 
Campesina’s innovations in terms of identity formation (the global peasant), even he has to admit 
that it has had negligible or no policy impacts (282). In a marked parallel to the anti GMO network 
and like the middle class neo Luddism described by Steven Jones, the Via has taken certain genuine 
themes  of  concern  to  farmers  (privatization  of  common  property  resources  especially),  and 
translated them into a global imaginary driven by the romantic rhetoric of a lost agraria.  
 
In  the  next  sections,  two  movements  that  preceded  the  anti  GMO  network  are  examined,  for 
evidence of how domestic and transnational imaginaries combined under romantic interpretations 
of protest; sometimes retrospectively inventing romantic themes, sometimes directly in tension with 
more modernistic/materialistic grassroots motivations. 
 
 
Chipko and the Narmada protests: Forerunners of the anti-GMO protests? 
 
The Chipko and Narmada Dam movements are obvious precedents for the anti-GMO coalition
211. 
Both involved issu es of protecting rural communities from alleged external threats, and both 
involved transnational imaginaries, transnational activist linkages and transnational media interest.  
 
As Haripriya Rangan explains, the Chipko Andolan the mid 1970s in the Garhwal   Himalayas in 
Uttarakhand has acquired the character of a “fairy tale” (Rangan 1993: 8) that “the people *of the 
Garhwal  region+  had  evolved  a  harmonious  and  peaceful  coexistence  with  nature”  which  was 
subsequently disrupted by the Indian state’s decision to build roads and encourage greedy timber 
merchants to plunder the regions resources, bringing environmental catastrophe in its wake. This 
plunder was then opposed by grassroots activists in combination with elite Gandhian activists such 
                                                           
211 See Peritore (1993) for the particular significance of Chipko in formulating a ‘green’ ethic among eilite 
Indian opinion makers. 170 
as a young Vandana Shiva
212 and, more prominently at the time, Sunderlal Bahuguna, as celebrated 
in Guha’s (1991) ‘The Unquiet Woods’
213. Chipko then became an international cause celebre of the 
global  environmental  movement,  long  before  the  acceleration  of  transnational  activism  in  the 
1990’s, and perhaps as a key model and precedent for that acceleration. 
 
However, some powerful scholarly critiques exist of this narrative, from Rangan (1993), Linkenbach 
(2007) and even former Chipko activist Bandyopadhyay (1999).  Rangan provides a severe critique of 
the ‘romantic’ interpretation of Chipko and, for the purposes of this dissertation a powerful model of 
the ‘unintended consequences’ that activism driven by metropolitan elites can have on local people. 
She develops two crucial themes: firstly that that ‘innocence / innocence disrupted’ myth of the 
Chipko movement was greatly exaggerated, in that local people had been in dispute over their 
economic access to forest resources  for over a century rather than disputing that the forests should 
be used as a material resource; and secondly, that externally led activism  harmed the very local 
people it claimed to be helping, by providing rhetorical resources to the state in its effort to create a 
“politics  of  coercing  conservation”
214  (280)    that  excluded  local  people  from  access  to  forest 
resources even more severely than before. Here there is a direct parallel to the colonialist ‘use’ of 
romantic narratives to control, order and ‘protect’ subject peoples.   
 
Linkenbach  (2007)  provides  a  critical  ethnography  of  the  movement,  showing  how  Sunderlal 
Bahuguna became the ‘international face’ of Chipko – arguing abroad that villagers had an inherent 
                                                           
212 See Shiva and Bandhyopadhyay (1986) for the ‘romantic’ view of Chipko as a Gandhian movement of 
villagers engaged in previously sustainable practices of forestry, a struggle which Shiva characteristically and 
strategically links (20-21) to the new environmental movements in Europe. See also Routledge (1993: Ch 4) for 
a (mis)reading of Chipko that emphasizes the ‘defence of the sacredness of place’ in the movement and 
virtually ignores the material dimensions of the actual movement. 
213 Guha’s analysis is nevertheless different from Shiva’s; he emphasises the ‘moral economy’ aspects of the 
protests in the subaltern studies tradition, rather than the more contentious feminist/ecological interpretation 
of Shiva. Although both would agree with Guha’s claim that the protests were in favour of a way of life “more 
harmoniously adjusted with natural processes” (Guha 1991: 196). 
214 In particular by helping the Indian government’s rhetorical arsenal in its transfer of control of the forests to 
the Ministry of Environment and Forests, from the Ministry of Agriculture, thereby excluding the arguments of 
villagers that they should have economic rights in the forests by invoking environmental conservationist 
themes. 171 
spiritual connection to trees (49) based on their Hindu beliefs, a spiritual message highlighted in the 
(transnational) ‘slogan’ of the movement: “What do the forests bear? Soil, water and pure air!” 
Linkenbach’s  analysis  of  the  growing  tensions  between  Bahuguna  and  the  more  ‘materialist’ 
grassroots of Chipko is worth quoting at length (68): 
   
Bahuguna knits together love, harmony, and protection as basic elements of an ‘ecological’ 
attitude towards the forest. This attitude finds its practical expression in the ‘true’ Chipko 
demands  for  a  total  ban on  green  felling  and  the closure  of  all  forest-based  industries. 
Against  this  demand  the  establishment  of  labour  cooperatives  for  the  extraction  of 
timber....to  achieve  local  employment  is  identified  with  exploitative  praxis....This  early 
‘economic’ phase of Chipko.....had to give way to the ‘true’ i.e ecologically inspired Chipko, 
represented by Bahuguna himself. 
   
This rivalry of romantic and materialist was won, in the field of representation by the romantics; 
Linkenbach  records  (81)  how  Bahunguna  was  adept  at  using  the  mass  media  (books,  films, 
newspaper editorials) to marginalize Chandi Prasad Bhatt – the leader associated with the labour 
cooperatives described in the above passage.  Linkenbach reports that the outcome of this ‘victory’ 
for villagers was, as Rangan also argued, lagely negative  – with new  strict forestry access rules 
framed in ecological language, and as the villagers reported (85) “the awards and the money are for 
the samsthans *the NGOs+”. In this respect Chipko represented one of the first global examples of a 
campaign increasingly geared to the needs of a transnational and urban activist community, eager to 
project its concerns onto peasants. Even former activist Bandyopadhyay (1999), though formerly a 
joint author with Vandana Shiva of an account of the movement (1986), later argued that Shiva had 
retrospectively appropriated Chipko for her own urban concerns 
 
The anti Narmada Dam networks, opposed to the Sardar Sarovar Project on the Narmada river, 
covering three states (Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Gujurat) are just as widely studied and, 
arguably, mythologized, as the Chipko movement. Again, there is an overlap with the anti-GMO 172 
case. Many of the NGOs I interviewed in Maharashtra, especially those based in Pune, were also 
involved  in  the  Narmada  Bachao  Andolan  (Save  the  Narmada  Movement)
215.  A  Greenpeace 
advertisement against the possibility of GM rice plays on the parallel, with the words ‘Dhan Bachao!’ 
(‘Save  our  rice!’)  written  on  a  field,  viewable  only  from  the  air  for  media  consumption  and 
reproduction in Greenpeace publicity materials. 
 
Unlike the Chipko Movement, where Rangan and Linkenbach report that local villagers, supposedly 
the ‘grassroots’ of the movement, had rarely even heard of it, the movement against big dams 
among people threatened with having their villages flooded had extensive grassroots involvement 
and few experts of whatever ideological orientation believe mega-dam projects are an efficient or 
equitable way to provide irrigation to farmers
216. However, there have been deep tensions within 
the anti-dam and resettlement organizations which would be hard to discern from reading the best 
known scholarly work on the transnational part of that movement, Khagram’s (2004)  Dams and 
Development. 
 
In brief, the Gujurat based ARCH-Vahini and the Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh based Narmada 
Bachao Andolan (NBA) were at loggerheads during the early 1990’s over whether to concentrate on 
getting resettlement and compensation for villagers whose villages would be submerged (the ARCH-
Vahini position)
217 or whether to link the Narmada campaign to a larger environmental and symbolic 
campaign against dams per se (the NBA approach). It should be stressed that  both  campaigns 
involved outsiders intervening on behalf of locals, and also transnational dimensions (at least in the 
ARCH-Vahini case so long as the World Bank was funding the project  – which was until 1993), 
although it was the NBA that  achieved global recognition as representative of affected villagers and 
                                                           
215 For example Lokayan and the National Centre for Advocacy Studies as well as activists such as P M Lata (see 
chapter six) 
216 See numerous articles collected in Fisher (1995) 
217 See the Introduction to Dreze et al (1997) for a balanced overview of the dispute 173 
which was far more active in building transnational linkages both normative and practical in the 
ways described by Khagram.
218 
 
Many issues of relevance are discernable in the anti -dams coalitions. Firstly, the decision over 
whether to seek compensation or whether to oppose the dam and actively work to stymie 
compensation attempts
219 depended on a larger ideological view about whether villagers affected 
were  true  subsistence  oriented  ‘adivasis’  (indigenous  persons)  or  were,  rather,  peoples  with  a 
complex history of economically motivated migration, interested in partaking of modern institutions 
and  legal  guarantees  of  land  ownership.  This,  in  turn  is  nested  within  the  broad  modernist  / 
romantic orientations we have tried to make thematic in this chapter. Secondly, the NBA, as even a 
sympathetic observer such as Baviskar observes (1995: 242) threatened to undermine their clients 
through its romanticization of their identity. Baviskar argues: 
 
Romanticizing adivasis reduces their problems and refuses to acknowledge that, at present, 
their  ability  to  mount  a  critique  has  been  vastly  eroded  by  their  subordination.  While 
intellectuals as well as people in the valley stress that priority must be given to a need-based 
economy – a wholly sound basis for reorienting natural resource management, that, in itself, 
is not enough. The scale of the degradation of the land and forest requires a massive effort 
calling upon financial, technical and organizational resources – a magnitude that has been 
achieved so far only by the state.  
This tendency to frame the dam issue as a battle for the survival of autonomous communities, and 
therefore rule out mediation through the state, had practical consequences for the network. Anil 
Patel of ARCH-Vahini for example, argued versus the NBA (1995: 196), that they had actively denied 
villagers  in  Maharashtra  and  Madhya  Pradesh  information  about  possible  resettlement  and 
                                                           
218 A google search reveals 33,000 pages referring to the Narmada Bachao Andolan versus 1,350 for the ARCH-
Vahini 
219 This is Anil Patel of ARCH-Vahini’s (1997) complaint against the NBA, arguing that they actively denied 
villagers in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh information about possible resettlement and compensation (as 
worked out in Gujurat) in order to pursue their adamant opposition to the dam, thus actively undermining the 
interests of their supposed clients in order to continue playing a transnational role as defenders of those 
clients.  174 
compensation (as worked out in Gujurat) in order to pursue their adamant opposition to the dam, 
thus actively undermining the interests of their supposed clients in order to continue playing a 
transnational  role  as  defenders  of  those  clients.    Even  more  dramatically,  ARCH-Vahini  had 
complained when the NBA publicized some threatened villagers’ willingness to drown rather than 
face resettlement (Fisher 1995: 24), arguing that this was a misrepresentation designed to appeal to 
the media and global audiences and that it actually played into the hands of the Indian government 
that wanted to portray the villagers as intransigent (Patel , 1995: 196). 
 
Unlike either the Chipko or the anti GMO campaign a more complex dynamic was at play in the anti 
dam  networks:  firstly,  there  was  the  greater  importance  of  self  organizing  village  level  groups 
(Baviskar 1995), before transnationalization, and secondly the different types of transnationalization 
at work. The ARCH-Vahini had succeeded in forging very specific, technical linkages with Oxfam UK 
and , via them, the World Bank (Patel 1995: 186), to ameliorate the resettlement options of villagers. 
At this time, the NBA had actually opposed transnationalization. But later, the tables turned, and it 
was the NBA that entered into a transnational phase, but not so much for technical mediation with 
the World Bank as to illustrate symbolically the plight of advisasi communities to a global audience. 
The first type of transnationalization was not ‘romantic’
220; the second was –  and  it is arguable that 
transnational linkages and the prospect of access to international media coverage helped push the 
NBA toward the strategy of romantic ‘indigenization’ of its clients and Manichean opposition to 
dams, even at the expense of the claims of those at the alleged grassroots of the movement
221. At 
                                                           
220 In Chapter six I label it ‘governance oriented’. 
221 See especially Whitehead’s (2007) sympathetic but critical (from a Marxist perspective) paper on the NBA, 
where she points out that the rhythm of protest was shaped by the availability of ‘celebrity activists’ like 
Arundhati Roy: “throughout the 1990s the vocabulary of the movement as well as the timing of local actions 
was increasingly dictated by the demands of the media and the constituency of transnational 
environmentalism” (412). The romanticization of valley dwellers as ‘true’ adivasis was crucial to this. 
Whitehead’s attack on romanticism is arguably vitiated however by an equally romantic version of Marxism 
which she advocates, demanding a full scale assault on commodification and enclosure in the countryside: not 
in accord with Marx’s own views about the practical options facing rural agriculturalists. 175 
the end of Chapter six I try to theorize further what this difference between ‘governance oriented’ 
and romantic TANs might mean and what explains it. 
 
 
The Anti-GMO Campaign: Variations on a Romantic Theme 
 
Most famous of the ‘southern ‘romantic activists involved first in the Chipko campaign and in the 
anti GMO network is Vandana Shiva. Her activities were discussed in Chapter Three in terms of her 
NGO based work on GMOs and the powerful emulative effect she exerted on Indian social activists is 
discussed  in  chapter  six.  She  has  published  more  than  twenty  books,  and  won  at  least  18 
international awards for her ecological campaigning
222.  
 
Shiva’s  work  on  GMOs  and  other  topics  (especially  the  WTO,  organic  farming,  and  patents)  is 
informed  by  a  small  number  of  generative  metaphors  and  signifiers.  This  ability  for  symbolic 
production is part of what makes her such a powerful media figure, and leads to her frequent 
speeches, and invitations to protests abroad,
223 and her status as key strategic partner for powerful 
INGOs such as Greenpeace and HIVOS (chapter three). Two signifiers stand out in much of her 
writing: the seed and monoculture. This passage combines both themes in a typical fashion (Shiva 
2005: 52): 
   
The seed signifies the freedom of diverse cultures from centralized control. In the seed, 
ecological issues combine with social justice. The seed can play the role of Gandhi’s spinning 
wheel in this period of recolonization through “free-trade”. The native seed has become a 
system of resistance against monocultures and monopoly rights.......Diversity as a way of 
                                                           
222 A list of the awards appears on her Wikipedia page: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vandana_Shiva 
223 One of the ironies of the hagiographic film Bullshit (2005) about Shiva’s work is that despite her praise for 
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thought and a way of life is what is required to transcend the impoverished monocultures of 
the mind. 
 
Here,  agriculture  becomes  a  symbol  for  much  wider  social  aspirations.  Shiva  is  arguably    less 
interested in the (very real) practical problems with monocultures
224, and more interested in turning 
‘monoculture’ into a global meme, referring to the supposed homogenization of ‘local’ cultures 
under the market and the state.  Similarly the ‘good’ local seed is set against the ‘bad’ seed of 
Monsanto, who sell “seeds of suicide” (Shiva and Jaffri 1998), or “seeds of deceit” (Shiva 2005: 53). 
These metaphors  are made  concrete  at  Shiva’s  Navdanya organization  (Navdanya  2007), where 
“seed keepers” preserve ‘indigenous’ seeds from around India, as a last resort for farmers, whose 
access to a variety of non hybrid seeds is apparently being limited by corporate agriculture.
225 . In the 
hagiographic European made film about Shiva called ‘Bullshit’ (2005), pictures of these ‘natural’ seed 
banks  are  juxtaposed  with  the  words  of  a  Monsanto  scientist  (with  ominous  music  in  the 
background) describing how “Monsanto has simulations of every occurring climate type in its data 
banks”; the implication being that in Monsanto, a computerized, homogenizing algorithm is being 
used  to  flatten  local  differences,  whereas  in  Navdanya  local  differences  are  celebrated  and 
protected.
226   
 
The other ‘concrete’ manifestations of the seed metaphor are  the Gandhian protest repertoires 
based around the seed – or ‘bija’ in Hindi; these include the ‘Bija Satyagraha’ (seed ‘soul-force’
227 
protests) organized alongside the KRRS (see chapter five) in 1992 on the occasion of the GATT / 
Dunkel Draft debate about patents on bio organisms, the ‘Bija yatra’ (seed pilgrimage’ of 2006-07) 
                                                           
224 Shiva originally worked with Prof. Nanjundaswamy of the KRRS on eucalyptus monoculture in Karnataka in 
1983 (Assadi 1997). The trajectories of both activists could be seen as a flight into symbolism since then. 
225 ‘Seed banks’ are described in chapters three and six, where the actuality of their low impact and uptake is 
highlighted. 
226 Needless to say I believe this dichotomy is simply false: if anything the Monsanto data banks have the 
potential (with good regulatory policies) for increasing the amount of seed variety available to farmers, 
whereas Navdanya’s seed banks appear to be mainly for show in the media, at ritual distributions and in 
brochures, rather than a practical resource for farmers. 
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joined by organic NGOs and focused on suicide affected parts of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh 
(Navdanya 2007: 35-6), and the ‘asha ke bija’ (seeds of hope) scheme that accompanied the yatra, 
where 6000 farmers were given seeds, in ritualistic style, from Navdanya’s collection (Navdanya 
2007: 37).  
 
Roy and Borowiak (2003: 79) analyze the atavistic elements of Shiva’s romantic rhetoric, citing her 
characteristic statement that: 
 
‘Development’ has meant the ecological and cultural rupture of bonds with nature, and 
within  society,  it  has  meant  the  transformation  of  organic  communities  into  groups  of 
uprooted and alienated individuals searching for abstract identities.....in effect turning away 
from the soil as a source of meaning and survival and turning to the state and its resources 
for  both.  The  destruction  of  organic  links with  the  soil  also  leads  to the  destruction of 
organic links with society 
 
This shows how Shiva’s views of the countryside are associated with a mythology of the “death of 
the sacred” (Roy and Borowiak: 79) which recalls Gandhi’s words on the railways cited above.  In her 
attack  of  GMOs,  as  Roy  and  Borowiak  critique  them
228, Shiva incorporates this quasi religious 
vocabulary to imply that “manipulating seeds is...analogous to manipulating female bodies” (82), 
where the feminine is associated with the soil and with the true spiritual source of the nation, 
echoing, for Roy and Borowiak, the rhetoric of Hindu nationalism. For Nanda (2003: Ch 9), this kind 
of gendered rhetoric (she cites Shiva’s various comments on women as protectors of the land) is also 
harmful to women, because it overlooks how integration into markets and wage labor has been the 
main source of emancipation for Indian women. For these critics, by positing the purity and feminity 
of the soil and the seed, threatened by external violations, Shiva is playing with themes that may 
                                                           
228 Although their critique of Shiva is marred by the way that they, like Brass (2000), merge her rhetoric with 
agrarian populism per se. This seems to be because they take for granted an equally romantic leftist view of a 
potential rural politics of landless labourers united with the urban working class and take everything else as 
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even tend, in Nanda’s terms (12) toward fascism. If this judgment goes too far, the rhetoric certainly 
implies  the  need  for  a  paternalistic  authority
229, and therefore, conveniently, a justification for 
vertical relations of dependency between organizations like Navdanya and the farmers working on 
organic  ‘projects’ under their supervision.  
 
Many  interviewees  among  NGOs  claimed  that  they  found  Shiva’s  romantic framing  unrealistic  , 
although several (like Lata P M, described in chapter six) talked of Shiva as a target for emulation, 
even rivalry. But Shiva’s rhetoric has found resonance in the media (see chapter two), and in a global 
constituency, and influenced the representation and strategies of well known social movements in 
India over the last few decades, from Chipko onwards. 
 
What of the other organizations in the anti GMO network? The tenor of romantic argument in the 
network depends on who the audience is for a particular presentation, and also on the other types 
of ‘structural coupling’ organizations have, as described in chapter three. Videos, for example, made 
for worldwide distribution or slogans intended for the national media tend to make use of a highly 
romantic rhetoric, while on the other hand metropolitan INGOs like GRAIN and  Suman Sahai’s Gene 
Campaign adopt a discourse that is amenable to coupling with governmental agencies, with less 
metaphorical or symbolic content and more reference to surveys conducted by NGOs and to ‘risk’ 
discourse.  However,  as  discussed  below,  this  kind  of  ‘risk’  discourse  has  its  own  romantic 
components. 
 
At the next level down, the ‘nodal’ groups discussed in chapter three, such as Greenpeace and 
Chetna Organic and nodal funding agencies such as HIVOS India are in the business primarily of 
forging  connections,  funding  smaller  groups,  and  in  the  case  of  Chetna,  as  ‘market 
                                                           
229 In interview with Kishor Tiwari of thje VJAS (interview number 42), he also stressed fears over female 
corruption, saying: “our daughters are out of control”, loosely linking this to a series of external threats, 
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environmentalists’, working as brokers for organic farmers with international fashion companies. 
While these groups strive for a professional, technical attitude in their self presentation and their 
employees  are mostly  career  track  NGO  workers,  they  nevertheless  provide resources  to  those 
promoting dramatically romantic views such as Vandana Shiva, sometimes, as described in chapter 
three, to the tune of six and seven figure dollar amounts. This can lead to a peculiar tension, which 
was  very  apparent  in  interviews,  especially  with  Greenpeace,  Chetna  Organic  and  HIVOS 
representatives. All three adopted a skeptical, cautious and seemingly open-minded perspective on 
GMOs  in  interviews
230,  and  emphasized  their  distance  from  Vandana  Shiva’s  views  without 
prompting.  
 
Nevertheless, even these self consciously professional organizations depend on romantic framings as 
part of their coupling with the media and their global supporters. This is the ‘radicalism’ mentioned 
in chapter three from the Greenpeace archives: not perhaps as sincerely felt as Shiva’s myth making, 
but  conscious of  the  power  of  romantic  narratives  to  penetrate  crowded  “social  space”  as  the 
Greenpeace director put it in the archival materials. For this reason Greenpeace refuse to engage 
with any framing of GMOs that includes price, or cost benefit calculation (chapter two). The GMO 
campaigns officer argued that what they objected to was the input-output model of agriculture per 
se: a position that accords with Shiva’s vision of village autonomy, even if Greenpeace does not 
poeticize this theme. Similarly, Chetna  Organic’s market oriented organic cotton projects depend on 
romantic appetites for ‘authenticity’, the ‘value’ of which is partly constructed (in unquantifiable 
ways) by more overtly romantic activists like Shiva: as Spooner (1986) argues in relation to the 
‘oriental carpet’ as object of interest for westerners, the non commodified production techniques 
                                                           
230 Interviews numbers 22, 32 and 71. The key term they used was ‘uncertainty’, about bio-safety. However, 
none of them would endorse specific claims about allergies, sheep deaths, etc, and they were quite detached 
and even ironical when discussing such claims (often produced by research funded by their own organizations) 
This was even more true of Greenpeace’s international science officer Doug Parr, interviewed in London in 
April 2006, who seemed positively dismissive of many of the key claims made by his own organization against 
GM crops, and keen to emphasize the work he felt more comfortable defending, for example on nuclear waste 
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involved  in  making  an  object,  paradoxically  enhance  its  value  as  a  commodity  in  these  niche 
markets. 
 
At the regional level, NGOs such as the DDS and CSA in Hyderabad, or large organic farming NGOs 
which fund smaller village projects are the clearest example of the ‘two faces’ of the anti GMO 
network; on the one hand producing dramaturgical video documentaries, for example, and on the 
other playing the part of science-based, technically sound rural development organizations that can 
be trusted by state governments and donors to disburse funds efficiently. At this level, ‘romantic’ 
attitudes were apparent in interviews, when the directors of projects spoke candidly about the 
villagers they were working with. For example, at the Green Foundation in Bangalore and MARI in 
Warangal
231,  the  directors  emphasized  the  ‘ignorance’  of  the villagers  they worked  with,  in the 
context of their susceptibility to ‘external’ influences. They saw their projects as attempts to ‘save’ 
villagers from the corrupting influences of the city, even if they were fighting a losing battle. Mr 
Murali  of  MARI  constantly  stressed  that  the  project  encapsulated  a  ‘vision’  for  “keeping  young 
people in villages”
232. At Dhara Mitra in Maharashtra, the director similarly talked of “cutting people 
out of the *market+ system”, as the solution to rural crisis
233.  This vision is put on display quite 
vividly at Eenabhavi, near Warangal in a project run by CROPS (described in chapter three), where 
villagers are literally encouraged to ‘live out’ the mythos of the communal Indian village; gathering 
under the banyan trees for communal discussion once a week, as mandated by NGO protocol
234. But 
of course, this re-imagined solidarity is only possible with ‘external’ inputs of donor money , even 
when the idea of autonomy appears to be at the heart of the way these projects are framed to 
donors and the global media.  
 
                                                           
231 Interviews 20 and 16 
232 Contrast the views of Dipankur Gupta (2000; 2004; 2009) on the need to overcome this perspective on the 
village and how he believes it hampers policy making. (see chapter six) 
233 Interview number 40. Here, and elsewhere the writings of Japanese organic farming pioneer Masanobu 
Fukuoka (1996) were mentioned as an inspiration.  
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Others, among these regional NGOs were more nuanced in their understanding of the romantic 
framing of agriculture – Mr P Babu, of ICRA, Bangalore
235 argued that a fusion of Marxism and 
‘Eastern’  ways  of  thinking  was  needed  (“Bakunin  meets  Sannyasa”  in  his  words).  Unlike  others 
interviewed, he was more alert to the negative aspects of the “old village system”, in terms of 
hierarchies and lack of opportunities, but at the same time, as in other project NGOs, he argued that 
they would only work with those villagers who “did not produce a market surplus”. This reluctance 
to engage with farmers who are actually producing for the market is revealing; suggesting either the 
inherently  low  attractiveness  of  the  ‘organic  village’  for  actual  farmers,  even  with  financial 
incentives, or more, cynically, the greater ease with which NGOs can form symbiotic connections to 
remote places where their external financial input carries greater relative weight and where ‘exit’ 
options are limited.
236.  
 
In terms of media productions, the Deccan Development Society (DDS)
237, run by former television 
producer P.V.Sattheesh, has produced a series of video documentaries, aimed at an English speaking 
audience, about the ‘failure’ of Bt Cotton in Andhra Pradesh. There are three films produced by an 
organization called the ‘Community Media Trust’, entitled ‘Bt Cotton in Andhra Pradesh: A Three 
Year Fraud’, ‘Bt Cotton: A Disaster in Search of Success’, and ‘Why are Farmers in Warangal so angry 
about Bt Cotton?’. These films were funded by HIVOS, the EED (the association of German evangelic 
churches) and by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) in the UK.  The 
films are supposedly produced and filmed by a collective of women farmers from Andhra Pradesh, 
who we occasionally see holding video cameras and audio equipment in the films. But the credits at 
                                                           
235 Interview number 23 
236 This also came over in a talk given at Hyderabad University (Interview/lecture number 55 d) on an organic 
project in Karnataka, called the Timbuktu Collective, where it was stressed that geographical distance from 
trunk roads and urban areas was a precondition for the success of such projects – the aim of which was to 
“revitalize old cosmologies” as well as farm organically.  
237 Pearson (2006) has conducted a discourse analysis of DDS documentation, and comes to similar conclusions 
as those presented here: he interestingly compares Monsanto and DDS discourses, concluding that both see 
rural people as needing professional interlocutors: “DDS represent farmers as having lost their traditional 
knowledge and agency. They require re-education and the professionals (the NGOs) are the ones to show 
them how to reclaim their sustainable ways of life” (313).  182 
the end mention a script by P.V.Sattheesh
238, and at no point do we see or hear the women actually 
communicating with farmers.  They make a trip to South Africa and  to Mali, to interview farmers 
about the failures of Bt Cotton there, but the supposed cosmopolitan interaction of subalterns never 
takes place; the African farmers are mostly represented by ‘rappoteurs’, dressed in the hip ‘ethnic’ 
garb of urban social activists.  
 
There is also an interesting gap in the films between the often quite pragmatic comments of the 
farmers interviewed and the editorial views of the film.  In both India and Africa, farmers express the 
wish that they could farm sugar cane (hardly a more environmentally friendly crop) instead of cotton 
if they had the capital, and the ominous commentary which, in booming Bollywood tones declares 
how “into this paradise *of supposedly sustainable cotton farming in the past+ entered a terrible 
pest: the American bollworm” (the word American is emphasized). At the end of one film, a woman 
who had planted Bt Cotton in a field rented with borrowed money, and then suffered crop losses, is 
described as not knowing she was buying the “seeds of her death”;  but this is despite her family 
(interviewed) putting her problems down to a mixture of poor rains and insupportable debt taking.  
The films try to construct a romantic narrative of paradise lost and innocence taken advantage of, 
out of the complex causal terrain of rural crisis described in chapter two. This depiction is clearly 
aimed at an international audience, who also funded the films, and perhaps primarily at donor 
organizations, like HIVOS, wanting to get a return for their investment, in terms of materials that can 
be consumed in Europe. 
 
As suggested in the introduction, the forms of romanticism extend further than imaginations of 
autonomy and the accompanying paternalism. Risk discourse also comes in a romantic form, in 
which cost benefit calculation succumbs to slippery slope pessimism. For example, the Centre for 
                                                           
238 I also spoke to Sattheesh’s predecessor at the DDS (interview number 34), who criticized the direction he 
had taken the organization, toward media driven activities and told me that there were frequent and 
deliberate mistranslations in the films, of what farmers in AP were saying in telegu.  183 
Sustainable Agriculture’s main GMO program officer Kavitha Kuruganti, in her largely factual and 
technical  seeming  Economic  and  Political  Weekly  articles  (2005;  2006),  but  especially  in  a  CSA 
booklet (funded by donor agency HIVOS) on GMOs ( CSA: 2007) employs a discourse that draws on 
romanticism  (she  uses  Shiva’s  term  “reductionist  science”  for  example),  but  is  closer  to  what 
Madsen (2001 a), in relation to the KRRS’ Inter Continental Caravan, refers to as rural ‘conservatism’. 
By this Madsen (3737) means an ideology combining “romance and pessimism”: that is “a secular 
conservatism rooted in a belief in the value of local folk-beliefs and practices, even though these are 
admitted  to  be  no  longer  really  viable  or  enforceable  in  the  age  of  darkness”.  This  discourse 
emphasizes ‘uncertainty’ above all else, and in the CSA text, this sense of lurking dangers behind any 
kind of ‘intervention’ pervades the argument, though that argument is presented in technical terms 
backed up with data and biological terminology (unlike with Claude Alvares’ and Vandana Shiva’s 
discourse). In the CSA booklet, GMO technology is described as “a very imprecise, unreliable and 
unpredictable  technology.  The  only  thing  that  is  predictable  is  that  it  is  unpredictable”.  This 
argument relies on a notion of genetic “holism” that may not have much scientific content, but 
which in a more subtle form links to the notion that ‘nature’ (conceived as external to homo sapiens) 
is resistant to human interventions, and will punish attempts to penetrate her complexity. It is 
noticeable that despite its relatively moderate tone (and this is true of Suman Sahai’s writings too) 
the booklet ends up finding no promise at all in any type of GM technology present or foreseeable. 
Its blanket refusal of the technology, and dark warnings (though not precise claims) about possible 
health effects, end up meshing with the romantic imaginary’s Manichean form of  argument; as 
Madsen argues, this represents a form of nihilism, in which no kind of action could ever change 
anything, except for the worse. 
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Conclusions: Why does romanticization matter? 
 
In  this  chapter  I  have attempted  to  draw some  lines  of  historical  continuity,  to make  sense of 
contemporary  transnational  activism.    While  much  literature  on  activist  networks,  tends  to 
concentrate  on  the  strategic  framing  work  done  by  movement  elites  in  the  present,  it  is  also 
essential to see how these frames have roots in specific political cultures and, more critically, that 
these frames might endorse one world view over others, with distributional consequences for the 
livelihoods of people represented in these movements. This argument about framing is continued in 
chapter six. 
 
We have seen, in the cases of Chipko, Narmada and GMOs that there are indeed such consequences, 
when a romantic frame is emphasized over the complex set of local and national demands that could 
loosely be termed ‘modernist’ or ‘materialist’. The very fact that modernism/materialism is much 
harder to define here (it is more eclectic and locally variable) than romanticism confirms one of the 
key points of this chapter – that romanticism, under conditions where transnational opportunities 
are available, may become a homogenized and homogenizing option for certain southern groups, 
who have made an initial decision to participate in the global protest imaginary
239.  
 
The table below helps to summarize the differences of the romantic and modernist world views as 
applied to the three cases described,  drawing on chapter two,  when looking at the ‘modernist’ 
arguments not emphasized on GMOs. In each case a transnationalized civil society is more likely to 
opt for the claims in the ‘romantic’ column, because it resonates with a global protest imaginary and 
brings in resources, as described in chapter three.  
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Table 4.1. Summary of ideologies in the three campaigns 
 
  Romantic   Modernist/Materialist 
Chipko  Subsistence,  indigenous  people 
against  external  appropriation  of 
resources  by  state  and  market;  
defending  a  ‘way  of  life’  close  to 
nature 
local  people  in  dispute  with  government 
decision to allow certain logging firms access to 
forests rather than them; dispute about who is 
allowed to exploit forest resources 
Narmada  Indigenous  /  adivasis  versus  a 
combination of the Indian state and 
transnational  capital;  attempt  to 
preserve a viable, pre-modern way of 
life 
Attempt to prevent non-efficient and costly big 
dams;  if  not  prevent  then  gain  adequate 
compensation for resettlement 
GMOs  Attempt of Indian peasant farmers to 
prevent  more  incursions  by 
transnational  capital  into  traditional 
farming;  opposition  to  a  dangerous 
and  unpredictable  meddling  with 
nature 
Complaints  against  seed  companies  over  poor 
choices of hybrids for early Bt Cotton; Attempt 
to reduce price of Bt Cotton; push for research 
into GMOs designed for Indian conditions and 
marginal farmers 
 
 
While there are certainly continuities between the three cases, the anti GMO network has more in 
common with Chipko than with the Narmada protests, in that in the first and third cases, the ‘base’ 
of the network was small (Chipko) or non existent (GMOs), whereas in the Narmada case the base 186 
was large and at different times (and in different interpretations) in synergy or in tension with the 
transnationalized ‘head’ of the network. As argued in chapter six, the GMO case may be an extreme 
type of ‘romantic TAN’, in which professionalized mediators, thriving in the numerous ‘choke points’ 
that have arisen, have free rein to romanticize the issue, in the absence of an articulated grassroots 
with more material concerns
240.  
 
The consequence of romanticization is a  selective focus on particular sources of disenchantment 
that deflects attention from more pressing problems. This is Nanda’s (2003) line of argument, in her 
attack on what she sees as the alliance of western postmodernism and southern romanticism.  For 
Nanda, just as the Nazi regime condemned the culture of science in the name of ‘organic unity’, 
while pushing for technical advancements in military technologies
241, so these civil society groups 
tend to selectively focus on particular instances of ‘disenchantment’ and ‘commodification’, while 
themselves  developing  (in  chapter  three’s  argument)  highly  efficient  technical  capacities  to 
coordinate with donor agencies, governments and markets.   
 
This also means a diversion of activist energies; E P Thompson’s (1994: 247-48) eloquent summary of 
Raymond Williams’ argument in ‘The Country and the City’ (1975) is worth citing at length here: 
   
What  was  wrong  with  the  ‘myth’  of  rural  life  was  that  it  became  softened,  petrified, 
protracted, and then taken over by city-dwellers as a major point from which to criticise 
‘industrialism’. Thus it became a substitute for the utopian courage of imagining what a true 
community, in an industrial city might be – indeed of imagining how far community may 
                                                           
240 Carl Schmitt would no doubt concur – since he argued that the ‘political romantic’ is someone who seeks 
out issues that can be rhapsodized, and where ugly blow back from reality is kept to a minimum. 
241 As Ronald Herring points out (personal communication) there is no campaign against genetically engineered 
medical products like insulin, although they should be subject to the ‘uncertainty’ critique exemplified by the 
CSA booklet. Insulin is probably used more by rich than poor.  Conversely, the cotton oil, used mainly by the 
poor, has not been a focus of NGO campaigns against Bt Cotton, even though it is actually ingested: here the 
Greenpeace officer I interviewed argued that science has shown the Bt gene couldn’t possibly harm humans in 
the form of cooking oil, but Greenpeace has adopted a much more liberal attitude to potential risks when it 
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have already been attained.....Williams [sees] the idealising of country life as a continuous 
cultural haemorrhage, a loss of rebellious blood, draining away now to Walden, now to 
Afghanistan.....solving nothing in their own countries but kidding themselves that they had 
somehow opted out of contamination by a social system of which they are themselves the 
cultural artefacts. In a sombre late chapter he reminds us that the idyllic labourers....upon 
whom the myth was long sustained, are now the poor of Nigeria, Bolivia, Pakistan. [my 
emphasis] 
 
And, of course, the ‘they’ mentioned in this passage are now also the middle classes of southern 
countries, not just ‘westerners’.  
 
 
Ideas and material Interests in the network(s): Separate or Inextricable? 
 
How can we square the ideational/historical approach taken in this chapter with the functional 
approach  taken  in  chapter  three?  Some  hints  have  already  been  made  in  this  chapter  in  the 
discussion of the governmental ‘uses’ of romantic ideas  and in chapter three in the discussion of 
Niklas  Luhmann’s  and  Lewis  and  Mosse’s  work  –  in  which  the  instrumental  rationality  of 
organizations  and  their  ideational  perspectives  are seen  as mutually  constituting.  Four  types of 
answer are available: the first three pointing to particular mechanisms (however vague they might 
be at present), the fourth making a larger theoretical point about the compatibility of ideational 
(chapter four) and instrumental (chapter three) forms of argument about TANs. 
 
Firstly, and most generally, following Hegel, Schmitt, and more recently, Morton, we could appeal to 
general  psychological/ideological  formations  in  the modern  world:  the  pervasive ‘beautiful  soul’ 
syndrome which reappears in countless guises, whether of left or right, cosmopolitan or nationalist, 
religious or secular. As described above, this syndrome involves a (self contradicting) disavowal of 
complicity in modern institutions and, in its transnational variety, a projection of this threatened 188 
purity  onto  likely  targets,  whether  they  be  indigenous  persons,  subsistence  farmers  or  Tibetan 
monks. 
 
Probing  this  complex  ideological  construct  is  well  beyond  the  bounds  of  a  dissertation  in 
comparative politics. However, a consumer base responsive to that range of feeling is implied in at 
least three of the structural couplings described in chapter three – the media, the market for organic 
goods and the mass membership of European religious or donor organizations that sponsor the 
network(s).  The  contemporary  mass  media  in  particular  may  encourage  the  cultivation  of 
spectatorship at a distance (Boltanski 1999); in other words the medium itself may encourage a 
‘romantic’  framing  of  issues  in  which  middle  class  audiences  spectate  struggling  agriculturalists 
whether  in  their  own  national  hinterlands  or  abroad,  and  project  their  anxieties  and  sense  of 
pervasive ‘risk’ (Beck 1992) onto those groups. 
 
Secondly, following Douglas and Wildavsky (1983), we could appeal to the type of organization 
involved in TANs.  As these authors argue, ‘border’ type organizations – meaning smaller, voluntary 
or quasi voluntary organizations, such as NGOs or even larger contribution-dependent groups like 
Greenpeace tend to adopt Manichean or apocalyptic values as a kind of organizational glue, in order 
to overcome their internal collective action problems. These (romantic) values then get externalized 
in the form of their attitudes to social problems and to risk: (123): 
 
The  border  is  self-defined  by  its  opposition  to  encompassing  larger  social  systems.  It  is 
composed of small units and it sees no disaster in reduction of the scale of organization. It 
warns the center that its cherished social systems will wither because the center does not 
listen to warnings of cataclysm. The border is worried about God or nature, two arbiters 
external to the large-scale social systems of the center. 
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For Douglas and Wildavsky, the decline of industrial organization and the rise of service industries 
creates a proliferation of these ‘border’ type organizations, or ‘sects’, usually manned by workers 
from these service sectors, who have had no positive experiences with large scale organizations. The 
argument could now apply transnationally to the proliferation of such ‘border’ groups. In addition to 
this externalization of organizational values,  competition between border groups (chapters five and 
six) in terms of  ‘purity’ and ‘authenticity’ accentuates those values.  
 
Thirdly  we  could  follow  Duffield  (2007),  and  take  up  arguments  already  made  in  this  chapter, 
showing that romantic framings of subsistence serve governmental purposes, whether of the state 
or  NGO  sector.  Duffied  argues  (67-70)  that  ‘sustainable  development’  and  its  concomitant 
encouragement  of  labor  intensive,  small,  autonomous  forms  of  production,  arose  following  the 
failure of modernization to reach marginal populations in countries of the global South. Since the 
1990’s it has been encouraged (he argues in analogy to colonial regimes, as also argued above) in 
order to ‘soak up’ surplus labor and to prevent unwelcome migrations, whether internally to cities or 
externally to richer countries. For Duffield romantic tropes such as self-reliance, autonomy, and 
small sized ‘natural’ communities mirror and assist in these projects of ‘containment’. Certainly, the 
paternalistic rhetoric of many NGO’s interviewed fits with this argument, in particular their emphasis 
on keeping farmers ‘away’ from outside influences. More importantly the influx of funds from state 
governments for organic agriculture in recent years suggests anxieties about rural discontent that 
labor intensive organic projects might meet. The anti-Bt coalition, then, could be seen as a very small 
but symbolically significant part of a larger effort to construct zones of what I would call governed 
autonomy in the countryside – fusing Gandhian rhetoric with a less than progressive ‘containment’ 
strategy, in a hybrid strategy with a long history. 
 
Finally, and more abstractly, Snyder (2006) reminds us that there is no contradiction involved in 
joining together these supply and demand side explanations (themselves mixing psychological and 190 
organizational factors) in accounting for TANs. In an important essay on network forms of power, he 
draws on the sociology of Michael Mann (1986) to argue that ideational complexes in networks 
emerge through feedback effects from their structural potency. Ideas that find “social niches” in 
which they “resolve contradictions of meaning or organization” for actors (324, my emphasis) will 
prosper. An example cited by Snyder, from Mann’s work, is the dissemination of Christianity, which 
solved psychological problems of status for freed slaves, economic trust problems for transnational 
merchants and ultimately governmental legitimacy problems (temporarily) for the Roman Empire. 
Success in filling these niches, however, in the context of no rival ideologies, created an emergent 
entity more potent than its individual origins. On a much smaller scale romantic TANs such as the 
anti GMO network fill various psychological and organizational niches, described in this and the 
previous chapter. This is in the absence (as argued in chapter six) of viable alternative ideologies in 
the Indian countryside.  The ideational solutions, as argued in this chapter, are not new, but draw on 
similar patterns from colonial India and from previous social movements. 
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Chapter Five: Comparing Farmers’ Movements. Why did the KRRS take the 
transnational route and not the Shetkari Sanghatana?  
 
Introduction 
Chapter three described the organizational linkages that have kept the anti GMO network in India 
active and influential. Chapter four tried to pin down the concept of ‘rural romanticism’ and pointed 
out  that  romanticism  tended  to  be  associated  with  transnational  linkages  in  previous  activist 
networks in India and that the anti GMO network exemplifies this ‘romantic’ approach.  Chapter five, 
combines  some  of  these  themes,  showing  how  making  transnational  linkages  was  both  an 
organizational and ideational choice of the KRRS (Karnataka State Farmers’ Organization), which 
enthusiastically led the way on opposition to Monsanto and Bt cotton.  In contrast the Shetkari 
Sanghatana (Cultivators’ Association) of Maharashtra, which took a strongly pro Bt cotton line, even 
organizing rallies for legalization, tended not to forge transnational connections with activists, in line 
with its forms of organization and its more ‘modernist/materialist’ orientation. 
The comparison is more complex than that, however. The epilog to the chapter points to some of 
the ways that Sharad Joshi, leader of the Sanghatana  did forge  transnational linkages since the mid 
1990’s. These linkages, of a ‘market romantic’ or libertarian hue, were ideologically at variance with 
those of the KRRS, but reflect some of the same structural issues surrounding transnationalism.  
The chapter deliberately does not focus exclusively  on the Bt Cotton campaigns by the KRRS. In line 
with the methodology expressed in chapter six, the aim is to make sense of the framings of the anti-
Bt cotton protests by putting them in a larger social and historical context. This context is what the 
chapter aims to provide. 
Methodologically,  the  chapter  can  be  taken  as  a  ‘pair-wise’  comparison  of  the  two  farmers’ 
movements. But, bearing in mind the discussion of social causality in chapter one, it is not intended 192 
as a strict ‘test’ of the ‘causes’ of a movement  turning to transnational linkages or the causal 
consequences of those linkages (holding certain similarities constant). This is partly because the 
reasons for key differences in structure and ideology of the two movements are obscure and will 
probably never be known, given the lack of field research on the movements in the 1980’s
242. There 
may  be  long  term,  structural/historical  reasons  why  the  farmers’  movement  in  Karnataka  was 
destined to be more hierarchical and more ‘romantic’ in orientation than that in Maharashtra; much 
also rests, in both cases, on sometimes arbitrary seeming decisions and personal preferences of the 
movements’ two charismatic leaders.  At most, the chapter can hint at ‘elective affinities’ between a 
certain kind of movement (in this case the KRRS) and the transnational public sphere, which might 
be probed further by similar studies on different issue areas in different countries. Nevertheless this 
chapter hopes to contribute to scholarship by its comparisons: the movements’ opposite views on 
GM crops provide an interesting bifurcation to investigate and none of the existing scholarship sets 
out to systematically compare the movements’ strategies, especially in the period of their decline, 
after the mid 1990’s
243. 
 
The KRRS as Transnational Icon 
One important motivation for this chapter is that the KRRS has acquired an almost iconic status in 
some  academic  literature,  as  an  exemplar  of  transnationally  oriented  resistance  to  neoliberal 
capitalism, and a potential example to movements throughout the world.  
                                                           
242 Despite excellent articles, dissertations and monographs on these movements, referred to in this chapter, 
no one ever undertook a systematic comparative survey of the movements’ membership in the 1980’s when 
they were genuinely mass movements. Much rests on later conjecture and reconstructions by interested 
parties. This chapter relies heavily for empirical analysis on work done by Assadi (1994; 1997) on the KRRS, and 
Omvedt (1980; 1993; 2004) and Youngblood (2004) for the Shetkari Sanghatana.  
243 Even Youngblood’s account ends in the late 1990’s, and has very little to say about the ‘decline’ in the 
Sanghatana’s membership and power at that period – sometimes slipping into the error of redescribing decline 
in terms of deliberate ‘looseness’ of structure; not an analysis which former Sanghatana officers found very 
plausible in my interviews. 193 
For Reitan (2007: 156-59) the KRRS represents a mass movement (she claims of 10 million members) 
joining up with transnational networks (the Via Campesina and Peoples’ Global Action) to demand 
“ecological sovereignty” (157) for global farmers. Reitan describes the KRRS as an example of a  
generative organization with global reach, innovating tactics that were imitated in Europe (smashing 
KFC outlets  imitated by the Confederation Paysanne of France, versus McDonalds) and as another 
scholar has pointed out, burning trial fields of GM crops, even before that tactic had been adopted 
by British activists (Scoones, 2008: 16).  Featherstone (2008) devotes a whole chapter of his book on 
‘counter global networks’ to the KRRS, and like Reitan, stresses the ‘productive’ networking  that 
created new forms of global resistance to neoliberal norms and through which the KRRS was able to 
switch  “from targeting rural-urban division in India to contesting transnational power relations” 
(152). Featherstone is alert to some of the paradoxes of the KRRS’ transnational activities, especially 
the essentialist and xenophobic views expressed during the  ‘Inter Continental Caravan’, discussed 
below, but nevertheless sees the KRRS as exemplary of the way third world groups can offer a 
transnational response to what Featherstone assumes are transnational problems caused by MNC’s 
and neoliberal norms.  
Perhaps  the  most  sophisticated  defence  of  the  KRRS  as  harbinger  of  a  new  networked  and 
transnational  politics  comes  from  Gupta  (1998).  Gupta  argues  that  farmers  groups  in  India, 
especially the KRRS “are aware that global accords signal important shifts in the territorial basis of 
nationalism and are struggling to articulate what this postcolonial space represents for peasant 
organization  and  resistance”  (292).  His  Foucaultian argument  is  that  new ‘intermestic’  forms of 
governmentality/power (as represented by global bio-property rules or the activities of Monsanto or 
Cargil  in  Karnataka)  have  brought  forth  new  forms  of  transnational  resistance.  Such  forms  of 
resistance, such as the innovation of new solidaristic identities (“farmers of the world”, 323), go 
beyond ‘northern environmentalism’ with its technocratic biases.  Even though the KRRS may draw 
on  “contradictory  logics”  (328),  including  old  nationalist  rhetoric,  the  organization  nevertheless 194 
represents a rupture with the old logic of the nation state and a move into an ‘unbundled’ world  
where global technocracy both confronts and generates global resistance.  
Gupta’s and Featherstone’s assessments of the KRRS as exemplar of a new politics of resistance are 
nuanced enough to admit to contradictions in the KRRS’ position,  not least that it is primarily a rich 
farmers’ organization talking about protecting the poor, and that it has employed a sometimes 
essentialist, nationalist or masculinist rhetoric in its campaigns. But none of these favorable accounts 
can explain the anomaly (although Gupta mentions it) that the Shetkari Sanghatana of Maharashtra, 
representing a similar group of farmers and facing similar problems, did not enter into new forms of 
transnational resistance. In fact, where the Sanghatana enters the debate, as on the activist website 
lobbywatch.org, it has been in the form of corporate stooge, rather than mass organization
244. This 
disparity in attention is also true of the secondary academic literature on the two movements: while 
the KRRS (or its transnational ‘face’, at least) has inspired a large number of articles and book 
chapters,  the  Sanghatana  remains  largely  undescribed,  apart  from  dedicated  works  by  Omvedt 
(1993; 1994;2004) and Youngblood (2005). 
The rest of this chapter attempts to explain this anomaly and point to organizational and ideological 
factors  that  might  have  predisposed  the  KRRS  into  forging  transnational  alliances,  where  the 
Sanghatana did not. Before making this comparison it is useful to consider how both movements
245 
fit into the history of rural social movement organization in India since independence. 
 
 
 
                                                           
244 http://wwww.lobbywatch.org/profile1.asp?PrId=195 
 
245 For purposes of comparison, farmers’ movements from other states, such as the powerful BKU of Uttar 
Pradesh, are excluded, partly because of the limitations of this particular research project, partly because the 
BKU did not have to deal with issues related to Bt cotton, being based in a non cotton producing state.  195 
The two organizations compared 
For simplicity’s sake three phases of farmers’ or rural mobilization in India can be described (Pai, 
2010). In the first phase, from 1948 to the 1970’s mobilizations were primarily about the failure of 
land reform in the immediate post independence period and were fought under the banner of 
socialist or communist ‘anti feudal’ ideologies. From the early 1970’s with the onset of the Green 
Revolution  and  the  concomitant  rise  of  class  differentiation  in  the  countryside,  so  called  ‘new 
farmers’ movements’ or ‘rich farmers’ movements’ took over. These movements, which included the 
KRRS  and  the  Shetkari  Sanghatana,  mobilized  against  the  state  and  its  interventions  in  the 
agricultural  economy.  The  target  of  these  heterogeneous  movements  was  ‘urban  bias’  (Lipton, 
1977); the critiques and prescriptions of these movements are described in more detail below. 
Finally, in the period since liberal reforms began in India, since the early 1990’s, the picture is much 
less clear. The economic background to this period is the relative decline of agriculture in India’s 
more diversified economy, the withdrawal of the state from the countryside (described in chapter 
two) and a focus of opposition to globalization in the form of trade agreements and transnational 
corporations. During this period mass rural movements have steadily declined as the rural middle 
classes that once led them migrated to the cities, to be replaced variously by NGOs and activist 
networks, rich farmer-corporation linkages and a resurgent Naxalite guerrilla movement. It is this 
third ‘phase’ (which has no clear label as yet) that is the focus of this dissertation and the aim is to 
shed  light  on  the  complex  patchwork  of  rural  organizations  that  have  replaced  the  mass 
mobilizations of phases one and two.  
The  Sanghatana  and  the  KRRS  both  originated  at  the  same  time  (late  1970’s),  under  similar 
economic conditions and, superficially at least, offered similar prescriptions to the problems faced 
by  farmers.  Before  analyzing  in  more  depth  the  more  subtle  differences  in  membership, 
organization, tactics and ideology of the two organizations, it is useful to summarize the broad 
points of similarity (Omvedt, 1980; 1993; 1994): 196 
  Both organizations argued that the Indian state was extracting surplus from agriculture, in 
the form of depressing price of agricultural commodities, and using that surplus in urban 
areas  and  for  urban  industrial  expansion.  Both  organizations  framed  this  as  a  form  of 
exploitation. 
  Specific complaints included such barriers to trade as zonal restrictions on where farmers 
could sell their crops, price controls organized through the Agricultural Price Committee 
(APC), artificially high exchange rates favoring imports for industry over agricultural exports 
and  restrictions  on  ‘value  added’  activities  by  farmers  such  as  processing  of  raw 
commodities. 
  Both  organizations  favored  specific  state  interventions  in  the  countryside  to  improve 
irrigation and infrastructure 
  Both  organizations  were  led  by  and  had  as  members,  primarily,  wealthier  farmers  – 
“intellectual rich peasants” as Assadi terms them (1997: 215), who were the gainers from 
the technological improvements of the Green Revolution; increasing surpluses, thanks to 
new  crop  hybrids  had  meant  more  time  available  for  protest  and  organization.    Their 
founders were upper middle class professionals , who were not reliant on farming for a 
living: Sharad Joshi of the Sanghatana had a background as an officer in the United Nations 
and Prof. Nanjundaswamy of the KRRS was a lawyer and university teacher who had quit a 
post in Germany to return to India and lead the movement (Gupta, 1998: 333)  
  Both organizations showed a similar pattern of rise and fall: initially able to mobilize rallies of 
hundreds of thousands of farmers in the early to mid 1980’s, by the early 2000’s, after failed 
flirtations with electoral politics, both were subject to splits, fractiousness and decline in 
mass membership, to the extent that active membership may now be down to the few 
thousand in both states
246. 
                                                           
246 Youngblood makes a case that the Sanghatana was still a mass organization in the year 2000, around which 
time his field research came to an end, but no one interviewed for this dissertation in Maharashtra believed 197 
Despite these important similarities there were three crucial areas of difference between the two 
movements: in their membership structure, organization, and ideology/campaign targets. Exploring 
these differences can help explain why the KRRS was able and willing to form transnational linkages 
and the Sanghatana was not, and why the KRRS’ ideational history made it compatible with the 
transnational imaginary’s mode of representing GM crops while the Sanghatana was not. 
 
1.  Membership Structure 
As pointed out above, the senior leadership of both movements was drawn primarily from richer 
and middle income farmers in their respective states.  Some scholarly accounts, by Marxist oriented 
scholars (Brass 1994; 2000, Dhanagare 1994) stop the analysis there and ‘write off’ the movements 
as populist lobby groups for ‘middle peasants’, whose agenda was twofold:  to get subsidies from 
the state which would disproportionately benefit the rich
247, and to distract political and media 
attention from the exploitation of agricultural labor. Other scholars (in particular  Varshney, 1998),  
point to the flaws in this critique, arguing that the aim of raising prices in the countryside could 
reasonably have attracted the support of marginal farmers and even laborers.    
However, there were differences  between the movements here. Firstly, the Sanghatana’s support 
base appears to have encompassed more crop areas than that of the KRRS. Having begun with a 
dispute over onion prices, the Sanghatana in its heyday represented farmers of gram, peanut, chilli, 
cotton,  tobacco  leaf  and  dairy  and  was  strong  in  the  poorer,  rain  fed,  eastern  portions  of 
Maharashtra  such  as  Marathwada  and  Vidarbha  (see  chapter  two)  where  cotton  growing 
predominates (Youngblood, 2004: 14). The KRRS, on the other hand, found its core membership 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
that the Sanghatana could still be called a mass organization today. Pattenden (2005: 1981) argues that “By 
2002, its *the KRRS’+ organizational presence was skeletal and no longer crossed both caste and class 
boundaries.” In both cases the primary reason for decline was economic: the exodus of ‘peasant intellectuals’ 
or their children from rural employment to the cities and, with declining terms of trade, a lower amount of 
time available to farmers for protest activities. 
247 Omvedt (1994) points out that it was actually communist party allied farmers’ unions (as described in 
chapter three) that were demanding subsidies, not the farmers’ movements. 198 
confined to richer, irrigated parts of Karnataka, and in particular to sugar plantations and some 
coffee and spice farmers (Assadi , 1997, 42-45). The sugar cane farmers were crucial for the funding 
of  the  KRRS,  providing  a  revenue  stream  for  the  KRRS  that  was  lacking  among  their  peer 
organizations (Madsen, 2011), so that Assadi can even describe the KRRS as a “sugar farmers’ union” 
(Assadi, 77)
248.    In fact, significantly for the overall argument here, cotton farmers had deserted the 
KRRS early on in the history of the movement, leaving in 1983, alongside rain fed farmers from the 
Bellary, Raichur and Dharwad districts who felt their interests were not being addressed by the 
leadership of the KRRS (Assadi, 145).  These differences in financial structure matter because, in a 
parallel to the ‘resource curse’ in primary commodity exporting countries, they led to different 
structural tendencies: in the KRRS a tendency toward central control and a ‘freedom’ of ideological 
action unrestrained by dependence on a larger contributing membership, and in the Sanghatana a 
need to respond to the demands of a more diffuse base. 
Arguably connected to these financial difference the two movements also had varied success in 
reaching out to groups beyond farmers. According to Youngblood’s thesis on the Sanghatana, the 
movement was successful in promoting the involvement of women, marginal farmers
249 and to a 
lesser extent of agricultural laborers and adivasis (‘tribal’ peoples). For example, Sharad Joshi pushed 
for India’s farmers’ movements to include a higher minimum wage for labor as part of their core 
program (Youngblood, 17). He did this by placing the interests of subordinate groups in a larger 
context of oppression at the state level. The Sanghatana, unlike the KRRS, also made efforts to reach 
out to urban trade unions (Assadi, 117). Overall, as Youngblood (18-19) summarizes it: 
                                                           
248 Madsen (2011) describes the ‘KRRS levy’ that these cane farmers paid in return for the success of the KRRS 
in getting them higher can prices than in neighboring states. Much of this ‘levy’ was at the personal disposal of 
Prof. Nanjundaswamy.  
249 Quantitative data is hard to come by, but Youngblood conducted a brief survey in 1996 at a Sanghatana 
rally (Youngblood, 140-41) and found that “the represented proportion of small and marginal holders was just 
two percentage points less than their overall representation in the state”. By contrast the KRRS leaders 
interviewed for this thesis in Bangalore (interview number 75) readily admitted that the KRRS was a ‘richer 
farmers’ organization’ and that they had rarely dealt personally with marginal famers in the state. 199 
It *the Sanghatana+ opposed entrenched dominant caste interests, and conservative ‘Hindu-
ist’ and casteist rhetoric that served to factionalize rural social groups. In the process it 
continued  to  attract  agriculturalists  with  widely  differing  degrees  of  participation  in  the 
market,  and  reached  out  to  rural  laborers,  women  and  the  scheduled  castes  (SC’s) 
historically marginalized by the politically dominant Marathas and ideologically dominant 
Brahmins of the state 
This verdict matches the (later
250) opinions of Omvedt (1993; 1994; 2005) on the Sanghatana, as an 
inclusive movement, and is taken up below in the section on organization. The KRRS, by  contrast, 
according to Assadi (118), was unwilling and/or unable to incorporate agricultural laborers in its 
agenda, being seen, more exclusively as a union for the interests of richer farmers, and in particular 
the sugar farming lobby. 
 
2.  Organization  
The inclusiveness or exclusiveness of membership relates to the way each movement was organized. 
Although  interviews  conducted  with  former  leaders  and  advisors  revealed  that  both  Joshi  and 
Nanjundaswamy were described as “egotistical”, “power crazy” and “undemocratic” by some of 
their former colleagues, nevertheless there are crucial differences in the way these leaders used 
their charismatic modes of leadership. The legacy of these differences is clear today: despite the 
collapse in mass membership of both movements, the Sanghatana still has a well kept office, with an 
archive of Sanghatana related documents and newspaper clippings; in addition, it was clear from 
interviewing former advisors and colleagues of Sharad Joshi that he had surrounded himself with 
highly educated and independent minded people, many of whom now work as university professors 
in Pune and Nagpur. In Karnataka, on the other hand, the institutional legacy of the KRRS is much 
harder to locate. The KRRS currently has no website or permanent office. Instead they have been 
                                                           
250 As opposed to Omvedt (1980) where she took the Marxist/Leninist line on the Sanghatana as primarily a 
rich farmers’ union. 200 
donated a space in a large function hall in Bangalore
251, where small delegations of farmers still visit 
one(unfunded)  faction of the current leadership to ask for  political support on local issues. That 
leadership, as discussed below, is fractured and contentious, with arguments raging over access to 
trust funds and valuable transnational linkages.  
These current  legacies relate to the way the movements developed in the 1980’s. Youngblood 
devotes  a  good  portion  of  his  dissertation  on  the  Sanghatana  to  an  account  of  its  democratic 
decision  making  processes.  Following  Steinberg  (1998),  these  processes  could  be  described  as 
‘dialogical’,  meaning  that  leadership  and  grassroots  were  in  constant  communication,  and  the 
structures of the Shanghatana were specifically designed to ensure this kind of engagement, or ‘co 
authoring’ of the movement with its grassroots. The most important evidence for this encompassing 
character of the Sanghatana is given by Youngblood, in his account of the various ‘positive spillovers’ 
(not his term) of Sanghatana activities. Because of the leadership’s flexible approach, individual 
villages were able to suggest local issues in which the larger organization could participate. Among 
these activities, described by Youngblood (205-223) and Omvedt (1994: 136-38) were monitoring 
and  exposing  corruption  of  local  officials,  registering  women  as  property  owners,  increasing 
womens’ participation in village panchayats (local village councils), setting up cooperative marketing 
schemes  and  labor  and  dalit  rights  initiatives,  assisting  in  compensation  demands  for  farmers 
afflicted by crop failure and addressing local demands for infrastructure, such as roads or irrigation.  
It would be wrong to suggest that the KRRS was unable to do any of these things. Even today, as 
witnessed during field research, KRRS leaders were engaged, during  my interview, in taking details 
of compensation claims from farmers. Certainly, in the 1980’s some ‘KRRS villages’, as reconstructed 
in interviews by Pattenden (2005: 1981) were able to look beyond caste and class differences to “the 
green  scarf”  of  the  KRRS.  However,  Assadi’s  account  of  the  KRRS’  institutional  structure
252 
                                                           
251 Interview number 75. 
252 An account backed up in interview with Prof. Basavaraj of Mysore University, a former KRRS leader and 
friend of Prof. Nanjundaswamy. (Interview number 76). 201 
demonstrates some crucial differences from that of the Sanghatana, even in its heyday. As Assadi 
253puts it (107), in terms that contrast sharply with Youngblood’s and Omvedt’s descriptions of the 
Sanghatana: 
The grassroots/district units, except concentrating on local issues, had limited autonomy 
which was confined to certain things like passing resolutions in conformity with the central 
leadership, duplicating the discourses of the movement or the central leadership…. 
For  Assadi  (104)  the  Sanghatana  was  an  ‘issue’  oriented  movement,  whereas  the  KRRS  was  a 
‘structure’ dominated movement, where rigid hierarchies determined unit level activities. Assadi 
backs up these claims by quoting internal letters from KRRS officials to Nanjundaswamy, complaining 
as early as 1986, that the KRRS leadership was becoming overly hierarchical and dictatorial (109) -  
claims acknowledged by  former and current  KRRS leaders interviewed for this dissertation.  As 
described  in  greater  detail  below,  this  tendency  became  even  more  pronounced  during  the 
‘transnational’ phase of the KRRS: as Assadi puts it, (97): 
peasants were often appropriated and their appearance in rallies….was construed to mean 
consent  to  the  political  agendas  of  the  movement.  Paradoxically  this  became  counter-
productive to the movement later on. 
Another important organizational feature of these movements was their relative capacity to form 
horizontal linkages with each other and with the other Indian farmers’ movements. Prof. Basavaraj, 
who was involved in talks between Nanjundaswamy and Joshi and Tikait of the BKU, commented 
that Nanjundaswamy’s “intellectual arrogance” and inability to speak hindi cut him and the KRRS off 
from  the  other  two  big  farmers’  movements  (of  Maharashtra  and  Uttar  Pradesh),  marring  the 
possibility of an all India movement, despite various ‘all India’ coordination committees being set up. 
                                                           
253 Is Assadi a reliable commentator? His work was also an important source for Pattenden (2005), so there 
may be systematic bias here. In interview with Prof Assadi (interview number 77) it was clear that he was 
actually sympathetic to the content (if not the style) of the more transnationalized, anti-corporate campaigns 
of the later KRRS, while acknowledging the hypocrisy of Nanjundaswamy’s claims to democracy. His critiques 
come from the Marxist left not from the pro corporate right. His book length study of the KRRS is amply 
referenced with primary sources and his position at the University of Mysore means he was close to senior 
KRRS leaders during the 1980’s.  202 
In interview Assadi claimed that Nanjundaswamy felt thwarted by his failure to get KRRS ideas 
accepted at the all India level.  This failure to generate horizontal solidarities at a national level, 
probably influenced the transnational tendency taken by Nanjundaswamy later on, and is discussed 
in further depth below. 
 
3.  Ideology and campaign targets 
Perhaps  the  most  important  difference  between  the  two  movements  was  in  their  ideological 
perspectives. The program of the Sanghatana had a clear focus on ‘fair price’ as a unifying theme. 
Around this theme, other cultural and ideological aims took shape. The KRRS on the other hand 
never formulated an ideology or ‘theory’ about farmers’ issues that ‘stuck’. This difference is a key 
reason why transnational themes became attractive for the KRRS. 
Omvedt  (1994:  134)  describes  how  Sharad  Joshi was  able to  formulate  an  ideology that would 
“share with  Marxism  its materialism”, while  transposing  Marx’s  story  of exploitation  from  class 
oppression to the urban elite’s oppression of the countryside. This was distilled, succinctly into the 
opposition  between  ‘Bharat’  (the  productive  part  of  rural  India)  and  ‘India’  (the  quasi  colonial 
extractor of value from ‘Bharat’). In addition to this quite plausible narrative (supported in Lipton, 
1977 and Varshney, 1998), the Sanghatana was able to draw on older cultural themes of Brahmin 
caste  oppression,  particular  to  Maharashtra.  Youngblood  stresses  these  cultural  themes  in  his 
dissertation, showing how anti Brahmin sentiment among rural masses was mobilized by replicating 
certain Marathi myths around the (anti brahmanic) figures of Shivaji and the fabled ‘return’  of the 
folk King Bali. This cultural symbolism was successfully tied, in Sanghatana mythology, to the theme 
of Bharat versus India. Although Youngblood may over emphasize these cultural aspects of the 203 
Sanghatana
254 one key outcome of this fusion of cultural and economic discourse was to help keep 
the ‘hindutva’ movement out of rural Maharashtra, by depriving it of normative and institutional 
space  (Lindberg  1995).  This  was  something  that  the  KRRS,  despite  equal  ideational  hostility  to 
hindutva, was not able to do in rural Karnataka (Assadi , 264). 
A theme that emerges from studying the two movements’ ideologies is that, despite the utilization 
of  myth,  the  Sanghatana  was  forward  looking  and  modernistic  in  its  program,  while  the  KRRS’ 
program was more scattershot and reactive. Omvedt shows, in her detailed analysis (1994: 147-51) 
of the Sanghatana’s 1990 agricultural policy proposals (scuttled by the contemporaneous rise of 
hindutva ideology at the centre), how a plausible vision for managing rural change was articulated by 
the organization. This vision, encapsulated in a proposed National Agricultural Policy (NAP), is worth 
dwelling on, as it speaks to key themes in this dissertation. It is an example of the ‘path not taken’, of 
pro  science,  pro  poor  development,  described  in  chapter  two.  The  NAP  asked  for  a  “drastic 
reordering of the pattern of national priorities” (quoted in Omvedt: 147) which included, but was 
not limited to, the core program of ‘fair price’ for agricultural commodities. Among the proposals 
were ecological goals that combined new technologies (in 1990 meaning new hybrid seeds) along 
with  less  emphasis  on  chemical  fertilizers
255; radical proposals for decentralization of decision 
making,  including  pancha yat  (village  council)  control  over village  forest  resources;  egalitarian 
proposals for equal inheritance for male and female children and , perhaps most relevant to the 
discussion of ‘paths not taken’ in chapter two, a proposal for more integrated agricultural research, 
with feedback from farmers on ‘needs’ which would be plugged into the state agricultural research 
system.  
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cultural dimension in his thesis, and that ‘fair price’ was the fundamental mobilizing theme, even for illiterate 
masses 
255 Proving, for Omvedt, that the Sanghatana (and in this case the KRRS too) were not working only for rich 
farmers, for whom fertilizer subsidies would be disproportionately beneficial, but had a larger vision of rural 
development. 204 
The upshot of these proposals, for Omvedt was a kind of modernized Gandhianism
256 (Omvedt 1993: 
120-21) that rejected Gandhi’s nostalgia for pre capitalist social relations and his anti-technological 
stance, but embraced the idea of power going back to the villages, but this time in the form of 
capital accumulation and investment under the democratic control of village panchayats. Such a 
vision saw South Korea’s and Taiwan’s paths to modernity as exemplars (Lindberg, 1994: 118-19). In 
these countries capital accumulation and investment in the countryside had gone hand in hand with 
industrialization
257, rather than the countryside (Bharat) being sacrificed to the cities (India).  
The KRRS’ vision of rural development was considerably less clear. This is apparent from the long 
‘lists’ of demands that the organization puts out, sometimes with 20 or more items on them
258.  The 
Sanghatana on the other hand always framed its demands in terms of core principles.  Alongside the 
profusion of particularistic demands the other tendency of the KRRS was toward an essentialist 
version  of  Gandhian  ideas.  While  Nanjundaswamy  also  focused  on  price  controls,  and  his  own 
version of ‘fair price’, called ‘scientific price’, he also formulated what he termed the ‘Khadi Curtain’ 
(Assadi  1994).  Unlike  the  Sanghatana,  for  whom  farmers  needed  to  maintain  a  connection  to 
international capital and technology, despite the unfairness of foreign subsidies and the predatory 
mediations of ‘India’, for the KRRS, a more isolationist stance was advisable. Rural India, in this 
conceptualization had to cut itself off from foreign and corrupting influences before it could hope to 
rejuvenate itself. The ‘Khadi Curtain’ concept drew on dependency theory and on Gandhian ideas, to 
blame foreign capital for the exploitation of Indian farmers, laying the groundwork for the series of 
transnational targets that the KRRS had in its sights through the 1990’s. 
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point of anti-developmentalism”. 
257 With the rural population becoming consumers for industrial goods. 
258 For example Mr Veerasangaiha, current general secretary, read me a list of 21 points, including 
transnational targets such as opposition to Monsanto, demands for increases in the cost of sugar cane, 
investment in wind power, free electricity, investment in horticulture, womens’ empowerment, seed banks for 
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 Assadi, throughout his monograph on the KRRS, suggests that this adoption of Gandhian rhetoric 
and the ‘othering’ of western capitalism by the KRRS were strategies designed to disguise the lack of 
unity in the organization. Gandhianism, paradoxically, became a tool of top down control (Assadi, 
111): the idioms of unity and ‘the village’ and the externalization of ‘the enemy’ helped to disguise 
the  organization’s  fundamental  structural  weaknesses    Assadi  also  analyzes  the  use  of  Marxist-
Leninist rhetoric in the KRRS along similar lines, although here, as a radical Marxist himself, Assadi’s 
critique  is  that  Nanjundaswamy  did  not  take  the  analysis  to  its  logical  conclusion.  Instead, 
Nanjundaswamy  emphasized  the  ‘cultural’  aspects  of  imperialist  theory,  focusing  on  threats  to 
‘nature’  in  rural  India,  and  drawing  up  Manichean  binaries  between  imperialists  and  peasant 
farmers, who were framed (in terms echoing Vandana Shiva) as preservers of natural values (Assadi, 
128).   
In short, although Assadi does not put it this way (due perhaps to his own ideological perspectives) 
the KRRS, unlike the Sanghatana, did not formulate a viable alternative modernity for Karnataka’s 
farmers. The division between ‘Bharat and ‘India’ that flexibly encompassed various instances of 
predation for the Sanghatana, including predation within the countryside (Omvedt 1994: 160, note 
5), became for the KRRS a more essentialized opposition between the rural world as a whole and 
external, urban and foreign influences. This Manichaeism then fed into the transnationalization of 
the movement’s demands, leading up to the campaign against Monsanto and Bt cotton. 
To summarize the differences and similarities between the two movements: Both movements were 
led by richer farmers and demanded an end to urban bias in the form of price controls and zonal 
regulations on selling produce. However, the Sanghatana had a more democratic structure, and was 
responsive to varied demands by farmers. It was also able to formulate culturally and economically 
cohesive narratives that appealed to marginal farmers and even laborers. By contrast, the KRRS had 
a smaller reach, with a membership dominated (in terms of influence) by sugar farmers and a more 
hierarchical, less dialogical structure. This was accompanied by a more ‘romantic’ (in chapter four’s 206 
sense) narrative that pitted India against foreign capital, and nature against new technologies and 
which  hypostasized  the  idea  of  an autonomous village  community,  perhaps to  disguise  its  own 
structural weaknesses.
 259. 
 
The Transnationalization of the KRRS: a Gradual Process 
One of the key methodological points of this dissertation, expanded on in chapter six, has been to 
put transnational activism in its social context. Rather than treat campaigns as isolated case studies, 
they should be seen as emerging from movements and actors who have been involved in prior 
activism,  who  have  world  views  and  perspectives  that  then  hybridize  or  are  accentuated  by 
transnational linkages.  
This is certainly true of the KRRS. Its world famous ‘Cremate Monsanto’ campaign of the late 1990’s, 
needs to be understood in the ideological context described above and by a series of increasingly 
‘transnationalized’ campaigns for ten years prior to the Monsanto campaign. In these campaigns 
Prof. Nanjundaswamy showed his dramaturgical talent for taking advantage of global memes and 
innovating new forms of global identity politics that have been admired by the scholars and scholar-
activists  described  at  the beginning  of  this  chapter.  In  all  this,  he  was  often  the  first mover,  a 
‘strategic transnational thinker’ and certainly not the passive recipient of northern funds or ideas. 
However,  transnationalization  came  with  costs  attached,  and  after  looking  at  some  of  the 
transnational moves made by the KRRS, these costs will be considered. 
A useful overview of the reasons for the ‘transnational’ move, made by the KRRS in the 1990’s is 
given in a revealing letter written by Nanjundaswamy (1999), for distribution on the internet.  In this 
                                                           
259 Madsen (2011) argues along similar lines that the focus on transnational enemies was one way for the KRRS 
to “shed its reputation as an illegitimate child of the Green Revolution”, in other words being beholden to rich 
sugar farmers. This was not a presentational problem for the Sanghatana whose ‘Green Revoltuion’ farmer 
members were smaller and less wealthy. 207 
letter, he explains the context of his disappointment with colleagues who have proved unreliable or 
fractious, and with the ‘mistake’ the KRRS made in trying to enter party politics in Karnataka. In 
contrast, ‘In Europe’ during the ‘Inter Continental Caravan’ of 1998: 
We saw that the non hierarchical organizational model attempted with respectable degrees 
of success by our European friends was, despite some eccentricities and a couple of serious 
problems, more attractive and interesting than the twisted relations between the high ranks 
of our movement. 
Of course, Nanjundaswamy himself may have been responsible for these ‘twisted relations’, as the 
KRRS  interviewees  for  this  dissertation  suggested.  But  it  is  notable  that  he  describes  the 
transnational  sphere  as  being  “more  attractive  and  interesting”  than  the  politics  of  his  own 
movement. It would be hard to imagine a senior Sanghatana leader saying something like this, and it 
reveals the fundamentally ‘romantic’ disposition of Nanjundaswamy, in a sense of romantic that 
echoes  Carl  Schmitt’s  definition  of  the  term,  described  in  chapter  four  –  a  preference  for  an 
aesthetic politics of spectacle over a politics of mass mobilization and negotiation. As discussed 
further below, Nanjundaswamy’s talent for dramaturgy, for example holding a ‘laughing protest’ in 
front of the Karnataka State Assembly, where farmers were brought in to sit continuously and laugh 
at the proceedings, meant he was predisposed to the theatrical tactics of transnational activists. 
The next two sections analyze, firstly the series of transnational protests engaged in by the KRRS 
from 1992 up to the Bt cotton protests, looking at some of the rationales used by the KRRS and 
arguments  about  those  rationales,  and  secondly  the  increasingly  dense  organizational  linkages 
forged with transnational groups and activists that accompanied these events. 
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Transnationalization of Protest: Key Events and KRRS Rhetoric 
The first incidents in the transnationalization of the KRRS came in 1992 and 93, with joint protests by 
the KRRS against the United States owned Cargill seed company in Bangalore and related protests 
against the Dunkel Draft of the GATT Treaty in New Delhi. In Bangalore the KRRS demanded that 
Cargill and 11 other multinational companies ‘Quit India’, in language echoing Gandhi’s anti-British 
campaign of that name. In December 1992 Cargill’s headquarters on St Mark’s Road, Bangalore were 
ransacked by KRRS members, destroying company documents and a Cargill warehouse in the town 
of  Bellary  was  also  attacked  in  July  of  1993  (D’Monte,  2000,  Assadi,  1997:  96).  This  property 
destruction was  in line with Nanjundaswamy’s doctrine of ‘non violence toward people; violence 
toward things (Assadi , 1997: 123). In March of 1993 Nanjundaswamy along with members of the 
BKU farmers’ union of Uttar Pradesh led a delegation of around 20,000 farmers to Delhi to protest 
the  terms  of  the  Dunkel  Treaty.  This  was  part  of  what  Vandana  Shiva  and  her  then  ally 
Nanjundaswamy  termed  the  ‘Seed  Satyagraha’,  referring  to  Gandhi’s  tactics  of  nonviolent 
resistance.  These events culminated in October of 1993, when the KRRS hosted a convention of 
‘Third  World  Peasantry’  in  Bangalore,  with  leaders  from  movements  from  Indonesia,  Malaysia, 
Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and the Philippines, demanding rejection of the Dunkel proposals 
and ‘autonomy’ for peasant farmers (Assadi, 96).  
At the same time Sharad Joshi, sent an equal, if not larger delegation of farmers from Maharashtra 
in favor of the treaty (Omvedt, 1994: 154), accompanied, (as described above) with the Sanghatana’s 
proposed National Agricultural Policy, that had welcomed freer trade, but with proposals designed 
to keep capital  accumulation in the countryside.  
The terms of the draft, as even an ideological opponent of Dunkel such as Assadi acknowledges (205) 
were not immediately threatening to Karnataka’s farmers: it represented an effort to move toward 
what would later become the World Trade Organization, and to ensure that the intellectual property 
rights  concerns  of  richer,  northern  states  would  be  incorporated  into  that  multinational 209 
organization. The pros and cons of the Dunkel Draft are beyond the scope of this dissertation, but 
Menski (2005, Ch 5) provides a thorough account, which draws on interviews with many senior 
Indian government officials and public sector scientists. Menski argues that  while the draft may 
theoretically have put India at a disadvantage, because strictly enforced patent laws might have 
stymied research , nevertheless most public sector scientists and government officials, including 
M.S.Swaminathan, saw the treaty and the future WTO as an opportunity: firstly to create incentives 
for  research  and  development  nationally  and  secondly  to  provide  a  collective  forum  where 
developing countries could pool their influence rather than rely on bilateral agreements with the EU 
and  USA.  The  Indian  state  was  able  (in  Menski’s  terminology)  to  ‘re-territorialize’  the  threats 
presented by Dunkel, by compulsory licensing agreements to be imposed on MNC’s, by safeguarding 
farmers’ rights to share seed and by limiting patents on genes (Menski, 141).  
More relevant to the argument of this chapter Menski claims, more tenuously
260, that protests such 
as that of the KRRS
261 might have helped give the Indian state ideological ammunition with which to 
negotiate with the  USA and the EU. This is plausible in the case of Suman Sahai of Gene Campaign, 
who at that time was arguing about biotechnology along nationalistic/developmentalist lines , rather 
than the ‘risk’ discourse which she currently emphasizes
262 , but the tone of the protests by the KRRS 
and  Vandana  Shiva  was  different.  Nanjundaswamy’s  rhetoric  focused  on  Gandhian  themes  of 
threatened autonomy and recolonisation, as cited in Assadi (1997: 205): 
From being autonomous producers with control over resources like land and seeds, farmers 
are being transformed into low wage labourers for agro business…It is our rural society 
which  gives  rise  to  the  diverse  cultures  which  make  India  a  distinctive  civilization.  The 
displacement of the small farmer is destruction of our culture. 
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negotiations from the outset and Nanjundaswamy’s type of protest appears to have appealed to a very 
different audience of “Delhi progressive intellectuals” as Omvedt (1994:154) somewhat sarcastically terms 
them, and increasingly to global activists and groups. 
261 Although Menski only briefly mentions the KRRS itself. His focus is on Gene Campaign/Suman Sahai. 
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This ‘romantic’ protest was framed in absolute and Manichean terms, quite different from the (then) 
nationalistic  discourse  of  Suman  Sahai.  More  importantly  it  ‘externalized’  the  problems  facing 
Karnataka’s farmers onto a future menace, which at the time had not even materialized. 
The next phase of transnationalization came in 1995 and 1996, with two incidents: protests against 
the staging of the Miss World beauty pageant in Bangalore and physical attacks on Kentucky Fried 
Chicken (KFC) in the same city. In January 1996, as the culmination of campaigns in 1995 to tear 
down billboards for western products such as Pepsi (Pepsico owned KFC), 150 KRRS farmers led a 
raid on Bangalore’s first KFC outfit (Gupta, 1998: 332), destroying furniture, and in an echo of the 
Cargill  attack,  ceremonially  burning  documents  in  the  street  outside.    This  protest  was  later 
emulated  by  fellow  Via  Campesina  member  from  France,  the  Confederation  Paysanne,  with  its 
attacks on McDonalds. (Reitan, 2007: 158). 
Gupta draws on KRRS literature to articulate a rationale for the attacks, (Gupta 333-335), arguing 
that meat consumption, encouraged by western fast foods, would drive up food prices and harm 
poor Indian farmers. There is clearly truth in this claim, but, as with the Dunkel Draft, there is also an 
element of ‘externalization’, as discussed later in the chapter. It seems implausible, for example that 
increased meat consumption is being driven purely by western advertising in India, and even as of 
the late 2000’s western fast food restaurants in India remain the preserve of the upper middle 
classes: symbols of the new inequality but not structurally responsible for rural crisis. 
In the case of Miss World, Nanjundaswamy again emphasized cultural themes in his protest
263, 
arguing that the competition was a conspiracy of M NC’s, and in particular  Rupert Murdoch, to 
“introduce a meat and beer culture in India”, and “sell national honour”, as well as introducing 
culturally inappropriate sexual imagery. Nanjundaswamy threatened to ‘burn’ the stadium in which 
the contest was to be held
264 , and joined in the protest with female MP’s from the Bharatriya Janata 
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Party (BJP), fusing Hindu culturalism with nationalist themes. Nanjundaswamy later called off the 
campaign,  with  allegations  that  he  had  been  ‘paid  off’  by  the  event’s  host  –  Indian  megastar 
Amithab Bhachan (Madsen 2011). 
These  were  the  precursors  to  the  two  events,  or  series  of  events,  that  the  KRRS  launched  in 
connection to Monsanto and Bt cotton. The first was ‘Operation Cremate Monsanto’, launched in 
1998; the second was the Inter Continental Caravan in Europe, in Spring of 1999. 
Operation Cremate Monsanto, was described by Nanjundaswamy in 1998, in an email distributed to 
global activist sites
265, in this way:  
The campaign will run under the following slogans: stop genetic engineering, no patents on 
life, cremate Monsanto and bury the World Trade Organization. There is also a more specific 
message directed at all of you who have invested in Monsanto: You should take your money 
out before we reduce it to ashes 
This message, aimed specifically at western audiences, shows Nanjundaswamy’s grasp of global 
campaigns:  a  clear,  uncompromising  message  (‘radical’  in  the  terminology  of  Greenpeace  from 
chapter three) aimed precisely at a northern audience, joining together some of the most potent 
symbolic enemies of the anti globalization / alter globalization movement. This was followed up by 
various actions.  
The operation itself began when Bt cotton trial crops were burned in two locations in Karnataka
266, 
with KRRS activists accompanied by activists from Spain and Germany (D’Monte, 2000). This tactic, 
of field burning, was then copied by associated activists in neighboring Andhra Pradesh.   The next 
stage of the operation was a stone throwing attack on the Indian Institute of Science (IIS) campus in 
Bangalore, which the KRRS believed (it proved wrongly) housed a Monsanto research centre
267.  
                                                           
265 Here accessed via a site names ‘monsantosucks.com’, http://www.monsantosucks.com/cremate.htm 
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(Klingsnorth 1999) 
267 Hindu Business Line (11-09-03) 212 
Operation Cremate Monsanto went hand in hand with a campaign named ‘Monsanto Quit India’, a 
Gandhi-inspired campaign trying to draw parallels between British colonialism and MNC’s. As part of 
this campaign the KRRS organized a postcard protest, in which postcards were distributed to NGOs 
and  individuals  across  India  to  be  sent  to  Monsanto’s  corporate  headquarters  in  Illinois,  USA 
(Klingsnorth, 1999).  
The second phase of the biotechnology related campaign was the Inter Continental Caravan (ICC) of 
1999. In this event, Nanjundaswamy accompanied around 500 farmers from India, including 170 
from Karnataka, to Europe (Madsen, 2001), where the protest culminated, after visiting 9 countries 
and numerous symbolically significant sites
268, at Cologne, Germany, the location of the G8 summit 
in June. During the ICC, the mark of the KRRS was clear, with a ‘laughing parade’ at the G8 summit, 
(Reitan,  2007:  209)  echoing  the  ‘laughing  agitation’  the  KRRS  had  held  at  the  Karnataka  State 
Assembly 8 years previously (Assadi, 1997: 91-92) and other events, including the uprooting of fields 
planted with GM rice (alongside Jose Bove) echoing KRRS actions against Bt Cotton in India.  The aim 
of this tour was to publicize not just the campaign against genetic engineering, including the feared 
(but not ever produced) ‘terminator seeds’ from Monsanto (Herring, 2005), but also a wider set of 
complaints about the WTO, globalization and the victimization of peasant farmers by neocolonial 
MNC’s (Madsen, 2001; Featherstone 2003, 2008).  The ICC is analyzed in more depth below in the 
section assessing the consequences of transnationalization. 
The campaign against GM crops was clearly the most ‘successful’ of the transnationalized actions 
taken by the KRRS. As Prof. Assadi explained in interview
269 the campaign represented the biggest 
‘overlap’ between the interests of Nanjundaswamy and those of the global activist community. 
Unlike the Miss World and KFC campaigns it could be linked directly to core agricultural issues 
(despite the KRRS not actually representing cotton farmers); it posed ongoing regulatory issues that 
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would keep the issue alive (choke points), and it resonated strongly in Europe at the time, where 
funding, travel, and media opportunities awaited.  
The final significant transnational action by the KRRS was to try and launch an alternative to the 
World Social Forum (Pattenden 2005; Majumdar 2005). This forum was named ‘Mumbai Resistance - 
2004’  and  set  up  across  from  the  main  WSF  venue,  which  Nanjundaswamy  accused  of  lacking 
‘genuineness’ (Majumdar, 22) and of being the tool of NGOs and international funding agencies such 
as  the  Ford  Foundation  and  Oxfam.    It  was  accompanied  by  a  return  to  the  rhetoric  of  anti-
imperialism, taking up the Marxist-Leninist strain of KRRS thinking (over the Gandhian). This last 
action, before Nanjundaswamy’s death in the same year, 2004, was perhaps a sign of weakness 
rather than strength – a last attempt to show the KRRS’ relevance in an increasingly crowded arena 
for ‘authenticity’. 
 
Global Partnerships 
Throughout these campaigns the KRRS was  building a set of transnational linkages to other ‘peoples 
movements’ but also to INGOs. 
According to an interview with Nanjundaswamy’s former colleague, Prof. Basavaraj, it was at the 
meetings to plan protests against the Dunkel Draft in 1991 that Nanjundaswamy first made contact 
with globally oriented activists
270. These activists came under the banner of the Third World Network 
(TWN), (Assadi, 1997: 95). Most important of these were Vandana Shiva and, to a lesser extent, 
Devinder Sharma, who brought with them access to global networks and, just as crucially, a modality 
of rhetoric and publicity that resonated with global audiences of activists. However, Nanjundaswamy 
was soon able to form linkages of his own, without the mediation of Shiva, as can be seen in the 
October 1993 convention of ‘third world peasants’ hosted in Bangalore, described above.  This rapid 
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success of the KRRS in the transnational field may have led to the tensions between Shiva and 
Nanjundaswamy described below. 
One of the two transnational networks with which the KRRS began to work closely was Peoples 
Global Action (PGA). This loosely structured anti-capitalist / anarchist network was first named in 
1998, but had begun after the Zapatista uprising came to international attention in the mid 1990’s 
(Pattenden, 2005: 1978; Graeber 2002). The KRRS soon became one of the most prominent ‘peoples’ 
groups within the PGA, hosting their second international conference in Bangalore, in August 1999, 
at  which  the  organization  formulated  its  ‘hallmarks’  and  ‘organisational  principles’
271  and 
undertaking its Inter Continental Caravan of 1999 under the aegis of the PGA (Featherstone 2008), 
including funding for flights organized via the PGA online network.   
The  other  prominent  transnational  network  in  which  the  KRRS  played  a  key  role  was  the  Via 
Campesina (VC). This group had a more distinct identity and mission than the PGA (Reitan, 2007: Ch 
5). The VC grew out of what Reitan describes (168) as a struggle of international peasants’ groups to 
claim autonomy from national political parties and from NGOs. Founded in 1993, its three most 
prominent members were the Confederation Paysanne (CP) of France (with its charismatic leader, 
Jose Bove), the Movimento dos Sem Tierra (MST) of Brazil (the ‘Landless Movement’), and the KRRS 
itself.  The  aim  of  this  umbrella  group  was  to  bring  together  northern  and  southern  peasants’ 
organizations, that felt marginalized by corporate agriculture and that could coalesce around the 
idea of ‘food sovereignty’ (Borras, 2008: 260).  
After demonstrating organizational and marketing flair during the Dunkel protests and the 1993 
convention of farmers’ movements in Bangalore, Nanjundaswamy became a leading member of the 
Via  Campesina,  acting  as  regional/Asian  ‘gatekeeper’  to  the  organization  (Borras,  275),  and 
coordinating its anti-corporate and anti-GMO campaigns (in close cooperation with Jose Bove of the 
CP).  Apparently  Nanjundaswamy  hoped  that  the  VC  would  set  up  headquarters  in  Bangalore 
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(Madsen, 2011). However, as Borras points out (275-76), the KRRS also acted to shift the direction of 
the VC away from its (Latin American) roots as an organization for the poor and for land reform, to 
such an extent that Borras claims that groups in Asia representing very poor farmers, laborers and 
indigenous groups were blocked from entry to the VC at the whim of Nanjundaswamy.  
While Nanjundaswamy always claimed to be opposed to NGOs and formal organizations (leading to 
the  Mumbai  Resistance-2004  described  above)  ,  he  nevertheless  formed  some  links  to  donor 
organizations. For example, Madsen (2011) reports an organization based in Rome, called ‘SUM’ 
(Stati  Uniti  del  Mondo)  was  giving  support  for  the  KRRS’  ‘sustainable  agriculture’  projects  in 
Karnataka via a charitable trust called the ‘Amrutha Trust’ which featured Nanjundaswamy’s family 
as chief trustees.  The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) also partly funded farmers to travel to 
Europe on the ICC (Madsen, 2001: 3739). This flow of money was linked in the opinion of several 
interviewees  and  Madsen  (2011)  to  Nanjundaswamy’s  media  successes  following  the  early  90’s 
Dunkel  Draft  protests.   However,  from  an  interview  conducted  with  Greenpeace’s  campaigns 
officer
272 it was clear that Greenpeace stayed clear of close cooperation with Nanjundaswamy: for 
one thing they already had close ties to his rival Vandana Shiva  – and in addition Nanjundaswamy 
could have been an unreliable partner, given his stated aversion to NGOs. Accurate accounts of the 
funding  sources  for  the  KRRS  from  abroad  will  probably  always  be  opaque,  given  that 
Nanjundaswamy controlled these linkages personally, in fact because of the fortunate financial links 
the KRRS had with wealthy sugar farmers, it is unclear that the organization needed flows of foreign 
funds, at least until the 2000’s, when its mass character began to decline. 
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Reasons and Consequences of Transnationalization 
The next two sections consider, in turn, the reasons why the KRRS ‘transnationalized’ based on the 
above  analysis  of  its  history  and  structure,  and  secondly,  what  the  drawbacks  of  that 
transnationalization were, based on field interviews with current and former activists and other 
social activists in the state. 
As pointed out above, the KRRS had failed to ‘scale across’, or form horizontal solidarities in its 
activities with other Indian states. At the All India Coordination Committee level, Nanjundaswamy 
had relatively little influence over, or personal affinity with, Sharad Joshi of the Sanghatana or Tikait 
of the BKU. As Kisan Patnaik, an Indian socialist leader put it (cited in Assadi, 1997: 138): 
Only the Maharashtra and Karnataka organizations [the Sanghatana and the KRRS] are in a 
position to bring about co-ordination among the non-party movements in different parts of 
the  country.  In  this  task  Karnataka  has  lagged  behind,  Maharashtra  leaders  are  always 
available to other states. Karnataka friends are insular. 
As  a  leader  with  a  flair  for  media  oriented  events,  such  as  the  ‘laughing  agitation’  of  1989 
Nanjundaswamy probably began to see a ‘scaling up’ to the transnational level as an effective route 
to keep the KRRS newsworthy.  Nanjundaswamy’s own talents as a media provocateur and publicist 
chimed with the new ‘marketing’ culture of transnational activism. It appears that this realization 
came during the Dunkel Draft protest preparations when Nanjundaswamy met Vandana Shiva and 
other ‘Third World Network’ Delhi based intellectuals. From that point on Nanjundaswamy focused 
most  of  his  energies  on  becoming  a  ‘gatekeeper’  for  transnational  networks  such  as  the  Via 
Campesina and Peoples’ Global Action, even framing the KRRS as a more ‘radical’ alternative to the 
World Social Forum, emphasizing his movement’s ‘authenticity’ and mass character in comparison to 
the NGOs that had begun to dominate the WSF. 
But as we have seen, the decision to ‘go transnational’ was not just strategic: it went to the heart of 
the KRRS’ ideological outlook. Unlike the Sanghatana, in which a broad range of types of farmers and 217 
income levels participated in a largely democratic structure, the KRRS was dominated by relatively 
wealthy
273 sugar farmers. It was therefore less relevant for the KRRS leadership to mobilize a mass 
membership around the ‘bread and butter’ issues of price and general rural development. This is 
why, from early on, the KRRS resorted to an ‘othering’ or ‘externalizing’ strategy, in which distant or 
foreign enemies were emphasized at the expense of systemic problems closer to hand. This strategy 
had the double virtue of disguising the class and caste inequality within the KRRS and occupying a 
space within the media and public sphere of ‘intellectuals’ that was predisposed toward anti-colonial 
narratives.    The  relatively  hierarchical  and  leader-dominated  structure  of  the  KRRS  made  this 
strategy more  available  to  Nanjundaswamy than would  have  been  the case  in  the  Sanghatana, 
where village representatives would presumably have objected to priorities that overlooked their 
more pressing material needs, and a reliable flow of income from the sugar farmers arguably made it 
possible for Nanjundaswamy to pursue his ‘romantic’  agenda unhindered. 
What were the consequences of transnationalization for the farmers’ movement in Karnataka? Four 
key issues are discussed below. 
A good place to start in answering this question are interviews conducted for this dissertation with 
current KRRS leaders
274. To my embarrassment , these leaders were keen to ask me how I could help 
them get to the UK or USA , both to improve their English language skills and to try and make 
connections with NGOs and activist groups in those countries. The reason they gave was that since 
the ‘split’ in the KRRS, between Nanjundaswamy’s family and the faction led by them and Mr K 
Puttanaiah (Madsen 2011), they had ‘lost’ the transnational connections that, they claimed, had 
become essential for mobilization, funding, and media attention, even though their ‘faction’ of the 
KRRS  comprised  maybe  90%  of  the  members.  A  particular  problem  mentioned  was  that 
Nanjundaswamy’s daughter, Chuki Nanjundaswamy, had become, after her father’s death, the KRRS’ 
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a fairer share of profits vis a vis the much more powerful sugar mill owners. 
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‘secretary  for  international  affairs’.  This  meant  that  she  alone  had  the  ability  to  network  with 
transnational groups, arrange foreign travel for conferences and receive funds for projects. Chuki’s 
transnational connectedness was bolstered by the fact that her husband – Luca – was an Italian 
leader of the Via Campesina.  Not only this, but there was a continuing dispute over the ownership 
of 100 acres of land, claimed personally by Chuki Nanjundaswamy, but which the other KRRS leaders 
claimed was KRRS property.
275  
The perspective of these leaders might be slanted against Nanj undaswamy. But others, more 
sympathetic  to Nanjundaswamy’s legacy concurred that, from the early 1990’s Nanjundaswamy had 
tended to “keep international connections to himself”
276 and that this was the key reason for the 
split  in  the  organization  in  1999
277. In other words  internal  factionalism  is  one  of  the  likely 
consequences of transnationalization, where, as is inevitable in a mass organization based in the 
developing  world,  only  a  few  leaders  or  one  leader  act  as  gatekeepers  to  transnational 
connections
278.  
In addition to this internal factionalism, the second main consequence of transnationalization seems 
to have been  external rivalry. Here, the rivalry between Nanjundaswamy and  Vandana Shiva is 
exemplary. Herring (2010) has aptly coined the term “authenticity rents”, to describe  the way that 
activist leaders need to claim authentic representativeness in order to succeed in the transnational 
activist field. We could go further here, and point out that the battle over ‘authenticity’ is a zero sum 
game, or, in other words, authenticity is a ‘rivalrous good’. This may be one (obviously unstated and 
probably  unconscious)  reason,  for  the  otherwise  surprising  rivalry  between  Shiva  and 
Nanjundaswamy over the Inter Continental Caravan. Madsen (2001; 2011) and Featherstone (2003; 
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‘indigenous seeds’ and funded partly by international donors. 
276 Prof. Basavaraj. Interview number 76 
277 Madsen (2011) interviewed K Puttanaiah who blamed the 1999 split specifically on the ‘Caravan’, and said 
that this trip was the final ‘betrayal’ of the larger movement, and that Nanjundaswamy preferred to speak 
English and cooperate with foreign activists than attend to Karnataka’s farmers. 
278 This was especially true in the 1990’s when, according to Madsen (2011) Nanjundaswamy was the only 
leader with an internet connection, but the wider dispersal of internet connectivity would not change the 
fundamental point that transnational connections are likely to link only the top of social movement pyramids. 219 
2008) have described  how Shiva publicly condemned the ICC, alleging that the farmers on the 
Caravan could not be ‘authentic’ because real farmers could not have afforded the airline tickets to 
Europe 
279 and that the KRRS had broken Gandhian principles of non violence by attacking property 
in its various raids on Monsanto and Cargi ll offices. As Madsen (2011 ) comments (based on 
interviews with KRRS leaders at the time of the Caravan): 
Vandana Shiva had no field base. Hence, she was keen to uti lize the field base of the KRRS. 
The KRRS was interested in sharing the Western and global base cultivated by Shiva. But 
when the KRRS used the Caravan to project itself as a  sui generis movement with a global 
presence, and not as a derivate of her nodal presence, she reacted
280. 
Such rivalries occur because of the structural demands of the transnational activist sphere, driven by 
limited access to global media and global funding.   
A third consequence of transnationalization refers back to the arguments of chapters two and four. 
This is that transnationalization  accompanied,  and  accentuated  but  did  not  necessarily  cause  a 
‘romanticization’ of the KRRS’ agenda and its turning of attention away from more local, material 
issues facing farmers in the state. Again, it is important to emphasize that this is not a standard 
causal  hypothesis:  groups  like  the  KRRS  that  were  already  inclined  to  post  Gandhian,  romantic 
ruralist ideas were more likely to seek out connections with a ‘transnational imaginary’ (chapter 
four) that supported a similar world view. But the resources and attention that came with those 
connections  enabled  the  KRRS  to  perpetuate  that  romantic  focus,  even  when  it  caused 
disengagement from the mass membership.  
This ‘romanticization’ was most obvious, and reached its peak at the Inter Continental Caravan. 
Madsen  (2001)  has  described  the  nature  of  the  romantic  and  theatrical  ‘display’  that  KRRS 
representatives engaged in here, making the KRRS seem, in the eyes of the world to be “a fortress 
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more privileged background (for example, speaking English as a first language) than Prof. Nanjundaswamy. 
280 P Babu (interview number 78) also claimed that Shiva helped effectuate the split in the KRRS by selectively 
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guarding folk ways” (3737). The problem with such a stance is that it is “thin on institutions” (3735) 
or even suggestions for building institutions. In fact it is striking how the events of  the ICC and 
Madsen’s interpretation of them resonate with Carl Schmit’s definitions of ‘political romanticism’ 
described at the beginning of chapter four, in other words, an aesthetic response, that avoids any 
pragmatic proposals and avoids ‘taking sides’ in material disputes, instead summoning up nostalgic 
images of past ways and inciting intense feelings about their supposed imminent destruction. 
In  practical  terms,  two  non-KRRS commentators  from  Karnataka  interviewed
281  agreed that this 
emphasis over the last 15 years on  narratives about patents, ‘food sovereignty’, ‘indigenous seed 
preservation’, neocolonialism, and ‘western’ technology had distracted the KRRS away from other 
problems.  These  problems  included  land  seizures  for  Special  Economic  Zone  (SEZ)  purposes 
(including 1000 acres recently cordoned off in the Bellary area of Karnataka) and a corrupt public 
distribution system that may actually have benefited the wealthier farmers the KRRS represented. 
Activist interviewee P Babu pointed out that the KRRS’ transnational activities had made domestic 
‘scaling up’ to combat these kinds of issues (especially the SEZ ‘enclosures’) harder to achieve
282.  
Obviously this emphasis on the transnational discourse also prevented the KRRS from forming any 
alliances with the public sector scientists, whose perspective was described in chapter two, against 
neoliberal trends in agricultural policy. Instead the KRRS literally ‘stoned’ buildings in public research 
universities (the Indian Institute of Science) and showed no nuance in distinguishing pro poor from 
profit oriented uses of biotechnology. 
There is also a relationship between the use of romantic rhetoric and the rivalries described above. 
As  the  rivalry  between  Nanjundaswamy  and  Shiva  intensified,  Nanjundaswamy  was  striving  to 
‘radicalize’ his message. The Mumbai-Resistance-2004 attempt seems to represent a last throw of 
the dice, in which Nanjundaswamy even parted company with the Via Campesina (Borras, 2008), 
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Gandhian social activist in the state. (Interviews 72 and 78). Both these individuals could be said to support 
Gandhian, anti corporate ideas themselves, so their views are highly relevant.  
282 Interview number 78. 221 
who set up an ‘intermediate’ forum between the ‘mainstream’ WSF and Nanjundaswamy’s radical 
alternative forum. Nanjundaswamy claimed to represent “true radical leftists” (Majumdar, 2005: 22) 
while  the  WSF  was  the  territory  of  “imperialist/capitalist”  groups  like  Oxfam  and  the  Ford 
Foundation.  This heightened rhetoric came five years after the split in the KRRS, at which point 
Nanundaswamy’s claims to representativeness were very small. 
Finally, there is the question of basic hypocrisy, but hypocrisy that may have practical consequences. 
As Pattenden puts it, in his essay on the ‘trickle down solidarity’ practiced by the KRRS (Pattenden 
2005), there was a basic contradiction between the ‘horizontalist’ rhetoric espoused by the KRRS 
and its transnational ally the PGA, and the reality of the KRRS’ hierarchical structure at the village 
level.  Or as social activist P Babu put it vividly in interview, it was hypocritical for an organization 
funded by environmentally ‘suspect’ sugar farmers and whose leader drove around the countryside 
in a vehicle, and in a style, more typical of India’s political party ‘bosses’,  to talk at the transnational 
level about solidarity, green values and village republics. This ‘hypocrisy’ is dramatically exemplified 
in  the  response  of  European  anarchist  and  anti-capitalist  demonstrators  to  the  attitudes  and 
behavior  of  many  of  the  KRRS  delegation  at  the  ICC,  as  documented  in  the  British  anarchist 
publication Do or Die in 1999. In one article (Do or Die, 1999) an anonymous author describes his or 
her  shock at  the way KRRS  delegates silenced  and  ostracized  non  Indian  delegates, threatened 
Nepali  delegates  with  rape  and  violence,  proclaimed  support  for  Hitler  and  Nazism,  and 
demonstrated unquestioning subservience to their leader Nanjundaswamy. The article ends with the 
understatement that despite the exciting potential of transnational networking “the ICC showed 
how hard it is to make that networking meaningful”. The larger political dangers of moments like 
these,  when  reality  intrudes  into  the  fantasy  of  transnational  imaginaries  is  that  the  inevitable 
disappointment will damage future, more realistic attempts to forge solidaristic networks.  
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A Mirror Image: The Shetkari Sanghatana’s splits, transnationalism and ‘market romanticism’ 
After the National Agricultural Policy (NAP) proposals in 1991, described by Omvedt (1994), the 
Sanghatana  also  faced  gradually  waning  mass  membership  and  splits.  Was  there  a  parallel 
transnationalization for the Sanghatana? Arguably there was, although it has been of much less 
importance either in Maharashtra or globally. One faction led by Vijay Jawandia tried to form links 
with the anti-GMO campaign and other globally oriented activists, while Sharad Joshi moved closer 
to a globalized libertarian outlook, in concert with a Delhi based libertarian group. 
Vijay Jawandhia argued in interview
283 that the Sanghatana had made a crucial ideological shift in 
1992. After this point, the more nuanced pro -modernization, pro-capital, but pro-decentralization, 
ruralist agenda described by Omvedt, was jettisoned in favor of a  belief that “the market can solve 
all  farmers’  problems”.  1993  marked  Jawandhia’s  split  with  Joshi  and  the  beginning  of  the 
factionalization of the Sanghatana, with no new, younger leader able to take up the reins from the 
older generation.
284  
Jawandhia’s own position, now without any mass base, appeared to have ‘forced’ him into alliances 
with transnational activists with whom he did not share fundamental perspectives. For example, 
while  he  had  attended  (he  said)  around  40 meetings  with  NGOs  (such  as  the  CSA  and  DDS  of 
Hyderabad and Kishor Tiwari of the VJAS) in order to plan protests against Bt cotton and Bt brinjal, 
he also expressed admiration for the way Gujurat Chief Minister Narendra Modi had pushed for the 
legalization  of  navbharat  seeds’  ‘illegal’  Bt  cotton  –  showing,  he  said,  that  Modi,  unlike 
Maharashtra’s leaders, was “on the side of farmers”.  Similarly, while he mentioned statistics and 
claims, probably originating from the DDS, about Bt ‘poisoning the soil’, he also pointed out that the 
organic agriculture promoted by NGOs like the DDS was “irrelevant” for India, where the problem 
was that marginal farmers were organic by necessity anyway. In other words, there was no obvious 
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social location by the mid 1990’s for Jawandhia’s position: pro technology but anti-free market, he 
seemed unable to speak the Manichean / romantic language of the new transnational networks 
fluently
285.  
Another former Sanghatana leader Chandrakant Wankhade of Nagpur
286 was more self-consciously 
aware of the potential contradict ions and drawbacks of working in transnational networks: he 
argued that activists such as Tiwari, were missing the ‘total policy picture’ on agricultural crisis (as 
argued in chapter two), but that the suicide narrative and the GMO narrative were necessary to ‘sell’ 
the problems of the countryside to India’s middle classes, via the media. For Sanghatana activists of 
the ‘left’, previously committed to a ‘modernist’ approach to rural problems, it was clearly difficult 
to campaign easily alongside the likes of Vandana Shiva. 
At the same time as some former left-leaning Sanghatana leaders turned, cautiously, to the new 
transnational  activist  networks,  others,  including  Sharad  Joshi  himself,  appear  to  have  turned 
ideologically  and  (to  a  lesser  degree)  organizationally,  to  the  kind  of  pro  capitalist  networks 
predicted by Jackie Smith (2008).  
An  example  from  field  interviews will  help  to  illustrate  the  shift that  has  taken  place  between 
generations of activists. I interviewed the Kashikar family of Wardha
287, among whom both parents 
had been Sanghatana leaders, and in the case of the wife – Saroj – had spent substantial time in jail 
for protesting in the early 1980’s. Saroj Kashikar’s analysis of the problems facing farmers matched 
well with the modernist program the Sanghatana was pursuing in the 1980’s and early 90’s – in favor 
of new technologies including Bt cotton (which she described as an ‘insurance policy’ for farmers) 
and in favor of cutting regulations about where and at what price farmers could sell produce, but at 
the same time aware of the long historical legacy of crisis in the eastern Maharashtra region. This 
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crisis she explained using a sophisticated understanding of history in the region , describing how 
former zamindars (British sanctioned tax collectors cum landlords) were able to maintan their status 
by forming new cooperatives, leaving the poorest in a cycle of debt. She felt there should still be a 
role for government services in the countryside, including institutionalized credit and information for 
farmers. Her son, on the other hand, spoke a language closer to western libertarianism, seeing no 
role  for  any  farmers’  movement  in  the  present,  because  the  government  had  already  followed 
Joshi’s advice and ‘got out’ of the countryside. For the son, the main issue was to remove land 
ceilings to allow corporate agriculture to flourish. Information services were of little value, since new 
products like Bt cotton were ‘demand’ driven, just like cell phones for ‘rikshaw wallahs’. 
Joshi himself, in a phone interview
288 would not be drawn on whether he now described himself as a 
libertarian,  but  argued  that  “farmers  have  suffered  most  under  socialist  regimes”  and  that  his 
philosophy was “the pursuit of freedom, truth and beauty”, to which he contrasted the “antiquated” 
world view of Prof. Nanjundaswamy and  his defense of “old world agriculture”.  
According to Ramanna (2006) Joshi had joined forces in March 2002, with two pro-free market 
organizations: the Liberty Institute in Delhi and Changal Reddy’s Confederation of Indian Farmers’ 
Associations  (CIFA)
289  around  the  agenda  of  “setting  the  Indian  farmer  free”. This  meeting  was 
occasioned  by  the  failure  of  the  GEAC  to  approve  the  commercialization  of  Bt  cotton  and  the 
concomitant success of the illegal Gujurati Navbharat Bt cotton.  Barun Mitra, the director of the 
Liberty Institute, claimed in interview
290 that he had been in touch with Joshi for up to seven years 
before the Bt cotton protests, and that Joshi had shaped his own perspectives on Indian politics. The 
Liberty Institute
291 is a libertarian think tank, based in Delhi, and dedicated to the ideas of Julian 
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wealthier farmers of commercial crops: they also make some less than libertarian demands – for higher 
subsidies on water and electricity and inputs. CIFA perhaps represents in reality the stereotyped Marxist 
version of what the 1980’s farmers’ movements were – lobbies for rich farmers. 
290 Interview number 86 
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Simon, Friedrich Von Hayek and Ayn Rand. Its transnational partners include the Atlas Economic 
Research  Foundation  (associated  with  Ayn  Rand’s  ideas)  and  the  libertarian  Friedrich  Naumann 
Stiftung in Germany. Mitra used the example of Gujurati seed entrepreneurs to frame his own 
libertarian diagnosis of India’s agricultural problems. For Mitra the single best answer to rural India’s 
problems  is  corporate  farming,  which  could  be  made  possible  by  removing  all  ceilings  on  land 
ownership
292. For Mitra, removing barriers to ‘choice’ is the answer to every element of crisis: choice 
to sell one’s land; choice to buy whatever seeds companies can produce with minimal regulation; 
choice to sell produce anywhere in India or the world and choice to take loans from moneylenders 
(who should not be demonized or regulated). 
In these prescriptions the example of Gujurati farmers may be misleading, as the analysis in chapter 
two suggested. Elsewhere in India, in specific regions and among lower caste and class farmers, lack 
of social and economic networks have stymied modernization, in ways described by Stone (2002) 
and Shah (2003)
293. Harris-White (2005) uses the term ‘(free) market romanticism’ to describe the 
kind of views expressed by the Liberty Institute. For Harris-White market romanticism fails (40): 
to recognize either the theoretical limitations to markets or the incapacity of markets by 
themselves  either  completely  or  decently  to  structure  social  life.  It  mis-attributes  some 
contingent effects mediated by markets to necessary characteristics of them and assumes 
away as ‘contingent’ other institutions which are structurally necessary and whose diversity 
is structurally necessary. 
Such  diversity  includes  gender,  caste,  ethnicity,  region,  religion,  and  the  various  nepotistic  and 
ethnic networks involving state officials, input dealers, moneylenders, and farmers that organize the 
market in India.  To an extent, the (transnationalized) discourse of market romanticism parallels the 
‘fortress against folk ways’ of Nanjundaswamy and the romantic ruralists: it depends on abstractions 
that divert attention away from regionally specific complexes of poverty and low social capital and 
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from particular institutions in need of reform. The effects of this transnational market romanticism 
on the debate in India are so far unclear. Given the sheer market power of business interests (textile 
producers,  seed  companies,  etc),  ideological  mobilization  may  be  unnecessary.  However,  when 
market romanticism comes to be seen as the only alternative to rural romanticism, the alternatives 
get lost in a debate, in which both sides come to mirror each others’ abstractions
294. 
 
Conclusion 
This  chapter  has  used  a pair-wise  comparison of  farmers’  movements  to  show  how mass rural 
movements of the 1980’s transitioned into a new political environment in the last two decades, in 
which  the  conditions  for  rural  mass  mobilization  declined  and  new  transnational  opportunities 
arose. 
The KRRS , unlike the Shetkari Sanghatana, could be said to have had an ‘elective affinity’ for the 
new transnational activism, and was in fact a key actor in forging frames and contentious routines 
for TANs. However, the chapter also argued, contrary to the consensus in the scholarly literature, 
that it was the very undemocratic and hierarchical structure of the KRRS that made that organization 
more compatible with transnational campaigning than the Sanghatana. Where dialogic interaction 
with  a  base  was  lacking,  the  KRRS  leadership  was  able  to  indulge  in  a  romantic  ideology  that 
concentrated on ‘external’ threats and globalized activist frames, of arguably little relevance to the 
marginal and middle farmers it claimed to represent. Romantic tendencies that had existed already 
in the 1980’s therefore came to fruition in the 1990’s in alliances with transnational partners. First 
came campaigns against ‘foreign’ influences like KFC and Miss World, and finally the Bt Cotton 
campaign, which achieved more resonance than the other campaigns for contingent reasons (choke 
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and followers of Vandana Shiva at a meeting about GMOs, filmed as part of the Shiva documentary Bullshit 
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points, media interest, etc) , but which was part of a series of attempts to turn the KRRS into a 
transnational gatekeeper for the whole of Asia.  
If Nanjundaswamy had lived he might have continued to forge these transnational linkages, but his 
strategies toward the end of his career suggested an increasing desperation to stand out as ‘radical’ 
or ‘grassroots’, given competition from Vandana Shiva and others. Arguably the KRRS would not 
have been well suited to the more ‘professionalized’ transnationalism of the last 10 years, described 
in chapter three, where romantic rhetoric and framing were combined with more stable and reliable 
partnerships with donor agencies,  state actors and markets. In a sense Nanjundaswamy proved less 
flexible than Shiva in reconciling romantic frames and professional brokerage activities. 
This chapter like others in the dissertation has avoided making strong ‘causal’ claims about the 
impact of transnational linkages. Again, the emphasis has been on environments and more subtle 
selection and adaptation processes, whereby globalized romantic discourses (whether pro or anti 
market) act as magnets for socially fragmented or isolated elite activists in the global South – a 
process that should resonate beyond this case, as argued in the concluding chapter. 
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Chapter Six: ‘Romantic Activist Networks’: the future of advocacy? 
 
Introduction 
The previous four chapters have analyzed, respectively, the role of anti-GMO activists in the media 
and public sphere debate on biotechnology in India and the way they have shaped that debate; the 
linkages and ‘structural couplings’ between the network and various bureaucracies, parties, markets, 
and the media, the ‘romantic’ orientation of the network’s way of framing rural issues and the way 
that some farmers’ movements joined forces with transnational networks and others did not. 
By way of conclusion, this chapter attempts to draw out mechanisms and processes from this case 
study that might address gaps in the literature on TANs.  As in previous chapters, the aim is to solve 
the particular puzzles of the network’s staying power and ‘unrestrained’ empirical claims by putting 
the network in a social and historical context , rather than treating activism as a set of disembodied 
‘frames’ and ‘ideas’. The socio-historical approach is in line with the ‘big’ questions Charles Tilly 
(2004:  153-58)  asks  about  the  future  of  social  movements  in  the  coming  century:  will 
professionalization  of  movements  and  networks  exceed  in  momentum  the  bottom  up 
democratization of societies? Will the growth of activist mediators and entrepreneurs (of the kind 
illustrated in this dissertation) choke or replace locally responsive grassroots mobilization?  
In order to address, in however modest a way these ‘big’ questions,  chapter six summarizes the 
characteristics of what we have termed the ‘romantic activist network’ and asks whether these 
characteristics are likely to be applicable to other issue areas and in other social contexts. If they are 
widely applicable, then Tilly’s worries about the ‘dark side’ of transnational mobilization may have 
more urgency than if ‘governance oriented’ or even more optimistically ‘grassroots’  or ‘democratic’ 
TANs are actually more prevalent. The chapter therefore opens with an account of the particular 
social  conditions  in  rural  India  that  have  made  romantic  activism  possible.  It  then  goes  on  to 229 
summarize  the  characteristics  of  the  anti  GMO  network  focusing  on  those  that  might  be 
generalizable to other issues areas. The secondary literature is then mined to suggest likely issue 
areas where romanticization has been and will be prevalent. Finally, in an attempt to generate a 
more positive theory of how the case fits into the universe of activist networks the chapter ends 
with a series of tables intended to situate types of activist networks and to isolate the characteristics 
that make some networks ‘romantic’ in the way they frame their claims.   
 
Romantic TANs and Vacuums of Representation 
One conclusion that many interviewees agreed on was the background condition for the success of 
the anti GMO network. This condition is the exodus from the countryside of rural ‘elites’ who had 
previously made up the backbone of regional farmers’ movements such as the Shetkari Sanghatana 
in Maharashtra and (at first) the KRRS in Karnataka. Chapter five pointed to the three periods in the 
history of farmers’ mobilization in India. To recap briefly: 
1.  1948-1970s:  radical  movements  of  laborers  for  land  reform  and  Naxalite  inspired 
movements of tribal peoples 
2.  Late 1970s-mid 1990s: ‘new’ farmers’ movements such as the Sanghatana, KRRS, BKU 
3.  Mid 1990s to present: The rise of transnationalized NGO-led protests such as the anti 
GMO and anti dam networks and the transnationalized versions of the new farmers’ 
movements (chapter five) 
   The social conditions that underpinned each phase involved the relative power and influence of key 
classes in the countryside. With urbanization and industrialization the laboring classes behind radical 
peasant movements became semi-detached from the countryside as they migrated for seasonal 
work  in  the  cities.  The  Green  Revolution  that  empowered  medium  and  large  farmers  was  the 
impetus  for  the  new  farmers’  movements  (Lindberg  1995;  Rudolph  and  Rudolph  1987).  These 230 
farmers, equipped with new wealth and time, were able to use these resources to mobilize against a 
politics seen as discriminatory against agriculture. Finally, in the third phase, this generation of richer 
Green Revolution farmers saw their children begin to move to the cities, not for manual labor, but 
into white collar jobs. The social prestige of the medium and large farmers began to fall as the 
relative prestige of urban IT workers and service sector workers (the BJP’s ‘Shining India’) rose, while 
at the same time the economic coherence of the village disintegrated as rural non farm employment 
(RNFE) became the main source of income for most villagers (Gupta 2004).  
If this sketch is accurate, then the NGO networks ‘representing’ India’s farmers to the world are 
beneficiaries of an exodus of well educated, indigenous rural activists like Sharad Joshi, who were 
able to mediate the interests of small and middle farmers (and even laborers) with the state in the 
1980s. In support of this thesis, Jodhka (2007: 27) argues (for Punjab, but relevant to India generally) 
that there is a crisis of representation in rural politics:  
Most  importantly,  the  explanation  for  the  marginalization  of  the  village  and  decline  of 
agriculture lies in the changing orientation of the erstwhile agrarian / rural elite. The new 
elite that had emerged from the village during the decades of the 1960’s and 1970s and 
identified almost completely with the agrarian economy are increasingly moving away from 
the village. Agriculture is not where they see the future of their coming generations. 
For Jodhka this “growing internal differentiation” of economic interests in the countryside is the 
underlying structural cause of “the fragmentation of farmers’ movement” described in chapter five. 
For Gupta (2004; 2009) and Suri (2006) this differentiation also entails a specifically cultural and 
status crisis, of the kind some have blamed for the spike in suicides (see chapter two). In the absence 
of well educated, high status farmers to lead (but not necessarily dominate) organizations rural 
policy has become listless. The equivalent generation of highly educated rural leaders will now be 
living in cities, and if not living there, earning money from investments in the city. This lack of ‘push’ 
from below is one reason, for Gupta (2004: 215) why “there is no fresh agricultural policy that can 
give a vision to the future of rural India” and that elected politicians, notoriously passive when it 231 
comes to giving direction to policy in India, are, in Gupta’s analysis falling back on clichés, either of 
the  market  romantic  kind  (just  raise  land  ceilings,  let  corporations  in  and  push  microfinance 
initiatives)  or  of  the  romantic  ruralist  kind  (organic  farming,  village  autonomy)  documented  in 
chapter four. 
This is the political-cultural vacuum that allows professional NGO networks to become magnets for 
the  remaining  rural  activists;  often  causing  them  to  abandon  more  complex-to-implement 
‘modernist’ approaches
295  to appeal to the polished and professional discourse of the network. A 
region by region sketch of the network’s centres of activity confirms that it is in those places most 
devoid of representation through party or social movement structures that the network tends to 
thrive; and this explanation is much stronger than the network’s claim that it is where Bt Cotton 
‘failed’  most  catastrophically  that  it  concentrates  its  resources
296.    In some states and regions, 
especially Gujurat (Shah 2003), but also much of Karnata ka (Panini 1999) middle and larger scale  
farmers have become integrated into transnational commodity networks and have therefore lost 
their  dependency  on  the  caste or  non  caste  local/national  solidarities
297  that  were essential 
resources for farmers’ movement organization. These farmers have effectively abandoned domestic 
political agitation; those less well connected to transnational commodity networks therefore find 
themselves without potential spokespeople and, crucially, without local elites with an interest in the 
modernist agenda of pro poor agricultural research (Nanda 1995).  
Areas such as eastern Maharashtra and the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh, where capitalist 
networks are relatively weak, party representation of rural classes has been historically low and 
vacuums of representation even greater than elsewhere in those states have become particular 
                                                           
295 See especially the case of Vijay Jawandhia described in chapter five 
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although other aspects of rural crisis are worse in those areas. For example most respondents argued that Bt 
cotton had fared better in its early years in the (NGO heavy, politically poorly represented) Warangal area of 
Andhra Pradesh than in the commercially more integrated and wealthier Guntur region of AP.  
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targets for the new activist networks
298. This process was illustrated in chapter three, where the 
Andhra farmers’ union and shepherds and goatherds union leaders were ‘forced’ to attach their 
agendas to the professional networks, in their claims making and in their own knowledge sources 
(for example the DDS brochures lying on the farmers’ union leader’s desk). 
Ironically  this  same  ‘vacuum’  was  what  helped  seed  companies  such  as  Mahyco-Monsanto 
disseminate exaggerated claims for Bt Cotton in some areas. Even supporters of the technology 
pointed out in interview
299 that Monsanto’s tactic of hiring young unemployed men to ride into 
villages on motorbikes, spread the news about Bt cotton, show videos and put up posters had a 
detrimental  effect  in  the  medium  term,  leading  to  excessive  expectations  about  the  crop  and 
earning the added hostility of the Left farmers’ unions described in chapter three.  
 
Summarizing scope conditions of the case study 
The  presence  of  this  ‘vacuum  of  representation’  is  probably  the  most  important  background 
condition for the flourishing of ‘romantic TANs’, but what other conditions are likely to be present in 
the environment for similar networks to thrive? In the terms of positivist social science, “to what 
range of institutional settings, cultural contexts, time periods, geographic settings, and situational 
contexts do the findings apply?” (George and Bennett, 2005: 119). In order to specify this domain of 
applicability some further background conditions are specified below. 
As chapter four showed, India has been the site of several internationally renowned TANs, including 
Chipko and the Narmada Bachao Andolan, discussed as precursors to the anti GMO network. India 
has many characteristics that enable TANs of the ‘romantic’ kind to proliferate: 
                                                           
298 The Greenpeace campaigns officer (interview 22) pointed out that these were the regions where 
Greenpeace expected their narrative to be most successful, for ‘cultural’ reasons, although he could also have 
been referencing the lack of competition over representation in such areas. 
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1.  It is a democracy with few ‘official’ barriers to entry in civil society. 
2.  The ‘Emergency’ period in the 1970’s catalyzed the growth of an oppositional civil society, 
many members of which are still working in TANs today (Baviskar 2010) 
3.  Its Gandhian tradition has found traction with transnational imaginaries, and in the case of 
Gandhi have contributed to those imaginaries 
4.  Bureaucratic ‘choke points’ over regulatory matters (in both the Narmada and GMO cases) 
enable the growth of coalitions, and the prominent role of international actors (The World 
Bank, Monsanto) in the absence of a strong developmental state, attracts transnational 
interest and resources.  
5.  Illiteracy,  social  fragmentation  and  the  withdrawal  of  state  institutions  enable  TANs  to 
monopolize representation of certain issues and engage in ‘unrestrained framing’ (the social 
vacuum described above) 
These conditions make something like the anti GMO coalition more likely to thrive in India than 
many countries, but only number 3 is unique to India per se, and as chapter three argued the 
‘Gandhian’  cultural  legacy  in  the  network  may  be  overstated.  Nevertheless,  based  on  these 
conditions we might expect ‘romantic TANs’ to be less prominent in China and East Asia (where 
widespread literacy and stronger state-society synergy reduces social vacuums in which TANs can 
proliferate), and more prominent in Latin America, which, appealing to a general knowledge of the 
secondary literature, does appear to be the case
300.  
Attempting to summarize the issue areas around which ‘romantic TANs’ might coalesce is more 
problematic than the more general socio-geographic conditions listed above, because  any summary 
is liable to superfluousness: organizations will tend to romanticize issues when the socio-economic 
and institutional conditions ‘select for’ romanticization. However, the issues discussed below along 
with the case study in this dissertation suggest the following:  
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1.  Cases where a TAN can effectively ‘adopt’ a group, depicted as somehow ‘authentic’ or 
‘traditional’ in its way of life and depict that group as actual or potential victims of 
negative external influences. 
2.  Connected to point 1 – there should be no clear rival organization mobilizing that group 
on  ‘modernistic’  grounds  –  where  the  goal  is  greater  inclusion  in  global  or  state 
institutions (the removal of secular modernist politics in the Middle East over decades of 
western interventions provides this condition for jihadism;  the lack of broad based 
farmers’ movements in India for our case; for indigenous peoples there may be a tension 
between autonomy seeking and inclusion seeking goals) 
3.  The  issue  should  enable  multiple  linkages,  especially  media  linkages,  which  do  not 
‘restrain’ the network into responding in their framing activity, to either the human 
needs of a mass base or the technical rational requirements of a governance institution 
(see discussion of restrained and unrestrained ‘framing below’) 
Finally,  drawing  on  chapter  three,  there  are  two  contingent,  institutional  conditions  that  made 
‘romantic TANs’ more viable, in this case at least: 
1.  The existence of multiple ‘choke points’ in a governance process – allowing a TAN to 
generate discourse about governance failures, but not (as in a governance oriented TAN) 
allowing for a tight coupling of any governance institution and the TAN. The TAN is able 
to  exploit  the  choke  point  for  discursive  ends  without  participating  in  governance 
processes
301. 
In other cases or issue areas, a similar choke points might substitute for the regulatory ones in the 
GMO case (for example the ambiguous legal status of indigenous persons in Latin America or the 
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for aestheticizing activity, without the pressure to actually partake of decisions. 235 
deferred hopes of statehood for the Palestinian people) – so long as it allows for a TAN to occupy a 
niche of critique around the choke point, without taking responsibility for governance.  
2.  Generous ‘external’ sources of funding not tied to strict performance criteria 
External funding that does not depend on ‘performance’ vis a vis a ‘base’ or a clear governance 
oriented goal  contributes to the ‘unrestrained’ nature of romantic TAN framing; effectively this is a 
‘resource curse’ situation among the elite activists who can easily attract funds
302, combined with 
intense competition at lower levels of activism (see above) to enter this elite group of recipients of 
resources.  
Not all these conditions (10 in total) are likely or necessary to pertain for all ‘romantic TANs;  the 
case  of  the  anti  GMO  TAN  may  be  an  ‘ideal,  ideal  ’  case  where  all  the  conditions  enabling 
romanticization pertained at once. As argued in chapter one the aim of analyzing ideal types is to 
generate ‘family resemblances’ that cut across conventional demarcations of TANs, not to enable a 
list of ‘causes’ that must be strictly in place for the phenomenon to occur. If ‘romanticism’ in activist 
campaigns is a long term feature of modern societies the particular, contingent circumstances in 
which it arises are likely to vary over time. Thus an excessive focus on the ephemeral contingent 
conditions enabling romantic TANs, might miss the forest for the trees.  
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incomes, thereby fail to invest in alternative institutions, education, etc (Auty 1993). For elite activists the 
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Summarizing the Characteristic of Romantic TANs 
In the following sections the key characteristics of the anti GMO network(s) are summarized along 
with empirical examples from interviews. Some of these characteristic will apply across other types 
of TAN; for example governance oriented TANs also involve professionalized brokerage. However, 
underlying  all  of  the  processes  is  the  particular  way  in  which  ‘romantic  TANs’  find  themselves 
claiming to represent the views of  a grassroots base, while at the same time occupying a social 
space  within  a  specialized  sphere  of  professional  activism.  As  section  5  on  ‘framing’  makes 
particularly clear this potential contradiction is what is most distinctive about romantic TANs.  
 
1.  Elongation and professional brokerage monopolization in the network: a new oligarchy? 
What are the class consequences of the kind of TAN represented by the anti GMO network?  
As  argued  in  chapters  three  and  five,  high  level  professional  skills  are  required  to  manage  the 
numerous ‘structural couplings’  involved in an activist network that focuses on the media, donors 
and other, heterogeneous elite organizations.  These symbioses of organizations do not necessarily 
expand entry points into policy debates for less educated and less wealthy people, and may act to 
limit such access, certainly in comparison to the farmers’ movements of the 1980’s. As Herring 
(2009) points out in relation to ‘Operation Cremate Monsanto’ in Karnataka, these barriers to entry 
have class consequences that can work against the poor, contrary to the hopes held out for TANs 
from both their liberal and radical defenders. 
Overall, TANs intersect with domestic politics in a highly uneven manner.  Liberal theorists of TANs 
(Smith and Wiest 2005) have pointed to the way that greater participation in global institutions and 
treaties  leads  to  greater  TAN  activity  in  countries  as  a  whole  (albeit  that  richer  countries  still 
participate  more  in  TANs).  However,  there  has  been  no  systematic  attempt,  to  look  at  the 
distribution of TAN activity within countries. A geography of TAN distribution could begin with the 237 
kind of diagrammatic analysis attempted in chapter three, where the anti-GMO network was broken 
down into its cosmopolitan, nodal and regional elements. Such a geography would act as a counter 
weight to the tendency in both TAN scholarship to treat as the ‘dependent variable’, the number of 
transnational  connections  and  interactions,  but  to  ignore  the  distribution  of  those  connections 
across a population and the variable access to those connections by social class
303. Chapter five, for 
example,  dealt  with  such  variable  geography  in  its  analysis  of  Prof.  Nanjundaswamy’s 
monopolization of access points to the Via Campesina in Asia. 
Thus the social geography of the network  involves elongation and professionalization. Elongation is 
readily apparent from the tables at the beginning of chapter three, where the network is visualized 
as a hierarchy of organizations. In terms of the politics of how issues are framed, this means that the 
metropolitan  and  nodal  groups  are  effectively  ‘insulated’,  in  some  cases  by  three  ‘layers’  of 
hierarchy from contact with the farmers who they claim to represent. Only at these higher levels can 
the  information  acquired  from  farmers  be  transformed  into  (romantic)  narratives  which  are 
communicable within the media-donor complex. 
A  parallel  to  Michels’  (1911)  ‘iron  law  of  oligarchy’  is  arguably  apt  here.  Whereas  for  Michels 
oligarchy  meant  control  of  the  bureaucratic  apparatus  of  European  social  democratic  parties, 
excluding the working class ‘base’, today it means control of networks of representation, in which 
the ‘base’ may have even less input. This is so because unlike in Michels’ case, where the ‘masses’ 
had at least de jure powers to select party leaders through elections and hustings, the activist 
network politics described in this dissertation involves even greater distance between social levels, 
even in organizations like the KRRS which were nominally mass based. 
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This professionalization has been described by Indian sociologist D.N.Dhanagare as the “NGO ization 
of social movements
304” (alongside what he terms the “projectization of NGOs”). As Sethi puts it 
(1998: 410) in an essay on the retreat of traditional social movements in India and the rise of new 
professional activist networks: 
Effective power over how issues will be formulated and presented passes on to the non-
grassroots para-professional groups and individuals. Put more sharply, it implies a shift in 
focus from grass-roots mobilisation and organisation, the hallmark of local activity, to trying 
to achieve media coverage in an effort to influence the environment and policy process, a 
strategic impulse favoured by those somewhat removed from the ground [emphasis added] 
Field research among the various ‘levels’ of the coalition provides support for the idea of different 
‘levels’ of professional qualification and status across the network. Metropolitan NGOs are staffed 
by people with PhDs (Vandana Shiva and Suman Sahai) or Masters level qualifications in some form 
of agricultural science or public relations. This is also true of the nodal NGOs who appeared to be 
staffed mainly by young (under 40 year old) professionals, most of whom had Masters degrees in 
agricultural sciences or public relations (the current Greenpeace GMO officer)  and sometimes (one 
of the DDS campaign managers) a background in corporate agricultural companies. When we move 
‘down’ to the level of regional NGOs however, the average age of activists increased: they were 
more often part of a generation of activists that remembered the 1970s ‘emergency’ and associated 
themselves with Gandhian alternatives to the Green Revolution and urbanization. This difference 
extended  to  the  ‘personal  style’ of the  interviewees  – something  hard  to  pin  down,  but which 
demonstrated itself in the way regional NGO officers wanted to tell personal narratives about their 
rural origins (even if as elites), often evoking a nostalgia for the ‘village system’ described in chapter 
four.  On the other hand, staff of the nodal and metropolitan organizations (barring Vandana Shiva’s 
questionable claims of coming from a ‘farming’ background) never talked about having rural origins. 
These  are  international  professionals  who  frequently  fly  to  Europe  to  attend  training  and 
conferences and are very unlikely to socialize with the older generation of activists that run regional 
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groups, let alone hopeful participants like the high school teacher who accompanied me to villages 
in Warangal.  
But  why  is  such  professionalization  necessary  and  what  are  its  consequences?  There  are many 
reasons why a network that depends on creating various functional ‘couplings’ with powerful actors 
tends  to  be  dominated  by  professional,  highly  educated  people.  Obviously  complete  fluency  in 
English is a prerequisite, and this is a key variable when analyzing the ‘levels’ of the network, with 
metropolitan and nodal groups staffed by people for whom English is probably their main language 
of  everyday  use,  to  regional  NGO  staff  who  are  competent  but  not  completely  comfortable  in 
English, to the grassroots / Left union activists with whom I needed a translator to be properly 
understood. In the case of the KRRS, for example, Nanjundaswamy’s fluency in English was a key 
reason for his ability to keep transnational connections to himself.   
But beyond language, it is the subtle capacity for engaging in ‘brokerage’ that marks out the skill set 
of the new professionalized activist class. The analysis of Greenpeace archives in chapter three 
showed how the organization needed officers capable of constructing ‘radical’ campaigns that could 
penetrate the newly ‘expanded’ social space of the internet age. This skill set, aptly demonstrated in 
interview by the Greenpeace officer responsible for GMOs
305, involves myriad strategic decisions 
about which alliances to work on at particular times, which government ministers to focus attention 
on, which media sources to channel stories to and which stories to select for publication in official 
brochures  and  websites.  He  described  for  example  the  low  ‘resonance’  that  would  result  from 
emphasizing  the  use  of  GM  cotton  oil,  a  product  ingested  mainly  by  the  poor  in  cooking,  and 
therefore (one might argue explicitly although he did not) less likely to resonate with the urban and 
European consumers of the anti GMO discourse. Similarly the officer had to weigh the costs and 
benefits of alliances with high profile, but unreliable actors like Nanjundaswamy of the KRRS, judging 
them  inadvisable,  whereas  Vandana  Shiva  had  both  high  media  profile  and  high  professional 
                                                           
305 Interview number 22 240 
reliability.  This  kind  of  judgment  call  requires  skills  similar  to  a  public  relations  officer  for  a 
multinational corporation: the ability to deal with allies and rivals in other professional spheres, 
knowing  which  aspect  of  the  discourse  to  emphasize  with  which  organization  for  maximum 
effectiveness.  
With these skill sets required, it seems very unlikely that anyone could get ‘promoted’ up through 
the network, from grassroots to regional to nodal to metropolitan levels
306, casting doubt on the 
claim that the new activist networks are likely to bring greater inclusivity to politics. Chapter five 
documented  exactly  this  process,  wh ereby  a  skilled  transnational  communicator,  Prof 
Nanjundaswamy,  was  able  to  bypass  traditional  mass  politics  and  traditional  farmers’  leaders 
through the cultivation of transnational linkages. This leads into the next section on the tension 
between vertical and ‘horizontal’ solidarity in activist networks. 
 
 
2.    Vertical versus Horizontal Solidarity in activist networks 
One  of  the  possible  lacunae  in  the  literature  on  TANs  has  been  the  idea  that  ‘scaling  up’  to 
transnational levels will benefit the network and those it represents.  In other words, vertical forms 
of solidarity can complement or supplement horizontal forms of solidarity at the domestic level. This 
process is sometimes described in terms of the concept of ‘scale shift’ (Tarrow (2005: 120-24), and 
Reitan  (2007),  as  recounted  in  chapter  one),  whereby,  through  various  brokerage  mechanisms, 
groups are able to adjust their claims and even identities, to achieve a global voice. 
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The implication of this case study is different and potentially generalizable across other issue areas 
where (romantic) TANs involve a purported ‘base’ of claimants and the possibility of transnational 
‘scaling up’.  A key point relates to Tarrow’s remark (2005: 123-24) that “the transaction costs of 
moving up the scale of contention are much higher than scale shift in familiar domestic settings”. 
One implication of this dissertation has been that this is not always the case. The resources and 
incentives in place for ‘scaling up’ in the case examined here, mean that activists have a ready-made 
set of channels through which to coordinate with transnational levels and much more professional  
assistance and funding than would be the case if they chose to try and coordinate action horizontally  
between Indian states or between, say, farmers and India’s public sector agricultural scientists. In 
other words, vertical solidarity may replace or substitute for rather than complement the search for 
new horizontal solidarities. 
Chapter five, for example, showed how it was actually easier for Prof. Nanjundaswamy of the KRRS 
to scale up vertically to the transnational level than to forge horizontal domestic alliances with 
fellow farmers’ movements in Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra. As cited in that chapter, his advisors 
were frustrated with this tendency to look to the vertical before the horizontal.  Chapter five also 
showed how Vijay Jawandhia, formerly of the Shetkari Sanghatana, somewhat reluctantly scaled up 
vertically to the transnational level, when the conditions for horizontal mobilization of a left leaning, 
pro-modernization alliance in rural Maharashtra had failed.  Some other cases from Maharashtra 
also help illustrate the ‘pull’ that transnationalism has on grassroots activists and how the desire to 
emulate those activists, such as Vandana Shiva, motivates an emphasis on forging vertical ties. 
Ms Lata P M, for example
307, was an early supporter of Sharad Joshi in the Sanghatana’s womens’ 
movement. She felt that Joshi was genuinely concerned with womens’ empowerment in the early 
1980’s and that the movement was able (as recounted by Youngblood, 2004) to synergize various 
interest groups around a common theme of rural neglect. By the 1990’s however, with no new 
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generation of leaders to fill Joshi’s place Lata felt that the Sanghatana had become drawn to ‘neo-
liberal’  themes  and  abandoned  its  interest  in  marginal  rural  groups.  Crucially,  she  argued  that 
anyone who wants to organize domestically now has to do so through the transnational sector. Only 
those with transnational linkages are physically “able to meet” domestically, thanks to the resources 
provided  for  such  simple  facilities  as  conferences,  libraries  of  activist  literature  (such  as  at 
Kalpavriksh of Pune) and travel expenses. Hence she began work as a movement ‘trainer’ with the 
National Centre for Advocacy Studies (NCAS) in Pune , Maharashtra, an organization that trains 
NGOs  in  how  to  frame  issues  to  gain  maximum  traction  with  the  media,  donors  and  Indian 
parliamentarians.  As  argued  in  chapter  three,    an  organization  like  NCAS  gains  legitimacy  by 
employing  someone  with  a  grassroots  activist  background  like  Lata  P  M  (and  her  multiple 
connections with small rural groups that can be turned into legitimate recipients of funding), while 
she gains access to the transnational resources she sees as necessary for social activism today
308. She 
described Vandana Shiva as “a shining figure” in rural activism, but at the same time expressed some 
resentment  that  “second  line  leadership”  was  unable  to  gain  access  to  these  transnational 
resources,  leading  to  an  internal  hierarchy  among  activists,  with  those  who  could  access 
organizations like NCAS and the transnational ‘domain’ privileged over those who could not.  
Arguably those most adept at accessing groups like NCAS are precisely those whose ideological 
orientation is most attuned to the transnational ‘romantic’ discourse described in chapter four.  So a 
hidden ‘selection’ process is at work, in which those with more nuanced or ‘modernist’ views about 
GMOs or globalization would be unlikely to end up working for a group like NCAS. Lata P M, for 
example,  appeared to  hold  quite  a  romantic  conception  of  rural  problems, critiquing  the  “cash 
economy” per se and the consequent “social fragmentation”, with an emphasis on a return to small 
scale “sustainable farming” rather than the rural modernization agenda of the 1980’s Sanghatana 
(see chapter five). Along with these attitudes came a rather paternalistic conception of rural women, 
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when she suggested that activists had to “learn how to mediate on behalf of women who can’t 
articulate for themselves”.  
As implied above and throughout this dissertation it seems unlikely that NGO-ized activist networks 
will achieve, or even want to achieve
309, potentially more contentious horizontal solidarities.  The 
state is becoming less of a ‘container’ of activist energies.  In fact in a highly NGO-ized activist 
network  it  is  debatable  whether  the  terminology  of  scale  shift  really  applies  at  all,  since  that 
terminology (as used by Keck and Sikkink and their followers) assumed that the end of activism was 
change  at  the  local or  national  level. One  Hyderabad  based  activist, who  had  been  a  founding 
member of the left leaning activist collective Lokayan, argued in interview
310 that NGOs nowadays 
are “in awe” of donors and unwilling to “risk a more political stance” by concentrating on issues 
which do not resonate with transnational themes, such as electricity privatization or the corruption 
associated with Special Economic Zones
311 and the public distribution system, issues which would 
entail horizontal connections across Indian regions, but which would have relatively little resonance 
with donors.  In other words vertical solidarity may be the default option, enabled by donor and 
nodal groups keen to couple with ‘legitimate’ grassroots activists, but only within a limited range of 
‘transnationalizable’ issues.  As one left leaning activist argued in interview: “it’s easier to confront 
an external enemy”
312 through TANs, than to mobilize around complex domestic issues. 
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temporary alliances of opportunity. 
310 Interview number 59 with Mr Narayan 
311 But see the account of the less ‘transnationalized’ and less resource endowed National Association of 
Peoples’ Organizations in chapter three. 
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3.  Knowledge  production  and  epistemological  filtering,  policing,  convergence  and 
monopolization  in activist networks  
Scholars  have  pointed  out  that  activist  networks  and  social  movements  produce  ‘frames’  (see 
discussion below) as well as grievances, stories and modes of thinking as an integral part of their 
activities  (Melucci  1997;  Poletta  1998).    Conway  (2006),  makes  this  a  central  point  in  her 
examination  of  new,  network  activisms,  in  which  (alternative)  knowledge  production  becomes 
central to the social movement task, over and above traditional forms of mobilization. Social theorist 
Nico Stehr (2001) makes this a central point in his claim that new social movements challenge the 
monopolization of knowledge in functionally differentiated societies and can become “a medium 
and manifestation of emergent conditions for a broader based linkage between knowledge and 
emancipation in modern societies” (141).  Along these emancipator lines, activists in the anti GMO 
network, such as Vandana Shiva, have emphasized their role as ‘keepers’ of traditional, alternative 
knowledges, via seed banks and the invocation of such practices as ‘Vedic agriculture’ (see chapter 
two). Chapter four critiqued such claims in its analysis of the ‘romantic’ discourse of the network; 
suggesting that a modular, mono causal interpretation of Indian agricultural life lay behind the more 
radical claims of the network to be enabling alternative forms of knowledge (see also Nanda 2003 on 
this theme). 
As was suggested in the diagrammatic figure of the activist network in chapter three, the network 
against  GMOs  can  also  be  seen,  in  more  instrumental  or  strategic  terms,  as  an  engine  for  the 
production of data, knowledge and causal claims about the lives of poor farmers and the dangers of 
GMOs. This ‘data’ was said to be ‘sold’ to urban and international sites in exchange for access to 
those  sites  and  to  funding  opportunities.  In  this  sense,  Sikkink  may  be  too  idealistic  when  she 
suggests that network forms of activism rely on the ‘exchange’ rather than the commodification of 
knowledge (Sikkink 2009: 230). Certainly in the case of romantic TANs, more than grassroots or 
governance oriented TANs, knowledge production in the form of romantic narratives about harms 245 
and harmers is likely to be central to their concerns. This is because these romantic narratives are 
the hooks which attach organizations to crucial media, donor and market linkages. 
This kind of ‘production’ of knowledge was illustrated in chapter four in the discussion of some of 
the DDS’ video materials and in chapter three in the discussion of the National Centre for Advocacy 
Studies (NCAS) and its tools and training for the dissemination of causal claims.  It can also be 
observed in the case of the unpaid school teacher cum activist-volunteer I spoke to in Warangal. I 
discovered after speaking to him that he was the source for a ‘scientific’ study into the effects of Bt 
cotton consumption on sheep deaths, funded by the DDS in Hyderabad. This study found that three 
sheep who fed on Bt Cotton leaves died, while three sheep who fed on non Bt Cotton survived. 
Obviously there are strong incentives for someone whose aim is to work for an NGO, to produce 
data that fit the NGO’s framing of risks
313. This is also true of the more sophisticated data produced 
by regional NGOs for donors and nodal NGOs, purporting to  show that organic cotton is actually 
more profitable than Bt Cotton
314.  Although the direct ors of regional NGOs may be   dedicated 
experts on organic farming, the data they are provided with come s from lower paid trainers and 
supervisors at the village level, who also have overwhelming incentives to ‘buy in’ to the narrative of 
organic cotton success and Bt cotton failure. 
 There are ways in which the network selects frames and narratives that accord with its ideational 
and institutional needs. The following examples illustrate, respectively, processes of epistemological 
‘filtering’, ‘policing’, ‘convergence’ and ‘monopolization’  in the network . 
Filtering can be illustrated by a case from Maharashtra, where two left oriented social activists and 
academics based in Mumbai – a husband and wife team  - the Pendses
315, were asked by Oxfam UK 
                                                           
313 See also Herring (2010: 90) for a discussion of the upward dissemination of claims from the CSA Hyderabad 
(rival knowledge ‘producer’ to the DDS) to articles in the Guardian Newspaper, UK about sheep deaths. 
314 For example a lengthy study by Dhara Mitra in Wardha, Maharashtra. The study shows non Bt cotton being 
‘more profitable’ than Bt, but this is only in the NGO’s own project areas, where presumably the organic 
cotton was lavished with special attention and there is no data about how the Bt cotton was treated – whether 
it received the amount of pesticide sprayings that are recommended, etc. 
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(a key funder of NGOs in the network) to produce a study on the relationship of globalization and 
agricultural crisis in Maharashtra, focusing on cotton as a commodity. Oxfam’s aim was to provide a 
parallel study to one on Burkina Faso in Africa, where globalization appeared to have caused ruin to 
indigenous  producers.  However,  their  research  suggested  no  links  between  crisis  among  cotton 
farmers in Maharashtra and globalization per se. For example, they argued that since 1987 the price 
of Indian cotton had been above the international price (ruling out the effects of dumping claimed 
by  some  network  activists)  and  that  in  fact  there  was  a  consistent  shortage  of  cotton  for  the 
domestic market of around 11-13% per year during this period, with only one year since 1951 in 
which imports were greater than exports. The Pendses argued (in line with the discussion in chapter 
two) that the causes of agricultural crisis (and ultimately suicides) in Maharashtra were lack of 
irrigation, small acreage farms that reduce returns to scale in picking, a lack of back-up subsistence 
crops in Vidarbha to cover against failure of cotton, regional deficiencies in farmer-market linkages 
and  in  policy  terms  a  decision  to  reduce  funding  for  the  National  Bank  for Rural  Development 
(NABARD) in 1997, which meant the rise of private money lenders who could manipulate interest 
rates by only announcing rates late into the season. This report (Cotton Cultivation in Maharashtra, 
2003) was rejected by Oxfam, who, according to the Pendses never wrote to explain why they had 
rejected it
316. The Pendses argued that “it is very hard to say no” to the “meta frames” of big donors 
like Oxfam and that regional NGOs and activists (perhaps those without regular academic posts like 
the Pendses) come to realise how to frame debates to fit the meta narrative, even when it bears 
little relation to the facts.  
‘Policing’ can be illustrated by the dispute between Oxfam and Vandana Shiva, where, in November 
1999, she (Shiva 1999) responded to a policy document published by British INGO  Oxfam (Oxfam 
1999) on the future of GM crops in the developing world. 
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In its position paper on "G.M. crops, WTO and Food Security", Oxfam recommends, Donor 
governments and agencies commit resources for investment in research into the potential 
opportunities presented by applications of G.M. to deliver environmental and health 
benefits pertaining to small holder agriculture in adverse agroecological zones. 
We feel that Oxfam risks betraying the South, the poor and food security objectives by 
calling for support for promotion of G.M. crops in the South instead of calling for support for 
ecological and sustainable agriculture which is much better suited to the small farmers in 
adverse agroecological zones. 
A perusal of the original document from Oxfam shows that the tone was overwhelmingly skeptical 
toward GMOs and supportive of the European ‘precautionary principle’, but Shiva picked up on a 
short section that asked for more public sector research into pro-poor applications like drought 
resistant crops. For Shiva, it was important to ‘police’ the message of the network of organizations 
involved in activism, perhaps successfully, since Oxfam has not afterwards published similar papers 
and may be sensitive to discussion of this topic
317. 
Epistemological ‘convergence’ is a harder concept to pin down, because it is less overt.  It implies 
that incentives and career trajectories ‘pull’ actors towards similar perspectives over time. These 
processes will include funding opportunities, media access and ‘career’ advancement in the activist 
profession. This dissertation has provided several possible examples: the journey of Vijay Jawandhia 
(chapter  five)  from  farmers’  leader  pursuing  a  broad  agenda  to  activist  against  GM  crops;  the 
convergence of regional project NGOs (described in chapter three) around the anti-GMO theme and 
their providing surveys and ‘field’ authenticity to back up anti-GMO claims, and the move of Lata P 
M from Sanghatana activist to aspiring transnational activist (above).  
It is difficult however, to catch the ‘social field’ performing the work of epistemological convergence. 
One  important,  but  debatable  case  is  that  of  Suman  Sahai  of  Gene  Campaign  in  Delhi.  One 
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interviewee,  an  academic  from  Hyderabad
318  recalled  Sahai’s  “stirring  nationalist  rhetoric”  in 
speeches she had given about biotechnology in the wake of the Dunkel Draft and TRIPs agreement in 
the early 1990’s. Her emphasis had been on how India must pro actively develop GM crops to suit its 
own agenda rather than rely on transnational corporations
319. This is reflected in Sahai’s publications 
from this period up to the late 1990’s (for example, Sahai 1997) where Sahai explicitly argued (along 
modernist or developmnentalist lines) that “the western debate about bioethics” was irrelevant to a 
developing country like India where hunger was the priority and GM crops could play a crucial role. 
After the anti-GMO campaign exploded in 1999-2002, Sahai’s emphasis shifted from nationalism to 
‘risk’ as the key discourse (for example, Sahai 2004). As argued in the media analysis of chapter two, 
it  is  now  hard  to  locate  ‘developmentalist’  views  on  GM  crops  among  activist  participants. 
Convergence, then, is hard to prove, and the convergence of views among activists is probably 
unconscious even to them, but instrumental reasons (in Sahai’s case funding from the German NGOs 
described  in  chapter  three,  and  perhaps  more  importantly  the  incentive  to  take  part  in 
governmental panels as the advocate for ‘biosafety’ – the very ‘western’ idea Sahai was previously 
critiquing  in  the  name  of  national  development)  may  ‘guide’  the  field  into  a  uniformity  of 
perspective.  
Finally,  knowledge  ‘monopolization’  describes  the  way  that  the  key  ‘nodes’  of  the  network 
accumulate  knowledge, making  themselves  indispensable  resources  for  less  privileged  nodes.  In 
Chapter three, for example, we described how Andhra Pradesh farmers’ union leader Malla Reddy 
relied on DDS documents and brochures to make claims about GMOs. According to public sector 
biotechnologist Prof. N. Raghuram of Indrapashtha University
320 NGOs have skilfully exploited the 
“vacuum” of knowledge about GMOs and the regulatory process associated with them, especially at 
the state level, where agriculture departments often lack a knowledge base on biotechnology (a 
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319 This is the interpretation of Sahai’s work favored by Heins (2008) based on interviews conducted in the 
1990’s.  
320 Interview/lecture number 55 c 249 
central state prerogative).  This was demonstrated in chapter three’s discussion of how nodal NGOs 
successfully  coupled  with  state  governments  to  object  to  field  trials  of  Bt  Cotton,  that  were 
supposedly circumventing the jurisdiction of states, and also in chapter two’s discussion of Indian 
MP’s  questions  to  Parliament,  where  NGO  knowledge  claims  were  uncritically  adopted  by 
parliamentarians.  
 
4. Competition versus synergy in transnational activist networks 
Sikkink  (2009)  describes  how  transnational  networks  can  achieve  more  efficient  results  to 
hierarchies or ‘traditional’ parties because of four factors (230): their voluntary nature; their capacity 
for rapid informational dissemination and learning; the trust that builds among nodes in the network 
and their inherent flexibility. As well as arguments from efficiency and speed , advocates of TANs see 
the network, or network of networks as inherently more democratic than hierarchical forms of 
organization  –  the  rhizome  (Hardt  2002)  being  the  organic  analog  of  this  hope.  Chapter  three 
suggested that the anti GMO network(s) is actually complex and striated in its internal structure: it is 
quite  hierarchical in the way different tasks are assigned to different ‘levels’, comprising a ‘hub and 
spoke’  type  structure  rather  than  an  egalitarian  ‘distributed’  structure,  but  it  could  also  be 
configured as several overlapping and rivalrous sub networks, each with their own particular hubs 
and spokes – such as the CSA of Hyderabad or the DDS in the same city. 
The irony of this rivalry is that while the rhetoric of the anti GMO network, as explored in chapter 
four, presented a picture of bottom up cooperation, sustainability and local solidarity as opposed to 
the forces of a brutal and inhumane global market, the reality of relations between parts of the 
network is very different. Cooley and Ron (2002) opened the debate on competition and rivalry 
among emergency relief NGOs, but a similar logic may apply to transnational activist networks, 
albeit with more subtle consequences. Competition within the network takes many forms and is 250 
about more than just jockeying for funds and media coverage (as for Cooley and Ron); it is about 
maintaining and building a reputation for ‘authenticity’; building allies and sub networks within the 
network, and finding niches for the organization that will guarantee institutional stability in the long 
run (see the discussion of Snyder (2006) in the conclusion of chapter four for this fusion of ideas and 
material incentives). Romantic TANs are likely to be especially prone to these forms of competition 
because  they  depend  on  projecting  an  image  of  authenticity  to  their  partners.  Competing  for 
authenticity ‘rents’ (Herring 2010) may become a zero sum game in and between romantic TANs, a 
zero sum game that may also appear in the competition for niche organic commodity markets. 
As noted above in the description of Lata P M, one form of competition is about access to the ‘top 
tier’ of activism where the transnational linkages are found. The most vivid example of this was 
given in chapter five where an account was given of the factional warfare within the KRRS over 
access  to  transnational  resources  and  between  the  KRRS  and  Vandana  Shiva  over  claims  to 
‘authenticity’
321. 
A  good  illustration  of  the  contrast  between  the  rhetoric  of  cooperation  and  the  reality  of 
competition or mutual  indifference within the  network,  is  in  the  concept  and  practice  of  ‘seed 
banks’. In theory, NGOs set up seed exchanges, with information about the particular qualities of 
seeds in certain soils and climates, for farmers to access free of charge and outside the control of 
transnational  corporations.  Seed  banks  serve  both a  practical  and  a  symbolic  role,  in  that  they 
represent a possibility of cooperative and local agriculture as an alternative to intensive, corporate 
agriculture (Shiva 2005). All the organic NGOs I spoke to claim to operate or be part of some such 
system, with the Green Foundation in Bangalore and Vandana Shiva’s Navdanya in Delhi producing 
glossy brochures about their seed bank programs. However, when I asked the director of the Green 
Foundation
322 whether any attempt had been made to produce a national seed bank to coordinate 
between different NGOs and share knowledge about seeds she did not even know about the 
                                                           
321 The claim that other network organizations or activists lacked ‘authenticity’ was pervasive in interviews. 
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existence of other networks of seed banks, nor indeed even the names of large NGOs like MARI 
working on the same set of issues in Andhra Pradesh. In other words these networks of seed banks 
exist in isolation from each other, arguably to attract the support of donors and act as publicity 
tools, rather than to act as a real bottom-up form of anti corporate agriculture
323.  
Another illustration of more direct competition between networks came on my second visit to the 
regional NGO MARI in Warangal in January 2009. When I arrived the director was too busy to see me 
as the village organic agriculture projects were undergoing what a project supervisor described as 
their yearly “crisis time”, when the organization struggled to find buyers for their organic cotton. I 
was reminded of the observation by the Chetna Organic officer in Hyderabad, that most of the 
Oxfam funded NGOs had weak marketing skills and had failed to form linkages to key organic textile 
buyers from the global North. Again, as with the seed banks, it might seem surprising that more 
cooperation  does  not  take  place  between  network  actors  on  arranging  linkages  with  northern 
organic cotton buyers, especially given the emphasis of their rhetoric on the need to return to non 
market forms of solidarity; but NGOs funded by different northern partners are very unlikely to 
enter into cooperative relations on such issues, forming instead exclusive vertical networks in rivalry 
with other networks. 
Different nodal organizations also preside over different ‘spheres of influence’ within the network. 
Most notably the DDS and the CSA; despite channelling funds to some of the same regional NGOs, 
having headquarters just a few miles from each other and being more or less united on framing
324 
and ideas,  they barely communicate with each other on a regular basis.
325 For example the DDS 
convenes a coalition of 140 NGOs in Andhra Pradesh called ‘the AP Coalition in defence of diversity’, 
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need for NGOs’ to run such programs  weighs against the option of pressing the state via agricultural 
universities, for example, to provide such programs. 
324 The Chetna Organic officer claimed that the DDS were less friendly toward markets per se than the CSA, and 
this may reflect their different structural locations in the anti GMO network (s), with the CSA attracting funds 
from the state for large projects and the DDS using media more exclusively. Chapter four, however, argued 
that they both accept largely ‘romantic’ framings of agriculture, albeit with different emphases: the DDS on 
threatened innocence, the CSA on the inherent risks of technology. 
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but surprisingly this does not include the CSA. The CSA is linked to an alternative mini coalition with 
Chetna Organic and Greenpeace India, named the ‘Coalition for a GM Free India’, which is glued 
together partly by the family connections of its key officers
326. Taking into account criticisms of the 
CSA’s closeness to the AP Congress Party
327, one reason for the lack of cooperation could be inter 
network rivalry over access to AP government funding for organic agriculture.
328 
 
5. ‘Framing’ in the network:  how framing can become ‘unrestrained’ in the absence of 
internal and external constraints 
Here, ‘framing’ refers to an “interpretive schemata that signifies and condenses the ‘world’ out 
there  by  selectively  punctuating  and  encoding  objects,  situations,  events,  experiences  and 
sequences  of  action  in  one’s  present  or  past  environment”  (Snow  and  Benford  1992:  137). 
‘Collective action frames’ include the ‘diagnostic’, which tell us what a problem is and attributes 
blame to targets, the ‘prognostic’, which propose remedies for that action and the ‘motivational’, 
which  encourages  people  to  take  action  (Stobaugh  and  Snow  2010;  Snow  and  Byrd  2007).  The 
content of these frames is drawn strategically from the “inherited and invented fibers” of culture 
and history (Tarrow 1998: 118). Framing  processes then emerge out of strategic and dialectical 
encounters between network or movement leaders and the institutions against which claims are 
being made (Tilly 1995, Herring 2010; Tarrow 2010). Herring, for example, (2010) has described how 
the  ‘generative  frame’  of  GMOs  emerged  out  of  the  institutional  ‘choke  points’  surrounding 
biosafety  regulations.  These  choke  points  provided  ample  space  for  activists  to  coalesce  and 
discursive and institutional opportunities for mobilization. Sato (2008) has similarly shown in great 
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327 Interview with Kameshwara Rao, Interview number 18. 
328 The DDS website does not mention any funding from the AP government in contrast to the CSA which has 
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detail  how  anti  GMO  frames  acquired  their  particular  form  from  interactions  with  particular 
regulatory institutions in France.  
The general emphasis in this dissertation has been rather different from this kind of ‘strategic frame 
analysis’, although it has hopefully made contributions to understanding the origin and persistence 
of certain strategic frames. For example, much of the discussion in chapter three contributes to a 
specific institutional analysis of how activists interact with various ‘targets’ and allies and how their 
framing of GMOs reflects those interactions – for example grafting opposition to GMOs onto an 
institutional  role  as  regional  NGO  doing  ‘sustainable  agriculture’  projects  and  framing  that 
opposition  in  terms  of  the  ‘better  alternative’ of  organic  agriculture,  or  in  Suman  Sahai’s  case, 
shifting to a biosafety frame that matches institutional opportunities for involvement in decision 
making  for  ‘experts’  in  the  NGO  community.    Framing  is  strategic  because  successful  frames 
resonate with specific audiences at specific points in time and, as my interview with Greenpeace’s 
GMO campaigns officer suggested (see the example of cotton oil above), and as Oliver and Johnston 
(2000) note, framing work in contemporary activist networks is strongly related to ‘marketing’. In 
fact, a business marketing text such as Heath and Heath (2007) is often pointed to as an invaluable 
guide as to how networks and movements can frame issues effectively.  
This focus on the strategic nature of framing processes, choke points and ‘framing as marketing’ sits 
awkwardly with scholarship that sees ‘global framing’ of campaigns as giving a voice to the voiceless.    
Reitan (2007: 19), for example, claims that “frame alignment” between local and global will lead to 
“a global transformative frame” that channels popular discontent with neoliberal norms. However, 
the key puzzle arising from the anti GMO case in India, and which is likely to be most applicable to 
romantic TANs more generally, concerns the unrestrained nature of the frames that the coalition has 
constructed. Here ‘unrestrained’ refers to the lack of ‘reality’ constraints on the choice of frames  - 
even though ironically those frames are strongly circumscribed by the modular romantic world view 
described in chapter four.  254 
The approach adopted here to addressing this puzzle, tries to explain how the anti GMO coalition 
found itself in a unique ‘niche’ in which framing activities were unrestrained either by technical 
responsibilities from above or by dialogical interactions with a base. While lacking either top down or 
bottom up restraints the network was able to flourish in a rich ecology of media attention and donor 
funds, enabling it to frame GMOs according to a default transnational romanticism. 
As  to  the  lack  of  ‘top  down’  restraints,  unlike  transnational  organizations  such  as  Amnesty 
International in the area of human rights, for example (Foley 2008: 24), the coalition members have 
not needed to attain a reputation for flawless fact checking or technical expertise in their ‘technical’  
field of biosafety. Unlike these governance oriented TANs the network has not formed structural 
couplings  with  organizations  that  require  replicable  and  rigorous  information.    This  emerged  in 
chapter three, where it was argued that Suman Sahai’s Gene Campaign in Delhi had inserted itself 
into technical committees and working groups, but that these concessions to Sahai appeared to be 
designed to placate the coalition rather than to act as serious sources of expertise. These insertions 
were  often  a  source  of  controversy  and  objections  from  scientists.  Since  the  audience  for  the 
coalition’s claims has been far away, either geographically (a European public) or in terms of social 
class  (upper  middle  class  activists  in  India),  those  claims  have  not  been  subject  to  expert 
interrogation by core partners of the network
329.  
As far as lack of restraint from below is concerned, it can be argued that dialogical interactions with 
a  ‘base’  should  prevent  elite  framing  activity  from  diverting  too  far  from  ground  realities  and 
perceived  human  needs.  Steinberg  (1998),  drawing  on  the  theories  of  Bakhtin,  describes  the 
‘dialogic’ as the inherently conflict riven process whereby stable ‘packages’ of meaning such as 
‘frames’ are produced. For Steinberg, the literature on framing in social movements studies has 
tended “in practice if less so in theory” (848) to concentrate on the generic end product of dialogical 
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articles (Herring 2009; 2010).  
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struggles in the form of “neatly structured packages or worldviews”. In other words, studies have 
concentrated on what Steinberg refers to as “mesomobilization” (860), meaning the marketing of 
pre packaged frames in the arena of mass communication and modern media, rather than on the 
“joint ideological labor” of interactions between elites and masses that (ideally) construct claims and 
frames in the first place. 
As argued above, the vacuum of representation in rural areas has meant that the ideal conditions 
apply for ‘mesomobilization’ – with no grassroots base with which to engage dialogically, network 
organizations have instead focused on marketing their claims to the various partners described in 
chapter three. In the contrasting case of the Shetkari Sanghatana, it was argued that dialogical forms 
of organization actually precluded the movement focusing on such elite framing activities in the 
media or at the transnational level. For other coalition organizations it is clear, that despite claims to 
be representative, no dialogical activity occurs between leaders and farmers – on the contrary as 
argued  in  chapter  four,  paternalism  is  a  better  description  of  the  structure  of  the  regional 
organizations in the network that work with farmers. 
While  Steinberg  wants  to  argue  that  a  reliance  on  the  elite  level  of  mesomobilization  and 
professionalized framing in partnership with the media,  will lead to the instability and collapse of 
movements  (860),  it  is  argued  here  that  romantic  TANs  are  not  necessarily  subject  to  these 
restraints. This was illustrated in chapter five, where the fame and (media evaluated) success of the 
KRRS reached its peak after it had declined as a mass movement. 
If this analysis has force, then we can argue that the really pressing questions about the type of 
activist network analyzed here are not so much about which frames will stick or how frames interact 
with particular institutional arrangements, but rather about how the prevalence of strategic framing 
activities aimed at the media and elite partners (‘mesomobilization’) itself sidelines other forms of 
activity, such as the formulating of claims in interaction with a ‘base’ in the first place.  In other 
words, Snow and Benford may be right about the prevalence of strategic framing but this prevalence 256 
needs to be historicized and explained. In particular, frames may have ‘resonance’ (in Snow and 
Benford’s phrase) at the level of elite and media linkages, but not with a purported base. Speaking 
more metaphorically, framing in this case may be less a jazz improvisation, where leaders suggest a 
theme that is transformed dialogically in the group (Tarrow 1992:191, summarizing Tilly 1983), and 
more  a  pre  packaged  pop  song,  effectively  produced  by  algorithm  to  appeal  to  targeted 
demographics. 
 
5.2. The upside down roots of network framing activities 
If the above arguments are correct the anti GMO network(s) is a good example of a romantic TAN 
that focuses its framing, and its brokerage activities on diverse elite organizations rather than on a 
grassroots ‘base’. Its patterns of interaction could be described as an upside down tree, whose 
‘roots’ are in the air.  
The diagram below attempts to illustrate this point by showing the paucity of framing activity in 
rural politics that actually originates with agriculturalists. The anti GMO network is shown alongside 
rival sources of frames in the diagram. 
 
 
 
 257 
 
Figure 6.1: Overview of Framing processes concerning agricultural policy 
 
The figure tries to illustrate how the ‘space’ or ‘grammar’, of romantic ruralism on the one hand and 
of  market  oriented  views  on  the  other,  dominate  discussion  of  agricultural  issues,  while  the 
‘modernist’ or  developmentalist  space  associated  with  public  research  and  figures  such  as  M  S 
Swaminathan has shrunk. The diagram shows that some of the ‘base’ of agriculturalists might be 
dialogically connected to three of the spaces, but not to the romantic ruralist space: for example 
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Gujurati farmers are linked to national and global markets by diasporic connections and rich social 
networks  (Shah  2005),  while  poor  adivasi  farmers  often  are  Naxalites.  Connections  to  the 
modernization space, if they exist, are more tenuous but are held together by diminished extension 
services and outreach by universities. The NGOs and activists on the other hand mainly work in a 
paternalist manner with farmers, as argued in chapter four, hence the one way arrow.  
Further up the diagram we see how the rural romantic and market romantic spaces feed off each 
other: as Herring (2010: 79) argues, they produce ‘mirror images’ of each others’ discourses, while at 
the top of the diagram they are both richly connected to professional and state institutions and 
resources. It is at this cosmopolitan level that the true linkages occur – between NGOs and other 
professional institutions. The modernization space, on the other hand, as argued in chapter two, is 
smaller and starved of rich connections, hence the narrower arrows.  
It must be remembered that the diagram represents an historically specific constellation. In 1950, 
for example, the modernization space would have been much larger, and the market romantic space 
nonexistent. Social movements can break up spaces and reconfigure them. In 1985 the Shetkari 
Sanghatana would have formed its own individual space, fusing together elements of all four of the 
separate spaces in the diagram, but more importantly forming strong vertical, dialogical connections 
going  from  agriculturalists  to  the  state.  TANs  on  the  other  hand  might  be  said  to  draw  more 
conservatively on older spaces and discourses, finding niches in existing institutional and discursive 
space. 
Frames connected to GMOs are deliberately downplayed visually in this diagram, by being portrayed 
as subsets of larger ‘spaces’. Particular institutional interactions will determine what these frames 
look like, but the ‘grammar’ in which they appear depends on this larger space. Thus the pro GMO 
frame of the modernization space may look superficially like that of the market romantic space but is 
part of a very different set of concepts, in which ‘farmer choice’ and ‘less state’ lie behind the GMO 259 
frame. The ‘unrestrained’ nature of the framing in the romantic ruralist space is implied by the one 
way arrow to agriculturalists.  
If networks are able to engage in such ‘unrestrained’ framing activities, then their contribution to a 
more democratic global civil society is questionable. Rather than forging more and more inclusive 
frames  that  scale  up  struggles  to  the  global  level  and  form  new  solidarities  (Reitan  2007), 
organizations may be indulging particular audiences and media and effectively ‘framing away’ from 
the concerns of those they claim to represent, brokering ‘upside down roots’ with elite actors rather 
than with a base. In the political vacuum of rural India ‘framing away’ to more lucrative audiences 
becomes a viable option and the anti GMO frame just one, particularly durable example 
330 
 
Parallel cases of romantic activism? 
Do  the  characteristics  of  ‘transnational  romanticism’  highlighted  in  the  above  sections  have 
applicability outside the case of GMOs and organic agriculture? There is good reason to think so 
since many of the concepts used to analyze this case were adaptations of ideas applied by Clifford 
Bob, Volker Heins and other scholars (chapter one) to account for a diverse range of cases.  
Chapter  four  argued  for  similarities  between  the  anti  GMO  case  and  the  Chipko  and  Narmada 
campaigns,  although  noted  that  in  both  those  cases  (especially  the  latter)  the  picture  was 
complicated by the presence of a real ‘base’. In the Narmada case this was the base of villagers being 
displaced by the dam organizing initially outside of transnational circuits (Baviskar 1995); only later 
and only at certain ‘levels’  did the NBA become highly integrated into a transnational campaign, 
some of whose characteristics prefigured the romantic framings of the GMO campaign.  
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“the rank and file no longer need to provide the material resources to sustain the campaign”. 260 
Two issue areas that might be receptive to the kind of analysis undertaken here are the fields of 
indigenous rights and transnational religious networks. The two issues are chosen as examples, 
because they are ostensibly so different according to standard ‘liberal/illiberal’ criteria, but may both 
be illuminated by parallels with the case in this dissertation.  
Bob  (2005)  described  how  ‘indigenization’  was  a  trend  in  networks  that  originally  had  more 
immediately  material  goals  (the  Zapatistas  and  the  Ogoni  of  Nigeria).  More  optimistically, 
‘indigenous  rights’  campaigns    have  been  hailed  as  exemplary  success  stories  of  transnational 
activism  (Brysk  2000; Perrault  2003)  in  which  advocacy  networks,  organized  around  the  United 
Nations and INGOs such as Survival International, have provided space for organization for local 
communities,  enabling  them  to  preserve  autonomy  and  protect  forest  habitations  and  native 
cultural practices. However, this process has gone hand in hand with elements familiar from the 
story  in  this  dissertation.  As  Andolina  et  al  (2005)  argue  with  respect  to  the  Andean  ‘Allyu’ 
communities of Bolivia, the trade off for transnational connections may be an added emphasis on 
‘cultural authenticity’, including rivalry within networks over which group is ‘most authentic’. This 
cultural  reification  then  gets  reincorporated  into  market  and  state  structures,  perhaps  at  the 
expense of more ‘modern’ forms of incorporation into the state. As the authors put it (689): 
Ethnodevelopment  [the  new  transnational  discourse]  reifies  links  of  contemporary 
indigenous peoples to traditional culture, instead of seeing indigenous cultures as particular 
manifestations of modernity 
This romantic turn in indigenous politics has the paradoxical effect of tying indigenous communities 
to government and markets, not in the capacity of national citizens, but only on condition that they 
live  up  to,  even  perform,  their  particular  indigenous  identity
331.  This is particularly true of the 
‘Faustian Bargain” (Ginsberg 1991; Prins 2002) that some indigenous groups have made with the 
media, in another parallel to the anti GMO case: by appealing to Northern conceptions of “romantic 
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incentives to seem truly indigenous/authentic in order to preserve a protected status vis a vis the state. 261 
exoticism” (Prins 2002: 72) groups can get attention and achieve policy goals, but at the cost of 
potentially ossifying their own communities in the light of those romantic perspectives. 
Transnational religious movements have been described by Castells (2004) as ‘reactive’, as opposed 
to the ‘progressive’ transnationalism of the Zapatistas or Seattle alter globalization protestors, but it 
is  arguable  that  ‘transnational  romanticism’  is  a  useful  concept  for  analyzing  the  “bad 
transnationalism” of Al Qaeda and certain kinds of Christian evangelism, and that making parallels 
with  the  anti  GMO  network  might  help  avoid  both  essentialist/Islamophobic  explanations  and 
complacent liberal typologies. 
Philips (2011: 283), for example, describes transnational Jihadism in this way: 
In contrast to mainstream Islamist opinion....the jihadists placed much greater emphasis on 
foreign malevolence in accounting for the ummas’s travails....In recalling the imagined unity 
of the early caliphate the global jihadists sought to transcend the parochialism of their more 
nationally focused counterparts. 
The irony here, which unfortunately Philips does not stress, is that global jihad was partly funded 
and  ‘seeded’  by  transnational  (Saudi  and  American)  sources  (Mamdani 2004).  The  parallel with 
externally funded ‘authenticity’ in the anti GMO network presents itself. Redescribing jihadists as 
‘transnational romantics’ might also help alleviate the neoconservative emphasis in Philips’ account, 
and others in the International Relations literature, on jihadism as a concerted attempt to overturn 
the norms of state sovereignty; romanticism with its emphasis on the spectacular and aestheticizing 
may have less ambitious aims. 
An even better parallel in the area of religious transnationalism are Christian evangelical TANs in 
Africa. Kaoma (2009) and Buss (2003) have described how American churches and more particularly 
the Institute of Religion and Democracy (IRD) have directly funded African churches in the reciprocal 
expectation that they will support harsh anti gay legislation. The ‘master frame’ given to the African 
churches by foreign supporters (Kaoma 2009: 2) was ‘anti imperialism’ – in which homosexuality was 262 
framed as an alien, western intrusion into authentic African culture. This was doubly ironic, since the 
IRD  had  previously  opposed  African  liberation  movements  and  of  course,  it  was  Victorian 
homophobia, not homosexuality that could best be described as an imperialist intrusion into African 
cultures (Kaoma 2009: 13). While foreign funded African churches’ homophobia resonated with 
indigenous nationalist rhetoric, it exaggerated it, through a process of ‘authenticity rivalry’ similar to 
the battle between Prof. Nanjundaswamy and Vandana Shiva described in chapter five; churches 
could  attract more  funds (which  were  deposited  directly  in  bishops’  accounts,  unlike  the  funds 
coming from more liberal denominations) by proclaiming a purer and more ‘authentically African’ 
position than their rivals
332. 
 
 
Categorizing Types of TANs 
If  the  above  discussion  points  to  the  plausibility  of  romantic  activism  as  a  category,  how  does 
romantic transnational activism fit in to the overall range of organizations engaged in transnational 
advocacy?  
The best way to specify the scope of this case study conceptually is to construct a series of tables, 
each representing an ideal type of TAN.  These tables could be a resource for future research into 
TANs, opening up new kinds of research questions and encouraging a more comparative approach to 
the field of study.  
The tables below classify TANs along several dimensions. One dimension is the degree to which the 
network(s) have a dialogical (Steinberg 1998) relation with a base, consisting of those people the 
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TAN claims to be representing, whether they be indigenous peoples, Muslims of the world or small 
farmers. (This base does not include the ‘mass membership’ of groups like Greenpeace who are 
essentially consumers not participants of the organization’s activities).  The second dimension is 
whether ‘mesomobilization’ (Steinberg 1998) is prominent, where this term refers to an emphasis in 
the  TAN’s  ‘structural  couplings’  on  the  mass  media  and  other  organizations  such  as  donor 
organizations  that  orient themselves  around  narratives  produced  by  the mass  media.  The  third 
dimension summarizes the type of ‘brokerage’ engaged in by the organization – meaning what kind 
of professional or non professional activity is devoted to building new linkages or expanding the 
scope of the movement. The fourth column in the tables tries to summarize the ideal-typical role the 
TAN plays in political life and the final column provides some real world examples of the type. 
These categories are contested and contestable. The ‘ideal typical characteristics’ might be accepted 
by participants in some cases but not in others. Participants in ‘romantic’ networks would almost 
certainly deny the term about themselves
333, while conservative critics of global governance (Rabkin 
2007) have described the ‘governance oriented’ type as itself guilty of a form of romanticism
334. 
However, it is the belief of the author that contestable categories are more likely to provoke debate 
and allow us to look at Tilly’s ‘big picture’ than the extraction of mechanisms and processes that may 
be common to all types of TAN.  
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‘democratic’, ‘illiberal’, ‘conservative’ even in many cases ‘left’ or ‘right’.  
334 For Rabkin, (in an argument similar to that of Carl Schmitt summarized in chapter four) this is the 
romanticism of governance without the power to use ‘legitimate’ violence to enforce itself. Some on the ‘old’ 
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Table 6.1: Governance Oriented TAN 
Ideal  Type 
of TAN 
Presence  of  a 
mass ‘base’? 
Degree  of 
‘mesomobilization’ 
activity:  esp. 
engagement  with 
mass media 
Type  of 
brokerage 
Ideal  typical 
characteristics 
of the TAN 
Empirical 
Examples 
Governance 
Oriented 
No:  linkages  are 
openly  restricted  
to  international 
organizations, 
UN treaty bodies, 
epistemic 
communities etc. 
Relation  to  mass 
is  overtly  top-
down 
representation 
on  behalf  of  a 
client group. 
Moderate  to  high: 
mass  media 
mobilized  to  gain 
leverage  in  linkages 
with  international 
organizations,  large 
retailers,  etc  as  in 
landmines  or  ‘blood 
diamond’ campaigns 
Technocratic 
brokerage 
between 
advocates 
and  the 
organizations 
they  aim  to  
‘tightly 
couple’  with. 
Relations  of 
‘expertise’ 
developed, 
for  example 
between 
blood 
diamond 
activists,  UN 
organizations 
and retailers 
Functions  to 
expand  the 
global  reach  of 
existing 
legal/technical 
norms  to 
threatened  or 
excluded  groups 
or  create  new 
technical  norms 
to  make  market 
transactions 
more 
transparent  (e.g 
the  Kimberly 
Process  for 
diamonds) 
Amnesty 
International, 
Human  Rights 
Watch,  ARCH-
Vahini  Gujurat 
(chapter  four 
on dams), Land 
mines 
campaign, 
‘Blood 
diamond’  and 
‘blood  timber’ 
campaigns, 
child  soldier 
campaigns 
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Table 6.2: Romantic TAN 
Ideal 
Type  of 
TAN 
Presence of a 
mass ‘base’? 
Degree  of 
‘mesomobilization’ 
activity:  esp. 
engagement  with 
mass media 
Type  of 
brokerage 
Ideal  typical 
characteristics  of  the 
TAN 
Empirical 
Examples 
Romantic  Yes,  but  not 
in  dialogical 
interaction 
with  the 
leadership. 
Base  is 
represented 
rather  than 
actively  self-
representing 
High:  focuses  on 
couplings with mass 
media  and  donor 
organizations. 
Prestige  and 
authenticity  are 
derived  from 
capacity  to 
formulate narratives 
that  resonate  with 
these systems. 
Multiple  and 
opportunistic 
brokerage with 
a  large 
diversity  of  
organizations, 
markets, 
parties, donors 
etc  (see 
chapter three) 
Organization  focuses  on 
media  representations 
that  appeal  to 
urban/middle  class 
understandings of victim 
groups.  Arguably  not 
focused  on  political 
mediation/negotiation 
but  on  preserving  their 
own    right  to  represent 
those groups. 
Anti  GMOs, 
some 
indigenous 
rights 
campaigns, 
some  anti 
logging  and  
anti  dams 
campaigns 
(NBA, 
chapter 
four),  some 
global 
religious 
networks 
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Table 6.3: Grassroots TAN 
Ideal  Type 
of TAN 
Presence of a mass 
‘base’? 
Degree  of 
‘mesomobilization’ 
activity:  esp. 
Engagement  with 
mass media 
Type  of 
brokerage 
Ideal  typical 
characteristics 
of the TAN 
Empirical 
Examples 
Grassroots  Yes:  arguably  only 
a base exists, with 
limited 
professionalization 
Varied:  media  used 
to disseminate ideas 
but  main  dialogic 
work  is  among 
‘cells’  of  the 
network  with  each 
other.  Media 
linkages 
subordinated  to 
primary  mass 
mobilizations. 
‘Rhizomatic’, 
leaderless 
response  to 
structural 
conditions: 
therefore 
relies  on  non 
relational 
forms  of 
diffusion 
rather  than 
professional 
brokerage  
(hence  status 
as  true 
transnational 
network  in 
doubt) 
A  genuinely 
bottom  up 
response  to 
top  down 
forms  of 
globalization, 
challenging 
existing  norms 
and  power 
structures 
Occupy  Wall 
Street  and  its 
imitators, 
Zapatistas/EZLN 
(contested) 
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Table 6.4: Global democratic TAN 
 
Ideal  Type 
of TAN 
Presence of a 
mass ‘base’? 
Degree  of 
‘mesomobilization’ 
activity:  esp. 
Engagement with mass 
media 
Type  of 
brokerage 
Ideal  typical 
characteristics of the 
TAN 
Empirical 
Examples 
Global 
democratic 
Yes: 
formalized 
mass 
membership 
Low:  institutionalized 
status  at  global  level 
and power to mobilize 
through  labor  action 
means less reliance on 
media 
Formal 
procedures 
and 
structures 
link  base 
to    global 
negotiating 
‘head’ 
Represents members 
from  multiple 
countries  at  global 
venues  in  order  to 
negotiate  with 
capital/global 
sources of power  
Transnational 
trades  unions 
in  North 
America  (Kay 
2011) 
 
 
How can these tables help make sense of transnational advocacy/activism in contemporary politics, 
and  how  can  this  kind  of  categorization  help  specify  Charles  Tilly’s  ‘big  questions’  about 
professionalization versus democratization of social movements cited in chapter one and earlier in 
this chapter? Four advantages of using this kind of tabulation are laid out below. 
Firstly, these tabulations might clarify the great diversity of TANs even within particular issue areas. 
Campaigns against dams and logging for example include both romantic and governance oriented 
TANs and provide a rich field for comparison between these types in terms of impact, endurance and 
function. Chapter four discussed the differences in approach taken by different strands of the dams 268 
movement in Gujurat (the ARCH Vahini) and Maharashtra (the Narmada Bachau Andolan, NBA). The 
former organization displayed many of the characteristics of a governance oriented TAN, with its 
close ties to the World Bank (via Oxfam UK) and its focus on using those ties to achieve particular 
resettlement goals. The NBA on the other hand arguably developed over time into a ‘transnational 
romantic  network’  with  a  structural  focus  on  media  spectacle  and  celebrity  support  and  an 
ideological emphasis on the impossibility of compromise and the defense of indigenous ‘ways of 
life’
335.    Similarly,  in  their  seminal  work  on  TANs  Keck  and  Sikkink  (1998:  150-165)  describe 
competing strands of the anti logging network in Malaysia, which included  romantic networks that 
emphasized threatened nomadic ways of life (155) and governance oriented networks (155-160) 
that concentrated on building alliances with UN organizations, the Malaysian government and on 
organizing specific boycott campaigns of northern retailers. The tabulations and typology invented 
here offer a way to compare such cases and formulate questions about why romantic campaigns 
might endure and come to predominate in some cases (Narmada) but not in others (Malaysia).  
Secondly, the tabulation might help to illuminate contentious cases, which can be conceptualized as 
lying on the ‘border’ between categories. The Zapatistas/EZLN of Chiapas, Mexico are one such case, 
lying on a border between romantic and grassroots categories. While Bob’s analysis, which focuses 
on the ‘mesomobilization’ aspect of the group (2005) would place them in the romantic box, other 
scholars such as Castells (2004) and Oleson (2005) would place them in the grassroots category. The 
criteria outlined in these tables might help researchers focus on changes in groups like the Zapatistas 
over time; for example Castells’ account suggests a revisionist reading of the Zapatistas in which the 
initial  political  failure  of  the  movement  led  to  a  recalibration  toward  romantic  positioning  and 
mesomobilization.  The border between romantic and governance oriented networks is likely to be 
even more populous, as suggested in the discussion on anti dams campaigns above.  
                                                           
335  See also Mallaby’s (2004: 261-285) account of the campaign against the Qinghai dam project in Tibet as an 
example of a campaign that fits the romantic profile. 269 
The third advantage of these tables is that they avoid conceptually superficial categorizations of 
TANs as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or ‘liberal’ or ‘illiberal’
336 or the more abstract categorizations in Heins (2008) 
and Keck and Sikkink (1998) such as the prominence of ‘short causal chains’ or ‘instances of harm’ in 
the TAN’s repertoire of claims. These criteria would probably fail to distinguish between governance 
oriented and romantic TANs, which both tend to emphasize ‘instances of harm’ and ‘short causal 
chains’, but with very different organizational intentions: for governance oriented TANs the intention 
is  to  ‘tightly  couple’  with  technocratic  global  organizations  and  become  the  enforcement  or 
monitoring arm of those organizations, while for romantic TANs the target is the mass media and the 
larger array of organizations (chapter three) that respond to the production of romantic narratives. 
In  addition  to  more  clearly  specifying  such  differences  these  new  categorizations  allow  for 
exploration  of  networks  not  generally  studied  under  the  umbrella of  transnational  activism,  for 
example, as suggested above, the case of global Islamist networks, some of which (Al Qaeda) would 
fit in the romantic category, while others (The Muslim Brotherhood perhaps) may lie on the border 
of the romantic and grassroots categories. By deliberately eschewing liberal categories that focus on 
whether networks advocate violence or whether they embrace certain formal democratic norms, 
these  categorizations  allow  us  to  ask  provocative  questions  about  the  similarities  between  the 
tactics, narratives and world views of activists generally seen as occupying opposed positions on a 
left-right spectrum, for example Prof Nanjundaswamy and the late Osama Bin Laden. 
Finally, the tables help us to address Tilly’s worries about the class and distributional aspects of the 
new  transnationalized  social  movements.  Looking  at  the  population  of  each  box  provides  one 
answer to those questions:  not many TANs are currently likely to be placed in the two ‘bottom up’ 
or mass oriented boxes: the grassroots and the global democratic. While Kay (2011) makes a case for 
North American transnational labor cooperation in response to NAFTA, there are few instances of 
transnational  activism  that  manage  to  square  the  circle  of  mass  membership  and  cross  border 
organization;  this  category  of  global  democratic  TAN,  where  institutionalization  and  formal 
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membership systems are in place may be the most sparsely populated type, but labor unions with 
their pre-existing institutional strengths are probably the most likely future catalysts for this kind of 
transnational politics. The grassroots category is a contested one, as discussed above. The most 
viable  contender  for  membership  would  be  the  recent  (2011)  ‘Occupy......’  protests,  where 
transnational diffusion seems to have occurred without the need for a professionalized activist elite 
to broker that diffusion, and where there have been ‘boots on the ground’ taking real risks of arrest 
or police violence. In the case of ‘Occupy.....’ media linkages (‘mesomobilization’) have followed 
mass action rather than (as in the case of the anti GMO network) professional brokers organizing 
media spectacles from the top down (as in the case of Nanjundaswamy and the KRRS in Europe 
described in chapter five).   
The boxes which are more populated with cases at this juncture are the first two: the governance 
oriented and the romantic.  These boxes are essentially peopled by middle and, more precisely, 
upper middle class activists adept at complex brokerage, and while the aims of governance oriented 
TANs  may  be  progressive  in  the  sense  of  a  liberal  institutionalism  committed  to  efficiency, 
transparency and the promotion of individual human rights norms, they are not mass based and are 
unlikely to be sources of a (Polanyian, or any other) ideological challenge to structural inequalities or 
the (perhaps ill specified) nexus of global neoliberalism.  
Likewise, romantic TANs are fundamentally middle/upper middle class in their world view, a world 
view that focuses (as chapter two argued) not on issues such as fair prices or access to modern 
institutions but on constructing a narrative of forsaken community. However, unlike the ‘grassroots 
Gandhians’ described in chapter four, who eschew media work for long term community building, 
transnational  romantics  focus  instead  on  mass  mediated  forms  of  community  and  themselves 
remain at a paternalistic distance from the ‘masses’ they claim to represent. As Harris (2009: 123) 271 
puts it in his analysis of Indian middle class activists, they “engage in such activism whilst people of 
the informal working class engage in politics”.
337  
The possible global outcome of this has been described by Anderson (1998: 45)
338as the “quasi-
planetary dispersion of bounded identities” . He argues that new transnational identities (he was 
thinking primarily of ‘long distance nationalism’ in diasporic networks) tend towards the reification 
of identity – what he terms ‘bound seriality’ – in common, not with the bottom-up,  liberating aspect 
of early nationalist modernity (the ‘unbound seriality’ carried through media such as the newspaper) 
but  with  the  classificatory  aspect  of  modernity  associated  with  ‘the  census,  the  map  and  the 
museum’. Certainly chapter five’s account of the self-representations of Indian ‘peasant farmers’ in 
Europe chimes with Anderson’s account of bound seriality, and the description could be extended to 
the  self  representations  of  Amazonian  indigenous  elites  to  the  mass  media  and  to  the  media 
representations of religious community put forward by Al Qaeda or ‘global family values’ activists. 
 
Possible Future Scenarios 
One answer to Charles Tilly’s question then, is that the hope for a democratizing trend in global 
social  movements  depends  on  future  conditions  favoring  the  growth  of  grassroots  or  global 
democratic  TANs.  In  the  optimistic  scenario,  given  greater  literacy  and  access  to  the  internet, 
grassroots TANs might become more common, some of which might go on to crystallize into global 
democratic organizations, especially as globally convergent wages cause similarly placed groups of 
workers to become conscious of potential horizontal solidarities.  From their different starting point 
                                                           
337 For a recent illustration see Arundhati Roy’s denunciation of Indian anti corruption activist Anna Hazare’s 
hunger strikes and accompanying mass movement as being ‘undemocratic’ (“Anna Hazare is not Secular”, 
Times of India. 23 August 2011), which could be seen as a middle class activist’s response to a mass movement 
threatening to intrude on issues previously monopolized by the de-politicized sphere of elite campaigning. 
338  See also Markell (2007) for  a theoretical critique of a politics based on the recognition of ‘bounded’ 
identities. Anderson  assumes (1998: 74) that non ethnic activist identities will be transient ; but that is an 
assumption less easy to make 12 years later, where indigenous, peasant, and other global activist generated 
‘bounded’ identities seem to have staying power, at least at the level of elite representations. 272 
governance  oriented  TANs  might  mutate  into  global  democratic  organizations  as  their  clients 
become  better  able  to  represent  themselves.  At  the  same  time  the  appeal  of  transnational 
romanticism might fade, as transnational movements such as the Arab Spring and Occupy....... re-
invent a ‘modernist’, universalist politics based on demands for more inclusive institutions rather 
than on the media representation of nostalgic, bounded communities. 
 In  the  pessimistic  scenario,  increasing  inequalities  within  countries  actually  multiply  the 
opportunities for romantic transnationalism, with a small, urban upper middle class monopolizing 
the  representation  of  the  excluded  in  an  increasingly  globalized  and  interconnected 
media/advocacy/donor complex. Domestic activists (like the former Shetkari Sanghatana members 
described  in  chapter  five)  will  find  themselves  increasingly  drawn  into  the  ambit  of  these 
transnational romantic networks. At the same time romantic networks will comfortably coincide 
with  governance  oriented  networks  that  focus  on  narrow  specialties  and  work  as  de  facto 
implementers of technocratic global governance and corporate social responsibility.  
This study of the anti GMO network in India has hopefully provided some criteria that might be 
useful when exploring these alternative scenarios. Like all social networks this network creates sunk 
costs, ‘lock-ins’ and positive feedback loops that set advocacy on a particular set of tracks which 
might be hard to change. The critical analysis of such networks, with an eye to their longer term 
implications is therefore important for anyone concerned with the future of social movements. 
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Appendix 1: List of Field Interviews Carried Out 
 
1.  Prof. Chanresekhara Rao, Hyderabad. Dec 3
rd, 2007 
2.  Abdul Qalam, Deccan Development Society, Hyderabad, Dec 5
th 2007 
3.  Kavitha Kuruganthi, Centre for Sustainable Agriculture, Hyderabad, Dec 5
th 2007 
4.  Dr K C Suri, Hyderabad University, Dec 15
th 2007 
5.  Narasinha Reddy, Eenadu Newspaper,Hyderabad,  Dec 20
th 2007 
6.  Malla Reddy, AP Farmers’ Union (CPI), Dec 21
st 2007 
7.  YS Vivekananda Reddy, AP agriculture ministry, Hyderabad, Jan 4
th 2008 
8.  Anil Kumar, Confederation of Kisan Organizations, Hyderabad, Jan 8
th 2008 
9.  Dr K C Suri, Hyderabad University, Jan 12
th 2008 
10. Dr Milind Kindlikar, Hyderabad, Jan 14
th, 2008 
11. Representative of AP Seeds Corporation, Guntur, AP, Jan 16
th 2008 
12. Ajit Kuma, Director of Agriculture, Guntur, AP, Jan 16
th 2008 
13. Dr Narayanam, ANGROU, Guntur, AP, Jan 16th 2008 
14. Kiran Sakkhari, Deccan Development Society, Hyderabad, Jan 18
th 2008 
15. Seed Dealer, Guntur, AP, Jan 21
st 2008 
16. Mr Murali, MARI, Warangal, AP, Jan 23
rd 2008 
17. Mr P Damodar, SYO, Waranal, AP, Jan 23
rd 2008 
18. Prof. Kameshwara Rao, Bangalore, Karnataka, Jan 26
th 2008 
19. Green Peace Street worker, Bangalore, Karnataka, Jan 26
th 2008 
20. Dr Ramprasad, Green Foundation Bangalore, Karnataka, Jan 27
th 2008 
21. Prof. Deshpande, ISEC, Bangalore, Karnataka, Jan 27
th 2008 
22. Rajesh Krishnan, Greenpeace India, Bangalore, Karnataka, Jan 28
th 2008 
23. Mr P Babu, ICRA, Bangalore, Karnataka, Jan 28
th 2008 
24. Cotton farmers off road near Warangal, AP, Feb 2
nd 2008 
25. Mr Lingaiah, CROPS Jangaon, AP and Eenabhavi AP, Feb 2
nd 2008 
26. Raj Ketkar, Vice President, Monsanto India, Mumbai, Maharashtra, Feb 4
th 2008 
27. Cotton farmers in Siddapuram, AP, Feb 6
th 2008 
28. Seed dealer in Siddapuram, AP, Feb 6
th 2008 
29. CPI (M) fileld worker, Siddapuram, AP, Feb 6
th 2008 
30. Cotton farmer in Thogarrai hamlet, AP, Feb 6
th 2008 
31. Laxman Misra, Monsanto-Mahyco, Hyderabad, AP, Feb 8
th 2008 
32. Arun Ambatipudi, Chetna Organics, Hyderabad, AP, Feb 9
th 2008 
33. Representative of Nuziveedu Seeds, Hyderabad, AP, Feb 10
th 2008 
34. K S Gopal, CEC Hyderabad, AP, Feb 10
th 2008 
35. Dr Khadi, Director, CICR Nagpur, Maharashtra, Feb 15
th 2008 
36. Dr Kranthi, CICR Nagpur, Maharashtra, Feb 15
th 2008 
37. Dr Agrawal, Politics Dept Nagpur University, , Maharashtra, Feb 16
th 2008 
38. Dr Deshpande, Economics Dept, Nagpur University, Feb 16
th 2008 
39. N B Nisal, Nagpur, Maharashtra, Feb 18
th 2008 
40. Dr Karte, Dhara Mitra, Wardha Maharashtra Feb 19
th 2008 274 
41. Vijay Jawandhia, Wardha Maharashtra Feb 19
th 2008 
42. Kishor Tiwari, VJAS, Yavatmal, Maharashtra, Feb 21
st 2008 
43. Mr Khandewale, Nagpur, Maharashtra, Feb 22
nd 2008 
44. Vivek Deshpande, Indian Express, Nagpur, Maharashtra, Feb 22
nd 2008 
45. Mr Murali, MARI, Waranal, AP, Feb 26
th 2008 
46. Sar Panch (Village Head) Siddhapur, AP, March 2
nd 2008 
47. MARI organic cotton project officers and farmers, Sadyatanda, Rolleakal, AP March 4
th 2008 
48. Farmers near Sadyatanda (see 47), AP, March 4
th 2008 
49. Prof A R Reddy, GEAC, phone interview, March 5
th 2008 
50. Mr K Ventateshwarle, The Hindu, Hyderabad, AP, March 6
th 2008 
51. ISAAA, New Delhi  
52. Prof Anand Kumar, PUSA/IARI New Delhi, March 15
th 2008 
53. Devinder Sharma, New Delhi, March 16
th 2008 
54. Scientists at University of Agricultural Science, Bangalore, March 19
th 2008 
55. University of Hyderabad Conference on Biotechnology, Jan 10
th 2009 
a.  Rasheed Sulaiman, CRISP, Hyderabad 
b.  Chandrasekhara Rao, CESS, Hyderabad 
c.  N Raghuram, Indraprastha University, New Delhi 
d.  T Laxmi, Timbaktu Collective, Karnataka 
56. Malla Reddy, AP Farmers’ Union (CPI), Hyderabad, AP, Jan 12
th 2009 
57. Dr Kodandaram, Nizam College, Hyderabad, AP, Jan 13
th 2009 
58. Prof D N Dhanagare, Lectures and interviews at Osmania University, Hyderabad, Jan 20
th 
2009 
59. Mr Narayan, formerly of Lokayan, Hyderabad, AP, Jan 21
st 2009 
60. Kiran Sakkhari, Deccan Development Society, Hyderabad, Feb 1
st 2009 
61. Changal Reddy, Confed.. Of Indian Farmers’ Associations, and other participants at meeting 
of CIFA, Hyderabad, Feb 3
rd 2009 
62. Prof D N Dhanagare, Pune, Maharashtra, Feb 5
th 2009 
63. Dr Palshikar, Pune University Political Science Dept. Pune, Maharashtra, Feb 6
th 2009 
64. Pradeep Chavan, Kalpavriksh, Pune, Maharashtra, Feb 10
th 2009 
65. Pradeep Apta, Pune, Maharashtra, Feb 10
th 2009 
66. Prof Anitha Ramanna, University of Pune, Political Science Dept. Pune Maharashtra, Feb 11
th 
2009 
67. Vinay Hardikar, Pune Maharashtra, Feb 11
th 2009 
68. Profs Aruna and Sanjeev Pendse, Mumbai, Maharashtra, Feb 12
th 2009 
69. National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, Maharashtra, Feb 14
th 2009 
70. Ms Lata P M , NCAS, Pune, Maharashtra, Feb 14
th 2009 
71. Mr Ghose, HIVOS, Bangalore, Karnataka, Feb 19
th 2009 
72. Dr A R Vasavi, Centre for Advanced Studies, Bangalore, Karnataka, Feb 20
th 2009 
73. Dr Anil Kumar, ISEC, Bangalore, Karnataka,  Feb 20
th 2009 
74. Prof. Joan Mencher, lecture at ISEC, Bangalore, Karnataka, Feb 20
th 2009 
75. Mr Veerasangaiah and other officers, KRRS, Bangalore, Karnataka, Feb 21
st 2009 
76. Prof Basavaraj, Mysore University, Mysore, Karnataka, Feb 22
nd 2009 
77. Prof Assadi, Mysore University, Mysore, Karnataka, Feb 22
nd 2009 
78. P Babu, ICRA, Bangalore, Karnataka, Feb 23
rd 2009 275 
79. Mr Venkateshwarlu, The Hindu, Hyderabad, Feb 23
rd, 2009. 
80. National Alliance of Peoples’ Movements conference (various people), Nagpur, Maharashtra, 
Feb 25
th 2009 
81. Mr P Chenniaha, Federation of Agricultural Workers, Nagpur, Maharashtra, Feb 25
th, 2009. 
82. Chandrakant Wankhade, Nagpur, Maharashtra, Feb 26th 2009. 
83. Saroj Kashikar and family members, Wardha, Maharashtra, Feb 27
th 2009. 
84. Arun Kashikar, Nagpur, Maharashtra, Feb 27
th, 2009. 
85. The hon. Sharad Joshi, phone interview, Feb 28
th, 2009. 
86. Barun Mitra, Liberty Institute, New Delhi, March 1
st, 2009 
87. Vandana Shiva, Navdanya, New Delhi, March 2
nd, 2009 
88. Suman Sahai, Gene Campaign, New Delhi, March 4
th, 2009. 
89. Prof. Deepak Pental, Delhi University, New Delhi, March 6
th, 2009. 
90. Dr Doug Parr, Greenpeace UK, London, UK, January 28
th, 2007. 
91. Sue Mayer, Gene Watch, Derby, UK, February 5
th, 2007. 
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